Would the collapse of the USSR in 1941 have meant peace with Britain?

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One of Hitler's assumptions going into Barbarossa was that the defeat of the USSR would have brought the British to the peace table. Assuming that everything goes wrong for Stalin and he is killed fleeing Moscow in October causing a major breakdown in C&C and the collapse of the Soviet government (handwavium), would it have meant Britain would have been more open to peace or would Pearl Harbor in December keeps them in and we get a Anglo-America Nazi war to the bitter end?
 
Anglo-American Nazi War. The British, like most of the world at the time, actually didn't expect the Soviets to last and this is one of the reason the aid sent to them was so belated. A Soviet collapse would not have surprised them.
 

Deleted member 1487

So how would a Anglo-Soviet war have played out then with a collapse in 1941? There would still be residual fighting in the East, a need to occupy the Caucasus oil, which would get bombed by the Brits, but not the major losses than happened from the 1941 Soviet winter counterattack through the rest of the war in the East. Even with 2 million men tied down in occupation duty that's a fraction of OTL's numbers lost and tied down in the East. Plus it gives a lot of hinterland to evacuate industry to if bombing gets too bad in the West. And the Axis can shift over earlier to a Wallies production strategy vs. Calbears scenario.
 
Anglo-American Nazi War. The British, like most of the world at the time, actually didn't expect the Soviets to last and this is one of the reason the aid sent to them was so belated. A Soviet collapse would not have surprised them.

Unless Hitler doesn't declare war on the USA, which would make sense if the USSR is surrendering by December '41. Bonus points if Hitler also restricts submarine warfare to avoid incidents with the USA.
Churchill will know that Roosvelt will want to intervene, but Roosvelt can't declare war on Germany.

Churchill would still want to prosecute the war, but what can Britain alone do? They could liberate Norway and seize Libya from the Italians, and keep hammering Baku. But the war would look endless.
If, by late 1942, Roosvelt found himself unable to go to war with Germany, at which point does a status quo peace begin to make sense? Germany keeps their conquests in continental Europe, save for Norway, the Italians loose Lybia and a truce gets signed. Neither Churchill nor Roosvelt will want this, but they aren't dictators. They won't be bombing Germany into submission and the UK can't invade France alone.
 

Deleted member 1487

Unless Hitler doesn't declare war on the USA, which would make sense if the USSR is surrendering by December '41. Bonus points if Hitler also restricts submarine warfare to avoid incidents with the USA.
Churchill will know that Roosvelt will want to intervene, but Roosvelt can't declare war on Germany.

Churchill would still want to prosecute the war, but what can Britain alone do? They could liberate Norway and seize Libya from the Italians, and keep hammering Baku. But the war would look endless.
If, by late 1942, Roosvelt found himself unable to go to war with Germany, at which point does a status quo peace begin to make sense? Germany keeps their conquests in continental Europe, save for Norway, the Italians loose Lybia and a truce gets signed. Neither Churchill nor Roosvelt will want this, but they aren't dictators. They won't be bombing Germany into submission and the UK can't invade France alone.

I thought by late 1941 Hitler was convinced the US was planning on DoWing Germany at some point, but perhaps he would put off his DoW to try and deal with the Brits before that became an option?
 
Unless Hitler doesn't declare war on the USA, which would make sense if the USSR is surrendering by December '41

Actually quite the opposite. Hitler declared war on the US because he figured he would defeat the Soviets in 1942, before the US could have a significant impact, anyways and then be able to turn their resources to fighting the Anglo-Americans. If the Soviets are already beaten, he is more likely to declare war on the US not less.

So how would a Anglo-Soviet war have played out then with a collapse in 1941?

US enters at the end of 1941, start of 1942 depending on details. North Africa probably ultimately goes the same but then things get stuck for a long while until 1946 when the US carpet-nukes Germany.
 
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Deleted member 1487

US enters at the end of 1941, start of 1942. North Africa probably ultimately goes the same but then things get stuck for a long while until 1946 when the US carpet-nukes Germany.
That's the question though, if the resources of the East are even somewhat available by 1945-46 Germany is a vastly different animal in its ability to engaged the Wallies technically. The ability to get enough bombers through may just not exist. The Ta-152 was designed exactly for countering the B-29 and would have the weapons to do so by day, while nightfighters capable of reaching 30k feet and performing there would exist as well. Aerial attrition could end up being a much tougher deal from 1943 on with Soviet oil (even just Maykop) as the Germans can keep up their pilot training with that in the East out of range of roving P-51s. And they'd have millions of men to pull recruits from that wouldn't be killed/wounded/captured/locked down fighting the Soviets.
 
That's the question though, if the resources of the East are even somewhat available by 1945-46 Germany is a vastly different animal in its ability to engaged the Wallies technically.

No it isn't. Between partisan activity, Soviet scorched earth, and the Nazis idiotic policies the east is going to be a giant net drain on German resources for at least a decade even without a Red Army putting up active armed resistance. The quantity and quality of WAllied aircraft means that the Germans are still liable to lose air superiority over the course of '44-'45.
 

Deleted member 1487

No it isn't. Between partisan activity, Soviet scorched earth, and the Nazis idiotic policies the east is going to be a giant net drain on German resources for at least a decade even without a Red Army putting up active armed resistance. The quantity and quality of WAllied aircraft means that the Germans are still liable to lose air superiority over the course of '44-'45.

The effect of the partisans was heavily overstated in Soviet propaganda:
http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-14304
The partisans in this book are presented as mainly a pointless failure. They mostly hunted for food (p. 288) and achieved little else. They generally obtained little classified German information. With reference to specific periods, the book refers to „remarkable military successes“ and „great“ or „acute“ threats to German supply lines (pp. 136, 222, 225); but the overall „military results“ were „everything but satisfactory“ (p. 190), certainly in view of the large number of partisans. It was also Stalin’s failure: „The Soviet leadership did not manage to turn the mass of partisans into a battle-ready armed force, to erect the second front, and to endanger the German supply lines to an extent that would affect the actual front.“ (pp. 442-443; see also p. 230)


The partisans killed only 6,000 to 7,000 Germans (p. 292), while countless innocent non-Germans died. Many were killed as alleged traitors by the partisans, who deemed them their „main opponents“ (p. 255). Others were killed by Germans who otherwise might have spared them, the books states: „Without the partisan war, the losses of the ethnic Belarusian civilian population brought about by direct German terror would probably have remained small.“ (p. 377) Thus I am not convinced when the final paragraph of the book warns that the above „in no way“ diminishes the merits of those who fought the Nazi occupants „courageously and decisively“ (p. 443).

The Hunger Plan would effectively stop the guerrilla resistance in its tracks once it lost outside support from the Soviets; genocide as a strategy works when you have no morals, because the starving lack the ability to fight back.

Scorched earth would be a problem, but Maykop oil was expected to be back in significant production by early 1943 and the Don Basin was in production from 1941 on. Finland still in the war means a continuing supply of nickel, as does holding the Don Basin, and Turkey and Spain are probably going to keep selling to Germany due to fear of a pretty powerful Germany by TTL 1944 when they stopped IOTL.

Without air losses in the East, little need to focus resources to replace combat losses of ground equipment in the East, plus more resources captured and held in the East that's a pretty huge surplus of resources, especially without fuel expenditures in the East that would enable Luftwaffe training to expand instead of contract like IOTL.
 
The effect of the partisans was heavily overstated in Soviet propaganda:
http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-14304


The Hunger Plan would effectively stop the guerrilla resistance in its tracks once it lost outside support from the Soviets; genocide as a strategy works when you have no morals, because the starving lack the ability to fight back.

Scorched earth would be a problem, but Maykop oil was expected to be back in significant production by early 1943 and the Don Basin was in production from 1941 on. Finland still in the war means a continuing supply of nickel, as does holding the Don Basin, and Turkey and Spain are probably going to keep selling to Germany due to fear of a pretty powerful Germany by TTL 1944 when they stopped IOTL.

Without air losses in the East, little need to focus resources to replace combat losses of ground equipment in the East, plus more resources captured and held in the East that's a pretty huge surplus of resources, especially without fuel expenditures in the East that would enable Luftwaffe training to expand instead of contract like IOTL.


Ah I see...the brilliant plan to wipe out your labour supply to solve the partisan problem. Yes you can fairly easily defeat a guerilla/partisan army if you ave no morals but it still takes years if not decades.

As to expectations; getting Maikop up and running still has the same problem the Germans had before they invaded...there are simply not the transport links to get enough oil to Germany. If you want to build the transport infrastructure required to transport the oil you are still going to be putting resources into the Ostgau for years.
 
The effect of the partisans was heavily overstated in Soviet propaganda:

And yet it represented a huge drain on German resources.

The Hunger Plan would effectively stop the guerrilla resistance in its tracks once it lost outside support from the Soviets; genocide as a strategy works when you have no morals, because the starving lack the ability to fight back.
Even when attempted at full implementation, the hunger plan never came close to its full success. The people achieved some success in hiding their food supplies from German requisition, the partisans achieved vastly more via growing their own food in hidden gardens. Eventually, the Germans policy will indeed kill off guerrilla activity. The problem is the Germans can't wait until "eventually" because by the time "eventually" arrives, their industry will already be radioactive ash and the Americans will already be charging across France.

Scorched earth would be a problem, but Maykop oil was expected to be back in significant production by early 1943 and the Don Basin was in production from 1941 on.
Nowhere near at the levels of production Germany had projected or needed and at no point did they ever pull more resources out then they were putting in. The underdeveloped nature of the Soviet Union, war damage, Soviet sabotage, and partisan activity all worked together to prevent that. Tellingly, up until mid-February 1941 German economists were telling their government as much. Then they realized their conclusions were unacceptable with their superiors and they had better shape up. The reports afterwards promptly started adjusting the facts to fit their masters conclusions instead of trying to find an objective reality.

Finland still in the war means a continuing supply of nickel, as does holding the Don Basin,
Drop in the bucket compared to what the Germans actually need.

and Turkey and Spain are probably going to keep selling to Germany due to fear of a pretty powerful Germany by TTL 1944 when they stopped IOTL.
Turkey, no. Since by '44 they will have far more to fear from the Anglo-Americans then the Germans. Spain is going likely going to keep playing the OTL game since they are as afraid of what will happen if trade with the Anglo-Americans stop as they are of the Germans.

Without air losses in the East, little need to focus resources to replace combat losses of ground equipment in the East, plus more resources captured and held in the East that's a pretty huge surplus of resources, especially without fuel expenditures in the East that would enable Luftwaffe training to expand instead of contract like IOTL.
And that does nothing more then extend their lifespan. It does not prevent them from getting ground down in the aerial war of attrition to the point that the Anglo-Americans will be able to safely nuke German industry. The imbalance is too great. The US possesses vastly greater war-making capacity then the Germans and the Germans are ultimately as well placed to deal with that reality as the Japanese are.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Ah I see...the brilliant plan to wipe out your labour supply to solve the partisan problem. Yes you can fairly easily defeat a guerilla/partisan army if you ave no morals but it still takes years if not decades.
How long does starvation take to kill? As it was the Hunger Plan was set to leave a controllable labor supply in the East.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunger_Plan#Outline_of_the_plan
In the discussion of the plan, Backe noted a "surplus population" in Russia of about 20 to 30 million. If that population was cut off from food, that food could be used to feed both the invading German Army and the German population itself. Industrialization had created a large urban society in the Soviet Union. The Backe plan envisioned that this population, numbering many millions, would be cut off from their food supply, thus freeing up the food produced in the Soviet Union, now at Germany's disposal, to sustain Germans. As a result, great suffering among the native Soviet population was envisaged, with tens of millions of deaths expected within the first year of the German occupation.

AFAIK the plan was to leave alive the farmers and labor in the Ukraine where the best resources were and murder the vast majority of the rest.

As to expectations getting Maikop up and running still has the same problem the Germans had before they invades...there are simply not the transport links to get enough oil to Germany. If you want to build the transport infrastructure required to transport the oil you are still going to be putting resources into the Ostgau for years.
If there is a collapse of C&C in 1941 there is less organization to get the sabotage of Maykop done and resist a push into the region; once the Caucasus is taken the Black Sea ports open to shipping that is nearby, which means shipping in equipment and using the existing pipeline to pump oil to the ports for export to Romania for refining then up the Danube to Germany. The Soviet infrastructure existed, it just wasn't all taken IOTL (Noworossiysk and Tuapse).
 
Point one - Hitler doesn't DoW US.

Japan still will (unless we're really getting into la-la land). As noted here many times, that forces Hitler's hand. US and UK are then allies in the East, and so the US if at peace with Germany will run vast amount of supplies straight to England "for use in our joint fight in the far east, wink wink", daring Hitler to attack the fleets shipping it over. If he doesn't he sits and watches Britain become ever more powerful week by week. If he does, he's at war with the US.

Point two - Germany has the resources of Europe.
The resources of Europe are great - the resources of the rest of the world are many times greater, and Britain/Empire & America can draw upon them.
The 'wonder weapons' and 'fighting spirit' of the Germans cannot combat that fact.

Same result (just takes a bit longer) Germany ends up getting nuked to rubble if it takes too long, and no Soviets means no cold war.
Making it worse for UK & US in 1941 actually makes the post war years way better for them.
 
think you would have a treaty with France (Admiral Darlan was perfect barometer of German success) which strengthens their collaboration with Germany.

NO, do not mean they join Axis but the opportunity to "flip" their colonies and fleet would probably have passed and their worldwide bases are open for (at least covert) German use.

not informed on Indian politics but it seems if victorious British empire had to grant independence by 1947 one (seemingly) on the losing side would be facing difficult situation there? adding to calculus on peace with Germany?
 
think you would have a treaty with France (Admiral Darlan was perfect barometer of German success) which strengthens their collaboration with Germany.
NO, do not mean they join Axis but the opportunity to "flip" their colonies and fleet would probably have passed and their worldwide bases are open for (at least covert) German use.

Germany had a pretty weak navy, Britain had a magnificent one. If the French colonies fought against Britain and supported the Axis they'd be picked off one by one at ease and Germany would be unable to support them. How would they propose to resupply French colonies in the Caribbean, say? Or East Africa? Also, despite what a guy in Germany said, why would somebody sat 1,000 miles away, knowing the Germans have no means of enforcing their decree, just go along with it?
 
The effect of the partisans was heavily overstated in Soviet propaganda:
http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-14304

I am quite skeptical about relying on a single sources that seems to contradict what most others think. There is usually good reasons for that . Of course, the majority may be wrong but you need quite a bit of proof for that.

I have a feeling we really don't know how many Germans were killed by partisans. The partisans had better things to do than keep good records while much of the German records were destroyed during the war. Also it looks better on the reports that did survive when you state "We lost 140 men to Red Army troops" rather than "We lost 140 troops to some scraggly partisans." I admit that the effectiveness of guerilla warfare is generally exaggerated but probably not to the extent of that.
 
Actually quite the opposite. Hitler declared war on the US because he figured he would defeat the Soviets in 1942, before the US could have a significant impact, anyways and then be able to turn their resources to fighting the Anglo-Americans. If the Soviets are already beaten, he is more likely to declare war on the US not less.
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Wasn't he also expecting the Japanese to declare war on the USSR?

No it isn't. Between partisan activity, Soviet scorched earth, and the Nazis idiotic policies the east is going to be a giant net drain on German resources for at least a decade even without a Red Army putting up active armed resistance. The quantity and quality of WAllied aircraft means that the Germans are still liable to lose air superiority over the course of '44-'45.
I'm not so sure. Even if the Eastern front sucks a lot of resources in anti partisan "warfare" (since this it's Nazis we're talking about, "genocide" would be a better description), that sucks APCs, light infantry, etc. It doesn't suck up 88 flak cannons, tanks (and many of those lines can be safely shut down and the capacity retooled, over some time, to aircraft), fighters, etc.
Basically, all the expensive stuff Germany would need to contest the Allied Air offensive.

And that does nothing more then extend their lifespan. It does not prevent them from getting ground down in the aerial war of attrition to the point that the Anglo-Americans will be able to safely nuke German industry. The imbalance is too great. The US possesses vastly greater war-making capacity then the Germans and the Germans are ultimately as well placed to deal with that reality as the Japanese are.
Interceptors are still far cheaper than bombers and the Germans can move their factories further east, greatly increasing attrition in the allied side. That also means there is little prospect of a successful invasion of France. So, what are the Allies fighting for? Keeping the fight up until nuclear weapons are ready? They are an unknown factor at this point - heck, physicist believed they could set the atmosphere on fire.

Point one - Hitler doesn't DoW US.

Japan still will (unless we're really getting into la-la land). As noted here many times, that forces Hitler's hand. US and UK are then allies in the East, and so the US if at peace with Germany will run vast amount of supplies straight to England "for use in our joint fight in the far east, wink wink", daring Hitler to attack the fleets shipping it over. If he doesn't he sits and watches Britain become ever more powerful week by week. If he does, he's at war with the US.
Yes. The issue is if, with the USSR beaten for the world to see, Hitler believes the resulting stalemate can make the British government to accept a truce.

Of course, Hitler can screw up German chances by ordering to focus resources in bombers and surface ships to conquer Britain...
 

Deleted member 1487

I am quite skeptical about relying on a single sources that seems to contradict what most others think. There is usually good reasons for that . Of course, the majority may be wrong but you need quite a bit of proof for that.
The author did extensive work in Soviet archives on the subject and the only info previous had been the official Soviet line, which apparently is not borne out by the records; that apparently was because the truth is far less complementary to the Soviet state that fostered the partisan movement, that it would seem was not nearly as effective as hoped and very lethal to civilians in their hunt for food and 'traitors'. Its been known for a while that there was a lot of unsavory things the partisans did to civilians it just the extent to which has so far been unknown.

I have a feeling we really don't know how many Germans were killed by partisans. The partisans had better things to do than keep good records while much of the German records were destroyed during the war. Also it looks better on the reports that did survive when you state "We lost 140 men to Red Army troops" rather than "We lost 140 troops to some scraggly partisans." I admit that the effectiveness of guerilla warfare is generally exaggerated but probably not to the extent of that.
That is a good question, but apparently the Soviets could only substantiate about 6-7k KIAs of German troops in Belarus.
 
The author did extensive work in Soviet archives on the subject and the only info previous had been the official Soviet line, which apparently is not borne out by the records; that apparently was because the truth is far less complementary to the Soviet state that fostered the partisan movement, that it would seem was not nearly as effective as hoped and very lethal to civilians in their hunt for food and 'traitors'. Its been known for a while that there was a lot of unsavory things the partisans did to civilians it just the extent to which has so far been unknown.


That is a good question, but apparently the Soviets could only substantiate about 6-7k KIAs of German troops in Belarus.
Oh sure partisan warfare was not heroic as Soviet movies after war showed up. And of course it was not nice to population which was between a rock and a hard place. If they didn't help partisans they were prosecuted, killed. If they did, Germans did the same to them.
As to the losses. Hard to say. 6-7000 just in Belarus. Add Ukraine which is much bigger, and other areas and its growing. But if there was 6-7000 German KIA, how many Germans were then involved in anti partisan operations? 100 000? They were tying up forces Germans could use better somewhere else.

On other side Germans claimed many thousands killed partisans while they just massacred some villages.

Here is another book on partisan warfare in former USSR where Glantz co author and it seems it showing different light on the issue.

https://books.google.com/books?id=1...an losses in anti partisan operations&f=false
 
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