Would the B-36 be a magic bullet against Germany if they defeated the USSR?
- Thread starter Captain Marvel
- Start date
I wanted to single this out as a very perceptive point.
Someone several pages back posted a map showing various B-29 ranges over Europe from likely Allied air bases (London, Tunis, Cairo, etc.). Which does indeed show that, yes, that even a German-occupied European Russia up to the Urals won't be able to find a credible place, strictly speaking, outside of Superfortress range (though it would expand the number places where they could hide things, I suppose). Not only is the General Government (Poland) and Baku in range, but so is Moscow. Maybe out beyond the Northern Dvina River is out of range, but there's virtually no infrastructure up that way, anyway.
And because of the German air defenses and advances you note, that's a problem, because it shows just how many of the Reich's air defense zones those B-29's (or yes, B-36's) would have to fly through (and not over!) to reach their targets in the General Government or the Russian Reichskommissariat. The Germans will now have spare resources to throw into those weapon systems. The result, in the shorter term, would probably be that that Allies restrict such raids only to target places of very high value, and premised on high loss rates. At least until the Allies had made a very serious dent into the Luftwaffe's air defenses.
In the long run, of course, the Germans are playing a losing hand.
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Fair point. Maybe an under-cooked brussel sprout?
I was thinking a raw carrot stick.
Given the amount of territory to cover the Germans are going to be playing point defense. Area of zone defense is flat out impossible. OTL the Germans managed to keep a average of between 4,500 & 6,000 operational aircraft in play during the years 1942-44. Even if they can double the combat ready & flyable aircraft in any particular week to 9,000 or 12,000 aircraft its still not a lot for covering the many useful approaches.
Complete coverage by a air warning system is problematic as well. A complete perimeter and internal radar network, with communications and a interceptor control systems won't be practical in the short term of several years. Thousands of visual spotting stations would need to supplement the radar network. Covering a few hundred kilometers radius around the many critical points is what is practical.
I may not need to point out its not necessary to fly all the way to Berlin or Moscow to do serious damage with heavy bombers. There are more than enough important targets around the perimeter which can be supported with fighter coverage and medium bomber strikes on the airfields in the targeted region.
My mother tried poisoning her children with cheap canned Asparagus. We were on to her & hid the bits in the potato gravy.
Given that the Germans in OTL's war attempted to do both (not always successfully), I think I cannot be as sanguine that in this proposed timeline where they've knocked the USSR out of the war - with all the freeing up of resources for air defense that would ensue - that they wouldn't attempt to do so here.
The fact is, those B-29's bound for targets in Lublin, or Smolensk, or wherever are going to have to fly over lots and lots of air space over the Reich and German-occupied territory (most of which is highly developed and covered with airfields), and that's going to not only increase the chances of defensive attacks, but also give point defenses around the probable targets more time to prepare, too.
In short, this is not the Pacific, where B-29's staging out of Guam, Saipan or Okinawa get the benefit of flying nearly all of their trips (each way) over hundreds of miles of empty ocean.
I'm not saying the Allies would never try to bomb that deep into Reich territory. Just that it wouldn't happen that often. They'd need a target that could justify the risk and costs.
Freeing up exactly what resources for air defense? At the start of 1943 the German AF was split more or less evenly between the Eastern Front and the West/Mediterraneian. Roughly 50% in the east & the other half spread from Norway to the Balkans. In latter 1943 the bulk of the fighter groups in the east were withdrawn to Germany to reinforce against the intruding bomber raids. Through 1944 the German air strength in the east fell below one third of the total. In other words the western Allies were already fighting the balance of the German air defenses in 1944 and winning. There was no huge pool of aircraft, pilots or heavy anti aircraft guns in the east to be moved west.
& the fact is I already pointed out the rather obvious, that the Allied air forces don't have to send bombers deep into enemy territory unescorted to hit important targets. While the German AF won a big tactical victory in October 1943 over Germany they were unable to compete anywhere else the US & RAF fighter planes could get at them. Occasional tactical victories notwithstanding the Germans were losing every air campaign at the operational and strategic level where the Allied fighter wings could get at them.
hammo1j
Donor
I think the scenario of the USSR being out of the war with the UK still in the war is unrealistic however this is what I believe would happen.
The fact that allied air superiority had not been achieved by 1944 would mean that any invasion would have to be delayed a year until 1945. In the meantime the fight to establish air superiority could go one way or the other.
Certainly the Germans would have a more opportunity to build superior jet planes and there was an opportunity to introduce a superior radar copied from the British which may have won the air War for them.
They managed to stop the allied bombers before on two occasions: in September the 1943 the Americans were stopped and in February 1944 the British were stopped - so it's entirely possible.
But on the other hand there was a fantastic train of new products from the allies such as the B29 and massive numbers of existing proven products such as the P-51.
Let's just call it's all square with it being hard fought and a degree of domination available by June 1945 over the French coastline.
I would probably say the most likely use of nukes would be as tactical Battlefield weapons firstly in blasting a path through the German defences at Normandy.
This could even be done by a converted B17 so as it turns out the B36 will not be a game changer.
The fact that allied air superiority had not been achieved by 1944 would mean that any invasion would have to be delayed a year until 1945. In the meantime the fight to establish air superiority could go one way or the other.
Certainly the Germans would have a more opportunity to build superior jet planes and there was an opportunity to introduce a superior radar copied from the British which may have won the air War for them.
They managed to stop the allied bombers before on two occasions: in September the 1943 the Americans were stopped and in February 1944 the British were stopped - so it's entirely possible.
But on the other hand there was a fantastic train of new products from the allies such as the B29 and massive numbers of existing proven products such as the P-51.
Let's just call it's all square with it being hard fought and a degree of domination available by June 1945 over the French coastline.
I would probably say the most likely use of nukes would be as tactical Battlefield weapons firstly in blasting a path through the German defences at Normandy.
This could even be done by a converted B17 so as it turns out the B36 will not be a game changer.
Not achieved over Germany. Elsewhere it was. There was a inability to compete at all at the strategic & operational levels over the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy & anywhere else in range of Allied fighter planes. The air opposition to Operation Neptune on 6th June was all of 300 sorties launched vs over 12,000 on the Allied side. A maximum effort to counter the Allied invasion with air attacks resulted in a early July peak of some 1,300 sorties in 24 hours, with most of the bomber sorties at night. At that moment the Allies were slacking off with the average daily sortie rate from the UK falling off to under 10,000. In 1942 the German AF could not protect the capitol ships in the French ports, in the spring of 1942 the GAF was kicked out of Tunisia, in the summer it was run off Sicilly, in the autumn out of the southern Italian sky. Nor in 1943 could it prevent attacks on industrial targets in France and the Low countries, nor effectively interfere with Op CROSSBOW. Their airmen still had a few tactical victories, but they lost every campaign at the operational and strategic level. Only where Allied fighters could not reach could the Luftwaffe retain any semblance of effectiveness. That ended in early 1944, after the bulk of the fighter groups in the east were transferred to Germany to reinforce the defense.