Would strategic bombing work today as well as it did in WW2 against cities?

Would strategic bombing work today as well as it did in WW2 against cities?

  • Yes

    Votes: 34 45.3%
  • To some extent

    Votes: 19 25.3%
  • No

    Votes: 22 29.3%

  • Total voters
    75
Type 1. was a total failure without nukes, 2. was a success, but they needed a lot of it and they - as you said - needed to find the right tagrets.

Type 1 worked on Japan. The surrender was under the legitimate and realistic threat of mass civilian casualties, it wasn't because they lost the ability to engage in military operations.
 
It was strategic bombing that forces the Luftwaffe to stand and die over the skies of German

Which was going to happen anyways, only substitute "over the skies of Germany" for "over the battlefields". The Luftwaffe still has to come out and fight the VVS, RAF, and USAAC over the battlefields just as much as it had to over it's own homeland. That was a fight the Luftwaffe was well on it's way to losing by the time they were forced to choose between prioritizing the fight over the battlefield vs that of the homefront.

and withdraw a majority of it's support from the army.

In the East, Luftwaffe was supporting the army to the very end. The fact that the bulk of German bombers and CAS aircraft were in the East represented a constant threat to Soviet operations that they had to deal with regularly to the very end. Likewise, German fighters were able to interfere with VVS operations in spite of the transfer, the fact that the fighter units that did remain in the East were the best the Germans had allowed them to challenge the VVS in the skies throughout 1943 and even well into 1944. The last serious attempt by the Germans to challenge VVS air power was in May 1944. The Red Army's mid-war victories mainly saw them simply apply tactics they had learned mitigate German air action to the point they were able to suck up what losses German air power inflicted and keep rolling, leaving the contest in the end to be about who the stronger ground power was. It was a contest the Soviets won.

it has been estimated that the German army artillery park could have been doubled without the majority investments in home defense FLAK.

Which would have left the Germans with the challenge of finding enough skilled personnel to effectively operate said guns as well as the transport to move and supply them on the battlefield. Having a bunch of static artillery pieces just means they get by-passed or obliterated by artillery or tactical air power once identified.

Even if the Eastern Front ended in 1943 the Germans would still have already cut pilot training and fuel allocations and the vicious circle of losses would inevitably lead to OTL TL of Luftwaffe fighter force death.

At least some of those policies could probably be reversed, as without the enormous fuel demands of the air and (especially) ground operations in the East there would be enough to go around. It wouldn't stop the decline of the Luftwaffe, but it would slow it down.

Not to mention that with no Eastern Front, even after whatever air campaign has taken its course, the Western Allies would still be faced with the challenge of surmounting a Heer which is much more powerful then it was OTL with a Nazi Party still holding onto Germany. They would still be faced, in a word, with actually winning the war.

The USSBS didn't really ignore the ground factors,

You don't really find a comparatively deep analysis in the USSBS upon the effects of the ground campaign on the German economy, even in the areas the.

they examined what it achieved and it was undeniable that alone strategic bombing achieved strategic success.

They examined what it achieved filtered through a lens which sought to justify their own existence as a independent service on a equal footing with the army and navy. In doing so, they duly ignored the niggling question over whether those resources spent on the strategic air campaign might have been better spent on the ground, naval, and tactical air campaigns which would have brought the end of the war about much faster. That also means it was a rushed work (the fact that it was published in September 30th says it all). Most historical work on the strategic air campaign since then, like those by Richard Overy and Hansen, are less sanguine about the what bombing achieved and what it might have achieved.

In the absence of the OTL ground campaign, which sped up the impact of the strategic air war, the strategic bombing campaign would still have collapsed the German fuel production, transportation, city life, etc. just about on time;

And in a single sentence you contradict yourself. By admitting that the ground campaign sped up the impact of the strategic air war you effectively admit that without the ground campaign, the air campaigns effect would have taken rather longer. Then you immediately turn around and say that it would "still happen about the same time".

With the Luftwaffe having a much more minor impact on the ground war all Allied forces directly benefited, the Soviets more than anyone.

And by the time the strategic air campaign was really impacting both the Luftwaffe and ground war, the Soviets had already gained the upper-hand in the ground war. The Soviets certainly benefited, but that's not the same as saying they needed it.
 
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Perkeo

Banned
Type 1 worked on Japan. The surrender was under the legitimate and realistic threat of mass civilian casualties, it wasn't because they lost the ability to engage in military operations.

Japan was already seeking terms, and after the Sowjets (who they wanted to ask for mediation) declared war at least part of their leadership was perfectly aware that the war was decided. At the very, very best, strategic bombing accelerated the surrender, but it didn't cause it.

Neither did Germany loose the ability to engage in military operations due to strategic bombing of infrastructure. I'm not denying that the bombing contributed to the success of ground offensive, but the fight didn't end until the allied troops had physically occupied almost all of the country.

So there are two lessions learned from WWII:
- No war can be won without air superiority
- No war can be won with air superiority alone
 
I'd say that if someone somehow went back to strategic bombing as being a thing IE full on carpet bombing it would be very effective. Attacks against infrastructure (motoway on ramps, bridges, power sub stations etc) would be very effective due to how interlinked everything is now in modern western society. Plus cities tend to have a high population density so you'd probably kill more people.
 
As pointed out earlier, mass city bombing is still happening in Syria, see Aleppo...

I fully disagree however that if you wanted to carpet bomb a city now you'd use nukes. A nuke, even tactical, is a line in the sand. You can make the same amount of damage with normal bombs without nearly as much international backlash (again, Aleppo) but using actual nukes would be big. Don't you think Russia would have used them if they felt they could?
 

jahenders

Banned
In short, it would work much better but very differently. The strikes would all be more precise, taking a handful of planes to definitely destroy a particular target instead of the hundreds it could take in WWII.

In general, there would be far more concern collateral damage to non-targets. That would hinder some strikes, but the improved accuracy would generally offset.

If, some country threw such considerations out the window (or specifically WANTED to go for terror), a combination of weapons could pretty effectively level a city or, at least, destroy all the key infrastructure (key buildings, dams, bridges, power plants, hospitals, etc.).
 

Deleted member 1487

Which was going to happen anyways, only substitute "over the skies of Germany" for "over the battlefields". The Luftwaffe still has to come out and fight the VVS, RAF, and USAAC over the battlefields just as much as it had to over it's own homeland. That was a fight the Luftwaffe was well on it's way to losing by the time they were forced to choose between prioritizing the fight over the battlefield vs that of the homefront.
The attrition of the Luftwaffe in the East was much less than that inflicted in the West/Mediterranean. Barbarossa and the 1942 certainly hurt, but it was all replaceable given production of aircraft and pilot training. Certainly against all three air forces the Luftwaffe would have been eventually beaten, but they'd be far stronger in numbers without the destruction of factories and bombing of the German homeland. In fact without having to have such a huge investment in civil defense and AAA protect of the homeland the battlefield would have had several thousand more FLAK guns protecting it, which aleviates the burden somewhat for the Luftwaffe having to protect ground forces, which allows for a husbanding of strength for major operations. Nevertheless eventually numbers would tell and the badly outnumbered Luftwaffe would be ground down, just later and at higher cost.

In the East, Luftwaffe was supporting the army to the very end. The fact that the bulk of German bombers and CAS aircraft were in the East represented a constant threat to Soviet operations that they had to deal with regularly to the very end. Likewise, German fighters were able to interfere with VVS operations in spite of the transfer, the fact that the fighter units that did remain in the East were the best the Germans had allowed them to challenge the VVS in the skies throughout 1943 and even well into 1944. The last serious attempt by the Germans to challenge VVS air power was in May 1944. The Red Army's mid-war victories mainly saw them simply apply tactics they had learned mitigate German air action to the point they were able to suck up what losses German air power inflicted and keep rolling, leaving the contest in the end to be about who the stronger ground power was. It was a contest the Soviets won.
A declining fraction of the Luftwaffe was present in the East; Barbarossa was the peak of the Eastern commitment and every year was a decline in proportion of the Luftwaffe present. By 1943 the fighter arm was about 20-25% in the East, a sharp decline from 1942. By 1944 there were only 40 fighters available to defend AG-Center during Bagration. It wasn't as if the Luftwaffe ever stopped being a factor in the East, it just became far less of one by 1943, which matches exactly with the period of VVS recovery and dominance over the battlefield. Once the fighter arm in the East was down to a few hundred or even less fighters the VVS seized air superiority and indeed by 1944-45 supremacy. Certainly there were notable instances when the Luftwaffe 'surged' and dominated certain battle spaces, like Romania in early 1944, but that was by far the exception and proved that despite the VVS numbers if the Luftwaffe could ever scrape together enough fighters they could dominate the skies. I know you'll bring up Kursk as a counterpoint, which actually just proved the Luftwaffe couldn't scrape together enough fighters to dominate that battle space, despite inflicting heavily disproportionate losses on the VVS (and again during the Orel Bulge offensive).

As to the contention that the fighters in the East were the best the Germans had...I know Bergstrom asserted that based on their kill totals, but most German pilots worth their salt that appeared in the East racked up much higher kill totals in the East than in the West. Even the marginal performers in the West became famous killers in the East. The problem is that when they then were transferred to the West they got massacred in 1944-45.

Also before you accuse me of anti-Soviet bias I do have to acknowledge that the VVS had a major turn around in 1943 and was learning their trade, applying new tactics and doing well with them as the war went on, but they were still losing half their aircraft to flight accidents (per Krivosheev) and despite their huge numerical advantage were never able to kill the Luftwaffe on their front like the Wallies did on theirs; certainly that was a function of the VVS as a pure army support arm, while the Wallies had a strategic air force with long range fighters that were tasked with attacking Luftwaffe airfields and aircraft where ever they could be found regardless of losses. They had more fighters with greater range and production to allow for that. But Soviet recovery was a function of the Luftwaffe pulling their fighters out of the East and Soviet production then being high enough to keep ahead of combat and non-combat losses, which were still atrocious even in 1945.

Which would have left the Germans with the challenge of finding enough skilled personnel to effectively operate said guns as well as the transport to move and supply them on the battlefield. Having a bunch of static artillery pieces just means they get by-passed or obliterated by artillery or tactical air power once identified.
Sure, that is certainly a problem, as static weapons were built around many cities; may would remain defending cities because it is unlikely there would be no threat to the homeland. However the resources that went into AAA could have gone into cheaper artillery or be moved around by rail to various important rail junctions or supply dumps that were attacked by Allied bombers in operational bombing missions IOTL, which weren't defended enough. No one is saying they'd all be on the front lines. Rail mobility would be a major factor in moving them around or even defending against ground attacks by deep penetration raids by Allied AFVs.


At least some of those policies could probably be reversed, as without the enormous fuel demands of the air and (especially) ground operations in the East there would be enough to go around. It wouldn't stop the decline of the Luftwaffe, but it would slow it down.
Agreed, but avgas demands were much lower in the West than West by 1943 IOTL and continued to decline as more and more efforts were put into the West. Fuel shortages in the East in 1944 weren't just a function of the bombing of oil production starting in May, it was also a decision to starve the East to make sure there was enough for the West.

Not to mention that with no Eastern Front, even after whatever air campaign has taken its course, the Western Allies would still be faced with the challenge of surmounting a Heer which is much more powerful then it was OTL with a Nazi Party still holding onto Germany. They would still be faced, in a word, with actually winning the war.
Sure, but that would be a far less difficult task with the air dominance that the Wallies were able to achieve IOTL by 1944. It would be significantly bloodier and probably conform more to the plan that clearing out France would take 15 months.

You don't really find a comparatively deep analysis in the USSBS upon the effects of the ground campaign on the German economy, even in the areas the.
Sure, because it wasn't about the ground war specifically. It does however touch upon the effects of the ground campaign aiding the destruction of the German war economy along with strategic bombing.

They examined what it achieved filtered through a lens which sought to justify their own existence as a independent service on a equal footing with the army and navy. In doing so, they duly ignored the niggling question over whether those resources spent on the strategic air campaign might have been better spent on the ground, naval, and tactical air campaigns which would have brought the end of the war about much faster. That also means it was a rushed work (the fact that it was published in September 30th says it all). Most historical work on the strategic air campaign since then, like those by Richard Overy and Hansen, are less sanguine about the what bombing achieved and what it might have achieved.
That is a valid criticism of the report. Without a doubt it gives the air campaign pride of place, perhaps more than it deserves. However the impact of the bombing is undeniable on the war economy, specifically in the realm of transport within Germany and oil production. The transport plan in France too is undeniable, same with the interdiction efforts in Italy. They weren't war winners on their own, but they made the job of the ground forces much easier.

I doubt that they could have been spent more effectively on the ground war given the huge resource diversion they caused in German production away from the front, the damage they inflicted on the Luftwaffe from having to fight rather than picking it's battles as it had done along the Channel for years and inflicted a hugely disproportionate casualty rate on the RAF, and the damage to German industry in the process.
This book makes a compelling case that the strategic air war was well worth the cost and saved the front line ground troops a lot of pain:
https://www.amazon.com/How-War-Was-Won-Cambridge/dp/1107014751/ref=cm_cr_pr_pdt_img_top?ie=UTF8

Certainly post-war works have been influenced by what could have been achieved by a smarter strategic air war, which the USSBS also acknowledges, and the failure of strategic bombing in other wars (Korea, Vietnam) to achieve victory through what in many cases amounted to terror bombing (though the interdiction campaign in Korea is what saved the Pusan Perimeter and during the Iraq wars pretty much demolish Iraqi CiC).

As to the 'rush' of the report:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strategic_Bombing_Survey#Europe
It started in 1944 and was initially written to provide lessons to aid the air war against Japan, which had still been ongoing.
That was the initial report though, there were additional elements released years after the war, as listed in the bibliography of the wiki article.

And in a single sentence you contradict yourself. By admitting that the ground campaign sped up the impact of the strategic air war you effectively admit that without the ground campaign, the air campaigns effect would have taken rather longer. Then you immediately turn around and say that it would "still happen about the same time".
Didn't I say that? Of course it would have taken longer, it doesn't mean that the air war would work at the same rate. But that also means it would have failed without the ground war or that the ground war would have been as 'cheap' as it was without the strategic air war. What would have happened at the same time is the destruction of the Luftwaffe, destruction of oil, and smashing up of transport. The impact of that might have taken longer to be felt without Romania being overrun on time, though the mining of the Danube really throttled what could get to Germany, and the shutting down of coal in West Germany had a huge impact on production in the Ruhr. Elements of the strategic air war would still have happened on time, all the effects might have taken longer to be felt.

And by the time the strategic air campaign was really impacting both the Luftwaffe and ground war, the Soviets had already gained the upper-hand in the ground war. The Soviets certainly benefited, but that's not the same as saying they needed it.
Sure, thanks to Stalingrad the war in the East had turned around, but the Soviet offensives in 1943 and on directly benefited from the strategic air war hitting German industry starting in March 1943 with the Battle of the Ruhr and siphoning of German fighters West. So the ground advance from Summer 1943 on was directly impacted by the effects of the strategic air war, though they weren't yet achieving what they would by 1944, which further sped up the ground war as the German economy began breaking down under the bombing and the front was deprived. What I would say is that if there was no strategic air war then the Soviets would have had a very hard time pulling off their 1943-44 advances in anything resembling their OTL form.
 

Deleted member 1487

How did the power grids of Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan stand up to bombing in 1940s?
None were attacked and the USSBS pointed that out as a major failing of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, both against Germany and Japan. The Germans planned a lot of attacks on Soviet electrical infrastructure to be conducted in 1944, Operation Eisenhammer, which relied on some optimistic assumption, but was pretty doable with the force accumulated at the time, but Hitler ordered it to be used to bomb London in 1944 in Operation Steinbock, which squandered the only strategic air units Germany had; the He177 did eventually do some missions in the USSR, but only rail interdiction and insanely enough some low level carpet bombing for ground support (Goering was so impressed with Operation Totalize and the Allied carpet bombing there, he demanded the same from the He177 Wing) which was promptly shot to pieces by Soviet AAA and fighters. So ended Germany's only heavy bomber unit, as they lacked the fuel and replacements to recover and operate.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eisenhammer
 
The attrition of the Luftwaffe in the East was much less than that inflicted in the West/Mediterranean.

In 1941 and 1942, attrition in the East was the most significant loss upon the Luftwaffe. In 1943 it wasn't, but that was a function of the Luftwaffe shifting it's operational tempos out of the Eastern Front

but it was all replaceable given production of aircraft and pilot training.

Except they were not. The Luftwaffe proved just as unable to replace the attrition inflicted upon it in 1942 as it had in 1941 or 1940.

A declining fraction of the Luftwaffe was present in the East; Barbarossa was the peak of the Eastern commitment and every year was a decline in proportion of the Luftwaffe present.

Which went in lockstep with it's decline as a proportion of the Luftwaffe's forces.

Certainly there were notable instances when the Luftwaffe 'surged' and dominated certain battle spaces, like Romania in early 1944, but that was by far the exception and proved that despite the VVS numbers if the Luftwaffe could ever scrape together enough fighters they could dominate the skies.

Except they don't prove that. If anything they prove the opposite, since those attempts by the Luftwaffe to dominate those battlespaces were defeated by the VVS.

despite inflicting heavily disproportionate losses on the VVS (and again during the Orel Bulge offensive).

Which means nothing more then that the side with fewer number of aircraft in a air battle gain important intrinsic advantages that lets them inflict lop-sided . If you bother to look into the instances of air-air combat during D-Day, you'll find that the Luftwaffe there also managed to inflict dispproportionate losses upon WAllied air forces.

As to the contention that the fighters in the East were the best the Germans had... I know Bergstrom asserted that based on their kill totals, but most German pilots worth their salt that appeared in the East racked up much higher kill totals in the East than in the West.

Which you base on nothing. There are multiple German hundred+ aces who flew on both fronts and managed to achieve roughly equal kills. One such rarity, Heinz Bär, actually managed to achieve more kills in the west then he did in the east. In fact, some of Germany's hundred+ kill aces (like Hans-Joachim Marseille and Adolf Galland) achieved all of their kills in the west (incidentally, Hartmann was of the opinion that Marseille was the better pilot and would have surpassed him if he hadn't been killed by a air accident). It wasn't at all due to the fact that the cream of German aces were any better then their Soviet or WAllied counterparts... they simply were kept in combat indefinitely while the Soviet and Anglo-American aces were only engaged for a limited amount of time before being rotated out. If you were to ask me who would win in a dogfight between Erich Hartmann, the top ranked German ace, and Ivan Kozhedub, the top ranked allied ace of WWII with 62 confirmed kills (64 if you count 2 P-51 Mustangs he shot down when they mistook him for a German), I would reply "flip a coin and bring popcorn". Ivan flew against as great or greater odds as the German pilots and lived to tell the tale. In fact, while his plane was occasionally badly damaged, he was never actually shot down whereas Hartmann in turn was shot down 16 times. Same with Marmaduke Pattle or Richard Bong vs Hartmann. Or any 1 vs 1 combination of those four.

And yes, before you start talking about how that isn't significant, the fact that the top Soviet and WAllied aces were just as good as the top German aces matter because these are the pilots who really mattered. WWII air combat was always defined by the scores of a small handful of aces. Some German pilots took that to extremes, but the trend was universal, with the top 10% of pilots on all sides responsible for about 80% of the kills. Less skilled but still well-trained pilots would learn how to survive, and maybe pick up a kill here and there, but they lacked the true fusion of abilities ever to become top scorers. Poorly trained pilots (which chiefly came from the early-war VVS and mid/late-war Luftwaffe) tended to just die. Many pilots could manage to fly well enough to get an enemy in their sights, but most lacked the shooting ability to inflict lethal damage once they'd done so.

By 1943, the VVS had plenty of the first and second category of pilots I mentioned above. The Germans, for their part, maintained a static pool number of the first category (most of whom were still on the Eastern Front), suffered from a dwindling number of the second, and had a skyrocketing increase number of the third.

But Soviet recovery was a function of the Luftwaffe pulling their fighters out of the East

Incorrect. Soviet recovery was a function of the reorganization of the VVS's logistical and training operation as well as the creation of a solid corps of Soviet aces during the course of 1942, with the result that by 1943 Soviet pilot training was better than their Luftwaffe counterparts. The transfer of fighter aircraft was second to that. The air environment on the Eastern Front was one of almost continual combat in very dangerous circumstances, as most battles took place under 10,000 feet. There was no rest for the Luftwaffe or VVS pilots, both of whom were forced to constantly give battle regardless of their own state whereas the WAllies had more choice in the matter until mid-'44. The psychological strains (for both the Germans and the Russians) were immense, and many couldn't handle them, snapped, and died.

Those few pilots who did survive this murderous environment attained a level of skill that few others have ever reached. Not because they were supermen, but because by necessity they were pushed far beyond the limits of what other pilots had to endure. It didn't make them unbeatable, but it did make them very very good.

However the resources that went into AAA could have gone into cheaper artillery or be moved around by rail to various important rail junctions or supply dumps that were attacked by Allied bombers in operational bombing missions IOTL, which weren't defended enough.

Actually, they were defended quite adequately. The problem for the Germans was that the WAllies and Soviets were willing and able to suck up the losses inflicted upon their tactical air forces by heavy AA fire.

Rail mobility would be a major factor in moving them around or even defending against ground attacks by deep penetration raids by Allied AFVs.

Rail mobility is not responsive enough to effectively respond to AFV raids and is too inflexible to respond to the rapidly changing conditions of mobile warfare. It would be easy for the Allies or Soviets to trick the Germans to commit the artillery in the wrong place and then use their armor or air power to cut the rail lines.

Agreed, but avgas demands were much lower in the West than West by 1943 IOTL

It's not just avgas demand, but also avgas supply. Without having to make as much fuel for tanks and trucks to fight in the east, the Germans can instead direct that crude oil to be made into much more avgas.

Sure, but that would be a far less difficult task with the air dominance that the Wallies were able to achieve IOTL by 1944.

Which the WAllies likely won't be able to achieve until 1945-46.

Sure, because it wasn't about the ground war specifically. It does however touch upon the effects of the ground campaign aiding the destruction of the German war economy along with strategic bombing.

Except the ground campaign didn't just "aid" the destruction of the German war economy, it caused the destruction of the German war economy well before the strategic bombing campaign did. By the time.

However the impact of the bombing is undeniable on the war economy, specifically in the realm of transport within Germany and oil production.

Both of which came too late to matter.

The transport plan in France too is undeniable, same with the interdiction efforts in Italy.

Which would certainly have still occurred without the strategic bombing campaigns, likely more rapidly and more effectively with the additional resources involved. Indeed, it would probably wind-up being where the bulk of the Luftwaffe would die instead, as they have to oppose the destruction of infrastructure in north-west Europe and Italy in order to prevent the WAllies from landing there.

I doubt that they could have been spent more effectively on the ground war given the huge resource diversion they caused in German production away from the front,

Which was of the wrong nature to influence the ground war.

the damage they inflicted on

Which was minor until mid-'44, by which point the Luftwaffe had already been ground down.

the Luftwaffe from having to fight rather than picking it's battles as it had done along the Channel for years

The Luftwaffe couldn't pick its battles along the channel any more then it could over the Eastern Front or Homeland. It has too challenge the WAllies over the French Coast in order to try and prevent them from obtaining the conditions to invade. The only place the WAllied air forces can't afford to choose to pick their battles prior to mid-'44 is over Britain.

s and inflicted a hugely disproportionate casualty rate on the RAF

Which the introduction of new WAllied aircraft in 1943, most particularly American fighters, would handily solve.

and the damage to German industry in the process.

Not significant until very late in the war.

during the Iraq wars pretty much demolish Iraqi CiC.

No it didn't. Iraq CiC remained quite perfectly intact throughout the Gulf War. Iraqi units were able to effectively communicate with each other and their higher command throughout the war. The air campaign actually did exceptionally little damage to the Iraqi combat capabilities... it was Iraqi incompetence that made coalition victory so lopsided.

It started in 1944 and was initially written to provide lessons to aid the air war against Japan, which had still been ongoing.

Then it was re-written too hastily.

Didn't I say that? Of course it would have taken longer, it doesn't mean that the air war would work at the same rate.

You did, in fact, claim that the strategic air war would have continued basically at the same pace as OTL without the ground campaign. You then reiterate that claim here:

What would have happened at the same time is the destruction of the Luftwaffe, destruction of oil, and smashing up of transport.

Despite the fact that with more fuel available to it, the Luftwaffe would have lasted longer and delayed the destruction of oil and smashing up of transport.

Sure, thanks to Stalingrad the war in the East had turned around, but the Soviet offensives in 1943 and on directly benefited from the strategic air war hitting German industry starting in March 1943 with the Battle of the Ruhr and siphoning of German fighters West.

Not really. The effects of air support in the meatgrinder offensives like Kursk and the D'niepr struggle were at best mildly additive. The Battle of the Ruhr was too late in the year and too minor to have much of an impact: the Germans were able to paper over the damage in a few weeks and ultimately their armaments production for '43 was doubled. The OTL Soviet advances would certainly have still happened in 1943 without the strategic bombing campaign. Case in point: in the two months of defense and offensive combat during the Battle of Kursk, involving tens of thousands of close air support sorties from both sides in the course of two months, the Soviets recorded the loss of only 30 tanks to enemy aircraft.
 
How did the power grids of Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan stand up to bombing in 1940s?

The power grids back in the 1940s were way less vulnerable. One big reason is that they didn't require uber-specialized transformers in the way they do today. It was acceptable in those days to transmit power at less insanely high voltages because the aggregate demand and thus the total power moved as much smaller. So you could smash lots of things with bombs and they could be repaired pretty swiftly, and the notion of the whole grid going down and being exceptionally difficult to restart wasn't there.
 
Japan was already seeking terms, and after the Sowjets (who they wanted to ask for mediation) declared war at least part of their leadership was perfectly aware that the war was decided. At the very, very best, strategic bombing accelerated the surrender, but it didn't cause it.

Neither did Germany loose the ability to engage in military operations due to strategic bombing of infrastructure. I'm not denying that the bombing contributed to the success of ground offensive, but the fight didn't end until the allied troops had physically occupied almost all of the country.

So there are two lessions learned from WWII:
- No war can be won without air superiority
- No war can be won with air superiority alone

Except that Japan did lose the capacity to wage war (against America, they were still causing mischief in China, but had no capacity to invade anywhere), and they continued to refuse to surrender. They surrendered only when the threat was the destruction of Japan's society city by city, after it was proven possible by the sudden and instant increase in the capacity of the Americans to destroy Japan with the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The War in the Pacific was not won with air superiority alone, but it's conclusion was that Japan was forced to unconditional surrender by the destructive capacity that could be delivered by air. There are arguments that they surrendered to America so they didn't have to surrender to Russia, but they did not do this until they felt there was a realistic threat of the destruction of Japan, remember that they believed they could repel an American invasion, I think they believed they could have kept the Russians out of Honshu. Then again, we don't know whether Japan would have accepted a conditional surrender, or what the conditions would have to be. If the Allies were willing to accept conditions.

Germany did not lose the capacity to wage war in the face of air attack, but they were comprehensively defeated in the field, they did not unconditionally surrender before enemy boots had been walking German soil, and Russian and WAllied forces met each other before the German surrender took place.
 
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