Would Operation Barbarossa still be executed if Britain is out of WW2 by then?

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Germans could've used more half-tracks for Barbarossa both light and heavy.

They used a lot of the French stock, but yes they needed more.

 

[DrakonFin]

Not sure that was the reason, I've seen it convincingly argued both ways. I lean toward the idea that the Finnish government didn't want responsibility for Leningrad, nor the casualties that would come with taking it, so they hedged their bets and let the Germans get on with it themselves, while against Murmansk/the RR they couldn't really overcome the defenders due to the lack of logistics in the region; they needed Leningrad captured to have a RR link to the region with the Murmansk RR to be able to have strong enough forces to cut it. Without that it wasn't a lack of desire to deal with the RR or city, just the lack of means. It also didn't help that their German allies had little training or experience to fight in that environment, so in some ways it was the Winter War reversed thanks to the Soviets defending on top of their logistics.

To expound on this (and to refer to what I have written elsewhere): Mannerheim did not want an assault against Leningrad for practical military reasons and for diplomatic/political reasons both, and he managed to convince the government's "inner circle", first of all President Ryti, of this. In the conditions of the time in question (from late 1941 into 1942) the Finnish Army going against Leningrad would have meant high losses for the Finns, a lot of supplies and materiel expended, and major morale problems for the troops and the nation. The attack would have been very unpopular among most of the troops that would have been ordered to participate. And the then on top of that, even if the city was taken, things would not look any better: when Finland was practically dependent on Germany for feeding its own population in 1942, having to take responsibility for even a part of Leningrad's population could only mean a mass death scenario. The Finns could not feed the people of Leningrad, and they could hardly expect the Germans to feed those people for them. The huge national-level risks involved, in terms of supply and logistics, in the first instance, and in terms of diplomacy (towards both the Axis and the Allies), in the second, are obvious. The potential costs of the attack by far outweighed the potential gains in the short and medium term.

The Murmansk railway was a different question. An attack against the railway's functioning branch around Belomorsk would not involve many of the huge risks included in an attack against Leningrad. But then such an attack would also be very costly and difficult, it would require committing a lot of troops (suitable for operations in East Karelian wilderness conditions, which all Finnish units were not) and it would stretch the Finns' already extended lines of supply.

Finland itself had only limited gains from such an attack against the Murmansk railway, as well: it would essentially be an attack done to support the German war effort. The risks involved in that operation were comparatively more on the diplomatic/political side of the equation: what will the Soviets and the Western Allies think when Finland is now committed to actions that are not just connected to particular Finnish objectives ("a separate war for independent goals" was the official line the Finnish leaders and diplomats argued for, towards the Allies and the neutrals, to distance the nation from Germany and its goals, and rather successfully at that*) but are working for larger Axis goals as well. One big looming threat was always the US also declaring war against Finland like the British had. If there is less of a risk of the Americans going to war against Finland, an attack on the Murmansk railway would be comparatively more likely to be tried by the Finns.

But then again we come to the question if it could be done. The Finnish resources were limited, and like you mentioned, the Germans were next to useless for fighting in the conditions in question. For fighting in sub-Arctic wilderness, at any time of the year, the Soviets and Finns were probably the very best in the world at the time. The German troops, even their so-called mountain troops, continually proved unprepared and inept when operating north of Lake Ladoga. And, again, these conditions favoured the defender disproportionately. For an attack against the Murmansk railway, the Finns would need German support. But for a successful operation, that German support would better be material assistance, and, say, German units freeing up Finnish units from elsewhere rather than German units taking part in the attack itself. This calculation involves then a political risk as well: the more the Finns are dependent on German supply, and the more German units are needed to defend Finnish lines, the more leverage Hitler has over the Finnish government.

Unlike in most Axis nations, the Finnish government was one that was created democratically (even if in wartime conditions) and was made of politicians that had risen to their positions in prewar conditions, through mundane party politics. To understand the functioning of the Finnish government during the war, I think we need to think of it as not being committed to a "total war" in any real sense, not subscribing to a "destroy or be destroyed" mindset. The Finnish leadership's politics were not ideological or radical to the degree the Nazi, Soviet or even Western Allied wartime politics were. They were based on the understanding that Finland was a small nation in between great powers, with very limited resources and very limited freedom of action. Small nations don't decide great wars. They just try to look after their own interests the best they can, and they let the great powers duke it out between themselves, to decide who comes out on top - this was what the Finnish leaders were thinking, and it informed their decisions about the war.

Looked at with hindsight, the Finnish leadership's understanding of the situation was a combination of level-headed realism and some leftover naivety and wishful thinking conforming to interwar modes of thought. President Ryti et al. really thought that Finland would have the best chance to survive by hedging its bets, by giving neither the Axis or the Allies a reason to be particularly cross with Finland's actions during the war. In reality Hitler and Stalin needed no particular reason to destroy small nations, and the Western Allies could be very cold to countries in the wrong camp as well. But then when we think about the actions of the Finnish leadership during the war, and the likelibility of them committing to this or that military operation in support of German objectives, we need to remember that while Stalin and Hitler (and most Axis leaders besides) did not really worry about the death toll they would be subjecting their nations to, to reach their goals, or the diplomatic fallout of their actions, the Finnish leadership was acutely aware how little resources the nation had, how few losses Finland could sustain, and how precarious Finland's international position was. All potential actions would be viewed through a certain cost-benefit calculation in Helsinki (and Mikkeli, where Mannerheim's HQ was), a cost-benefit calculation unique to the Finns.

*The understanding that Finland had just limited objectives was also shared by the rank and file of the military, and also the majority of the civilian population. There was a lot of opposition among the troops already for crossing the 1920 border, and in some units this opposition nearly led to mutiny. In Väinö Linna's The Unknown Soldier one character summarizes the popular view (my translation):

Rokka: "We don't care about Europe. We'll take Karelia. Then we can bloody well go home."

 

[Michele]

You start Barbarossa, you get a holocaust.

(...)

The decision to kill millions of European civilians as an end in itself was a genuinely popular one in Germany.

That second sentence can be debatable, actually.

On the other hand, the first isn't - even if we should assume a non-genocidal-inclined German leadership (and population, if you want that).

That's because Germany simply could not feed its Ostheer from Germany. They were pretty short on actual foodstuffs in OTL. In this ATL, they don't have to feed the French and all the other occupied populations, but they can't steal food from them, either. I don't know if these two aspects balance out or not, but in any case, that's not even the problem, either. The problem is that even if the Germans had mountains of flour, they would be unable to ship them to the frontline, because of the overloaded rail lines. They had problems sending winter clothing in addition to tanks and fuel and ammunition, never mind things that could be procured locally like food.

So they had to steal food locally. Now, normally the Ukraine would have a surplus of cereals, but when you throw in the previous less-than-efficient Soviet management, the war, the scorched-earth tactics of the withdrawing Soviet armies, and the shortage of farmhands, you find that feeding the Ostheer from the Ukrainan sources requires starving the Ukrainans. Never mind that some of them were Jews, never mind that some of them might be partisans, never mind that some of them might be potential opposers of Nazi domination: they had to starve so that the German soldiers could eat their bread. Starting, of course, with the undesirables, but then continuing with anybody whose profession or skills were not necessary to the Germans, and continuing with the city-dwellers. Non-Jewish, uneducated, preferably non-military-material farmhands would be allowed to survive, on meager rations, as serfs, so that they could tend the land and deliver the harvests to the Germans.

So, even without any ideological or racist motivation, you do get mass murders of civilians with Barbarossa, merely on practical resource management grounds.

 

[Sam R.]

That second sentence can be debatable, actually.

I agree that it is debateable. I just consider the opposing position in the debate to have been refuted: Browning is pretty much sufficient, as is the role of the Heer's popular work when in secondary duties (hunting was voluntary, and the alternative wasn't shit-can duty).

As far as expounding on a holocaust being the decision to place civillians last, and the recognition of people claimed as Soviet citizens as the victims of such a holocaust, I agree entirely.

There is no nice way around large scale population displacement and liquidation in the east: war means millions of people put to death with systematic deliberation.

yours,
Sam R.

 

[Michele]

I agree that it is debateable. I just consider the opposing position in the debate to have been refuted: Browning is pretty much sufficient,...

We'll have to disagree on the validity of the refutation. Actually, the position you seem to maintain isn't Browning's but Goldhagen's, by and large. Browning's position as to the motivation and behavior of the sample group is much more nuanced, and he places much more importance on peer pressure and state/army authority than on individual motivation.

 

[thaddeus]

The main question is, how does this affect Hitler’s plans for invading the USSR later on?

With a 'peace' in the west there is a reduced need for naval and air forces elsewhere. A wholesale reduction does not necessarily result in a 1-1 exchange, but selective redirection of resources helps.

The loss of the German aircraft in the BoB has been remarked on here as well. Then there is a the smaller saving from no Balkans campaign, or diversion of air forces to Lybia & Italy.

What I see as a possible loss would be in vehicles. OTL there was a significant expansion of German motorization through looting the automotive stocks in the west. Peace treaties with the Netherlands , Belgium, and France might include such a massive transfer of automotive stocks, but then it may be less. My wild guess here it would be something less & the Wehrmacht less motorized than OTL. Similary draconian rationing of peril fuels in the west helped increase the Wehrmachts fuel reserves for the eastern war. Again my guess is this is a lesser amount than OTL.

Given the unreality of Hitlers planning for Op BARBAROSSA of OTL none of this may matter at the strategic level. Obviously fewer supply trucks, mechanized divisions, or fuels reserves implacts tactical & operational planning, but I suspect the overarching assumptions and strategic plan would look much the same.

defer to your knowledge on the vehicles. cannot imagine however that in the wake of events here that there would be the "hiccups" in deliveries of Soviet raw materials? or that Romania would be getting a better deal?

historically oil from the USSR was moved on rail cars, couldn't that be supplemented (or replaced?) by tankers? (under this scenario) and/or Iranian oil could again be brought by tankers?

does not solve all their other problems but it seems they would have relatively more fuels?

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

The initial premise is not defined*.O plausible POD is of course that the Dunkirk evacuation is far less successful and hence Churchill is ousted in favour of a PM willing to make peace largely on German terms.

Another possibility I'd like to throw out is a POD around the New Year of 1941. After the BoB and the British success in the Western Desert. Churchill dies (natural causes or foul play) and in the confusion Roosevelt withdraws any idea of Lend Lease. This the UK decides to make an Amiens type armistice from a position of relative strength. Possibly also in the knowledge of the forthcoming Operation Barbarossa which indicates it can rearm in an interlude of peace and easier trade.

Worth considering ??

* Not a criticism of the OP in any eat.