Would modern China's borders be a lot smaller if there were native instead of Qing dynasty?

Would China under native dynasty(ies) from 1644-1911 be a lot smaller than OTL

  • yes

    Votes: 46 76.7%
  • no

    Votes: 14 23.3%

  • Total voters
    60
For a backwards pre-industrialized regime,it most certainly would be costly to lead military expeditions,but for a fully industrialized power with Gatling guns,modern artillery,rails and telegrams?I am looking less towards the days where the Han emperor bankrupts the empire trying to fight the Xiongnu than the Russians blitzing through Central Asia in the 19th century.From my POV,a native Chinese dynasty after Ming has far more potential in terms of dragging China into modernity than the Qing.

Rather than looking at land as the only source of expansion,there's also a chance that they would be looking forward to maritime expansion as well.

My discussion is more aimed at the period of China during the 17th-18thC. Had China not taken that land then there's a good chance that Russia would have taken it.

Anyway, even the British Empire in the 19thC was cost-conscious when and where it expanded. An absence of good co-optation policies by the Chinese might have created a situation similar to that which Britain faced in Afghanistan - a distant, rebellious land simply not worth the costs needed for direct control.
 
My discussion is more aimed at the period of China during the 17th-18thC. Had China not taken that land then there's a good chance that Russia would have taken it.
And then there's also a good chance they will lose it to the Chinese.Prior to the creation of the Trans-Siberian railway,the Russians had immense trouble fighting in the Far-East.It's very possible that in an ALT-timeline,China would have been capable of defeating and taking land from European powers.
Anyway, even the British Empire in the 19thC was cost-conscious when and where it expanded. An absence of good co-optation policies by the Chinese might have created a situation similar to that which Britain faced in Afghanistan - a distant, rebellious land simply not worth the costs needed for direct control.
Thing is that Afghanistan's not even connected to Britain itself.The amount of troops Britain deployed to Afghanistan's also far less than what they could have.Whereas,the situation for China would probably be similar to Central Asia for the Russians and the Wild West for the US--since they will be physically connected to such lands.
 
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Without the Qing I think the Russians would have definitely eaten Xinjiang and northern Manchuria, and probably a lot more of Mongolia as well. The Russians fought well against the Zunghars, and against steppe nomads in general (Kazan, Crimeans).


The Dutch, of course. Some Japanese businessmen tried to recruit ronin to conquer it early in the 1600s, but after Sakoku that was obviously impossible. Without the exceptional circumstances of Ming collapse, pirate-merchant groups like the Zheng family can't kick out the Dutch.

The Ming did not care about Europeans in Taiwan. They explicitly told the Dutch that as long as they left the Penghu Islands alone (since Penghu was Chinese since before the Song), they could have the whole island because it wasn't Chinese territory. Not even the Qing cared very much about whatever was going on there.


What was crucial about the Qing conquest of the steppe was that they, as close geographic and cultural neighbors, understood the Mongols. It was only through this common heritage that they could obtain the horses, allies, and local knowledge needed to vassalize the Khalkas and conquer the Zunghars. The Han Chinese did not understand the enemy at all, hence why Ming officials constantly refused to allow Mongols to trade across the Great Wall (when just allowing trade would have stopped 99% of Mongol raiding).

Technology doesn't matter much. The Zunghars had lots of guns, and more importantly, nomads would simply burn the steppe and leave the Chinese army to die from attrition (the Crimeans were famous for this, and even Kangxi's armies during the 1690s campaign against Galdan would have starved if there was a delay of just a few days). Guns are unwieldy in such situations. What you needed was an organized supply line backed by an extremely efficient economy, not military technology per se. And I find it doubtful that the Han Chinese would have revitalized Northwestern China's economy to the same extent as the Manchus.


First, you're exaggerating what Ming thinkers actually thought, and second, this is almost entirely because the Ming were such a shitty dynasty with unprecedented levels of institutionalized corruption that the gentry began to have doubts. Any moderately successful dynasty will need to have good rulers akin to Kangxi and Yongzheng, and their presence alone will make this sort of ideas diminish.


There was a lot of scientific development during the Qing as well. For example, there was a lot of medical research done on "heat factor" diseases (endemic tropical diseases in places like Yunnan and Guangdong) which was all new. Generally speaking there was an inward turn in Chinese science in the 18th century, but it didn't have anything directly to do with the Manchus. If anything the Jesuits are more to blame because they didn't keep in touch with the Scientific Revolution and claimed that thunder was the creation of God and stuff.

If Russia tried to conquer Xinjiang, I'm pretty sure they'd ask China for help.

While the PoD here is unclear, I think any native Han dynasty is going to severely reform after the troubles of the Ming. Even if a merchant-warlord like Koxinga doesn't take power, the trends of the 17th century will encourage a mercantile, maritime focus without the institutional nature of the Qing state inhibiting it. Given this, I think the Taiwan will be taken as Chinese merchants had interests there. Chenggong already acted like a king over the Taiwan Chinese before he conquered Taiwan for example.

I certainly think proto-democratic ideas were flourishing at the time. Again, I think you're discounting broad structural trends. These ideas didn't just come out of dynastic incompetence. Ideas like the idea that the people should govern rather than having the Emperor treat the state as his personal fiefdom comes out of things like the entire economic, cultural, and political environment of the Late Ming. The Qing didn't simply stamp out these ideas because they had strong leaders. They did so because their nature as an ethnic military regime made those ideas a direct threat. The entire structure of a continued Han state is going to operate differently. The Ming entered crisis in large part because they failed to adapt. I think a continued Han dynasty is going to pay a large amount of attention to these ideas. China is pretty difficult to govern autocratically because of sheer size. Southern mercantile interests also benefit greatly from these ideas-think of how France treated its merchants vs Britain.

The reason the Qing had to rely on the Jesuits in the first place is because they had an institutionally inward orientation. A continued Han regime is not going to have the same roadblocks to people sailing around and visiting/trading with other countries. A focus on "practical learning " was a constant refrain among Late Ming reformers-not so much in the Qing period.
 
If Russia tried to conquer Xinjiang, I'm pretty sure they'd ask China for help.

While the PoD here is unclear, I think any native Han dynasty is going to severely reform after the troubles of the Ming. Even if a merchant-warlord like Koxinga doesn't take power, the trends of the 17th century will encourage a mercantile, maritime focus without the institutional nature of the Qing state inhibiting it. Given this, I think the Taiwan will be taken as Chinese merchants had interests there. Chenggong already acted like a king over the Taiwan Chinese before he conquered Taiwan for example.

I certainly think proto-democratic ideas were flourishing at the time. Again, I think you're discounting broad structural trends. These ideas didn't just come out of dynastic incompetence. Ideas like the idea that the people should govern rather than having the Emperor treat the state as his personal fiefdom comes out of things like the entire economic, cultural, and political environment of the Late Ming. The Qing didn't simply stamp out these ideas because they had strong leaders. They did so because their nature as an ethnic military regime made those ideas a direct threat. The entire structure of a continued Han state is going to operate differently. The Ming entered crisis in large part because they failed to adapt. I think a continued Han dynasty is going to pay a large amount of attention to these ideas. China is pretty difficult to govern autocratically because of sheer size. Southern mercantile interests also benefit greatly from these ideas-think of how France treated its merchants vs Britain.

The reason the Qing had to rely on the Jesuits in the first place is because they had an institutionally inward orientation. A continued Han regime is not going to have the same roadblocks to people sailing around and visiting/trading with other countries. A focus on "practical learning " was a constant refrain among Late Ming reformers-not so much in the Qing period.
The proto-democratic ideas definitely didn't come out of incompetent rulers.It probably originated from the Song Dynasty itself.Song Dynasty was the days were gentry officials can speak their mind without fear of persecution.Even if they did something wrong,the worst they can get was probably exile to Hainan island(unless they plotted treason,it which case they will probably be ordered to commit suicide).
 
If Russia tried to conquer Xinjiang, I'm pretty sure they'd ask China for help.
The Russians made steady encroachments on Zunghar territory throughout the early 18th century (Omsk was built to expand Russian power in the Zungharian steppe, for example), though it was helped by the presence of the Qing tying up the Zunghars' hands. Without a strong China, there's really nothing stopping the Zunghars--and possibly the Khalka as well--ending up like the Kazakhs.

Even if a merchant-warlord like Koxinga doesn't take power, the trends of the 17th century will encourage a mercantile, maritime focus
Just as the trends of the Song-Yuan period encouraged a mercantile, maritime focus?

Any native Chinese dynasty in the 17th century will come from the Northwest macroregion, which is both close to Beijing and a place where the hand of the gentry and the state is very loose. There's simply no other region that can compete; the Yangzi or North China macroregions have no real reason to leave the Ming regime (and indeed, these places didn't revolt OTL) while the southern macroregions like the Southeast Coast and Liangguang are too faraway from places that matter. Plus, without 18th-century population movements in these areas, their potential to shake up the Chinese state is much lesser than, say, during the Taiping.

You can see this is the case because the principal "peasant rebels" during the late Ming crisis originated in this single area.

The Northwest region also happens to be the most insulated from both commercial and maritime changes. It wasn't properly integrated into the Chinese national economy until the 18th century, when the Qing made a drive to develop the region because it was so critical to the war effort against the Zunghars.

the institutional nature of the Qing state inhibiting it.
I don't see what this nature is, because the Qing were the single regime most open to maritime trade since the 14th century. Kangxi allowed all maritime trade in 134 Chinese ports and Chinese people were free to leave their country again (there were some restrictions, but nothing serious and a lot of these were intended for popular welfare, e.g. the prohibitions on rice exports). This sort of liberality compares favorably to Song or Yuan openness.

The Qing were so liberal that 18th-century Southeast Asia essentially became an economic colony of China, with its largest city (Ayutthaya, then Bangkok) becoming majority Chinese, its market economy in Chinese hands (especially in Java), and even Dutch colonies, where the VOC tried to direct all trade to the colonial capital of Batavia, trading more with Xiamen than Batavia. This simply cannot have happened if the Qing had a strict policy against maritime trade.

I certainly think proto-democratic ideas were flourishing at the time.
Democracy is a concept in Western political philosophy that rises from the specific circumstances of European statebuilding, where different social classes were in conflict. It isn't something that really works in the Chinese context, where the state was "fractal"--its actual authority was very loose, but the local gentry's desires for a Confucian society generally aligned with that of the state (hence why the Qing could get anything to work while one magistrate was in charge of 300,000 people). See R. Bin Wong's China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience. People like Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu were anti-imperial autocracy, not democrats in any sense of the term. And given that both scholars were ultimately statecraft scholars and wrote as a response to the Ming-Qing transition, I find the simplest hypothesis the most likely; they wrote in response to the political failure of Ming autocracy. Like, that's what they literally say; the collapse was caused by the autocracy of emperors in a Mencian sense, and that is why autocracy was bad (this traditional basis of 17th-century philosophy is evident when you see Gu praising literal feudalism). The Qing restored confidence in the imperial system.

When that confidence faltered and crisis continued, you see late Ming patterns repeating; the jingshi scholars, people like Hong Liangji and Wei Yuan, the rise of literati cliques like the Spring Purification Circle.

The reason the Qing had to rely on the Jesuits in the first place is because they had an institutionally inward orientation.
See above. "Institutionally inward" is a pretty big claim to make when the Qing understood Inner Eurasia by far the best out of all Chinese dynasties since the Tang (save the Yuan), when they essentially abolished the tributary trade system, and when they fully freed up maritime trade for the first time in centuries, possibly for the first time in Chinese history. The Song only had ten custom houses, while the Qing prior to the Canton System, as I mentioned above, had 134: 24 in southern Jiangsu; 7 "major" ones and 11 "small stations" in Zhejiang, plus fifteen "branch stations"; 20 in Fujian; 72 in Guangdong. See The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684-1757.

A focus on "practical learning " was a constant refrain among Late Ming reformers-not so much in the Qing period.
....Are you serious? Have you really never heard of Qing Evidential Learning and Statecraft scholarship? Practical Learning was huge under the Qing. When people like Chen Hongmou--one of Qianlong's most trusted officials--go around saying that imperial examinations should only measure the Practical Learning of the candidate and founding Confucian schools in backwater provinces and explicitly ordering them that the only curriculum offered should be Practical Learning, I simply cannot take you seriously.

See William T. Rowe's Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China.
 
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....Are you serious? Have you really never heard of Qing Evidential Learning and Statecraft scholarship? Practical Learning was huge under the Qing. When people like Chen Hongmou--one of Qianlong's most trusted officials--go around saying that imperial examinations should only measure the Practical Learning of the candidate and founding Confucian schools in backwater provinces and explicitly ordering them that the only curriculum offered should be Practical Learning, I simply cannot take you seriously.

See William T. Rowe's Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China.

I probably used the wrong term for what i was referring to. Or perhaps I simply screwed up entirely and I'm completely wrong. It's been a while since i've read the relevant work. If you can't take me seriously anymore, should I not respond the rest of your arguments?

EDIT: I mean, I'm not sure there's any point if you're not going to consider anything further that I have to say on the topic as valid.
 
EDIT: I mean, I'm not sure there's any point if you're not going to consider anything further that I have to say on the topic as valid.
It's rhetorical, please do respond.

I's just that the constant "blame everything on the Qing" meme--which has been around on this site since years, this isn't my first account and I've lurked for longer--very tiring. It's gotten worse than "the Ottoman never stopped declining after 1571" or "the Mongols ruined Asia forever".
 
I prefer not to spaghetti quote-it gets really tedious. Keep in mind that my paragraphs don't necessarily correspond one to one with your rebuttals. They interlink and build off each other.

It's rhetorical, please do respond.

I's just that the constant "blame everything on the Qing" meme--which has been around on this site since years, this isn't my first account and I've lurked for longer--very tiring. It's gotten worse than "the Ottoman never stopped declining after 1571" or "the Mongols ruined Asia forever".

No, I entirely get what you mean. I see people do this over and over again and it annoys me as well. I certainly think more people should be educated on the very real Qing accomplishments-instead of buying into dumb cliches. I actually argued in favor of the Qing in your Early Modern dynasty thread. At the same time though, I do think the Qing were institutionally limited in ways that aren't touched on by the standard tired cliches.

Wouldn't the Zungars become tribute vassals to China? The Ming intervened when Japan invaded Korea right?

I think the Song-Yuan comparison reinforces my point-the trends of both were only stopped after a dynastic change just like the trends of the Late Ming were stopped after the Qing conquest. In fact, I would hypothesize that the "traditional" policies of the first Ming emperor was a direct reaction to the extremely non-traditional nature of the Yuan.

i disagree that "any" native Chinese dynasty has to come from that region. For example, I've brought up Zheng Chenggong before and I think he has an excellent chance of retaking China if we PoD his Nanjing campaign to succeed. While the Yongli Emporer would probably be the actual emperor, I'm pretty sure Chenggong would play a large role as the Prime Minister or something. Aside from that, a Han emperor from the northwest would still not have the kinds of institutional structures that inhibited the trends of the Late Ming. For example, the merchants of the south coast are rich, powerful, and hotbeds of Ming loyalism. I just can't see the new emperor replicating traditional Ming policies regarding maritime trade right after the collapse of the Ming proved how unsuited they were.

i agree with everything you say about Qing maritime trade because I've heard it before (some from you on this board previously). However, I'm comparing them to a hypothetical continued Han regime. I would argue that the reason the Qing were so open is precisely because maritime trade had grown so important and the Qing recognized that the Ming policy had failed. However, their institutional nature prevented this from reaching its full theoretical potential. I've been using these terms a lot and I'll define what i mean below.

The Qing regime was fundamentally a minority ethnic military regime that forcibly imposed Manchu ethnic dominance over a vast majority of Han subjects. This defined the Qing regime, it's priorities, and its institutions like the banner system in a way very different to a native Han dynasty. The single greatest threat to the Qing was a Han uprising to overthrow them. This is why the South Chinese were ranked below the North Chinese in the Manchu ethnic hierarchy. They were inherently judged to be more dangerous than northern Chinese. Why? I would say part of the reason is the way in which their mercantile nature and connections with overseas Chinese threatened traditional Confucian norms. Acquiring enormous amounts of wealth through trading and going and living overseas does not mesh with the Qing focus on stability and tradition (which they needed to focus extra hard on given the Manchu existence as a ruling minority). This is especially true given the maritime associations of Ming loyalists in SE Asia. I know that in the late Qing, gentry were making fortunes from trade while pretending to be ideal gentlemen farmers. The fact that they had to hide it is the issue.

Someone like Zheng Zhilong/Chenggong could not exist under the Qing. Koxinga was able to build enormous fleets and finance ultra-expensive wars through a trading organization that had comparable revenues to the Dutch East India Company (and this is before he took Taiwan). Why did the Qing never copy this? Why did they not take a personal role in trading and financing and exploring? Why did they need to rely on Tungning defectors to finally take Taiwan? Why wasn't there any attempts to gain direct control over overseas Chinese like with Koxinga and Zheng Jing? It is true that the Chinese maintained immense economic sway over SE Asia. However, compare OTL to if Chenggongs organization was backed by the the entire Chinese state. The difference is massive. No state would be able to stand against the immense power of the Chinese navy and the active pushes of Chinese merchants for more wealth. Contrast that to the Qing naval policies. I believe the Qing didn't do this because it made far more sense to focus on land and adhere to a Northern Chinese orientation than a south Chinese orientation given their institutional nature as a state. Imagine a US which adopted the same kind of mercantile and maritime policies that the Qing did. Yes Americans would still hold enormous economic sway in the world due to the sheer size and wealth but not comparable to what they have in OTL.

I said proto-democratic, not democratic. This means that I think they could eventually develop into actual democratic institutions. The Qing restored the autocratic system but I don't think their way is the only way. I mean, they blamed people like the reformers for the Ming fall right? Why can't a Han monarch listen to the reformers instead? The idea that the world should belong to the people instead of selfish autocrats echoes democratic thinking. The idea that the Emperor and his advisers should consult with public opinion before deciding what's right for the country is about giving power to the people. Huangs ideas on schools which would make local and regional educational systems into semioffical forums for the expression of elite opinion on public affairs is also about giving "the people" a voice over the autocrat. it's worth noting that parliaments can start out as largely advisory bodies and gain more substantial power over time. Perhaps the educational system could serve as an alternate evolutionary path to democracy? I'm getting this info from Huang Zongxi in Context: A Reappraisal of His Major Writings by Lynn A. Struve BTW. He doesn't give an interpretation to those facts- I added them.

And as I said before, rich merchants are not well suited to prosper in a traditional Confucian society. There rise to open dominance makes them a interest group that doesn't align with the traditional landowning gentry of the early Ming. They don't benefit from going back to strong autocratic rulers-again, look at the difference between post Glorious Revolution Britain and Ancien Regime France. Which one was far better for rich merchants? The Qing managed to rule an enormous country one way but I think more active participation in governance by local elites is another way. Gaining the cooperation of local elites in order to use their resources would enable the concentration of enormous power when compared to leaving them alone. The South Chinese maritime merchants weren't openly integrated into the Qing ruling class in the same way they were in places like Britain.

When I refer to the Qing having an "institutionally inward orientation" I'm not comparing them to previous dynasties. I'm comparing them to what China could have been. I know all the stuff you cite about how maritime trade increased and all that. I get that people buy into stereotypes of China being completely closed off and decaying with the Qing. That's not what I'm talking about though. When the Qing emperor temporarily shuts down maritime trade because of

(I pulled an All-Nighter yesterday so if what I'm typing doesn't make sense, I apologize)

EDIT: I remember reading an interesting scholarly article which talked about how Chinese Ming academies could have acted like proto-political parties. I'll try to find it.
 
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About people pretending to be ideal gentry while trading,I think this was always the case.Even in the Tang Dynasty,I remember reading about the royalty and aristocrats carrying out large businesses.I think it has always been the case in China that the elite decry about trade while at the same time traded themselves.
 
The House of Windsor is not really a powerful dynasty if you get my drift...

How powerful do you think the Yongli Emperor would be if Zheng Chenggong managed to save the day?

And of course, there's also other monarchies like in the 2nd German Empire.

I agree most of what you say in principle,but just word of caution.The line between merchant and the Confucian gentry class became increasing narrow since the Ming Dynasty.Many large land gentry officials had families that carried out large business while decrying about merchants.

I understand that. I referred to it in this sentence:

"I know that in the late Qing, gentry were making fortunes from trade while pretending to be ideal gentlemen farmers. The fact that they had to hide it is the issue."

I know that the merchants were sending their kids into the examinations and getting land in the Ming/Qing. I probably phrased it wrong to give you the opposite impression but I'm tired. For the record, I do understand.
 
How powerful do you think the Yongli Emperor would be if Zheng Chenggong managed to save the day?

And of course, there's also other monarchies like in the 2nd German Empire.



I understand that. I referred to it in this sentence:

"I know that in the late Qing, gentry were making fortunes from trade while pretending to be ideal gentlemen farmers. The fact that they had to hide it is the issue."

I know that the merchants were sending their kids into the examinations and getting land in the Ming/Qing. I probably phrased it wrong to give you the opposite impression but I'm tired. For the record, I do understand.
Yes I read it as well,and upon some thinking,I think this has always been the case in Chinese society--with large aristocratic clans and royalty from the Tang Dynasty participating in trade through proxies.Difference was that since the Ming Dynasty,you see bona fide merchants directly becoming part of the Confucian class.It's a major reason to why trade tax was never increased(or even waived in some circumstances),because there's increasing number of merchant officials.
 

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I agree that a native Chinese dynasty would have had borders significantly smaller than OTL Qing, but the reason for that lies less in military capability/will and instead on the cultural barriers that would prevent native Chinese from crafting successful policies to co-opt local elites.

Iain Johnston's analysis of Ming foreign policy vis-a-vis the Mongols has demonstrated that the idea of an 'innately peaceful' Chinese disposition is somewhat misleading: like most other nations, the Ming were more aggressive when they held the upper hand against the Mongols and more peaceful when the Mongols were stronger. As such, I have little doubt that a native Chinese army with sufficient military and logistical superiority would eventually attempt to expand beyond the Great Wall (as Emperor Wu of Han did).

The problem, as always, is one of costs. Leading expeditions thousands of miles from the heartland would have been immensely draining for the court - as such, without ways of successfully co-opting local elites, eventually the costs of sustaining local rule in these far-flung areas would have outweighed any benefit, material or political, of staying. Few courts - and certainly not the factionalized and budget-conscious Chinese courts - would have long stomached repeated and costly rebellions in an irrelevant frontier.

This is where I think the cultural differences between Manchu and Han would have been important. Di Cosmo (I think) makes the argument that ever since Sima Qian, Chinese historiography had placed the Mongols as somehow 'beyond the pale' of Chinese culture, unable to respond positively to cultural or policy incentives. Such a view was echoed in the more militant of Ming officials in Iain Johnston's analysis, which essentially argued for war with the Mongols on the basis that they were inherently rapacious and greedy. Such a worldview, in my opinion, would be a major obstacle in the ability of native Chinese dynasties to successfully co-opt Mongol elites and thus bring down the costs of occupation.

The Qing policy of coopting non-Manchu elites (described in Evelyn Rawski), which included not just the forging of marital, social and religious links, but also the ideological flexibility to be all things to all people (for example, simultaneously posing as the representative of Tibetan Buddhism, Confucianism and Xinjiang Islam), would have been completely alien to the Ming and, I suspect, broader Han Chinese culture. For one, the idea of heqin (marrying princesses to foreigners) was alien not just to the Ming, but apparently also to the Song Dynasty as well.

TL;DR: even if a native Chinese empire had militarily conquered Mongolia, Xinjiang or Tibet, the cultural barriers towards successful cooptation of local elites would have been so high as to make continued occupation very costly and eventually unsustainable.
OTOH the fundamental factors which allowed the Qing to expand China's borders was military technology had by 1700 or so made sedimentary infantry armies capable of reliably beating nomadic cavalry armies on their steppe homelands. Han dynasties had dispatched costly military expeditions into the steppes before under far less favorable circumstances and it's quite possible a "later ming dynasty" or Shan dynasty or w/e would have marched an army into Xinjiang to wipe out the Khanates once and for all.
 
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