Would Lend Lease in September 1939 prevent the Fall of France?

Would Lend Lease in September 1939 prevent the Fall of France?

  • Yes

    Votes: 3 8.1%
  • No, but it prevents Italian entry into the war and prevents France from surrendering

    Votes: 8 21.6%
  • No, and Italy still enters war but France refuses to surrender

    Votes: 5 13.5%
  • No, and France still surrenders but Italy stays out of the war

    Votes: 1 2.7%
  • No, and Italy still enters the war while France still surrenders

    Votes: 20 54.1%

  • Total voters
    37
Let’s say that Germany accidentally sinks an American ship in September 1939. Americans are angry but not really looking for war. FDR claims that in order to ensure we don’t have to fight, we need to send aid to Britain/France so they can win. FDR gets some sort of Lend Lease bill through Congress by the end of September before the public calms down.

Would Lend Lease starting in September of 1939 make a difference? And if not, would Lend Lease following Germany’s betrayal of the Munich Agreement make a difference? Or Lend Lease starting during the Munich Agreement?

Also, if it was later expanded to Finland and China at the start of the Winter War, would it change anything there?

I don’t consider these scenarios very likely, but am curious.
 
Would it really help the Wallies?
-Cash and Carry was voted in September 1939 and repelled the neutrality act, the allies already bought crucial material. For instance 400 of the French fighter were Curtiss P36 and among the few modern fighters of the Armée de l'Air.
-The main issue that I see is that between the time the law is voted and capitulation of France, the time is too short to really impact on the conflict. The only way it could affect the battle of France would be that the Germans are pressed by time and attacked earlier than May 1940 while not having recovered from the Polish campaign (essentially in term of ammunition) and tank/fighter upkeep.
 
The major problems with the French military were not so much equipment as doctrine/planning. In terms of air force, their system for air defense was poor, other doctrine bad, and even had they had more aircraft they were short of pilots, mechanics/ground crew etc. In many ways their tanks were better than the Panzers, but utilized extremely poorly. Lots, and lots of other examples. Soem US equipment, like tanks, was worse than what the French had. The USA is rearming/modernizing itself. As it was there was a lot of pushback for LL before the US was in the war on the basis of "the USA needs this stuff, we can't send it elsewhere". Even if the USA is willing to send a huge chunk of production to France, the reality is production in fall, 1939, has limited ability to send much.
 
Unfortunately the French didn't make very good usage of the American aircraft that they did purchase in regards to putting them actively into service. As The Rise and Fall of the French Air Force notes:

Unfortunately, this prodigious American effort was not matched on the
French side of the Atlantic. La Chambre had estimated that it would take four
weeks to transport these planes across the Atlantic and assemble them.31
When the Neutrality Act was relaxed on 3 November 1939, the first batch of
Martin bombers was already ready to go but a shortage of Allied shipping
prevented the first leaving the United States until mid-December, when the
first batch of ninety-three Martin and eight Douglas bombers set sail for
France. By this time, it had rather belatedly been decided that it was better if
the planes were assembled in North Africa: the Atlantic crossing was safer,
the winter weather was better for training, and there was no risk of enemy
bombing interfering. The first American bombers arrived in North Africa on
Christmas Day 1939 and by the beginning of April, 215 Martins and seventyfive
Douglas bombers had arrived. Unfortunately, the facilities simply did not
exist to assemble the planes and more time was wasted while equipment and
personnel were brought over from France. A shortage of machine guns,
radios, and bomb racks caused further delays. The first Martin was not
officially accepted by the French Air Force until March 1940, seven months
after the Americans had handed the first plane over to the French authorities.
The first Douglas DB-7 was delivered to the Air Force the following
month.32

They had also ordered 6,000 engines which did not arrive from the Americans.

However, there are things which could change. The French had made plans to build the Rolls-Royce Meteor Engine, but relied heavily upon American industrial capacity for it. The declaration of war meant that under neutrality Ford pulled out his participation in the effort, which undercut it heavily. If that continues, then the French could be able to build more engines. Unfortunately I don't think that this would be that useful, since the French planned to use them in D.520, which were simply not available in sufficient numbers in May 1940. However, it could accelerate Amiot 350 production, as well as other tactical bombers, which would be useful.

One could see somewhat more aircraft, and perhaps somewhat better aircraft, but in the context of May 1940 it will not be enough. The only thing I could see changing is if the French are much more confident in their ability to pursue a long war, and hence alter around their strategy and planning. French Foreign and Defense policy 1918-1940 argues that by May 1940 the French were increasingly uncertain about whether their long term war strategy was working, and so were willing to look for increasingly risky secondary options to redress the situation, such as intervention in Scandinavia, bombing Baku, intervention in the Balkans, etc. If the French are more certain about their long term advantage against the Germans, with heavy backing by the US, then could neglect these secondary options to weaken Germany, not sending many new bombers and equipment to Syria, not providing the contingents for the Norway operation, not giving Weygand his forces for opening up a new Balkans front, etc. This might even trickle down to the French high command, where part of the rationale for the disastrous Breda variant of the Dyle strategy was to save the Dutch forces, needed to redress the balance of power against the Germans when the total German strength was very much-overestimated.

How likely is this? Not very likely at all I fear, as i'm unsure that the French would draw this lesson, and even if they did, that they would appropriately utilize their resources. But the possibility exists, albeit a low percentage.

Much more likely however is that this sign of American assistance for the Allies on such a scale means that the French fight on from their Empire, but France has still fallen so that is a different question.
 
Main effect is psychological, the US is more clearly indicating it favors the Allies. That is probably enough to stop Mussolini as all his generals are telling him they will not be ready till 1942. It also stiffens the French and might make the Germans more hesitant. Given the amount of good luck the Germans had OTL, it does not take much to stop France falling in Spring 1940. Probably still pushed out of the Metropole later but fighting on from Africa ( and as Algeria is part of France at this time rather than a colony, technically France has not fallen )
 
The Fall of France was really lucky for Germany. Lend-Lease in 1939 probably would have enough butterflies for France to change the whole battle so that we will see a repeat of the Western Front of WW1.
 
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The Fall of France was really lucky for Germany. Lend-Lease in 1939 probably would have enough butterflies for France to change the whole battle so that we will a repeat of the Western Front of WW1.

Maybe so, but there's not a clear causal connection between early Lend-Lease and the French reacting to the breakthrough at Sedan more vigorously, so I wouldn't consider that in the spirit of the OP's question.
 
No. At that time it wasn't an issue of paying the military supplies; France had ordered them and was ready to pay. Nor would the US industries be able to deliver much before May 1940. Nor would any delivery change the overall situation much.

Nor is a change in the stance of the USA going to be considered a great game-changer, either in Rome or Berlin. Mussolini was still underestimating the USA on the date he declared war on them.

As to the French government setting up in exile to continue the fight, I always found that rather unlikely, but I'll admit I have not much definite evidence that it never would do so.
 
Maybe so, but there's not a clear causal connection between early Lend-Lease and the French reacting to the breakthrough at Sedan more vigorously, so I wouldn't consider that in the spirit of the OP's question.
While that's right I think it's difficult to answer such a question without recognizing the butterfly effect.
 
The US was not in a position to supply France with any great quantity of arms or equipment in 1939-1940. And as noted above, the French could not even make effective use of most of the goods they purchased from the US at this time. Also, French operational and tactical methods were deeply flawed, which additional equipment would not affect.

So this would be very unlikely to change the outcome of the Battle of France.

However, it might alter the aftermath. Explicit American commitment to the Allied cause would have a significant chance of preventing France's surrender or deterring Italy's declaration of war. So any of the four "No" options is possible, with about 10% to 50% probability each.
 
Soem US equipment, like tanks, was worse than what the French had. The USA is rearming/modernizing itself.
What would be the M2A4 was first modified from an M2A3 in November, 1938.

It was one if the best light tanks available at the Start at the War. Problem was, there was no hurry to build them. One of the best things, was it also had one of the best radio sets in the World, twice the Voice range than what the Germans could do in Morse, and all could send and recieve, unlike the German sets, where many were recieve only thru 1940.
 
As @sloreck said: outdated doctrine/tactics did the French in. No amount of slightly subpar weapon systems from the U.S. is going to change the outcome much.
 
What would be the M2A4 was first modified from an M2A3 in November, 1938.

It was one if the best light tanks available at the Start at the War. ...

Was not a light tank in that era. It out gunned most mediums of the era, & the armor was average for comparable medium tanks.

...............Length.........Width........Weight.......Armor
M2A1....... 5.38m.........2.59m.....18,600kg......51mm
Lt Tank
M2A2....... 4,42m.........2.26m.....11,800kg......25mm

PzIIID.......5.56m.........2.9m.......14,590kg.....30mm

BT7-2.......5.66m.........2.9m.......13,900kg......40mm

D2...........5.46m.........2.22m......17,950kg.....40mm

M4...........5.84m.........2.62m......30,400kg.....76mm

The French liked the US 37mm gun, & the engine/suspension but thought the M2 armor weakned by the vertical faces of the MG sponsoons.
 
No.
The French had all they needed to force a stalemate in 1940 except good leadership and a decent plan.
The two areas were they were lacking was getting enough modern AA guns and aircraft into service. The French government was spending a lot o money (specially on the Air Force) and they were buying all the US could supply (and buying well)
The only thing LL would change would be the financial situation, and by 1939 that was not a problem.
 
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