It's very simple: no CP defeat in WWI, no "Dolchstoßlegende"
Admittedly, if the Central Powers win, there will be no "Dolchstoßlegende" or "Stab in the Back-legend" in the exact sense that we know this myth from our timeline. In our timeline, this myth was first spread by the German Supreme Army Command to cover up its own mistakes and that of the Imperial Governments and the Kaiser himself. It claimed that Germany's Army had not been defeated in the field, but that the defeat was the result of a betrayal of Jews, Socialists and 'Bolsheviks'. If there is no defeat, there is of course no need for a myth to "explain" the defeat "away" and shift the blame to some one other than the supreme leadership.
But this does not mean that other, very similar myths might not arise, that blame Jews or other groups for problems other than Germany's defeat, for which the groups blamed were not responsible either and which may even have been caused by the people spreading these myths. Of course this type of scapegoating is not restricted to Germany or to right wing politicians. As far as I know, socialist politicians were forever blaming "spies" and "saboteurs" of the West for socialism's inherent problems, and in those places where they are still in power, they may still be doing so.
no economic hardship due to the treaty of Versailles
If the treaty of Versailles does not exist, it cannot cause any hardship, true enough, but there may be plenty of other problems for Germany in this timeline.
Some of those problems might even be the obvious result of Germany's having won the war. The Weimar government had many problems, but paying for an air force (apart from a few clandestine machines) or for a large army or navy or for any colonial administration was not one of them, very much in contrast to what German governments have to pay for in most 'CP victorious' scenarioes. The same of course goes for involvement in the various of wars of Central Europe.
Some problems might also be the result of winning the war, but in a counter-intuitive way. Let's say the French widget industry produces widgets of the same quality as the German industry but at only three-quarters of the price. In order to protect its own widget industry the German government slaps prohibitive tariffs on widget imports from France,
without having to fear French retribution, which the peace treaty expressly forbids. The cost of living for the part of the German populace which needs widget for its daily sustenance rises accordingly, as do the costs of the German widget processing industry, which due to the German government's measure suddenly has to fear being outpriced by its British, Swedish and Swiss competitors. French widget exports to Germany have, unsurprisingly, plummetted, and since 17,5 % of France's exports to Germany have consisted of widgets, the value of the Franc against the Mark plummets too. Which makes French gadgets, some of which were only barely competitive before the imposition of the widget tarifs,
very competitive. The German government is rapt in contemplation what to do in order to protect the German gadget industry. Then it suddenly has a bright idea:
without having to fear French retribution, which the peace treaty expressly forbids...
Then of course there are all sorts of economic problems that might occur in many timelines in many countries during the time that Hitler lived, such as an equivalent to the Wall Street crash in 1929. And of course there are any number of problems that are typical of Germany of the time (or possibly even later eras), which have nothing to do with Versailles or WW I. Let's say the coal seams in the Ruhr are too small to allow the mining companies to compete with American coal, the farms in Germany's South West are way too small, and the land owners in the North East are way too conservative to innovate in time to stay competitive ... and probably many more real life problems, that might, in combination with mistaken government measures cause an economic crisis in a victorious Germany. The best solutions will probably look somewhat abstract to the average German and will probably involve not just the distribution of wealth but also the creation of more wealth. The easiest to understand 'solutions' are those offered by Hitler or by a Hitler equivalent: 1. Take it from the Jews 2. Take it from the Eastern Untermenschen
(Of course, an alternate Hitler equivalent does not neccessarily have the same groups as intended victims, but in order to qualify as a right-wing radical, he must have, among other things, a similar 'we will get rich by taking it away from the enemy group' ideology)
there is no "treacherous" democratic government around which signed said humiliating treaty
I assume that history abounds with nationalists of the most diverse countries who blame their supposedly weak-kneed government for "treacherously" "squandering" hard won victories by not imposing much harsher terms on the countries they have just defeated. A Hitler who blames a government of whatever stripe for "only" taking Longwy-Briey from France and apart from that "only" making Belgium a vassal state (on top of the Central European vassal states of course) and besides "only" realising the "Mittelafrika" colonial project, such a Hitler is very easily imaginable. If Germany happens to be wealthy in this timeline (the victory is no guarantee for that) he will not have many listeners for his crackpot theories, but if Germany has big financial problems, there will be many, and he has good chances of getting power in Germany.<br>
there's no need for revanchism (remember, Alsace-Lorraine, Posen and West Prussia will all be still part of Germany), and there's nobody around to forbid the Austrians from joining Germany (in the case that Austria-Hungary falls apart in a CP victory).
Therefore, would Hitler rise to power? The answer is NO.
To describe Hitler as a revanchist is to describe him much too mildly. In
Mein Kampf he called those Germans who wanted "only" to restore Germany to its pre-1914 position "criminals", because, in his view such a Germany would not be able to survive. A type like Hitler would always see the well-being of his own country dependent on its ability to dominate, possibly even to exterminate, other countries. No matter how big Germany actually is, he would always want it to become bigger, because for him that's the only way to thrive. If the Germany he lived in was wealthy, he would have relatively few adherents, but a victory in World War I would not have guaranteed Germany wealth and in any Germany with deep economic problems he would have had a following that made him a force to be reckoned with.