Would Germany have beat the Soviet Union if they could focus 100% of their power on them?

Operation Barbarossa and Germany's failure to defeat the USSR is often analyzed, but one crucial factor that is sometimes overlooked is the immense strain Germany faced due to fighting on multiple fronts. While Germany waged an all-out genocidal war against the Soviet Union, they were also forced to divert significant resources to other theaters of war.

Troops and matériel were needed to counter British air raids, fight in the Mediterranean and North Africa against the British and later the Americans, and maintain control over the Balkans. Additionally, German forces were spread thin across Europe, where they had to suppress partisan movements in countries such as France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece. These diversions siphoned manpower and resources away from what Hitler considered the primary objective: the conquest of the Soviet Union.

In contrast, the USSR could direct nearly all of its efforts towards repelling the German invasion. Though, even this was often insufficient. Despite Germany's divided focus, they achieved absolutely staggering successes against the Soviets early on, advancing to the gates of Moscow and Stalingrad. Along the way, they captured major cities and vast territories, including Kiev, Minsk, Sevastopol, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Odessa, and Smolensk. The Germans also occupied the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Crimea, and a large portion of European Russia.

The significance of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet war effort cannot be overstated; even Stalin acknowledged its crucial role in the USSR's survival. However, Germany's failure to capture Moscow and their eventual defeat at Stalingrad and then Kursk marked decisive turning points in the war.

It's important to remember that Germany's inability to fully concentrate on the Soviet front was largely due to Britain's resistance. Britain's survival kept Germany embroiled in a multi-front war, supporting Soviet and partisan efforts while simultaneously engaging German forces elsewhere. So, this raises an interesting question: If Britain had been neutralized early in the war, allowing Germany to focus all its resources on defeating the USSR, could they have won?
 
Depends on what you classify as a victory. If we're talking a complete conquest like what they did in Western Europe and the Soviets completely surrender: extremely unlikely if not impossible. The Germans were trying to conquer an area the size of the United States from the Atlantic Coast to the Mississippi River. They could possibly get to Moscow if they make it their number one overall priority and Hitler doesn't shift forces around either to Leningrad or to the Ukraine. I said this on another thread but I think the Eastern Front would eventually have bogged down and become like what the US had to deal with in Afghanistan and Iraq post fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Even though the Nazis wanted to exterminate the inhabitants, there's still a huge area to hide in for guerilla activity. Allied Lend-Lease could still keep going through the routes they used OTL to keep the partisans fighting.
 
No. The Germans didn't lose because of the Soviets' air superiority.

They lost because they invaded a bigger, more populated and more industrialised country under the belief it would collapse in less than three months. Their sheer brutality against the locals only increased resistance against them, turning the sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad into utter Hell

If by some miracle Hitler managed to get a ceasefire with London, Stalin would get far more paranoid about a Nazis invasion. IRL he was caught with his pants down because he didn't belive the Nazis would start a two-front war
 
At the very least, they would have forced Stalin to sue for peace. I would argue that it is possible to cause the Soviet state to collapse as an effective combatant, but total occupation was not feasible nor was seriously contemplated.
 
In 1941 I'd guess about 90-95% of German men and materiel were on the eastern front. They got as far as they could then. Adding the rest wouldn't have really helped, because they didn't have the logistics. As an example: it's often told the Germans were stupid fighting in the winter without winter gear. Well, they had thought about winter gear, but it was sitting in Poland, because they didn't have the means to supply everything to the front, so they took a chance to not ship wintergear in the hope they could take Moscow and have the soldiers sitting in warm houses. It didn't quite work out that way.

In 1942 their chance had already passed. They weren't able to mount an offensive over the whole front, but just towards Stalingrad/Baku. Which was exacly were the Russians didn't expect it, so they hit them were they were weakest.

The Afrika Korps was small, so that would have been just a drop in the ocean.

The Luftwaffe protecting Germany may have made a bit of difference, but that were mostly fighters and the Germans in general already had airsuperiority in 1941 and 1942 in Russia, so not much of a difference either. Although maybe they could have built more (fighter)bombers, but then again it means more have to be supplied and they had issues with their logistics already.

So no, it wouldn't have helped.
 
At the very least, they would have forced Stalin to sue for peace. I would argue that it is possible to cause the Soviet state to collapse as an effective combatant, but total occupation was not feasible nor was seriously contemplated.
Weren't they only looking to seize the land all the way to the Urals? Granted, that's a lot and I don't think it's feasible, but it's not the majority of Russian land, although it did have most of the population.
 
No because the Soviets were fiercely fighting every inch of the land. German logistics also wouldn't allow it to push like they did on 1941. That's why the thrust to the south caucuse mountain was so limited and eventually bogged down.

They need oil to achieve any kind of maneuver warfare which was severely limited since Romanian oil wasn't enough or even half of what Axis forces in total needed.

This alongside their draconian killing of any they deem subhuman only further strengthen the Soviet people's resolve.

Once the Germans reach their limit and the Soviets finally reorganize itself like in 1942 it was more or less game over for them.
 
The war against the USSR was more than just a military confrontation for the Germans, it was a Nazi fueled clash of civilizations, and ultimately of races / "races". German atrocities stemming from the clash of civilizations / races Nazi ideology fueled Soviet resistance in places where it might of collapsed.

That aside, lets say that the Nazis become "Notzis". That does not mean they transform into "Mister Rogers". Rather, they just follow French, British- heck, even Ottoman colonial empire building norms. Like the Franco British and Ottomans before them, the "Notzis" have sticks- but they also have carrots. And.... are pretty good about dialing in the appropriate carrot to stick ratio to the local situation.

Favored "Martial" ethnic groups are declared to divide targeted societies. Larger areas broken up for easy administration. Some areas are directly colonized. Others are given a variations of autonomy, varying degrees of "independence" as a protectorates etc.

My guess is that the Notzis go all the way to the Urals. The Nazis? Not sure about them, especially if Lend Lease remained intact.
 
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The first question is what does it mean to "win". If the definition is that the Germans reach the Pacific Ocean and occupy every kilometer of Soviet territory, then I think it is impossible. But if the definition is that they reach the Archangel-Astrakhan line and then defend it leading to perhaps a formal or informal cessation of hostilities with the rump Soviet regime, then it may be possible.
Some combination of the following things would be necessary.
1. no lend lease or other aide to the Soviets
2. Turkey becomes at least a friendly neutral leading to Axis control of the Black Sea which then eases logistic problems by permitting shipping of various men and material by sea,
3. Germany does a much better job of reaching out to minority nationalities and even Russian dissidents perhaps by supporting an alternate exile regime
4. Germany develops a long range heavy bomger
5. Germany faces less demands in the West due to either peace with the UK or at least the failure of the US to enter the war
6. Hitler gives his generals more discretion,
7. Speer assumes control of the economy at an earlier date,
8. Japan attacks the Soviet Union from the East

There may be some others. I would say that if you give them 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7, they would have a higher than 50% probability of getting there.
 
This sums it up. The forces remaining in the west were small, as were those diverted to the Mediterranean.

In 1941 I'd guess about 90-95% of German men and materiel were on the eastern front. They got as far as they could then. Adding the rest wouldn't have really helped, because they didn't have the logistics. As an example: it's often told the Germans were stupid fighting in the winter without winter gear. Well, they had thought about winter gear, but it was sitting in Poland, because they didn't have the means to supply everything to the front, so they took a chance to not ship wintergear in the hope they could take Moscow and have the soldiers sitting in warm houses. It didn't quite work out that way.

In 1942 their chance had already passed. They weren't able to mount an offensive over the whole front, but just towards Stalingrad/Baku. Which was exacly were the Russians didn't expect it, so they hit them were they were weakest.

The Afrika Korps was small, so that would have been just a drop in the ocean.

The Luftwaffe protecting Germany may have made a bit of difference, but that were mostly fighters and the Germans in general already had airsuperiority in 1941 and 1942 in Russia, so not much of a difference either. Although maybe they could have built more (fighter)bombers, but then again it means more have to be supplied and they had issues with their logistics already.

So no, it wouldn't have helped.

To reiterate the point made above more forcefully: The Wehrmachts problem was one of logistics, and more specifically material transportation. The problem of rebuilding the railways to support the armies and air forces was insurmountable, and all the automotive transport remaining in the west was grossly inadequate. The Wehrmacht had already stripped France, Belgium, and Holland of the useful and some not so useful cargo vehicles.

Another problem seldom considered is the actual losses taken July - December 1941. Those were actually severe, and another panzer corps or infantry army from the west won't make up for those losses.

The low estimate of Wehrmacht losses from 22 June to 31 August 1941 is 390,000 WiA, MiA, KiA. 22 June to 30 November the losses were slightly under 800,000, Thats well over 20% of the Wehrmacht manpower committed to to the conquest. Add in the losses of the winter and the Wehrmacht was down over 30% of its critical combat arms strength As MBE Bailey pointed out in his examination of "Bliztkrieg". those losses were concentrated among the officers and NCO of the infantry, reconnaissance, and armored battalions. This crippled many of these formations for the winter, until replacements could be trained up to the same high skill levels.
 
No because the Soviets were fiercely fighting every inch of the land. German logistics also wouldn't allow it to push like they did on 1941. That's why the thrust to the south caucuse mountain was so limited and eventually bogged down.

They need oil to achieve any kind of maneuver warfare which was severely limited since Romanian oil wasn't enough or even half of what Axis forces in total needed.

This alongside their draconian killing of any they deem subhuman only further strengthen the Soviet people's resolve.

Once the Germans reach their limit and the Soviets finally reorganize itself like in 1942 it was more or less game over for them.
You are totally missing the point of the OP. Without the Germans being at war with the Western Allies, they can resume buying oil from other sources. Limited, yes, but far more than they were able to obtain whilst under blockade. And no, it's not game over once the Soviets reorganize themselves. Without German commitments to the Western Theatre, it becomes not only possible but probable that the Soviets get forced into a peace of exhaustion at best. They don't have infinite resources themselves, and have to recapture lost territory to gain the upper hand. Which was extremely difficult to do when the Germans were fighting from well-prepared positions. Germany doesn't have to resume maneuver warfare to break Soviet capability to retake its western territories. They just have to hold the line and bleed the Red Army white.
 
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The Soviets were top down organized. All the failures and victories ultimately lead to Stalin. More losses could push more purges and those could push generals to coup him and sue for peace to save their own skin. Germans could be less chauvinist and actually treat Belarusians, Ukrainians and Balts as people and arm them at least until they win in the East. Aparently the idea of letting Ukrainians die fighting Russians before you try to exterminate them is too far for Nazis. Not losing cream of Luftwaffe in Africa and over Britain would’ve helped as well but most important change would be opening of sea lanes. If Germany can get access to world oil market they won’t invade Soviets in 41. And if they do they will go much further
 
I've seen it argued here that the Germans couldn't implement friendlier policies towards the Ukrainians and such because the success of their whole invasion hinged on stealing everything from the locals, including food, as soon as they began occupation.
 
These threads are always exhausting because people see a massive POD with earth-shaking consequences such as "the Western Allies duck out of WW2" and come to the frankly confounding conclusion that "pretty much nothing changes, actually". Like -- huh? There's this increasingly common notion that the support of the Western Allies was in the "nice to have" category for the Soviets, when in reality it may very well have been a decisive factor in their national survival.

One of my pet peeves on this site is the notion that the outcome of the war was decided by any one factor. For example, the Germans did not lose because they were racist, nor did the Soviets win because they had more people. Both of these contributed to the ultimate outcome of the war, sure, but there were many factors in play that worked to the Soviets' benefit and to the Germans' disadvantage-- and with the scenario posited in the OP, things are looking much better for Germany and much, MUCH worse for the Soviet Union.

To start, I disagree with the conception that the Soviet Union would be in any way meaningfully helped by Stalin being aware of Barbarossa. This awareness does not change the dreadful state of the Red Army at the time, nor does it likely result in a change to the Soviets' OTL ineffective response to the invasion when Stalin did finally pull himself together. The Red Army in 1941 was not the well-oiled fighting machine it would later become, and it was not until later in the war that they would more heavily implement the much more effective strategy of defense-in-depth. It is for these reasons that I don't think the opening stages of Barbarossa would be meaningfully shifted in the Soviets' favor. In fact, the opposite is likely true -- they are in for a world of hurt if the Germans are able to deploy the entirety of the Luftwaffe to the Eastern Front. I think it's ridiculous that one of the most liked comments on this thread more or less dismisses the significance of having air superiority. Now, it's not a war winner in and of itself, sure, but it played a massive part in the Allies' success OTL, and combined with other differences such as a more mechanized Wehrmacht in the East due to renewed access to world oil markets and the Germans may very well capture strategic locations that OTL were close-run things. With a little luck, Germany may very well occupy Leningrad and Moscow where they failed OTL, dealing a mortal blow to the Soviets' administrative and transportation systems.

And while yes, the Soviet Union did have a much higher population than Germany, this was not necessarily a major factor in the beginning of the invasion. In fact, the total fighting strength on the Axis and Soviet sides at the opening of Barbarossa were largely similar, with the Axis actually having a slight numerical advantage. That the Soviets were able to mobilize so many more soldiers later on was due in no small part to the material support of the Western Allies. Without food supplied from the US, for example, a huge amount of fighting-aged men who were sent to the front OTL are going to have to stay behind to run the farms. Ditto for war material -- more men who went to the front OTL are going to be staying in the factories to try and make up for the loss of material that the US in OTL sent them in droves. Returning to the food situation, the Soviet Union is going to be in dire straits if/when the Germans have occupied their best farmland and there is no foreign aid coming to make up the difference. In this scenario, the food problem for the Soviets could very well reach apocalyptic proportions, with the potential for the state to outright collapse from the combined stresses of the war.

To conclude, I would like to be clear that I don't think German victory in this case is in any way guaranteed, I simply want to argue against the common stance that the Soviets would be just peachy in the absence of Western support, and that the war would, regardless of the outcome, be a much closer-fought thing.
 
These threads are always exhausting because people see a massive POD with earth-shaking consequences such as "the Western Allies duck out of WW2" and come to the frankly confounding conclusion that "pretty much nothing changes, actually". Like -- huh? There's this increasingly common notion that the support of the Western Allies was in the "nice to have" category for the Soviets, when in reality it may very well have been a decisive factor in their national survival.

One of my pet peeves on this site is the notion that the outcome of the war was decided by any one factor. For example, the Germans did not lose because they were racist, nor did the Soviets win because they had more people. Both of these contributed to the ultimate outcome of the war, sure, but there were many factors in play that worked to the Soviets' benefit and to the Germans' disadvantage-- and with the scenario posited in the OP, things are looking much better for Germany and much, MUCH worse for the Soviet Union.

To start, I disagree with the conception that the Soviet Union would be in any way meaningfully helped by Stalin being aware of Barbarossa. This awareness does not change the dreadful state of the Red Army at the time, nor does it likely result in a change to the Soviets' OTL ineffective response to the invasion when Stalin did finally pull himself together. The Red Army in 1941 was not the well-oiled fighting machine it would later become, and it was not until later in the war that they would more heavily implement the much more effective strategy of defense-in-depth. It is for these reasons that I don't think the opening stages of Barbarossa would be meaningfully shifted in the Soviets' favor. In fact, the opposite is likely true -- they are in for a world of hurt if the Germans are able to deploy the entirety of the Luftwaffe to the Eastern Front. I think it's ridiculous that one of the most liked comments on this thread more or less dismisses the significance of having air superiority. Now, it's not a war winner in and of itself, sure, but it played a massive part in the Allies' success OTL, and combined with other differences such as a more mechanized Wehrmacht in the East due to renewed access to world oil markets and the Germans may very well capture strategic locations that OTL were close-run things. With a little luck, Germany may very well occupy Leningrad and Moscow where they failed OTL, dealing a mortal blow to the Soviets' administrative and transportation systems.

And while yes, the Soviet Union did have a much higher population than Germany, this was not necessarily a major factor in the beginning of the invasion. In fact, the total fighting strength on the Axis and Soviet sides at the opening of Barbarossa were largely similar, with the Axis actually having a slight numerical advantage. That the Soviets were able to mobilize so many more soldiers later on was due in no small part to the material support of the Western Allies. Without food supplied from the US, for example, a huge amount of fighting-aged men who were sent to the front OTL are going to have to stay behind to run the farms. Ditto for war material -- more men who went to the front OTL are going to be staying in the factories to try and make up for the loss of material that the US in OTL sent them in droves. Returning to the food situation, the Soviet Union is going to be in dire straits if/when the Germans have occupied their best farmland and there is no foreign aid coming to make up the difference. In this scenario, the food problem for the Soviets could very well reach apocalyptic proportions, with the potential for the state to outright collapse from the combined stresses of the war.

To conclude, I would like to be clear that I don't think German victory in this case is in any way guaranteed, I simply want to argue against the common stance that the Soviets would be just peachy in the absence of Western support, and that the war would, regardless of the outcome, be a much closer-fought thing.
I agree with this, but I just want to ask: Why wouldn't the Soviets get international support and be able to buy at least some of the lend-lease stuff?
 
A lot depends on the starting conditions.
If Germany attacks in late June 1941, as OTL, but leaving the Balkans and Africa to Italy and reducing troop committments in Norway, it would be nearly impossible to do better. The extra motorised and armoured troops from Africa (and those lost OTL in Greece and Africa, which includes airlanding troops that have not been lost in Crete) would make the encirclements and sweeping advances a little faster and easier, but we're only looking at one or two panzer divisions extra. Besides, the original encirclements were so spectacularly successful that the scale and effect probably doesn't change. Meanwhile, supplying the extra motorised units strains logistics, so the following infantry are even further behind, worse supplied etc.
But while this is going on, Italy is being kicked around in Greece, Africa, possibly Albania and probably Rhodes and the other Aegean islands while the Balkans leave an uncertain flank that is vulnerable to allied interference. The French in Syria are probably fairly secure, but other Vichy controlled areas might feel a bit more inclined to test the limits of the armistice if they see Italy doing so badly and with minimal german presence.
This suggests minimal difference in overall results the soviet union but a very unstable southern flank, which likely turns into a disaster if Italy withdraws from the war or (less likely in late 41 and early 42) switches sides. But maybe the slight increase in mobile forces and more powerful airforce and more available air transports could give a chance of doing just enough better in the alt AGC and AGN areas to be worth it.

If Germany plans (very) differently and heads east instead of west in 1940 [1], they can only do that with France securely pacified somewhow - which requires extraordinary diplomatic skills beyond what I can conceive - and also requires that Hitler's thirst for vengeance for Versailles is suppressed, which also would be very hard (more likely impossible) to arrange.

I'll agree that getting Turkey and the Balkans on board sufficiently to permit supply to the Black Sea would be helpful to alt Barabarossa, but that again needs the kind of long term strategy that Germany wasn't good at or interested in. So the starting conditions- no Hitler, tightly controlled Hitler or someone esle in charge - aren't impossible, but they both require and result a very different world in the late 1930s and in 1940.

[1] 1940, about half the German tanks were Panzer 2, the rest about an even mix of Panzer 1 and assorted mediums (3, 4, 35t and 38t). Without the OTL French campaigns, they will be missing the 80,000 captured British vehicles, the few hundred captured French tanks and a pile of captured guns. Sure they will not have lost vehicles in combat, but still it's not necessarily as rosy as it might seem at first glance.

Edit. Normal for Norfolk provided better figures. It's more like about half Panzer 1 and 2 combined (if I include the Befehls tanks as mostly 1 based). and the rest some king of medium. But still a lot of light tanks.
 
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I simply want to argue against the common stance that the Soviets would be just peachy in the absence of Western support, and that the war would, regardless of the outcome, be a much closer-fought thing.
Other than the idea that what happened IOTL is the only thing that could have ever happened I think this issue stems from people not wanting to acknowledge that in the real world evil can defeat good and being good doesn’t mean you can never lose, make peace or stalemate against the forces of evil. As discussed in countless threads going back to the forum’s origin it’s very plausible that the Reich could defeat the USSR without the WAllies and plausible that the WAllies would make peace with the Reich if the USSR fell due to the tremendous cost in blood and treasure they’d have to pay. Governments are run by human beings, not storybook characters incapable of deviating from the script.
 
Other than the idea that what happened IOTL is the only thing that could have ever happened I think this issue stems from people not wanting to acknowledge that in the real world evil can defeat good and being good doesn’t mean you can never lose, make peace or stalemate against the forces of evil. As discussed in countless threads going back to the forum’s origin it’s very plausible that the Reich could defeat the USSR without the WAllies and plausible that the WAllies would make peace with the Reich if the USSR fell due to the tremendous cost in blood and treasure they’d have to pay. Governments are run by human beings, not storybook characters incapable of deviating from the script.
I thought the general consensus was that the Germans couldn't beat the USSR, even with the WAllies out of the war? And that even getting the WAllies out of the war is pretty much impossible too?
 
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