Would France be better off had the second french empire continued?

I didn't think about the mobilization's rapidity, it's a very good point!
However, the troops sent to Mexico never represented the majority of the French imperial army. An intervention in Rhineland doesn't need all the army. The possibility of a French intervention in 1866 was discussed in a book that i read some months ago. I'll try to get it and post the interesting paragraph.
In my mind, the single effect of the announce of a french mobilization could have greatly feared Prussians and forced them to send troops in West-Prussia in emergency. The Austrians could have gained a little rest and the war could have last longer than in OTL, turning in a Prussia's defeat.

And like you've written, the biggest problem remains Napoléon IIl himself who was blind to Bismarck's danger for a long time...

The rapidity at which Vienna got its behind handed to it surprised everybody, Napoleon 3rd included. Remember the last European war Prussia had fought (just two years before!) it took them 8 months with Austrian help to beat Denmark. A fight with another great power? No way that was going to only take 7 weeks. And mobalization is expensive, politically controversial, and would slow down the steady reforms going on. No, no need to rush: better to wait until things big down and you can collect on the bill for your assistance.
 
Yes, i know that Napoléon III counted on a long war to be a mediator and try to gain compensations.
However in France, the cabinet and the emperor really hesitated between this strategy and an intervention. I remembered that Napoléon III seemed agree for the war and then changed his mind.
 
If, for whatever reason the war is short or doesn't happen, you would probably get an earlier French Tonkin.
In 1873, there was an unofficial army expedition that was not pursued as France was still reeling from the war.
No reason those pressures wouldn't happen. So now, France has a border with China ten years earlier, right after the Taiping rebellion
 
The rapidity at which Vienna got its behind handed to it surprised everybody, Napoleon 3rd included. Remember the last European war Prussia had fought (just two years before!) it took them 8 months with Austrian help to beat Denmark. A fight with another great power? No way that was going to only take 7 weeks. And mobalization is expensive, politically controversial, and would slow down the steady reforms going on. No, no need to rush: better to wait until things big down and you can collect on the bill for your assistance.
The 2nd Danish war was the first field test of both the Prussian army reform and of the Moltke's ideas to set up a General Staff, to use railways for mobilization (in 1858 the Prussian army's mobilization was a laughingstock) and telegraph for communication, and to implement the new tactical doctrine for infantry (which was based on a shift from battalion action to independent company action). As it is easy to imagine, a good number of the officers from major level and upwards were not particularly enthused by the idea that they had to strictly follow General Staff directives or that subalterns would be delegated so much authority, and Moltke had to behave like the legendary Dutch boy running from dike to dike to put is finger in leaks.
The Austrian co-belligerence was more a hindrance than a benefit, and the only good point (from the Prussian POV) was that the Austrian did not realize that the Prussian had changed the traditional tactical approach.
On top of this, the only strategy conceivable was to attack the Danish fortifications of the Jutland (the superiority of the Danish fleet did not allow amphibious operations against the islands) after having quickly occupied the Duchies: not a lot of leeway for brilliant strategic plans.

The field tests were successful, a good chunk of the Prussian officer class was retired (not all the deadwood, by all means, in particular at the top: the generals were all important nobles or even members of the royal house), the timetable for the mobilization of the army was drafted very close to perfection and the operation theater gave Moltke the opportunity to shine from a strategic point of view.
No surprise the war of 1866 was so much shorter with 20/20 hindsight: from the POV of contemporaries it was a big shock, everyone expected a much longer war.
 
I didn't think about the mobilization's rapidity, it's a very good point!
However, the troops sent to Mexico never represented the majority of the French imperial army. An intervention in Rhineland doesn't need all the army. The possibility of a French intervention in 1866 was discussed in a book that i read some months ago. I'll try to get it and post the interesting paragraph.
In my mind, the single effect of the announce of a french mobilization could have greatly feared Prussians and forced them to send troops in West-Prussia in emergency. The Austrians could have gained a little rest and the war could have last longer than in OTL, turning in a Prussia's defeat.

And like you've written, the biggest problem remains Napoléon IIl himself who was blind to Bismarck's danger for a long time...
I said that "the best French troops were in Mexico", not the the largest portion of the army was: IIRC there were some 10,000 French soldiers in the Mexican adventure,but they were the best French infantry troops.
The mobilization was made even more complicated by the fact that in peacetime the French army was split up all over the country, 2 regiments in each city, and in case of war the armies were formed by ordering each regiment to reach a meeting point. It also means that these regiments would have to be fitted into an organization they had never known in advance, with obvious integration problems.It goes without saying that this cantonment system had been thought up to minimize the risk of a military coup.

The Prussian army after 1862 was cantoned by armies, which allowed them to conduct military exercises on army basis every summer, guaranteed an easier integration in case of mobilization and also guaranteed thath they would reach the front more or less t the same time.

In 1870 the French army crossed the Prussian border before the Prussians invaded France: the 2nd Corps (Frossard) and the 3rd one (Bazaine) crossed the border on 2nd August and moved to occupy Saarbrucken, but it was more of a demonstrative action to please the French public than a real invasion: it certainly wasn't the "first step of a march on Berlin" which the imperial propaganda depicted. On 4th August news of the march of the 3rd Prussian army toward Wisselbourg convinced Louis Napoleon to recall the 2nd and 3rd Corps on defensive positions in France.

If the French had mobilized in 1866, it would have been an obvious bluff and I doubt very much that von Roon or Moltke would have lost their nerves upon hearing of this
 
All that you say is true and clear to me but it's opposed to this Bismarck's quotes: "I was so sure about Napoléon III that we didn't let a single soldier on the french border. Nevertheless, if the red pants [=french soldiers] had appeared on the Rhine, i was losing the game".
So i'm confused, if French mobilisation in 1866 would have been a bluff, why Bismarck had feared it?
 
All that you say is true and clear to me but it's opposed to this Bismarck's quotes: "I was so sure about Napoléon III that we didn't let a single soldier on the french border. Nevertheless, if the red pants [=french soldiers] had appeared on the Rhine, i was losing the game".
So i'm confused, if French mobilisation in 1866 would have been a bluff, why Bismarck had feared it?
Are you now believing what a politician writes in his memoirs?
 
Well, 2 historians used this quote in their books so I considered that it would be interesting. This quote is not the single argument in favor of the possibility of a victorious intervention. The following informations come from the book "the great defeat 1870-1871" of Alain Gouttman.

Battle of sadowa happened on July the 3rd. The 4th, the austrian ambassador Metternich called france for help.
The next day, a day that numerous authors considere as "the most decisive of the second empire", Napoléon III is with his principals ministers to decide if France must intervene or not. Several french officials was ready to intervene. The minister of foreign affairs, the minister of war and Eugénie wanted an intervention. Napoléon III hesitated as usual.
The maréchal Randon (minister of war) told, not exagerating, to the government that he could concentrate 80000 men in Strasbourg at this moment and 250000 in 3 weeks.
The minister of foreign affairs even told "40000 is enough!".
Bismarck told to the parliament in 1874 that "Even if France had not so much troops at this moment, the addition of a few french regiments would have been enough to transform the important troops of South Germany, who had an excellent equipment but without organisation, into a very good army who would have immediately forced us to cover Berlin and give up to all of our successes in Bohemia.".
Benedetti, french ambassador, was sent in emergency to Bismarck in Bohemia, in the middle of the staff. The french told him to not forget the armistice asked by Vienna. Bismarck answered that an immediate armistice was too kind to Austria and that "Today, the way to Vienna is open. In 3 days, it will be closed".
It was admit, without telling it, that the Sadowa's victory was not as complete as the Great prussian Staff had wanted: conceived like an obliteration battle, it only have been a repelling of the enemy without preventing him to continue the fight.

July the 12th, Austria again called Napoléon III for help, the emperor didn't reacted.
Even with the best troops in Mexico and the problem of money in military administration, in 1866, the French imperial army remained an intimidating force. Beust (austrian diplomat) -like Bismarck- was right to think that a simple show as the sent of an observation corps on the border would have been enough to fear Berlin.
The austrian diplomat reported that he told to Napoléon on July the 12th: "Majesty, you have one hundred thousands of men in Châlons. Move them to the border. The operation's line of the prussian army is already too large so this army will must be forced to stop. In Vienna, Munich and Stuttgart, we are regaining courage and Germany will welcome you as a mediator. Otherwise, be careful, it's all of Germany that will be made against you.".

I finished the quotes. Finally, it seemed to me that the question of the possibility of a french intervention is not settled.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
A moderately or even slightly friendly/cordial stance towards the Catholic Church from Napoleon, together with a much weaker anti-clericism without the Republic, could have delayed or even nullified the Jules Ferry Laws. The Jules Ferry Laws on public education had a huge legacy on the French education system and nation state, since it was the first major step towards the official separation of the Church and the State in 1905.
 
Top