Would Fall of Singapore have looked like ASBs once?

[King Augeas]

Singapore falling is ASB because the Japanese are bogged down in an unwinnable war in China, lack bases anywhere near Malaya, and any attempt to move on Singapore would almost certainly bring the US into the war by virtue of having to attack the Philippines first, giving plenty of time to reinforce Malaya. It's utterly ridiculous to think that Japan could project enough force, quickly enough, into Malaya and the DEI to cause Singapore to fall.

Until, of course, the UK is wholly committed to war in Europe, Africa and the North Atlantic and has had to re-equip its army after a catastrophic defeat in Europe, meaning that there are no meaningful reinforcements to be sent, while France and the Netherlands have been defeated, allowing Japan to waltz into forward bases in Indochina and to occupy the DEI, and the US fleet has been mauled at its own, similarly impregnable base... oh.

The sad truth is that by autumn 1941, Singapore was close to indefensible. Percival might have been able to defeat the initial attack, but the siege that would have followed would have been unwinnable.

 

[Julian]

Which division? I'm genuinly curious, becuase I thought I'd accounted for all the Soviet divisions in this area, none even close to being an operational threat to the XLI Pz.-A.K.

Edit: The only thing I have close is the 90th rifle division, but it had been badly mauled during the opening phases of Barbarossa, IIRC it had lost most if not all of its divisional artillery and was not a threat at that point.

Mid-July? Early August/late July, yes I agree. Mid-July? There's a gap between the 13th and 21st/22nd July there are no Soviet forces opposing the XLI.Pz.-A.K. at the Luga river from what I've found.

There's also the dwadling from OKW about Reinhardt's corps that is eerily similar to what happend during the advance of Panzer in Fall Gelb.

And yes I'm quite harsh on von Leeb, I don't think he was suitable to conduct a large scale offensive of this kind. A defensive fight? Sure I'd pick him or Heinrici any day of the week, but on the offensive he just wasn't aggressive enough.

Alright will you agree with me that attaching the 5. Leichte and 15. Panzer divisions under the command of a certain general Erwin Rommel to Panzergruppe 4 will substantially increase it's hitting and exploitation capabilites during Barbarossa to the point that the fights at Luga and Staraja Russa might not have happend as they did OTL?

According to Glantz, and a couple internet sources I found, the LOG on 6 July consisted of 4 rifle divisions (70th, 171st, 177th, and 191st)and 3 People's Militia divisions. It was then reinforced by 41st Rifle Corps (90th, 111th, 118th, and 235th rifle divisions), the 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade, 10th Mechanized Corps (21st and 24th Tank Divisions), and 1 more PM division. It was also reinforced by various training schools, machinegun-artillery units, etc. Around 60,000 civilians were conscripted to construct the Luga Defense Line and various other belts. Most of the troops had taken up positions by 14th July.

Part of the confusion may be because Reinhardt swung further north than expected and seized bridgeheads east of Kingisepp against only light Soviet resistance. This would account for why you're only seeing 1 rifle division. However, over the next 6 days Piadyshev threw most of his reserves against XXI Corp's bridgehead, including 90th and 191st rifle divisions, 2 people's militia divisions, and various training, AT artillery, and STAVKA artillery units.

I'd add that save for a couple fresh units most of the forces on July 14th were 50% understrength. However, they were occupying strong defensive positions and were able to fight Reinhardt's corps to a standstill until the offensive was halted. He clearly did try to breakout from the bridgehead, as OKH's originaly plan was for LVI and XXI Corps to encircle Soviet forces in the region and seize Leningrad off the march.

Finally, Voroshilov had organized a reserve of forces transferred from north of Leningrad by 15th-17th July (272nd, 265th, 268th, and 281st Rifle Divisions, along with 1st Tank Division).

The Red Army's forces were dangerously understrength but still in fighting condition, receiving a steady stream of reinforcements, and fighting from fortifications in excellent defensive terrain. Beyond the Luga Line they had several more belts in various stages of completion, and reserves to man them.

I agree that having an extra panzer and light division would be useful, but not decisive to the degree you suggest. Soviet forces, while badly beaten, were not on the verge of collapse as you suggest. Just the opposite, the mid-July period was one where Northern Front received a number of reinforcements and launched a major counterstroke that mauled LVI Corps. The scale of the fighting is simply too large for a couple divisions to make a difference.

Plus the logistic problems remain; while the 25th Panzer and 5th Light would be in ok condition (They wouldn't have captured British or Italian trucks, and would be in constant combat rather than in a pursuit, increasing the supply load), Reinhardt and Manstein's Corps would still be suffering the same supply problems they did IOTL, necessitating an extensive buildup before launching another offensive.

Also I'd add that I was incorrect earlier, 3rd Panzer Group did transfer a corps (39th) to assist in attacking Leningrad.

 

[Rubicon]

According to Glantz, and a couple internet sources I found, the LOG on 6 July consisted of 4 rifle divisions (70th, 171st, 177th, and 191st)and 3 People's Militia divisions. It was then reinforced by 41st Rifle Corps (90th, 111th, 118th, and 235th rifle divisions), the 1st Mountain Rifle Brigade, 10th Mechanized Corps (21st and 24th Tank Divisions), and 1 more PM division. It was also reinforced by various training schools, machinegun-artillery units, etc. Around 60,000 civilians were conscripted to construct the Luga Defense Line and various other belts. Most of the troops had taken up positions by 14th July.

I have the 70th rifle division much much further south, near the town of Luga, near Utogorsj, further from Kingisepp then Kingisepp is from Leningrad.
Both the 177th and 191st was part of the Northern reserve so they hadn't been to badly mauled at the opening stages, but I don't have the 177th on the Luga line anywhere.
The 191st I have further to the north near to Narva. A days march away.
I don't have the 171st anywhere on the Luga line, or for that matter general Leningrad area at this point. Had it arrived by then? I know it was part of STAVKA reserves, had it been transfered in at that point? And where was it?
The militia divisons?... No not even close to being combat effective at this point. To little weaponry, to little training.

The 111th I have south of Kingisepp, near Sabsk (attacked the bridgehead on August 8th) and not able to conduct counterattacks at this point.
The 235th is further south of the 111th, just north of the town of Luga, same thing there.
The 118th I have in Leningrad in September, but not in July. Had it been transfered there already? Where was it positioned?

The 10th Mechanized Corps was involved with the fighting against the 8.Pz.-Div near Starajo Russa on July 13th, and much to far away to effect anything near Luga, Kingisepp or Leningrad.

Finally, Voroshilov had organized a reserve of forces transferred from north of Leningrad by 15th-17th July (272nd, 265th, 268th, and 281st Rifle Divisions, along with 1st Tank Division).

The 1st Tank division was combat ineffective at this point, it together with the rest of the 1st Mechanized Corps had been crushed at Pskov in early July.
The rest I have in transit but not yet taken upp defensive positions near Leningrad at this point.

I agree that having an extra panzer and light division would be useful, but not decisive to the degree you suggest. Soviet forces, while badly beaten, were not on the verge of collapse as you suggest. Just the opposite, the mid-July period was one where Northern Front received a number of reinforcements and launched a major counterstroke that mauled LVI Corps. The scale of the fighting is simply too large for a couple divisions to make a difference.

Yes the LVI. Pz.-A.K. near Starajo Russo, not the XLI. near Kingisepp. And it was 'only' the 8. Pz.-Div. and not 'mauled' a blooded nose is more accurate, or maybe nasty shock.

I'm not arguing that the Red Army couldn't conduct counterattacks, just not HERE where it would be needed.

Maybe I'm just an armchair general (no maybe about it) but have the 5. Leichte and 15. Pz.-Div. guard the bridgehead and have the XLI. forge ahead. There is nothing standing in between it and Leningrad. You haven't shown me any units nearby capable of stopping such a thrust. Those that are nearby are either combat ineffective or not in a position to launch a counterattack.

Plus the logistic problems remain; while the 25th Panzer and 5th Light would be in ok condition (They wouldn't have captured British or Italian trucks, and would be in constant combat rather than in a pursuit, increasing the supply load), Reinhardt and Manstein's Corps would still be suffering the same supply problems they did IOTL, necessitating an extensive buildup before launching another offensive.

First as I've shown it's 550 km by land from Dünaburg to Leningrad. That is at the edge of German logistical capabilites, maybe even to far. But the logistical situation you are referring to occured after the XLI. had stopped and it was decided to move the Supply area from Dünaburg to Luga, they had no problems prior to this to supply the XLI. Pz.-A.K. at Kingisepp. This move prolonged the stop as the XLI. could not recieve supply while the move was made. Kingisepp and maybe Leningrad (would depend upon what fight can be made in front of Leningrad by the Red Army) is within logistical range of the German army from Dünaburg.

Edit: I attached a map I made some time ago of the Red Army deployments at the Luga river. I've pieced it together from numerous sources so anything you can add I'll gladly put in.

 

[Julian]

I have the 70th rifle division much much further south, near the town of Luga, near Utogorsj, further from Kingisepp then Kingisepp is from Leningrad.
Both the 177th and 191st was part of the Northern reserve so they hadn't been to badly mauled at the opening stages, but I don't have the 177th on the Luga line anywhere.
The 191st I have further to the north near to Narva. A days march away.
I don't have the 171st anywhere on the Luga line, or for that matter general Leningrad area at this point. Had it arrived by then? I know it was part of STAVKA reserves, had it been transfered in at that point? And where was it?
The militia divisons?... No not even close to being combat effective at this point. To little weaponry, to little training.

The 111th I have south of Kingisepp, near Sabsk (attacked the bridgehead on August 8th) and not able to conduct counterattacks at this point.
The 235th is further south of the 111th, just north of the town of Luga, same thing there.
The 118th I have in Leningrad in September, but not in July. Had it been transfered there already? Where was it positioned?

The 10th Mechanized Corps was involved with the fighting against the 8.Pz.-Div near Starajo Russa on July 13th, and much to far away to effect anything near Luga, Kingisepp or Leningrad.


The 1st Tank division was combat ineffective at this point, it together with the rest of the 1st Mechanized Corps had been crushed at Pskov in early July.
The rest I have in transit but not yet taken upp defensive positions near Leningrad at this point.



Yes the LVI. Pz.-A.K. near Starajo Russo, not the XLI. near Kingisepp. And it was 'only' the 8. Pz.-Div. and not 'mauled' a blooded nose is more accurate, or maybe nasty shock.

I'm not arguing that the Red Army couldn't conduct counterattacks, just not HERE where it would be needed.

Maybe I'm just an armchair general (no maybe about it) but have the 5. Leichte and 15. Pz.-Div. guard the bridgehead and have the XLI. forge ahead. There is nothing standing in between it and Leningrad. You haven't shown me any units nearby capable of stopping such a thrust. Those that are nearby are either combat ineffective or not in a position to launch a counterattack.


First as I've shown it's 550 km by land from Dünaburg to Leningrad. That is at the edge of German logistical capabilites, maybe even to far. But the logistical situation you are referring to occured after the XLI. had stopped and it was decided to move the Supply area from Dünaburg to Luga, they had no problems prior to this to supply the XLI. Pz.-A.K. at Kingisepp. This move prolonged the stop as the XLI. could not recieve supply while the move was made. Kingisepp and maybe Leningrad (would depend upon what fight can be made in front of Leningrad by the Red Army) is within logistical range of the German army from Dünaburg.

Edit: I attached a map I made some time ago of the Red Army deployments at the Luga river. I've pieced it together from numerous sources so anything you can add I'll gladly put in.

Apologies, I should have clarified what I thought was where. According to my sources at Kingisepp I have 191st Rifle Division Deployed to Kingisepp, fighting around bridgehead at some point, eventually subordinated to Kingisepp Operational Group. Based off your sources it may have originally been fighting further west before moving to XLI Corp's bridgehead. 90th Rifle Division fought in the area of the bridgehead and was eventually attached to the 2nd Luga Operational Group. 118th covered the approaches to Kingisepp and was also involved in battles around the bridgehead. Information is sketchy, but it was definitely involved in combat in July. Along with that are two PM rifle divisions, with more available for combat.

So for 14th-15th July the Red Army OOB at Kingisepp was:

191st Rifle Division
90th Rifle Division
118th Rifle Division
2nd DNO (With an attached tank battalion)
4th DNO
1st/3rd DNO in reserve
Various training schools and separate artillery units

For reserves, 1st Tank Division was attatched to the Karelian Front (Did not take part in fighting with 1st Mechanized Corps) and shifted south in mid July to form part of Voroshilov's reserves, as were the four rifle divisions. Apparently they were in the region for deployment 15-17th July.

The XLI Corp's decision to halt at the Luga bridgehead came only after a week of stalemated fighting against 2nd DNO, it's attatched tank battalion, and elements of various other Soviet units. While the People's militia divisions were certainly weak, they weren't useless, as shown by 2nd DNO's ability to contain Reinhardt's bridgehead. XLI Corps attempted to do so several times in order to link up with LVI Corps in accordance with OKH's original directive to encircle Soviet forces along the Luga. But it failed to expand its bridgehead in order to stage a major advance.

With the support of 25th panzer and 5th Light it certainly could do so, but this assumes that both divisions can be deployed quickly into the bridgehead. XLI Corps only controlled two bridges, and took several days to bring up elements of two divisions to support the bridgehead. Adding in two extra divisions will create a further traffic jam which will delay German forces forming up to exploit from the bridgehead. At best XLI/DAK will be across the river in force for an exploitation by 17th-18th July. By then the Red Army will have concentrated at least 3, possibly 4, rifle divisions against the bridgehead, backed up by the Luga Defense Line which extended 10 kilometers back from the river.

Following the Luga Defense Line are several more belts extending back to Leningrad. These will be defended either by Soviet reserves or People's Militia formed in Leningrad which IOTL proved effective at defending from fortifications. XLI/DAK also have to contend with the terrain of the region which is unaccommodating to rapid exploitation against strong resistance. Further, the Red Army still has 4 reserve Rifle Divisions and 1 Tank Division to repel an attempted exploitation towards Leningrad.

At best XLI/DAK will unhinge the Luga line and force a Soviet withdrawal before having to halt due to logistics and Soviet resistance. The net result is a more consolidated Soviet defense and the loss of a German opportunity to encircle Soviet forces around Luga as they did IOTL in August.

 

[ScrewySqrl]

Sorry but I am having a senior moment. What does ASB mean?

As mentioned, Alien Space Bats. The derisive invention of the late, great Alison Brooks originally thought of as a sarcastic attack on poorly written alternate histories due to lack of plausibility.

Its since been used to describe any timeline needing deus ex machina, magic, or similarly way-out-there timelines

 

[Cook]

Singapore falling is ASB because the Japanese are bogged down in an unwinnable...

Far from it, the threat of the Japanese prompted the Royal Navy to commence construction of a fleet base in Singapore in 1925, and a battery of naval guns for the defence of the approaches to Singapore which were completed by 1935.

 

[Rubicon]

Apologies, I should have clarified what I thought was where. According to my sources at Kingisepp I have 191st Rifle Division Deployed to Kingisepp, fighting around bridgehead at some point, eventually subordinated to Kingisepp Operational Group. Based off your sources it may have originally been fighting further west before moving to XLI Corp's bridgehead. 90th Rifle Division fought in the area of the bridgehead and was eventually attached to the 2nd Luga Operational Group. 118th covered the approaches to Kingisepp and was also involved in battles around the bridgehead. Information is sketchy, but it was definitely involved in combat in July. Along with that are two PM rifle divisions, with more available for combat.

So for 14th-15th July the Red Army OOB at Kingisepp was:

191st Rifle Division
90th Rifle Division
118th Rifle Division
2nd DNO (With an attached tank battalion)
4th DNO
1st/3rd DNO in reserve
Various training schools and separate artillery units

Like I said the 90th is of dubious combat value and to the north. It wasn't able to counterattack until August 8th.
The 191st is recently arrived and to the south and not in a position to launch a counterattack or block an advance to Leningrad.
The 118th I don't know anything about. I'll have to do some digging on it's strength and positioning. Now that I know that it might be there I think know where to look for it.
The militia can't block an advance. Contain a bridgehead, sure. Block an advance? No.

For reserves, 1st Tank Division was attatched to the Karelian Front (Did not take part in fighting with 1st Mechanized Corps) and shifted south in mid July to form part of Voroshilov's reserves, as were the four rifle divisions. Apparently they were in the region for deployment 15-17th July.

Did not know that about the 1st Tank division, checked through some sources and you're correct (at least partially) I thought it got mauled with the rest of the 1st mech corps. Most of it left Karelia, two tank battalions and it's motorised rifle regiment was left behind and formed an independent tank brigade later. But the problem is that the division was fighting in the Salla region, that is way up north, it has no chance of reaching Leingrad in time as from my understanding the order to redeploy to Leningrad was given on July 17th (of course since my Russian sucks worse then google translat it very well be that it's commanding officer where having a birthday party on the 17th). On the 23rd I have it assembling south of Leningrad near the town of Gatchina 45km south of Leningrad. The question then is, when is it at Leningrad? 22nd? 21st? 20th?

The XLI Corp's decision to halt at the Luga bridgehead came only after a week of stalemated fighting against 2nd DNO, it's attatched tank battalion, and elements of various other Soviet units. While the People's militia divisions were certainly weak, they weren't useless, as shown by 2nd DNO's ability to contain Reinhardt's bridgehead. XLI Corps attempted to do so several times in order to link up with LVI Corps in accordance with OKH's original directive to encircle Soviet forces along the Luga. But it failed to expand its bridgehead in order to stage a major advance.

Containing a bridgehead is not the same as stopping an offensive from a Panzer Korps. And my sources say the advance stopped prior to Soviet forces arriving to contain the bridgehead for the reasons I've given.

With the support of 25th panzer and 5th Light it certainly could do so, but this assumes that both divisions can be deployed quickly into the bridgehead. XLI Corps only controlled two bridges, and took several days to bring up elements of two divisions to support the bridgehead. Adding in two extra divisions will create a further traffic jam which will delay German forces forming up to exploit from the bridgehead. At best XLI/DAK will be across the river in force for an exploitation by 17th-18th July. By then the Red Army will have concentrated at least 3, possibly 4, rifle divisions against the bridgehead, backed up by the Luga Defense Line which extended 10 kilometers back from the river.

I agree with the first part, that the it would take time to sort out any problems, but not with the second part, that the enough Soviet forces had arrived by then to block an advance by a full Panzer Korps. You have a weak 90th and the better off 191st, on each side but not directly in between and the possible 118th at an unknown location. Both the 90th and 191st are unable to block an advance due to their positioning. The 118th I don't know much about, I have it attached to the 8th Army (part of the Leningrad front) which is split in between Estonia and north of Leningrad, but no location as to the divisions exact whereabouts on August 1st. And nothing between that and June 22nd. From I can gather the 8th army or any of it's units was in any position to block an advance on Leningrad from the southwest.

Following the Luga Defense Line are several more belts extending back to Leningrad. These will be defended either by Soviet reserves or People's Militia formed in Leningrad which IOTL proved effective at defending from fortifications. XLI/DAK also have to contend with the terrain of the region which is unaccommodating to rapid exploitation against strong resistance. Further, the Red Army still has 4 reserve Rifle Divisions and 1 Tank Division to repel an attempted exploitation towards Leningrad.

The soviet militia were able to check a corps not set on advance and without it receiving much in the form of supplies due to facts I stated earlier, which won't be a problem here. The tank division if we're talking about the 1st it isn't there yet, it only arrives on the 22nd/23rd. What four rifle divisions? I don't have any nearby, the 272nd, 265th, 268th, and 281st you mentioned earlier?
The 268th was part of the 8th army as well, so same thing applies as with the 118th.
The other three were units in reserve, but I have nothing as to their locations. And nothing that indicates they were south of Leningrad or in the city itself. All I have is that they are diverted north to halt the Finnish advance from the north on the Karelian isthmus. So it seems to me like robbing Peter to pay Paul, either divert them south to try and halt Reinhardt, which might succeed long enough due to the logistical chain and have the Finns cripple the northern defense and other forces will have to be diverted there. Or leave the door open for Reinhardt.

At best XLI/DAK will unhinge the Luga line and force a Soviet withdrawal before having to halt due to logistics and Soviet resistance. The net result is a more consolidated Soviet defense and the loss of a German opportunity to encircle Soviet forces around Luga as they did IOTL in August.

I disagree, between the 15th and 20th the Soviet defenses south of Leningrad is wide open without any organised forces between the city and the Germans. The Soviet were scrambling for reinforcements true, but could they get there in time to halt an advance on Leningrad? Maybe, maybe not hard to really tell as there's quite a few factors involved.


Now overall I must say I've enjoyed this discussion, great fun
But I don't have the time to dig through a shitload of various sources like this, so I'm just going to ask: Given everything both you and I've dug up do you still consider it ASB for the XLI. Pz.-A.K. To take Leningrad sometime the 18th-20th July? Does it require magic, aliens, time-travel? I'm not asking if you consider it likely or even remotely likely, but is it ASB or is it within the reason of possibility?

 

[Julian]

Indeed, I think you're correct that ASBs are not required in this situation. This was actually a really interesting debate!

(Also, I only have 268th being attached to 8th Army after it arrived at Leningrad in mid July, and before that Voroshilov had it grouped as part of his reserve)

 

[JimTheB]

Ardennes offensives X2

That the area of France opposite the hilly, densely wooded, allegedly crap-for-tanks area known as the Ardennes should be so lightly defended in 1944 as it was in 1940 might be seen as such a monumental failure of memory as to justify a call of ASB.

 

[NorthernFiend]

Thatcher's election wins in 1975 and 83 would be seen as ASB

Prompted by the female dictator threat..

Margaret Thatcher winning the Tory leadership election in 1975 would have seemed incredible in 1974. It took her direct political mentor, Keith Joseph, to make a terrible gaff, another rival on the right, Edward Du Cann to suddenly retire (giving her campaign the brilliant leadership of Airey Neave) and the leader of the party Edward Heath to make a series of crazy mistakes for the Tories to suddenly wake up with a female leader in 1975. Had she been a serious candidate at the start of the campaign she would have been laughed out of the race, or crushed,


Similarly her government winning re-election would have seemed completely ASB in 1980-81

"Thatcher's job approval rating fell to 23 per cent by December 1980, lower than recorded for any previous Prime Minister"

then a general in a country 8000 miles away picked a war over a forgotten rock in the South Atlantic

 

[Karelian]

Except that the German advance on Leningrad was delayed just as much by military as logistic concerns. The Soviet Solsty-Dno, Staraia Russa, and various lesser attacks delayed the final German drive on Leningrad by weeks. The DAK, while helpful, is not strong enough to make a difference

There is a force strong enough to make the difference right next door. It just has to keep moving to matter. Have Mannerheim suffocate on a fishbone (he ate zander nearly daily) in a convenient time to let Airo and other generals take over, and Finns will comply with German demands and join to the offensive against the city.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_reconquest_of_the_Karelian_Isthmus_%281941%29 (sorry for Wiki link, but the basic details are ok and you wouldn't do much with references to Finnish sites )

 

[Shadow Hawk]

I see the Space Bat, but where's the alien-ness of it?

That is clearly a Naturalized Space Bat, not a Alien Space Bat.

 

[ScrewySqrl]

That is clearly a Naturalized Space Bat, not a Alien Space Bat.

here is a proper alien space bat:

http://tinyurl.com/m73mb2d

 

[Dunning Kruger]

ASB Events in History

Bull Run
Meade's Peninsula Campaign
American Revolution - Even Washington, Adams, Jefferson etc thought so
Midway
Vietnam
Bay of Pigs
France 1940
Spanish Armada
Early Muslim conquests
Everthing McArthur did in Korea other than Inchon
Lenin/October Revolution

Give me faulty intelligence, faulty leadership, faulty operational execution, and/or some bad luck and you have an ASB that looks legit in hindsight.

Regarding the Eastern Front, the fact that the Soviets reached Berlin only after Stalingrad, Kursk, army group central, western front open, and after 4 years of war suggests the outcome was a bit less inevitable than is often suggested. Particularly given Hitler's natural ASBness post 1943/44. Looking at the order of war doesnt instruct you as to how the nazi's win. Rather you need a major flaw as said above, which after June/July 1941 was lacking.

Just my 2 cents as a relative newbie to the site. Thanks.

 

[Julian]

There is a force strong enough to make the difference right next door. It just has to keep moving to matter. Have Mannerheim suffocate on a fishbone (he ate zander nearly daily) in a convenient time to let Airo and other generals take over, and Finns will comply with German demands and join to the offensive against the city.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_reconquest_of_the_Karelian_Isthmus_%281941%29 (sorry for Wiki link, but the basic details are ok and you wouldn't do much with references to Finnish sites )

I was under the impression that, beyond Mannerheim's own opinions, the Finnish government was also unwilling to allow an advance on Leningrad, as were some Finnish generals. At the very least this would complicate decision making enough that by the time an offensive might be decided upon the crisis period would have already passed. But I'd assume you know more than I do on the topic!

 

[BlondieBC]

Screwysql said -

The success of the Dive Bombers at Midway has to feel ASB.

This is exactly what I mean - is a man in a high castle on an alt history forum somewhere else arguing vainly that a few planes could sink three elite Japanese carriers if they caught them at the right time?

The actual tactical reality of Singapore we are all (well not most Brits) aware of now, it's the difference between that and the perceived reality beforehand. We have to make assumptions on historical likelihoods that give no room for wildly unlikely events that do happen.

The problem boils down to people want things to make sense, but things often happen that appear almost random. Or put another way, "Fiction has to make sense, reality does not". It is largely out of this writing rule, that we avoid the really random stuff. You lose your readers if you put too much seemingly random stuff. You have listed examples, but let give you some more from history.

- Submarines with wheels (maybe it was tracks).
- Guns not even yet in TOE being so important in Liege in 1914.
- A-H know war with Russia was likely over Serbia, but not using the War Plan designed for war with Russia.
- Using somewhere between 1 million and 10 million porters to supply about 10,000 man army across entire Congo basin. Estimates have huge margins of error on this operation, but it is clearly larger than operations we talk about a lot such as Gallipoli, Palestine, Basra, etc. Seriously, think about how much people would complain if you wrote a TL where a minor European country used porters to attack across the entire Amazon basin, when this country had allies with control of the sea and you could use RR from ports by using the other coast.


So yes, our Time line is ASB. So many random events, but we don't want to read fiction that has this aspect of our TL. From the perspective of writing a TL with odd events (Germans have massive win in Africa in WW1, South Africa leaves Empire without any major battles being fought for them, most decisive naval action in war was in Red Seam etc), people demand logic for TL. It is not hard to simulate how OTL worked. I considered doing it, but I would lose my readers. I thought about looking at what % of time leaders did really bizzare decisions (guess be about 10% of time). Using dice to roll for irrational decision or battle that just goes wrong way. Then just have people do something bizarre. So what would happen is I probably give say each nation about a 1% chance per month of event/decision that greatly harms or helps them. The problem is going to be when we look at execution. I would get to say July 1915, then suddenly have the UK declare war on Japan over hard to explain outrages. Or out of the blue have Jewish revolt in Russia. Or Switzerland joins Entente over trivial reason.


So basically, most of the ASB on this forum relates to the human mind wanting to see patterns, even when the underlying events are essentially random. And this then flows into how we write history books and alt history fiction.

 

[ray243]

I completely disagree. The notion that people's action are random is based on your assumption of their personality. The biggest issue with alternate history and history in general is generalizing it.

Instead of examining closer, people tend to declare which events seems implausible simply by glancing at the historical events. It is the weakness of human assumption that makes things seems incredulous to us, and not because things in this world just happened to be random.

Even rolling a dice is not a random event. It just seems random to us because their is no way we can humanly calculate which number is going to end up at the top.

 

[Basileus444]

Unless there are magic, mind-control, psychic powers, aliens, time travel, ghosts, goblins, elves, Gandalf, faster then light travel, Ben Affleck or Yar-Yar Binks involved it isn't ASB in my opinion.

People making good or bad decisions (e.g. Malaya campaign) isn't ASB.
People using faulty intelligence for invading another country (e.g. USA in Iraq) isn't ASB.

Many people here seems to think Barbarossa succeding is ASB.
Many peolpe here seems to think the USA not dominating any world after 1945 is ASB.
Many people here seems to think that the USSR not falling apart is ASB.

The cry for ASB in most stories isn't because it is impossible, it's most of the time because of the readers (not writers) narrowmindness and lack of grasp of history. Now sure there are stories every now and then that are just to stupid to even consider (Frisian isles is a prime example, but my favourite example is actually a few years older then that. A story in which Japan built up an industry and new fleet in the East Indies and after losing the Home Isles, the NEW! fleet defeated the USA with the help of V1 rockets fired at the US navy..... sadly I think that "story" has been moved to a Mod forum where we can't see it anymore)

I agree wholeheartedly. I have no problem with ASB in its 'classical' sense. But now it's just a catch-phrase for 'unlikely', which is why I hate the term now. It is way way way overused. Something that has a 1% chance of happening is not ASB, just highly unlikely.