Would Fall of Singapore have looked like ASBs once?

The success of the Dive Bombers at Midway has to feel ASB.[/I]

This is exactly what I mean - is a man in a high castle on an alt history forum somewhere else arguing vainly that a few planes could sink three elite Japanese carriers if they caught them at the right time?

Indeed, the alt universe or Double WI is a useful tool for analyzing a situation. It generally shows perception of a situation with incomplete or bad information is important to the outcome, or perceived outcome.

I used to umpire and play double blind or limited intel wargames. The style, caution, decision making process or whatever you want to call the actions of the players on the game board changes when they dont have a near perfect view of the opposing pieces. Some people seem to have a instinct for sucessfull decisions in this reduced information enviroment. Others I saw became paralyzed or indecisive, or over focused on the wrong part of the battle. My favorite example from these game was where both players conceded on the next to last turn, each convinced there was no likely way they could win. In fact the game had come down to the wire and either had a fair chance of winning with the last round of attacks. But, both had convinced themselves the opposition was stronger than reality.

The actual tactical reality of Singapore we are all (well not most Brits) aware of now, it's the difference between that and the perceived reality beforehand. We have to make assumptions on historical likelihoods that give no room for wildly unlikely events that do happen.

For those who have studied the Maylasian/Singapore campaign a bit the ASB factor seems to lie in the entire series of events/decisions for the Brits that led to its capture. The idea that so many poor decisions could be made, even before the campaign started seems difficult to credit, but reality is stranger than fiction. It is even more difficult to accept the course of events within British leadership when you understand the views that led to these decisions were not universal and changing a few leaders, or the circumstances of the moment alters the course of events significantly.

I think if the entire course of events for both sides of Singapores fall were written out with the names, dates, ect... masked most folks would declare it poor fiction. They would have real difficulty accepting one side would so consistently have the choices and events go against them. 'The world does not work that way' might be the usual reaction.
 

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Unless there are magic, mind-control, psychic powers, aliens, time travel, ghosts, goblins, elves, Gandalf, faster then light travel, Ben Affleck or Yar-Yar Binks involved it isn't ASB in my opinion.

People making good or bad decisions (e.g. Malaya campaign) isn't ASB.
People using faulty intelligence for invading another country (e.g. USA in Iraq) isn't ASB.

Many people here seems to think Barbarossa succeding is ASB.
Many peolpe here seems to think the USA not dominating any world after 1945 is ASB.
Many people here seems to think that the USSR not falling apart is ASB.

The cry for ASB in most stories isn't because it is impossible, it's most of the time because of the readers (not writers) narrowmindness and lack of grasp of history. Now sure there are stories every now and then that are just to stupid to even consider (Frisian isles is a prime example, but my favourite example is actually a few years older then that. A story in which Japan built up an industry and new fleet in the East Indies and after losing the Home Isles, the NEW! fleet defeated the USA with the help of V1 rockets fired at the US navy..... sadly I think that "story" has been moved to a Mod forum where we can't see it anymore)
 
Many people here seems to think Barbarossa succeding is ASB.

Perhaps because the manpower and logistic obstacles Germany needed to overcome were simply too great for the Barbarossa Plan to succeed without divine intervention. Hell, Barbarossa had failed by July when the Germans were halted around Smolensk by a new wave of Soviet reserve armies which supposedly didn't exist.
 

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Perhaps because the manpower and logistic obstacles Germany needed to overcome were simply too great for the Barbarossa Plan to succeed without divine intervention. Hell, Barbarossa had failed by July when the Germans were halted around Smolensk by a new wave of Soviet reserve armies which supposedly didn't exist.

...like I said. :D

There are several ways in which Barbarossa could have succeeded. Or rather taking Moscow and Leningrad. Getting to the Urals is a bit optimistic.
 
I used to umpire and play double blind or limited intel wargames. The style, caution, decision making process or whatever you want to call the actions of the players on the game board changes when they dont have a near perfect view of the opposing pieces. Some people seem to have a instinct for sucessfull decisions in this reduced information enviroment. Others I saw became paralyzed or indecisive, or over focused on the wrong part of the battle. My favorite example from these game was where both players conceded on the next to last turn, each convinced there was no likely way they could win. In fact the game had come down to the wire and either had a fair chance of winning with the last round of attacks. But, both had convinced themselves the opposition was stronger than reality.

Indeed. I watched (as a 'message runner') a replay of the Battle of Midway where the Japanese were given Zuikaku, and the Americans had no warning (Midway un-reinforced, Yorktown sent to the West Coast, Enterprise/Hornet still at Pearl). The Japanese players spent several game-days searching for the American carrier fleet that "must" be near Midway.
 
...like I said. :D

There are several ways in which Barbarossa could have succeeded. Or rather taking Moscow and Leningrad. Getting to the Urals is a bit optimistic.

Please elaborate on the myriad of ways Germany could overcome manpower losses which by July were exceeding replacements by 40,000, overstretched logistics, and armored losses which left the most powerful German spearhead in November at 20 tanks strong. How they overcome the Red Army's ability to generate new armies every month, allowing them to launch an enormous strategic counteroffensive while German forces were exhausted.

The Germans made it to Leningrad, but were so exhausted and pinned down by Soviet counter attacks that they couldn't storm the city. They made it to the gates of Moscow, and almost immediately disintegrated, suffering enormous losses and being pushed back hundreds of kilometers.

You can claim to have solutions, but without evidence it means nothing.
 
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Please elaborate on the myriad of ways Germany could overcome manpower losses which by July were exceeding replacements by 40,000, overstretched logistics, and armored losses which left the most powerful German spearhead in November at 20 tanks strong. How they overcome the Red Army's ability to generate new armies every month, allowing them to launch an enormous strategic counteroffensive while German forces were exhausted.

You can claim to have solutions all you want, but without evidence it means nothing.
I know of two changes that might do so.

1) Before Barbarossa, replace Wilhelm von Leeb as commander of Heeresgruppe Nord with either Günther von Kluge or Paul Ludwig von Kleist.

2) Italy either does better in North Africa or worse, ensuring that the D.A.K. is never sent there and instead the divisions, logistical support and Fliegerkorps X is sent to bolster Heeresgruppe Nord.

Either of these two solutions means Leningrad falls in mid-July. Freeing Höpner's Panzergruppe 4 for use elsewhere (i.e. Taifun) and also means that Hoth's Panzergruppe 3 is not sent north to help with the assault on Leningrad only to be recalled prior to Taifun.

With Panzergruppe 3 not having as much wear and tear as OTL and with the support of Panzergruppe 4 (either with or witout Pz-Div. 15 & 21) the assault on Moscow will be much stronger.

It also means that with no active siege of Leningrad and clearing up the Leningrad port increases the amount of logistical support available for Heeresgruppe Mitte and Taifun.

I'm not saying it is still likely to succeed, but it is not ASB if it does succeed.
 
I know of two changes that might do so.

1) Before Barbarossa, replace Wilhelm von Leeb as commander of Heeresgruppe Nord with either Günther von Kluge or Paul Ludwig von Kleist.

2) Italy either does better in North Africa or worse, ensuring that the D.A.K. is never sent there and instead the divisions, logistical support and Fliegerkorps X is sent to bolster Heeresgruppe Nord.

Either of these two solutions means Leningrad falls in mid-July. Freeing Höpner's Panzergruppe 4 for use elsewhere (i.e. Taifun) and also means that Hoth's Panzergruppe 3 is not sent north to help with the assault on Leningrad only to be recalled prior to Taifun.

With Panzergruppe 3 not having as much wear and tear as OTL and with the support of Panzergruppe 4 (either with or witout Pz-Div. 15 & 21) the assault on Moscow will be much stronger.

It also means that with no active siege of Leningrad and clearing up the Leningrad port increases the amount of logistical support available for Heeresgruppe Mitte and Taifun.

I'm not saying it is still likely to succeed, but it is not ASB if it does succeed.

Except that the German advance on Leningrad was delayed just as much by military as logistic concerns. The Soviet Solsty-Dno, Staraia Russa, and various lesser attacks delayed the final German drive on Leningrad by weeks. The DAK, while helpful, is not strong enough to make a difference; IOTL it was composed at this time of one panzer division and one "light division". Further, the logistic support the DAK could provide was minimal; supply lines in Rissia depended on rail, not trucks. While extra trucks aren't harmful, they don't change the fact that the vast majority of German divisions were still on foot.

Also 3rd Panzergroup was involved in clearing out the Valdai region, not Leningrad. The presence of two extra divisions doesn't strengthen 16th Army enough to allow it to advance on its own.
 

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Except that the German advance on Leningrad was delayed just as much by military as logistic concerns. The Soviet Solsty-Dno, Staraia Russa, and various lesser attacks delayed the final German drive on Leningrad by weeks.

You're talking about August and later, I'm talking about July. On the 13th Rheinhardt was across the Luga river, wich is two days from Leningrad, with NO organised soviet forces nearby. The Germans forces stopped there for two weeks, not to help with supply but because von Leeb had little to no experience with deep armoured thrusts and what to do with them, he wanted to wait for the infantry to arrive. Von Kleist or von Kluge would know what to do, go for Leningrad. Two divisons extra would help in convincing von Leeb that they wouldn't have to wait for the infantry.

The DAK, while helpful, is not strong enough to make a difference; IOTL it was composed at this time of one panzer division and one "light division". Further, the logistic support the DAK could provide was minimal; supply lines in Rissia depended on rail, not trucks. While extra trucks aren't harmful, they don't change the fact that the vast majority of German divisions were still on foot.

The armoured spearheads relied on trucks, not rail during Barbarossa.

Also 3rd Panzergroup was involved in clearing out the Valdai region, not Leningrad. The presence of two extra divisions doesn't strengthen 16th Army enough to allow it to advance on its own.

I never said they were sent north to help with assaulting Leningrad, not that they assaulted Leningrad. The operations the 16th army took part of was with the overall objective of Heeresgruppe Nord in mind, taking Leningrad.
And it was in September, much later then the changes I've proposed.
 
You're talking about August and later, I'm talking about July. On the 13th Rheinhardt was across the Luga river, wich is two days from Leningrad, with NO organised soviet forces nearby. The Germans forces stopped there for two weeks, not to help with supply but because von Leeb had little to no experience with deep armoured thrusts and what to do with them, he wanted to wait for the infantry to arrive. Von Kleist or von Kluge would know what to do, go for Leningrad. Two divisons extra would help in convincing von Leeb that they wouldn't have to wait for the infantry.

The armoured spearheads relied on trucks, not rail during

Untrue, the Dno Counteroffensive took place from 15-20 July and delayed German forces for a week trying to shore up their flanks and defeat the offensive. Indeed, the it was nearly a disaster for German forces and resulted in one corps being badly handled (Including 8th panzer division). This combined with German logistic problems, a Soviet buildup along the Luga defense line and several days of poor weather prevented an immediate German push towards Leningrad. It's the same reason why 2nd Panzer Group was pinned down around Smolensk despite Guderian's desire to push forward; heavy Soviet resistance and logistic problems.

They relied on trucks for movement and some supply, but actual supply required a rail head. After the initial big push German forces had to halt mid-July and wait several days-a week to build up supplies for another shorter jump.
 

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Untrue, the Dno Counteroffensive took place from 15-20 July
I thought you were talking about the counterattack by the 245th rifle division and 163 motorised rifle division on August 12th.

You're talking about the LVI Pz.-A.K. under von Manstein I'm talking about the XLI Pz.-A.K. under Rheinhardt.

Add the D.A.K. and Rheinhardt can keep pushing while the D.A.K. hold the flank, have von Kluge or von Kleist in command and they won't care about the flank.

They relied on trucks for movement and some supply, but actual supply required a rail head. After the initial big push German forces had to halt mid-July and wait several days-a week to build up supplies for another shorter jump.
Wouldn't have to if they have the D.A.K. trucks to supply them.
 
I thought you were talking about the counterattack by the 245th rifle division and 163 motorised rifle division on August 12th.

You're talking about the LVI Pz.-A.K. under von Manstein I'm talking about the XLI Pz.-A.K. under Rheinhardt.

Add the D.A.K. and Rheinhardt can keep pushing while the D.A.K. hold the flank, have von Kluge or von Kleist in command and they won't care about the flank.

Wouldn't have to if they have the D.A.K. trucks to supply them.

LVI Corps made up 4th Panzer Group's right flank; conducting an advance off the march with it being mauled and unable to support operations for at least a week would be suicidal even with weak Soviet forces along the Luga (Stronger forces attached to the Northern Fron were still available at Leningrad itself, preventing Reinhardt from taking it off the march anyways). Further, LVI only recovered from the Soviet offensive due to reinforcements from Reinhardt's corps.

As for DAK's trucks, in 1941 it didn't deploy nearly enough to support a full panzer corps over several hundred kilometers. Indeed, a good portion of Rommel's vehicles were Italian or captured British. Even then his two divisions are operating at their limit.

So again, even ignoring the military feasibility of trying to seize Leningrad with a single panzer corps, 4th Panzer Group still needs a week to build up supplies for a drive on Leningrad.
 

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(Stronger forces attached to the Northern Fron were still available at Leningrad itself, preventing Reinhardt from taking it off the march anyways).
No, there wasn't. There were no large organised Soviet forces in between the XLI. Pz.-A.K. and Leningrad and not in Leningrad itself at this point.

As for DAK's trucks, in 1941 it didn't deploy nearly enough to support a full panzer corps over several hundred kilometers. Indeed, a good portion of Rommel's vehicles were Italian or captured British. Even then his two divisions are operating at their limit.
Distance from Tripoli to Tobruk 1255km,
distance Benghazi to Tobruk 460km.
Distance Königsberg to Leningrad 820km.
Distance Riga to Leningrad 485km.

I'd say it's feasable to use the logistical services of the D.A.K. to support it's two divisions deep into Russia. Might not be ideal, but adequate.

Edit: and distance between Dünaburg (where the Heeresgruppe Nords supply base was at this point in the campaign) and Leningrad is 550km by road. Just at edge of feasability for an offensive.
 
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No, there wasn't. There were no large organised Soviet forces in between the XLI. Pz.-A.K. and Leningrad and not in Leningrad itself at this point.


Distance from Tripoli to Tobruk 1255km,
distance Benghazi to Tobruk 460km.
Distance Königsberg to Leningrad 820km.
Distance Riga to Leningrad 485km.

I'd say it's feasable to use the logistical services of the D.A.K. to support it's two divisions deep into Russia. Might not be ideal, but adequate.

In the Luga Operational Group yes, only a few brigades for military school and the remains of several rifle divisions were deployed (Though they still succeeded in preventing Reinhardt from expanding his bridgehead on the 14th/15th). But the Leningrad Defense Committe recognized the threat of a German advance across the Luga and immediately began organizing defenses. This included organizing civilians to construct a series of defensive belts, forming 10 people's militia divisions and several rifle brigades, and most importantly, transferring reserves from North of Leningrad. Three divisions arrived on the 15th alone.

Further, I think you overstate both Leeb's cautiousness and Soviet weakness. According to accounts of the Luga battles I've been looking over Reinhardt's forces were unable to achieve a decisive penetration beyond Kingisepp, stalled by Soviet resistance for several days. The Luga Defensive Line and several more belts constructed in the first two weeks of July served as effective obstacles against a German advance. Red Army forces, while certainly under strength, were also able to put up organized resistance. Out of 30 divisions on the Luga line 5 were close to full strength and the rest were 30-50% under strength. That still gives them 5-7 thousand men.

I wasn't contesting that DAK could supply itself, but that it could support a full extra panzer corps as well. Reduce the time it needs to build up perhaps, but not allow it to immediately begin operations.
 

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In the Luga Operational Group yes, only a few brigades for military school and the remains of several rifle divisions were deployed (Though they still succeeded in preventing Reinhardt from expanding his bridgehead on the 14th/15th). But the Leningrad Defense Committe recognized the threat of a German advance across the Luga and immediately began organizing defenses. This included organizing civilians to construct a series of defensive belts, forming 10 people's militia divisions and several rifle brigades, and most importantly, transferring reserves from North of Leningrad. Three divisions arrived on the 15th alone.

Which division? I'm genuinly curious, becuase I thought I'd accounted for all the Soviet divisions in this area, none even close to being an operational threat to the XLI Pz.-A.K.

Edit: The only thing I have close is the 90th rifle division, but it had been badly mauled during the opening phases of Barbarossa, IIRC it had lost most if not all of its divisional artillery and was not a threat at that point.
Further, I think you overstate both Leeb's cautiousness and Soviet weakness. According to accounts of the Luga battles I've been looking over Reinhardt's forces were unable to achieve a decisive penetration beyond Kingisepp, stalled by Soviet resistance for several days. The Luga Defensive Line and several more belts constructed in the first two weeks of July served as effective obstacles against a German advance. Red Army forces, while certainly under strength, were also able to put up organized resistance. Out of 30 divisions on the Luga line 5 were close to full strength and the rest were 30-50% under strength. That still gives them 5-7 thousand men.

Mid-July? Early August/late July, yes I agree. Mid-July? There's a gap between the 13th and 21st/22nd July there are no Soviet forces opposing the XLI.Pz.-A.K. at the Luga river from what I've found.

There's also the dwadling from OKW about Reinhardt's corps that is eerily similar to what happend during the advance of Panzer in Fall Gelb.

And yes I'm quite harsh on von Leeb, I don't think he was suitable to conduct a large scale offensive of this kind. A defensive fight? Sure I'd pick him or Heinrici any day of the week, but on the offensive he just wasn't aggressive enough.

I wasn't contesting that DAK could supply itself, but that it could support a full extra panzer corps as well. Reduce the time it needs to build up perhaps, but not allow it to immediately begin operations.

Alright will you agree with me that attaching the 5. Leichte and 15. Panzer divisions under the command of a certain general Erwin Rommel to Panzergruppe 4 will substantially increase it's hitting and exploitation capabilites during Barbarossa to the point that the fights at Luga and Staraja Russa might not have happend as they did OTL?
 
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Sorry but I am having a senior moment. What does ASB mean?
"Alien Space Bat", used on this board to indicate a idea that's so unlikely that it would take a outer space mutant to make it happen/work.
Indeed, these fine gentlemen. :)

Alien Space Bat.jpg

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