Would an "M-R" Pact have been possible w/ a noncommunist Russia, or bigger USSR?

raharris1973

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Would a non-communist Soviet Union with a non-communist, democratic, reactionary dictatorial, or some other form of radical leftist dictatorship, have been willing to make a deal with a similarly aggressive Germany in the 1930s or 1940s, at the expense of Poland and the Baltics?



And there's another potential question-

Suppose that the Soviet Union had ended up with a more "satisfying" further western border, possessing at least Poland up to the Curzon Line, and possibly ruling over Bessarabia and the Baltic States from the end of the Russian Civil War, instead of the OTL borders of the Treaty of Riga that left the USSR with more irredentist claims?

Would this expanded Soviet Union have been as likely as OTL's to engage in a nonaggression pact with an expansionist Germany and a fourth partition of Poland?

What if Poland had been snuffed out by the Soviets in 1921. Would that Soviet Union having more than the Russian Empire's borders in nearly all respects, have automatically become an opponent of an expansionist Germany that is aggressive against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Scandinavia, Western Europe and the Balkans. Or might this Soviet Union have stayed benevolently neutral against the Germans, or engaged in a non-aggression pact and partition of Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Romania?
 
Yes. To some extent, if there is a strong Poland in between them in this timeframe, Germany and Russia could always reach an agreement on division of it.
 

raharris1973

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How would you define a "strong" Poland?

And would you argue that a "weak" or a "small" Poland would be seen by the Soviets as something they should see preserved, rather than divided with Germany?
 
It is certainly possible, Hitlar's main beef with Russia was his hatred of Communism. He still thought that the Slavs were degenerates, so it wouldn't last long.

One question is would Nazi's have been allowed to rise in power? A lot of people think they were allowed to get away with as much as they did because they were a bulwark against the communists.

Another question is what Russia would want out of the deal aside from a trade partner? I think it depends on who ends up in control if the Bolsheviks don't. Would they want more territory or would they be more inwardly focused?
 
How would you define a "strong" Poland?

And would you argue that a "weak" or a "small" Poland would be seen by the Soviets as something they should see preserved, rather than divided with Germany?

A strong Poland would probably be the stable, with significant military force and seen as significant ally of the French.

I think the Soviets wouldn't mind communist Poland, closely aligned with them. It all depends on international situation and perceptions of the Soviet leader. If he is paranoid, than Baltic states represent a threat to him. Generally, any stable and relatively well off non-communist country represents a threat to communist system if the people are opressed and hungry.

But if you have a resurgent Germany on one side and slighted Soviet Union/Russia on the other with poor Poland in between, unless Poland sides with one, she will get divided between them.
 

raharris1973

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But if you have a resurgent Germany on one side and slighted Soviet Union/Russia on the other with poor Poland in between, unless Poland sides with one, she will get divided between them.

I wonder if a smaller, weaker, more homogenous Poland with an eastern border on the Curzon would be dominated by Roman Dmowski's national democrats rather than Pilsudski. In turn, Dmowski may align with Russia, because he always saw Germany as the bigger threat. He would be right-wing, anti-semitic and anti-communist internally, but might Moscow think its better having him as a de facto ally on their western border instead of having a common border with Germany, even if it means the Soviets getting back Lublin or Warsaw.
 
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