we know? we would ever know? maybe CP victory is a better or worse world? OTL as example say...maybe
Deleted member 94680
How does A-H fall apart quicker in a victory than it did in defeat?
Supposing the French collapse very early and Russia is left alone, they might get status quo antebellum or even a smidgen of Austria territory as they were into Germany and Austria at year's end. France loses Briwny, Luxembourg gets annexed, and Belgium likely ends up a puppet of Berlin that keeps the Congo at least for now. Germany keeps her colonies and may grab a French one or two. Italy loses nothing and may remain a lukewarm Central Power while the Ottomans survive for the moment. Russia benefits from being 'victorious' while Austria benefits from prolonged existance.
Deleted member 94680
I think it’s fair to say the “balance of power doctrine” is very much a thing for Britain once it comes to war rather than being a permanent state of affairs.
Whilst Britain remained a Great Power (ie up until the end of WWII) she would chose what was best for the Empire or what was best for trade - in peacetime. Once a “slide to War” began, or conflict broke out, in Europe Britain would chose the “weaker” side of the conflict to balance the scales of power.
I don't know that it des But either it does or it doesn't so I covered both cases - and noted the implications for the Magyars in each event.
Battle of the Masurian lakes happend within a month of wars start, so chances are something similar would happen if it's a war that ends by christmas. They'd want to negotiate a white peace asap, with France exiting the stage left there's now no way they can fight this on their own, the huge loss in the battle would prove it. The Russians gambled and lost dearly, there's nothing to gain, to the contrary, they have another 1905 situation where the public got promised a gloriously victorious army performance but they return in body bags. Times will be rough for a few years in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
a peace like this will end in a lot of “piss on perfidious Petersburg” sentiment in Paris, Belgrade, maybe even London, even though it would be the best of Russia’s bad options at the time.
There's plenty of blame to go around. The Russians might blame the French for baiting them into this mess and default on the huge loans the French gave them to get ready for the war. Just like the Soviets did. Russia would have bigger fish to fry than its relations to France though.
Unlikely. Without the carnage of WW1, it's likely that old-guard leadership would remain entrenched and start the whole mess back up again in 5-10 years.
Would it mean that the Schlieffen Plan was validated? Would it make Germans think that quick, lightning style wars are the way to get things done? Would it spur them to develop ways to make war go faster?
Seems like they might have learned some of the same lessons from a quick victory that they learned from four long years of war and losing. Who'd a thunk it?
Seems like they might have learned some of the same lessons from a quick victory that they learned from four long years of war and losing. Who'd a thunk it?
Thing is with a German Empire flush with victory (and chunks of France and Eastern Europe), they're going to want to compete via navy but colonially as well. (you need the first to do the second). A quick German victory means Belgium defacto stays under German control which means Germany gets Belgium's colonies, Germany going to take the French ones it wants as well.
The British issue isn't with a European hegemony per-see (it's not like Britain's ever going to seize chunks of mainland Europe) although it does like selling stuff to receptive Europe, it's with a European rival trying to compete globally with the British empire.
In the previous two centuries it's either beaten it's Global colonial European rivals (France), or outlived them/helped push them to collapse (Spain)
the US isn't looking to do this, but a victorious Germany might well
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Decisive 1914
Short-War outcome
CP Victory –
Germans do better in France through better luck, more French, British, Belgian mistakes
Settlement yields punishment, territorial losses of Serbia, probable indemnities, and maximum German territorial gains of Briey-Longwy, Polish border strip, maybe colonial border strips.
Arrived at through French realizing dire situation early, Brits, either as a neutral, or an unassailable belligerent threatening Germany with the prospect of making the war a long, drawn out affair. Germany quitting while ahead.
Chances of rematch – Germans will feel strong, French and Russians weak, Germans secure. British dissatisfied.
Entente Victory
French do better through better uniforms, realistic defensive plans, stronger left-wing deployment- Maybe even Belgians do a bit better, and Germans have some bad luck. German front line ends up no more than halfway through Belgium. Combined with defeats of Austrian offensives and only defensive victories in the east.
Not gaining east or west, Germany & Austria start hunting for a white peace. For it to work, Russia and France need to let them. Once joined, France may be hardest to stop, short of cession of Alsace-Lorraine.
If Anglo-French-Belgian counter-offensive presses Germans back from late 1914, and Russians pick up in Galicia in 1915, or minor neutrals declare for Entente, CPs may consider peace ceding A-L in west, Posen or Ost und WestPreussen in East, Galicia and maybe Bosnia, as an alternative to getting totally steamrolled.
Chances of rematch-
French will feel strong, but tired, and satisfied, not interested in boat rocking. Russians will feel tired and only a little more secure externally than before. Germans and Austria will feel more chastened, weaker and insecure. They are less likely to feel like they were “this close” to victory and will feel that fundamental diplomatic realignments, new sets of allies, not just small tweaks or fealty to the “perfect” military plan, will be needed for security. The German military won’t lose all prestige, but it’s prestige will be cut down in size.
--
Medium-or Long War
It takes two to make peace, one to make a fight. Ending WWI early, in less than a year, requires everything to go just right, the losers to recognize their predicament, the winners to not overreach, and for this all to happen at the right times and not get ruined by tactical moves designed to haggle for large or small advantages over terms.
A deal is not impossible, but it’s hard.
It’s much easier, even in the event that a much greater German success in France in 1914 makes it the all-but certain victor of the war, to imagine that haggling and jockeying for relative advantage, each side’s greed, bad luck and timing, miscalculation and miscommunication, will lead to a settlement *not* being made, and for follow-on campaigning to occur wherever possible (western and southern France, Russia, the seas, the Near East) for another couple years, even after potential false starts at making peace.
Short-War outcome
CP Victory –
Germans do better in France through better luck, more French, British, Belgian mistakes
Settlement yields punishment, territorial losses of Serbia, probable indemnities, and maximum German territorial gains of Briey-Longwy, Polish border strip, maybe colonial border strips.
Arrived at through French realizing dire situation early, Brits, either as a neutral, or an unassailable belligerent threatening Germany with the prospect of making the war a long, drawn out affair. Germany quitting while ahead.
Chances of rematch – Germans will feel strong, French and Russians weak, Germans secure. British dissatisfied.
Entente Victory
French do better through better uniforms, realistic defensive plans, stronger left-wing deployment- Maybe even Belgians do a bit better, and Germans have some bad luck. German front line ends up no more than halfway through Belgium. Combined with defeats of Austrian offensives and only defensive victories in the east.
Not gaining east or west, Germany & Austria start hunting for a white peace. For it to work, Russia and France need to let them. Once joined, France may be hardest to stop, short of cession of Alsace-Lorraine.
If Anglo-French-Belgian counter-offensive presses Germans back from late 1914, and Russians pick up in Galicia in 1915, or minor neutrals declare for Entente, CPs may consider peace ceding A-L in west, Posen or Ost und WestPreussen in East, Galicia and maybe Bosnia, as an alternative to getting totally steamrolled.
Chances of rematch-
French will feel strong, but tired, and satisfied, not interested in boat rocking. Russians will feel tired and only a little more secure externally than before. Germans and Austria will feel more chastened, weaker and insecure. They are less likely to feel like they were “this close” to victory and will feel that fundamental diplomatic realignments, new sets of allies, not just small tweaks or fealty to the “perfect” military plan, will be needed for security. The German military won’t lose all prestige, but it’s prestige will be cut down in size.
--
Medium-or Long War
It takes two to make peace, one to make a fight. Ending WWI early, in less than a year, requires everything to go just right, the losers to recognize their predicament, the winners to not overreach, and for this all to happen at the right times and not get ruined by tactical moves designed to haggle for large or small advantages over terms.
A deal is not impossible, but it’s hard.
It’s much easier, even in the event that a much greater German success in France in 1914 makes it the all-but certain victor of the war, to imagine that haggling and jockeying for relative advantage, each side’s greed, bad luck and timing, miscalculation and miscommunication, will lead to a settlement *not* being made, and for follow-on campaigning to occur wherever possible (western and southern France, Russia, the seas, the Near East) for another couple years, even after potential false starts at making peace.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Although usually avoiding the world wars is thought to be key to prolonging colonialism, it might instead help shorten it. See below:
i dont really see why the colonial empires would have incentive to end because of televisions. this post assumes that tv would be the same as it was in our tl with free reporting and open press and all anti-colonial movements would be peaceful. During WW1 controlling mass media and ensuring that the public got a tailored message of the war was seen as righteous and necessary. this came once again in the second world war.
Without the wars, this view may well persist in the attitudes of the imperial governments and by the time television comes about, it could equally be a measure of controlling information. when television began OTL, it was a state controlled industry because the governments at the time controlled the infrastructure in of itself... Who's to say that a nation like Britian or Germany doesnt just use tv to frame colonial movements as terrorists, ultra nationalists or violent secessionists..?
Without the wars, it's not difficult to imagine that the 1940's the attitudes would be closer to how modern China uses media as propaganda to maintain public perception of the state, rather than 1970's anti-war america. there has been no serious challenges to the system at play, so I feel a lot of colonial Empires would cling on to their empires and fight to maintain them, rather than reform them.
And lets be honest, reform in the empires were never going to be truly in the natives favour.. Empires weren't created and maintained to benefit the people that were colonized, they were designed to benefit the nation at the top. They were sources of prestige, exploitable manpower, cheap labour, soldiers and raw resources. Britain didnt built it's empire to spread civilization, it built it's empire because it was a tiny island that had limited resources, expansion was nesseacry to accrue power and wealth. There was little respect for native cultures, at best the"White man's burdern" was the prevailing attitude, these "poor primitives" need to be brought into the capitalist western model because Europeans chauvinistically believed "that's what's best for the natives".
Europe saw itself as the centre of civilization, 2 wars shattered that perception, becase how can such "civilized" governments send the cream of their youth to slaughter each other so needlessly. Short glorious war simply maintians what people already thought. Am I making any sense? :S
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raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Reply
It could go all sorts of ways, but why in particular, would a lack of wars *strengthen* censorship over reporting and information in industrial nations?
It could go all sorts of ways, but why in particular, would a lack of wars *strengthen* censorship over reporting and information in industrial nations?
BeFore the wars, the edwardian/aristocratic status quo was not seriously questioned. A short great war, while saving lives may reinforce the attitudes of edwardian europe and colonialism. By the time TV comes around, it could potentially just be another tool to protect the status quo.
For example I mean if we look at Imperial Germany; the war shattered it's aristocratic government not only militarily, but culturally. The Junker/Prussian/aristocratic class that had ruled for so many decades was gone and left a bad taste in people's mouths (an attitude reflected in the Nazi's that took power, they distanced themselves from the disgraced monarchy etc). In a scenario where a short war has earned Germany "it's place in the sun", this class would likely be enboldened and ratified.... The authority of the Kaiser and it's style of government is "proven" to be effective, the authoritarian, Eurocentric, Imperialist attitudes of this leadership would likely be reinforced. This was a group that saw propaganda as a tool to protect these attitudes, and I feel that if this attitude persists, early TV (which would likely be state controlled) Could very plausibly be used as another method of promoting the status quo, not challenging it.
The vietnam war is also very different. America in the 70's was a culture that put value on free press media. America also lost in Vietnam for reasons not restricted to negative public perception.... they were propping up an unpopular regime that was corrupt and incompotenct, the US were fighting an engagement where the scope and rules were changing near constantly, their enemy was being supplied by another powerful rival. Imperialist Germany or Brtiain going into Africa to put downa native revolt is going to be fighting a very different war with very different rules.
While TV could be used to show the true horrors of war, equally you can you use TV to frame nativist movements as terrorists, killing good europenas and raiding good colonial homesteads etc. The medium itself was not the thing that turned public opinion agaisnt something like the Vietnam war, but the evironemnt that medium existed in was also a factor.
For exmaple imagine If America was more authoritarian when engaged in vietnam. Say the government directly controlled ALL press and media, never reporting on the firebombings, columns of refugees, atrocities or the fact that thousands of young american boys were dying horribly in the jungle thousands of miles from home for dubious reasons. Casualties are underreported and coverage of antiwar protests are surpressed. In this scenario, TV is a tool for control, not free speech.
I would argue that Imperial European governemnts held this kind of attitude pre-WW1 and the scope and suffering of the war eventually was beyond hiding. Different outlets for information were increasingly turned to by a public that no longer trusted the narrative of the government.
I used modern China as a comparison, and while not perfect, my point was that the media is a tool wielded by the state to influence public opinion towards the ruling communist party. Pre-WW1 Europe held more authoritatiran attitudes towards mass media, and there was a persisting idea that it was acceptable to use mass media as a tool of controlling public perception of the government and war....
I'm not saying that the post proposed would never happen, but i feel there are many other factors that aren;t taken into account that could swing it the other way.
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I am pretty sure that this was mostly the case in OTL even.
In OTL, decolonization was very much a product of the times. The empires had been battered by two world wars in which the victorious alliance claimed to be fighting for freedom and democracy and then in the Cold War the two greatest world powers were both revolutionary republics who had a strong antipathy to imperialism. With the USA and Soviet Union struggling to one-up each-other in a context of British and French weakness, the old empires were crumbling too fast and the Cold War didn't give much opportunity to those in the US and USSR who championed some ideological whitewashed effort to expand their own empires. (No joke, in the Soviet Union there were those who thought that having colonies would accelerate the progress towards socialism - actually in much the same way that French imperialists justified their colonies as bringing the virtues of the French Revolution to the unwashed native masses.)
Also, there's the role of development in decolonization - in Indochina, the key demographic backing independence were the French-educated locals, who due to racism and under-investment in the colonies could not expect jobs equal to their talents without radical change. From the biographies of other fathers of post-colonial freedom, I suspect this was true for many other colonies. So if the wealth of Europe has not been squandered in an orgy of self-destruction, does that mean more investment in the colonies? Enough to give the Western-educated members of colonial populations adequate opportunities? I have my doubts that no WW1 on its own would be a sufficient change to make that happen, but it may happen and it may happen in enough places to radically change the trajectory of the colonial empires. Perhaps, for example, the continuing aura of European invincibility means more efforts by colonial people to change the systems to ones that were more equal. Again, considering the strength of European racism and classism in the time period we're discussing, it is unlikely that we'll get happy multi-ethnic imperial federations. More likely frustration with European unresponsiveness pushes would-be colonial reformers into seekers of independence, just a bit later than happened in OTL. But we're talking about an extremely complex process and altogether I think a much less damaging WW1 could allow enough small factors like the above pile up to lead to a much, much longer period of European colonialism.
So I agree with you that most likely decolonization could well be greatly delayed in this scenario, and that European powers would fight to keep their empires much harder than most people tend to think. Heck, all the European powers fought tooth and nail to keep their empires in OTL. In Britain, Malaysia is often held up as an example of a good decolonization effort. What is generally forgotten is that the British started fighting the "Malaysian Emergency" in order to keep Malaysia a colony, and the shift of mission to one of suppressing the Communists and allowing more Anglo-friendly nationalists to take power in the newly independent Malaysia was one that came later, when the British admitted to themselves that they were not willing to pay the costs of brutally crushing ALL the nationalist groups.
Heck, even a scenario where Japan did not fight a war with the UK, France or the Netherlands might be enough to avoid decolonization in the 20th Century (of course, the empires will fall eventually, all empires must). The Japanese conquest of the colonies of Southeast Asia as well as the blundering this conquest provoked from the British (Bengal famine anyone?) was an absolutely massive blow to the colonial empires. A quick German victory in WW1 leads to a much altered Japanese economic trajectory, and Japan may experience less growth between 1910 and 1937, but also have more economic stability, avoiding some of the most important factors that pushed Japan into militarism in OTL.
fasquardon
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Back to the main concept, I think of all the Entente powers, the one whose revanchist would be most worrisome would be Britain. For reasons I and others have stated, France will feel too weak to be a first mover against Germany. Russia could be revanchist if it gets a period of time to self strengthen and become confident, and it will feel more motivated for revanche if Germany forces it to cede any of Ukraine or Belarus or the northern Baltic’s.
despite feelings of perfidious St Pete, I feel like Britain will become a big investor in Russia postwar, taking much of the place of France, because Britain will want some sort of strong power on the continent independent of Germany, and Russia will want to show Germany it has other diplomatic options, even while striving to be circumspect enough to avoid provoking another beating from Germany.
Britain may try to take a “sour grapes” attitude toward German dominance in Western Europe, acting like it’s not a problem for British trade and focusing on French incompetence. this would be easier to do if Britain was neutral all along than if Britain DOW’ed and the BEF was defeated. But the temptation for opposition politicians to razz the govt for being too weak in the face of Germany will be high. Mutual competitive pressure could in time force Britain to adopt a position that forces it into a conflict with Germany.
despite feelings of perfidious St Pete, I feel like Britain will become a big investor in Russia postwar, taking much of the place of France, because Britain will want some sort of strong power on the continent independent of Germany, and Russia will want to show Germany it has other diplomatic options, even while striving to be circumspect enough to avoid provoking another beating from Germany.
Britain may try to take a “sour grapes” attitude toward German dominance in Western Europe, acting like it’s not a problem for British trade and focusing on French incompetence. this would be easier to do if Britain was neutral all along than if Britain DOW’ed and the BEF was defeated. But the temptation for opposition politicians to razz the govt for being too weak in the face of Germany will be high. Mutual competitive pressure could in time force Britain to adopt a position that forces it into a conflict with Germany.