I feeel like people always think avoiding nazism or the ussr means the world is fundamentally better, but such a world would likely see extended imperialism and forget the suffering of Europe's colonial subjects in africaand asia... people here tend to forget that these institutions weere maintained solely to benefit the colonial powers at the expense of millions... reform wasnt really there to uplift natives, it was always placating the locals underfoot to help european powers... i never like this question because people measure a "better world" by removing the wars and holocaust in Europe but that discredits the potential misery of extended colonialism... the world is different,but may not always be better for everyone. Its just fiction after a point in the end, saying it would be better always seems silly because we never really know,we only speculate
There's actually a way this might lead to a "win-win" for the global north and south, west and east. Less bloodshed in Europe, and earlier decolonization. Somebody argued it in a recent AHC thread on earlier decolonization. They said with avoidance of WWII (and maybe WWI) the advance ofapplied consumer technology goes faster, leading to faster development of television, leading to unwillingness of western populations to watch their soldiers mired in putting down colonial unrest.
If the French have lost the war in a single season, then they have clearly shit the bed and are scarcely going to be motivated to immediately start planning a third round. Again, based on the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war, after reparations, its going to take at least 20 years for France to drag itself off the floor.
At the very least, one strategic "lesson" the French may take away from this is that they do not, repeat not, want to be Germany's first target and so do not want to be involved at the outset of any war. They'll resign themselves to being a minor military and colonial power, and perhaps think of revenge, but won't commit themselves in any fashion against Germany, unless an opportunity comes up like gross German instability, or Germany getting deeply involved in hostilities with Russia and Britain and starting to do poorly.
OTL on the eve of war only one member of the British Liberal Cabinet was enthusiastic about war with Germany - and even Churchill's oratory failed to sway anyone else on the matter. OTL much of Grey's diplomacy in the years prior to the war was done in the shadows, since he had been put on notice his dealings with the French was jeopardising British relations with the Germans. On the eve of war, the British Cabinet were outraged to hear of Grey's private dealings with the French. It was a priority for the majority of Cabinet, that Britain retained a free hand, a cornerstone of isolationism - not some "Yes Minister" conspiracy theory.
But are the "lack of enthusiasm" of the Cabinet, Grey being put "on notice", Cabinet "outrage", and the "priority" for keeping a "free hand" really all that historically significant?
After all, Britain went to war and kept its commitments to the French, whether liking it or not.
Much is made of British "reluctance" to get it's empire, "obtained in a fit of absentmindedness" and all that, and its reluctance to get into continental commitments, but that's what she ended up doing, no matter how many ministers' diaries have hand-wringing entries about their doubts. To regard their doubts as more important than their ultimate actions is possibly to over privilege the significance of consciously written testimonial statements above all else.