Would a Qing collapse in the 1700s help or hurt China vis-a-vis the west & Japan?

Would a Qing collapse in the 1700s help or hurt China vis-a-vis the west & Japan?


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raharris1973

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Would a Qing collapse in the 1700s have left China with a fresher dynasty, more capable of fending off the West and Japan in the 19th & 20th centuries?

Or would it have created political chaos severe and lengthy enough to have China share the fate of India and be colonized by the west or Japan in the 18th or 19th centuries?
 
I guess it really depends on the details of this collapse, especially in which exact period of the 18th Century, and which Chinese state comes out of its wreckage. If it collapses in 1780s into a Warlord Era, then, the European "scramble" will be facilitated, perhaps even more than in India, as it won't be solely Britain who wants a piece of "Chinese furniture" in its empire.

If the fall of the Qing actually suceeds in putting a more progressive and popular dynasty, well, China will be stronger than ever, even if somewhat lagging behind technologically.

I voted "hurt" above because most of the dynastic collapses in Chinese History introduced minor or bigger periods of civil conflict. For all the defects and sheer incompetence of the later Qing regime, it at least presented a united political entity (even if the fractures in the social, cultural and later economic fabric might precipitate the collapse) to organize a certain effort against the Europeans.
 
Help, because Qing China was a Malthusian economy in which population growth led to economic decline. The depopulation caused by civil wars would not be a big hit to GDP if at all, and the rise in GDP per capita would give the state more resources to mobilize for modernization, or for war. It's brutal, but by the 18th century, the Qing state didn't really have the ability to develop.

Bonus points if said collapse butterflies away the Dzungar genocide, which just about every Qianlong stan ignores.
 
Help, because Qing China was a Malthusian economy in which population growth led to economic decline. The depopulation caused by civil wars would not be a big hit to GDP if at all, and the rise in GDP per capita would give the state more resources to mobilize for modernization, or for war. It's brutal, but by the 18th century, the Qing state didn't really have the ability to develop.

Bonus points if said collapse butterflies away the Dzungar genocide, which just about every Qianlong stan ignores.
that is one theory, I am personally a follower of Pommeranz and the California school. Simple answer is in China a unch of exogenous and endogennous factors came together to cause thhe collapse of the Qing state n the 19th ccentury. Had factors only hit one aat a time the state would have survived it fell due to the simultaneous shocks caused by the effects of multiple factors. Also colonies with resources was what China did not have. Even with a han dynasty China would have struggled and the chaos would as the Taiping rebelion did depopulate the rich ynangtze region of China causing much more horendous damage economically and probably lead tot he deaths of many millions of chinese.
 
Help, because Qing China was a Malthusian economy in which population growth led to economic decline.
Regardless of the veracity of the California School arguments, "Malthusian China" is an extremely contested issue (and one looking much more favorable to revisionist arguments than the Pommeranz dispute) and you're not doing OP any favor by portraying it as if it's not. In particular, James Lee and Wang Feng in One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700-2000 and other works have shown quite successfully that female fertility was reduced despite almost universal early marriage, especially through high rates of abortion and female infanticide but also adoption, low rates of male marriage, and Confucian disapproval of widow remarriage. Chinese marital fertility is probably lower than in Europe, although probably not as low as Lee and Wang claim. This is a well-documented debate and I'm not sure why you're ignoring it entirely. Generally, your assertion flies against

As to OP. The economic boom of the 18th century (which made High Qing China one of the most peaceful eras in imperial Chinese history and thus made total collapse unlikely) seems rather difficult to avoid with a 1700 POD, especially considering that the Chinese climate became much nicer around 1710 up to the early 19th century, that the Kangxi emperor had already reestablished confidence in the future and hence investment through his capable rule, that the Qing were already proving themselves "the most commercial regime in imperial Chinese history" (to quote William T. Rowe), and that foreign maritime trade had already been permitted for sixteen years by 1800. Additionally, the Qing had already proven their dedication to Chinese norms with the Kangxi emperor's patronage of Chinese intellectuals and Confucian education; almost all gentry and other regional elites were favorable, or at least neutral, to the new government by that point. Although the Qing economy did slow in the late 1700s and there was an increasing sense of crisis among intellectuals, conditions in 1800 were yet inhospitable to a dynastic change or to civil conflict spreading into the centers of China. After all, the primary causes of Qing civil conflict around 1800 were not corruption and other short-term failures at the center, but issues rising from wider 18th-century trends (especially overpopulation in marginal areas) which aren't really applicable much earlier in the 18th century. So plausible collapse in the 18th century would most likely require a 17th century POD and a generally unrecognizable Qing empire, hence a totally unrecognizable collapse of said empire in the 18th century. But even had the Qing we all know and love somehow collapsed in the 18th century, it's unpredictable what could have happened as @Rdffigueira said without knowing more details. In 1340, could we have predicted with any degree of certainty what post-Mongol China would have looked like? No, as the three conflicting regimes of Chen Youliang's Han (which had a stronger Manichean streak than the Ming), Zhu Yuanzhang's Ming, and Zhang Shicheng's Zhou (which would probably have been a continuation of Southern Song norms) testify. There could have been a liberal, progressive, and expansionist post-Qing regime, a regressive one with horrible economic policies (like the early Ming), and anything in between.

TLDR: Anything could theoretically have happened, but requires an early POD anyhow.
 
Regardless of the veracity of the California School arguments, "Malthusian China" is an extremely contested issue (and one looking much more favorable to revisionist arguments than the Pommeranz dispute) and you're not doing OP any favor by portraying it as if it's not. In particular, James Lee and Wang Feng in One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700-2000 and other works have shown quite successfully that female fertility was reduced despite almost universal early marriage, especially through high rates of abortion and female infanticide but also adoption, low rates of male marriage, and Confucian disapproval of widow remarriage. Chinese marital fertility is probably lower than in Europe, although probably not as low as Lee and Wang claim. This is a well-documented debate and I'm not sure why you're ignoring it entirely.

Because my claim is not a classical "China had higher fertility than Europe, therefore it was poorer" line. It's a via media, in which, whatever kinds of fertility restraint China engaged in, it had rapid population growth, and slow decline in wages toward subsistence. Slower than a simple Malthusian model would project, but the direction was still downward. Population doubled in the 18th century, give or take. The same happened in supposedly restrained Europe in the 16th century, resulting in a dramatic fall in living standards, and in most of Europe real wages kept falling through 1800. (But not in Britain or the Low Countries, where wages recovered in the 17th century and remained high even as population kept growing.)
 

raharris1973

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So plausible collapse in the 18th century would most likely require a 17th century POD and a generally unrecognizable Qing empire, hence a totally unrecognizable collapse of said empire in the 18th century.

OK Daichingtala - I will peel the onion back a little and give you a 17th century PoD:

The Revolt of the Three Feudatories (OTL August 1673 – November 1681) overthrows the Qing-

By the nineteenth century (or even middle and late 18th century), are odds more in favor of China being able to do better or worse vis-a-vis the west and Japan?
 
Wasn't Qing at it's height during the 1700s? I don't see how it falling during that time could be considered helpful.
 

raharris1973

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Wasn't Qing at it's height during the 1700s? I don't see how it falling during that time could be considered helpful.

My thinking was that, perhaps, if the Qing collapse is timed correctly during the 1700s, the Europeans with all their wars elsewhere from the Spanish Succession to the Napoleonic won't be able to take advantage of Chinese chaos, and the Japanese under Sakoku would deliberately stay out of the Chinese mess. Then when Europe finally has a more prolonged period of peace (probably at some point in the early 1800s) and Japan moves beyond Sakoku (the middle or late-middle 1800s), the odds may favor China having a new, vigorous dynasty in place ready to handle what the outside world throws at them.

That was the thinking behind my "help" poll option anyway ;)
 
We have an example of a massive Asian empire collapsing in this time period: the Mughals. It ended with India being far more European-dominated than China ever was. While India and China are very different, the basic recipe (operating from factories in the coast to back various proxies among the warlords that emerge from an imperial collapse to slowly gain dominance) seems like it would apply just as well to China. It's not like the various Anglo-French wars of the 18th century did much to contain the expansion of British dominance; to the contrary, the need to act against French proxies drove further British military investment. I'd expect you'd see something similar if the Qing broke apart; most dynastic transitions went through at least a brief warlord era, which the Europeans could exploit and prolong.
 

raharris1973

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We have an example of a massive Asian empire collapsing in this time period: the Mughals. It ended with India being far more European-dominated than China ever was. While India and China are very different, the basic recipe (operating from factories in the coast to back various proxies among the warlords that emerge from an imperial collapse to slowly gain dominance) seems like it would apply just as well to China. It's not like the various Anglo-French wars of the 18th century did much to contain the expansion of British dominance; to the contrary, the need to act against French proxies drove further British military investment. I'd expect you'd see something similar if the Qing broke apart; most dynastic transitions went through at least a brief warlord era, which the Europeans could exploit and prolong.

and that was my thinking behind the "hurt" option. ;)

And I noticed so far this discussion has ignored another potential player on the frontiers of chaotic China --- Russia!
 
On the other hand, China is a highly literate civilization with a history of actual states and infantry using firearms.
 
India already had substantial European influence by the time the Mughal Empire collapsed. The coastal areas were dotted with European-run factories, which wouldn't happen in China until the Unequal Treaties; the earliest Portuguese factories even predate the Mughals.
 
India already had substantial European influence by the time the Mughal Empire collapsed. The coastal areas were dotted with European-run factories, which wouldn't happen in China until the Unequal Treaties; the earliest Portuguese factories even predate the Mughals.
Macau was Portuguese before the Qing were founded, and there was significant European trade throughout the Guangdong region. It's true that European influence was much less, but I'd argue that's in large part due to the Qing's ability to keep them confined.
 
Macau was Portuguese before the Qing were founded, and there was significant European trade throughout the Guangdong region. It's true that European influence was much less, but I'd argue that's in large part due to the Qing's ability to keep them confined.

Yes, Macau existed, but compare this with the tons of factories in India, owned by multiple European powers.
 
Chinese ideas of Imperial unity placed it much better to survive European irruption than India, and this would probably remain the case even if it were temporarily divided. What does a divided China look like with modern predatory powers about?

1931-1941

To the OP.... It depends. How does the Qing regime fall? When does it fall? And what is the initial replacement - hard division into two parts, hard division into many parts, nominal unity with de facto division (as OTL), or a new and united regime?

For the means, there are no terribly plausible contemporary invaders to be had, but civil conflict could go different ways. A lot of dynasties declined over long periods, so the easiest way to bring the Qing down so early would be to have escalating and compounding crises. Is a longer decline better or worse than a short and sharp one? Hard to say, but the European threat is obviously greatest for a long, slow descent.

For timing, sooner is probably better than later.

For successors, a Han Chinese regime founded this early would likely have an easier time of some things than the Qing, but would still face a great many structural hurdles. An argument can easily be made that China would have benefitted from a period of division. Modern, literate states much larger than contemporary European countries could be quicker on their feet than a united dynasty, and divided China could effectively experiment with different responses to Western traders. If one state got it especially right, the failures and weakness of other states would only aid it in reuniting the empire on a new model.
 

raharris1973

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What if we make the PoD be the collapse starts with a successful revolt of the three feudatories?

Another option could be a koxinga-wank

Yet a third could be a russo Chinese from 1763 or later
 
I have strong doubts that "Catholic Ming warlord state based on naval supremacy" leads to a conquest of China.
 

raharris1973

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I have strong doubts that "Catholic Ming warlord state based on naval supremacy" leads to a conquest of China.

Oh yeah, Koxinga was Catholic. Yeah I guess his Kingdom taking over China is unrealistic, but I wonder if him doing much better could subject the early Qing to a cumulative death by a thousand cuts of rebellion, that some other group later exploits.

Possibly the Three Feudatories, especially Wu Sangui

As for a Russo-Chinese war, I could see this leading to bad trouble for the Qing if they lose. PoDs could be with a) Qianlong underestimating the Russians and launching a campaign of aggression in response to Russian slights in the 1750s-1760s or b) Catherine the Great possibly launching a campaign of aggression in the 1770s, possibly using Qing interference with her Mongol subjects as the excuse. More detail previously posted on SHWI:

"
...But tensions did exist, war was possible at times, and it is
interesting to speculate how the Russians and Chinese would have
stacked up against one another during the reign of Qianlong
(1735-1799)

---I see two main scenarios for this, an earlier one based on Manchu
aggression, and a later one based on Russian aggression. I welcome
tweaks for making a conflict more realistic, and thoughts on the
sides' relative military capabilities and performance, and their
possible diplomatic and strategic objectives against one another.

Scenario A) Qianlong determines on a campaign to reduce Russian power
and chastise the Russians, in the tensions brought on by China's
demands for the return of the body of Dzhungar chieftain Amursana (the
campaign against Amursana was what in OTL resulted in the Qing
Dynasty's conquest of Xinjiang and Tibet), and Russia's refusal to
return the body.

Tensions were fairly high starting from 1758 for the next few years.
In OTL, the Qing threatened to cut off trade and besieged the Russian
Orthodox monks authorized to reside in Beijing.


The Qing had finished several victorious campaigns and extended their
territories and crushed vestigial Mongol resistance. They had built up
a skill set for war on the steppes that allowed them to win.

If they are sufficiently angry at the Russians they should be able to
mount an offensive gravely threatening Russian territories in eastern
and southern Siberia.

Qing territorial objectives, if Qianlong gets greedy, could include
seizure of the Buriat Mongols' lands, the silver-mining ditrict around
Nerchinsk, and a band of the fur-rich forest country north of
Manchuria.

At this time, the Russians are busy with the 7 Years War. Qianlong
could conduct his war on an entirely independent basis, but the
British could conceivably take an interest in the campaign.

Fighting the Russians would probably at least reveal they were
stronger than in the 1680s. It may or may not be sufficiently
disturbing for the Chinese to become interesting in cooperating with
the British in terms of purchasing certain types of arms and renting
naval assistance. Frederick in Prussia would be incapable of reacting
to the situation except simply to pray that Chinese attacks divert
Russian forces from Europe. The seed would be planted over the long
run in Prussian thinking of the potential of China as an ally. If a
true coalition war develops, Qianlong long may try, and succeed, in
having French missionaries and traders ousted from Vietnam. In the
long run, this might divert French colonial interests offshore to
Okinawa and Taiwan in the nineteenth century.

Scenario B) - Catherine the great gets the wild idea of recovering
territory (and glory) on the Amur, and gambles to establish a trading
empire along the lines of the emerging British Raj in northeastern
Asia. The occassion or provocation she can seize upon was the the
Qing's solicitation of Catherine's vassals, the Torghut Mongols, to
migrate from the Volga back to Mongolia/Dzungaria in 1771.

Russian Chinese cooperation was built in OTL on a degree of
expectation that the two sides would return each other's fugitives,
but the Qing dynasty as part of its strategy of in-gathering the
Mongols essentially stole potential taxpayers and soldiers from
Catherine, so this could be used as justification for a conflict in
the 1770s if Russia chooses on.

The near-term territorial objectives would be focused on seizing the
Amur and more of the Pacific coast to support Russian trade in the Far
East and North America. From 1774 onward, there is a break in the wars
with the Turks, and Suvorov could be available for service against the
Manchu banner armies. How would he do militarily?

At this point in time, 1775 and the years after, Russia has a fairly
peaceful environment in the west, and China has no one in Europe
likely interested in becoming a coalition partner, as the Atlantic
powers are abosrboed in the American revolutionary and colonial wars.
Actually, the Turks and Persians might be most interested in allying,
but they may or may not be capable of getting involved at this point.

Thoughts on A or B or other takes on the same overall theme of the
post?"
 
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