Would a non-European dominated world develop democracy?

Most likely non-European region to develop democracy?

  • East Asia

    Votes: 9 18.4%
  • North Africa and the Middle East

    Votes: 9 18.4%
  • India

    Votes: 10 20.4%
  • The New World

    Votes: 15 30.6%
  • Indochina and the Indies

    Votes: 4 8.2%
  • Other

    Votes: 2 4.1%

  • Total voters
    49
Would democracies and liberal ideas (such as freedom, right of free speech etc) develop in a non-European dominated world

Non-European dominated world = some other region colonizes the rest of the world, like Europe in OTL.

Looking from a glance, it seems like Europe had the necessary factors to start the Age of Enlightenment which ultimately consolidated later on in the 19th and 20th centuries to create the system of government many countries in the world are using today (not all though, North Korea & Saudi Arabia im looking at you)

For example, would a world centered on the Middle East develop democracy and liberal ideas along the same lines as Europe? If so, why?
 
Would democracies and liberal ideas (such as freedom, right of free speech etc) develop in a non-European dominated world

Non-European dominated world = some other region colonizes the rest of the world, like Europe in OTL.

Looking from a glance, it seems like Europe had the necessary factors to start the Age of Enlightenment which ultimately consolidated later on in the 19th and 20th centuries to create the system of government many countries in the world are using today (not all though, North Korea & Saudi Arabia im looking at you)

For example, would a world centered on the Middle East develop democracy and liberal ideas along the same lines as Europe? If so, why?
This is a very deterministic and Eurocentric way of thinking about colonization and the development of democracy and liberalism.
 
Not necessarily, because the basis for liberalism most ultimately derives from medieval European norms about autonomy and the contract between the monarch and the nobility, which did not exist in (for example) China. This does not mean that an East Asia-dominated world would be any worse in terms of government systems than the OTL world. The natural progression of East Asian systems of government would appear to be a sort of bureaucratic meritocracy, for instance, which might as well be more efficient and better-ran than the typical Western democracy.

OTOH, the Islamic world (the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman empire, for example) and South and Southeast Asia did have strong center-periphery tensions similar to Europe, so it would be easier for something resembling our democracy to emerge there.
 
Seconded @I
Not necessarily, because the basis for liberalism most ultimately derives from medieval European norms about autonomy and the contract between the monarch and the nobility, which did not exist in (for example) China. This does not mean that an East Asia-dominated world would be any worse in terms of government systems than the OTL world. The natural progression of East Asian systems of government would appear to be a sort of bureaucratic meritocracy, for instance, which might as well be more efficient and better-ran than the typical Western democracy.

Seconded.

On other hand, India does have ancient idea of Republic and some idea of Taoism is "Liberal" so it not impossible either.
 
Well from what i can remember, small local democratic bodies aren't that uncommon in human societies around the globe, but large scale? I can only think of the Haudenosaunee outside of europe.
 
If they were able to develop some form of democracy or liberalism, they would be very different from our own. Considering that what we today label “democracy” or “liberalism” are oftentimes the result of happenstance, imagine what would happen if some similar cluster of ideas was set to emerge in China, or India, or the Arab World. Maybe they are closer to Athenian Democracy, maybe their democracy features, like our modern liberal democratic system does, on institutions rather than the “will of the people”.
 
On the pro:

- "No taxation without representation" is a reasonably pan-human norm and even governments which offered a rational form of neutral, nominally impartial form of goverment would have difficulties raising taxes without it. The idea of being virtually represented in the government because anyone "can" enter by their merit is not, I suspect enough to offset a lack of direct accountability at election.

- Democracy offers a form of peaceful stable succession as an alternative to cliques of bureaucrats, courtiers and Praetorians trying to win favour, influence or control over the top autocrat (whether it's President-For-Life Xi, the Tsar, whomever), or repeated cycles of civil war.

- Expanding the franchise provides a way to deal with the stresses of mass literacy, mass urbanisation, mass shift of the workforce out of agriculture and mass political awareness, beyond the use of repression (surveillance, secret police and force) and beyond raising the specter of foreign domination to force conformity.

Those are ideas that seem like they could occur to persons from any tradition of civilization (everyone's smart enough and those problems are pan-human, maybe pan-sapient), and at the right time can be locked in with a dialogue about human moral rights (which all traditions stress to provide legitimacy) that develops under the influence of new technologies and science that will question core cultural traditions.

On the con though, how much can you actually use these ideas without traditions of using Parliaments to raise revenue, or the examples of selecting certain classical and even post-classical city states as examples of stable or glorious democratic traditions?
 
"No taxation without representation" is a reasonably pan-human norm and even governments which offered a rational form of neutral, nominally impartial form of goverment would have difficulties raising taxes without it.
It's really not though. "No taxation without representation" is a thing in the West because of its heritage of conflict between royal and noble interests. In late imperial China, however, both the central state and the regional elite shared the same overall goal of creating a hands-off government and stable society aligning to Confucian ideals. The interests of the local gentry were rarely at odds with that of the state, so there was no need for taxation to be justified by concessions (i.e. representation at the central government).
 
It's really not though. "No taxation without representation" is a thing in the West because of its heritage of conflict between royal and noble interests. In late imperial China, however, both the central state and the regional elite shared the same overall goal of creating a hands-off government and stable society aligning to Confucian ideals. The interests of the local gentry were rarely at odds with that of the state, so there was no need for taxation to be justified by concessions (i.e. representation at the central government).
Isn't the taxation without representation thing come from high levels of tax needed by Early Modern European states?
There was an arm race with quite high taxes, compared to China which always kept taxes very low.
Also, everybody could in theory become advisor to the emperor and a mandarin of the highest order. That's a good incentive to not rock the boat but to try to play the game.
 
Would democracies and liberal ideas (such as freedom, right of free speech etc) develop in a non-European dominated world

Non-European dominated world = some other region colonizes the rest of the world, like Europe in OTL.

Looking from a glance, it seems like Europe had the necessary factors to start the Age of Enlightenment which ultimately consolidated later on in the 19th and 20th centuries to create the system of government many countries in the world are using today (not all though, North Korea & Saudi Arabia im looking at you)

For example, would a world centered on the Middle East develop democracy and liberal ideas along the same lines as Europe? If so, why?

I know some folks may disagree.....but honestly, this is not at all an impossibility, by any stretch.

Not necessarily, because the basis for liberalism most ultimately derives from medieval European norms about autonomy and the contract between the monarch and the nobility, which did not exist in (for example) China.

When it comes to political/institutional liberalism, this may well be at least partly true(England, in particular, would have had the Magna Carta to fall back on).

This does not mean that an East Asia-dominated world would be any worse in terms of government systems than the OTL world.

Sure.

The natural progression of East Asian systems of government would appear to be a sort of bureaucratic meritocracy, for instance, which might as well be more efficient and better-ran than the typical Western democracy.

Not necessarily, TBH, re: the bold. In fact, more traditionalist systems, at least, would actually be quite vulnerable to inefficiency, corruption, etc., than otherwise, partially as such would be quite dependent on the sort of ruler & clique running the country-hell, this would be true of non-democratic authoritarian systems in general(for a particularly disastrous non-monarchical example, look at China under Mao IOTL).

Of course, to be fair, such would hold true everywhere, and not just in the Middle East/East Asia-plenty of pre-modern Western examples can show us this as well.

If they were able to develop some form of democracy or liberalism, they would be very different from our own.

They could be. But this isn't necessarily inevitable, by a long shot-they could also be rather similar, if not exact copies, perhaps, of Western systems.

Considering that what we today label “democracy” or “liberalism” are oftentimes the result of happenstance,

Somewhat so, perhaps(mainly, and especially, when it comes to economic "liberalism")but not really to a large extent; hell, (relative) social liberalism in particular has been around in one way or another since the beginning of civilization, long before the term was even coined. Honestly, the biggest question might well be if democracy, where it develops, ends up being more universal, or if it's more limited.

imagine what would happen if some similar cluster of ideas was set to emerge in China, or India, or the Arab World. Maybe they are closer to Athenian Democracy, maybe their democracy features, like our modern liberal democratic system does, on institutions rather than the “will of the people”.

Perhaps, but our modern system hardly ignores "The Will Of The People", as it were.

On the pro:

- "No taxation without representation" is a reasonably pan-human norm and even governments which offered a rational form of neutral, nominally impartial form of goverment would have difficulties raising taxes without it. The idea of being virtually represented in the government because anyone "can" enter by their merit is not, I suspect enough to offset a lack of direct accountability at election.

- Democracy offers a form of peaceful stable succession as an alternative to cliques of bureaucrats, courtiers and Praetorians trying to win favour, influence or control over the top autocrat (whether it's President-For-Life Xi, the Tsar, whomever), or repeated cycles of civil war.

- Expanding the franchise provides a way to deal with the stresses of mass literacy, mass urbanisation, mass shift of the workforce out of agriculture and mass political awareness, beyond the use of repression (surveillance, secret police and force) and beyond raising the specter of foreign domination to force conformity.

Those are ideas that seem like they could occur to persons from any tradition of civilization (everyone's smart enough and those problems are pan-human, maybe pan-sapient), and at the right time can be locked in with a dialogue about human moral rights (which all traditions stress to provide legitimacy) that develops under the influence of new technologies and science that will question core cultural traditions.

On the con though, how much can you actually use these ideas without traditions of using Parliaments to raise revenue, or the examples of selecting certain classical and even post-classical city states as examples of stable or glorious democratic traditions?

Quite a few valid points here-the real question isn't so much of if such ideals could come to play.....but when, and how.
 
Firstly, I think it's unlikely democracy develops on a large scale anywhere else. We have had hundreds of policies develop in different contexts around the world and constitutionalism/mass representative government was a very rare thing. Even in Europe, it only developed in England, Scotland and the Netherlands organically. Everywhere else groped towards it after fits and starts because it was a superior model demonstrated by Britain. And even those three had a lot of cross pollination so can't be considered that separate.

Secondly, I don't think it is possible for another region of the world (or an alt Europe) to dominate on the same scale that Europe did in OTL 19th C without constitutional government developing. The default state of human government on a broad scale is extractive power sucking up as much economic surplus off those below them as they can. It is only when you have a clear setup preventing the government from doing this that you get the accumulation of capital in the private sector that allows the virtuous investment cycle needed for an industrial revolution. Autocratic states can then hold back from maximal extraction once they see those economic benefits from doing so, but until there is a constitutional frontrunner leading the way there is no reason for them to do so.
 
Firstly, I think it's unlikely democracy develops on a large scale anywhere else. We have had hundreds of policies develop in different contexts around the world and constitutionalism/mass representative government was a very rare thing. Even in Europe, it only developed in England, Scotland and the Netherlands organically. Everywhere else groped towards it after fits and starts because it was a superior model demonstrated by Britain.
That's interesting, how did the British model influence the Franco-German Enlightenment though? Through John Locke?
 
Yes.

Although Europe had the best infrastructure to support it (largely because colonising others makes it harder for them to apply their own philosophical development), enlightenment ideas were developing (and long developed) across Asia.
Not necessarily, because the basis for liberalism most ultimately derives from medieval European norms about autonomy and the contract between the monarch and the nobility, which did not exist in (for example) China.
Confucianism is so heavily oriented around this idea as to provide legitimacy to overthrowing a monarch who fails his mandate. I have no idea why you think China did not have this culture defining aspect.
This does not mean that an East Asia-dominated world would be any worse in terms of government systems than the OTL world. The natural progression of East Asian systems of government would appear to be a sort of bureaucratic meritocracy, for instance, which might as well be more efficient and better-ran than the typical Western democracy.
Whilst this is somewhat true, its worth noting that a lot of Asian beauracracy as we know it evolved from colonial government, and that there were centers of democratic evolution. The Sikh empire for instance had a democratic federalism, with enshrined protection of religous minorities and women in office prior to the establishment of the United states. This existed in large part due to millenia or Indian democratic tradition that arguably goes back to the Mahabharata. This federation notably comprised itself of republics due to India's history of republican (and often democratic) then recent history in the medieval era.



OTOH, the Islamic world (the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman empire, for example) and South and Southeast Asia did have strong center-periphery tensions similar to Europe, so it would be easier for something resembling our democracy to emerge there.
Like the ottoman democratic assemblies before much of Europe?
 
Also, I do think it is important to mention that Early Modern England (and Western Europe more generally) was unique among large states (so excluding the Iroquois, etc) in a few ways when it came to proto-democratic institutions. This included the emergence of a relatively critical public sphere, which was unparalleled even in Confucian East Asia, and in England the unusual robustness and formalization of representative institutions. There's a need to reject Eurocentrism, but no need to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

Confucianism is so heavily oriented around this idea as to provide legitimacy to overthrowing a monarch who fails his mandate.
The Mencian argument for deposing an inept monarch is simply not the same thought process that led to the Magna Carta. Rather, the argument as understood by late imperial Chinese intellectuals is that a ruler, whether he is the emperor or a county magistrate, who is incapable of carrying out his fundamental mission of jiaohua (lit. "transform by education"; this included both economic improvement in popular welfare and social reforms to make popular culture align to Confucian orthodoxy) is unfit to rule. Both the Early Modern Chinese state and the local elite desired jiaohua in their areas and cooperated to achieve it. In late medieval and Early Modern Europe, by contrast, there were increasing tensions between the state and the local elite over who controlled what.

There could be no native Chinese notion of "no taxation without representation," which takes conflicting interests between the state and the elite as a given. The Chinese gentry did not want or need a parliament because their ideology (promoting jiaohua) and interests (leading a prosperous local society with little state interference) were shared with those of the central government. And without representative institutions like in medieval Europe, it's difficult to think of anything resembling a modern Western democracy ever developing.

The Sikh empire
Which is not East Asia. Calling the Sikh state democratic is also very misleading.

prior to the establishment of the United states.
Insofar as the unified Sikh state did not exist when the United States was founded, this seems quite the miraculous feat.

Like the ottoman democratic assemblies before much of Europe?
The "classical" Ottomans (before Selim's New Order and Mahmud's Reorganization) had no formalized democratic institutions, although the padishah's authority was effectively checked by a combination of relatively informal interest groups like the janissaries and the ulema.
 
Well from what i can remember, small local democratic bodies aren't that uncommon in human societies around the globe, but large scale? I can only think of the Haudenosaunee outside of europe.
Well taking into accounts most of the American Civilizations were destroyed and don't let write accounts it's dificult to use them as reference.
Aztecs have a long traditional of public education and a form of proto civil service as a form of social mobility, self governate and self regulate trade and artisanal "Guilds" by an elected concil, The Noble in Charge of a Calpulli, think an híbrid between a municipality and a clan, have to listen The elder Council of farmers, The slaves have voice rigths, and The rigth to not be sold without their approbation.
Woman have propietary rigths an economic indepdendence, and to be, to use The Román term, Pater Familias.
This sounds really "liberal" to me.

Mapuche Coyaq, Council or Parliment of all The tribes, were The Lonko(chief) of all The clans( in the scotish sense) get to elect one Toqui(warchief)and sub-toquis, The Mandate Is accotated and could be revoqued, any adult Male of the Clans could be elected as Toqui, the same apply to the sub-toquis. This Mandate and his desision could be also extended to negotiate diplomátic Treaties and peace Offers, that have to be ratified by The Coyaq, this sounds pretty Republican( in the Román sense) to me.
I could continue but I'm in The móvil and don't have acces to my sources and a not-spanish autocorrector
 
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The Chinese gentry did not want or need a parliament because their ideology (promoting jiaohua) and interests (leading a prosperous local society with little state interference) were shared with those of the central government. And without representative institutions like in medieval Europe, it's difficult to think of anything resembling a modern Western democracy ever developing.
To be honest, OP didn't say "Western" Democracy but just Democracy.
Even within the Western World, US Democracy and German democracy are far removed, in term of structure, power and norms.
 
Also, I do think it is important to mention that Early Modern England (and Western Europe more generally) was unique among large states (so excluding the Iroquois, etc) in a few ways when it came to proto-democratic institutions. This included the emergence of a relatively critical public sphere, which was unparalleled even in Confucian East Asia, and in England the unusual robustness and formalization of representative institutions. There's a need to reject Eurocentrism, but no need to throw out the baby with the bathwater.
Would you mind elaborating somewhat more on this? I.e. the exclusion of the Iriquous


The Mencian argument for deposing an inept monarch is simply not the same thought process that led to the Magna Carta. Rather, the argument as understood by late imperial Chinese intellectuals is that a ruler, whether he is the emperor or a county magistrate, who is incapable of carrying out his fundamental mission of jiaohua (lit. "transform by education"; this included both economic improvement in popular welfare and social reforms to make popular culture align to Confucian orthodoxy) is unfit to rule. Both the Early Modern Chinese state and the local elite desired jiaohua in their areas and cooperated to achieve it. In late medieval and Early Modern Europe, by contrast, there were increasing tensions between the state and the local elite over who controlled what.
You have moved the goalposts quite a bit here, as you initially talked about a contract between the ruler and nobility, only to now extend that to a specific type of contract. Whilst I disagree that there was such a complete unity (the dynastic overthrows were strongly understood as a legitimate avenue for when the Emperor was not sufficient in virtually any means) but I digress.

There could be no native Chinese notion of "no taxation without representation," which takes conflicting interests between the state and the elite as a given. The Chinese gentry did not want or need a parliament because their ideology (promoting jiaohua) and interests (leading a prosperous local society with little state interference) were shared with those of the central government. And without representative institutions like in medieval Europe, it's difficult to think of anything resembling a modern Western democracy ever developing.
Whilst true (and it should be clear I am not saying that China would just develop a specifically western style democracy out of nowhere), the no taxation without representation wasnt that big in the west either. As a rallying cry amongst the 13 colonies sure and with precursors in UK politics, but that isnt representative of European society as a whole, for whom the move from "absolutism" (to varying degrees) more commonly came off the back of the related governments losing wars.

Which is not East Asia. Calling the Sikh state democratic is also very misleading.
It was not East Asia, but I was not claiming that it was.
Its not very misleading to call it democratic, as democratic as modern day? Hardly, but direct assemblies had nationwide representation with a far larger franchise than any other contemporary. For its time, its relatively easy to argue it as one of the most democratic countries in the world.

Insofar as the unified Sikh state did not exist when the United States was founded, this seems quite the miraculous feat.
So I had quite a derp moment here. My brain switched up the dates of the US revolution and the formation of the Sikh empire.

The "classical" Ottomans (before Selim's New Order and Mahmud's Reorganization) had no formalized democratic institutions, although the padishah's authority was effectively checked by a combination of relatively informal interest groups like the janissaries and the ulema.
Yes?
My point was that the Ottoman empire had democratic institutions before much of Europe despite being an Asian country, not that it had institutions centuries before.
 
In general, I think the notion that all of Asia would somehow have moved towards democracy in the absence of imperialism is itself 1) Eurocentric, as it takes European development to be the norm; 2) Whiggish, for the same reasons; 3) presentist. R. Bin Wong’s China Transformed is a pretty good book on how late imperial China simply did not have the political background necessary for representative government, not because it lagged behind but because it took a different path, one of “fractal” government.

I.e. the exclusion of the Iriquous
The Iroquois aren’t really relevant to OP because they couldn’t plausibly have dominated the world.

as you initially talked about a contract between the ruler and nobility, only to now extend that to a specific type of contract.
Democracy, assuming we’re talking about representative democracy which all modern (country-sized) democracies are based upon, comes from representative institutions that reflect attempts to defuse a state-elite conflict. This sort of conflict dynamics did not exist in China, where the state was ideologically committed to small government and unobtrusive rule (Ming and Qing China had some of the lowest tax rates and official : population ratios in the world) and where the local elite and central state shared the same priorities (the perpetuation of jiaohua). So no representative government.

whom the move from "absolutism" (to varying degrees) more commonly came off the back of the related governments losing wars.
The liberal revolutions of 1789 onward, whether with the Estates General or the role of the Diet of Hungary in 1848, were predicated on the (prior or current) existence of representative institutions.

Hardly, but direct assemblies had nationwide representation with a far larger franchise than any other contemporary.
The PLC was not democratic, and nor was the (fairly autocratic in terms of the Maharaja’s authority) Khalsa state.

My point was that the Ottoman empire had democratic institutions before much of Europe
These were not natural developments of Early Modern Ottoman institutions but imitations of the West, and indeed the reforming monarchs eliminated or weakened the traditional informal curbs on monarchic absolutism (the janissaries, the seyhülislam). Also, the Ottoman “democratic institutions” as you call them were founded after all major European powers except Russia already had them.
 
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