Worst Military Underperformance

You all know there are 1001 things that determine the outcomes of battles and wars. But sometimes,all the factors seem to be good and yet a debacle occurs. This tread is for you to mention the armies who performed much worse in a skirmish/battle/campaign/entire war than they should have regarding the relative strength,training,equipment,terrain etc would make us think. This doesn't necessarily have to be defeats,a victory that was much closer run and with much heavier losses than could be reasonably anticipated count too.
 
Argentina in 1982 has to be up there. It was conscripts (mostly) against professional forces but they were facing an outnumbered enemy at the end an 8,000 mile log chain on terrain where a troop of boy scouts could have held out indefinitely.

The Red Army in WW2 has always been a strange one for me, considering they ended up as total victors and occupying half of Europe. They won but they took massive casualties even in the final battles and in many of their battles their tactics could be described as 'unimaginative' at best. At times they were brilliant (Bagration for instance) but even as late as the breakthrough at Seelow and the capture of Berlin there was a lot of human wastage.
 
Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. A large mechanized army that should have been able to rip apart the mostly infantry forces it fought, and (later on) a better general staff. Yet it barely managed a victory through brute-force set piece operations.
 

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Mussolini and his insane scheme with Italian armed forces. The Regio Esertico was the only army that was weaker in WWII than it was in WWI.
And
Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. A large mechanized army that should have been able to rip apart the mostly infantry forces it fought, and (later on) a better general staff. Yet it barely managed a victory through brute-force set piece operations.
Asad Babil. "Mechanized" army.
 
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but even as late as the breakthrough at Seelow and the capture of Berlin there was a lot of human wastage.

In some ways, the Soviet performance at Seelowe is even more inexcusable then their '41-'42 catastrophes. Almost every other Soviet offensive of the 1944-45 period - Bagration, Romania, and Manchuria are just a few standout examples - showed a finesse and skill a world apart from the headlong scramble for Berlin. But that's exactly what makes it worst: the Soviet generals had already proven, and would go on to prove, that they knew better and could do better.
 
George McClellan comes to mind...

"If General McClellan does not have any plans to use the Army, I should like to borrow it for a time." - Abraham Lincoln
 
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Probably a little out of the box but the Imperial German Navy of WWI. A huge investment for very little return. Granted the Kaiser kept them on a very short leash and IMWO they should have been used aggressively. The Kaiser's fleet could afford to take losses the British could not because Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could lose the war in the an afternoon.
 

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In some ways, the Soviet performance at Seelowe is even more inexcusable then their '41-'42 catastrophes. Almost every other Soviet offensive of the 1944-45 period - Bagration, Romania, and Manchuria are just a few standout examples - showed a finesse and skill a world apart from the headlong scramble for Berlin. But that's exactly what makes it worst: the Soviet generals had already proven, and would go on to prove, that they knew better and could do better.
From what I've understood Zhukov wanted to prevent the German 9. Armée to retreat back to Berlin and instead encirle and destroy it outside the city. Anything but a brutal frontal assault on the Seelower Höhen might have allowed the Germans to retreat back into Berlin and make that fight all the more harder. Or so I've understood it.
 
Looking at modern examples, the clear winners are the Kingdom of Italy, and all Arab countries in the post World War II era, though you can argue that Egypt should be excepted from the latter. Iraq is particularly horrible but none of the others are anything to write home about. The Italian World War II performance is (in) famous, but the same problems showed up in World War I, in their colonial wars, and in the 1866 war against Austria.

After those two, there is a big gap, though mention should be made of Mexico in the Mexican-American War, and the Republic of Vietnam.

Earlier, its harder to tell, because we don't have enough sources of information to determine who "should" be winning. The Song dynasty under performed, given what they could have put into action. Alexander the Great, the Arabs during the "righteously guided Caliphate" period, and the Mongols pretty much made everyone encountered look bad, the Mamlukes and the Byzantines being the exceptions.
 

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Actually with Italians it is more concrete then this. In WWI their troops were badly led, but average infantry divisions had pretty much the same number of guns compared to their allies or enemies. Now have you actually fielded an Italian division from 1918 and from 1940 the former had more throw weight in terms of artillery.
 
Actually with Italians it is more concrete then this. In WWI their troops were badly led, but average infantry divisions had pretty much the same number of guns compared to their allies or enemies. Now have you actually fielded an Italian division from 1918 and from 1940 the former had more throw weight in terms of artillery.
That's a running Italian historical theme though isn't it? Decent troops (as good as anyones) terrible commanders.
 

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But actually they could be that nice and at least do a favour for this troops and try to increase their firepower by interwar period, as every other nation on Earth did.
 
From what I've understood Zhukov wanted to prevent the German 9. Armée to retreat back to Berlin and instead encirle and destroy it outside the city. Anything but a brutal frontal assault on the Seelower Höhen might have allowed the Germans to retreat back into Berlin and make that fight all the more harder. Or so I've understood it.

That's Zhukov's post-facto justification in his phone call with Stalin on the end of the first day and what he offers up in his memoirs but according to the timetable he had at the start of the whole thing he was supposed to have already been through the heights and on his way to Berlin. To be sure, a river crossing overlooked by enemy held heights is never gonna be an easy task and imposed restrictions on the options the Soviets could take but the Red Army had handled even more formidable terrain barriers much more ably before.
 

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The Red Army in WW2 has always been a strange one for me, considering they ended up as total victors and occupying half of Europe. They won but they took massive casualties even in the final battles and in many of their battles their tactics could be described as 'unimaginative' at best. At times they were brilliant (Bagration for instance) but even as late as the breakthrough at Seelow and the capture of Berlin there was a lot of human wastage.
Well the Soviets at their best were supplied with LL and had massive help from the Wallies via strategic bombing of Germany, which resulted in removal of the 75% of the LW fighters from the East plus 1/3rd of the military budget spent on air defense and deprived German artillery of ammo, economic warfare via blockade of Europe and buying up of critical raw materials from neutrals, threatening so much of Europe with invasion that nearly 50% of German divisions were not on the Eastern Front as of May 1944 rather in occupation/coastal defense duties, plus they were in combat in Italy and were bombing German oil to bits before Bagration even happened and killed the Luftwaffe in early 1944. The very best Soviet offensives came after the LW was then not a factor due to losses in the West and bombing of oil production, economic issues due to blockade and bombing of production/transport, use of major German resources in the West (Atlantic Wall, V-weapons programs that cost more than the Manhattan Project, strategic air defense), and the use of nearly half of German divisions on coastal defense duty, plus nearly the entire German navy being used outside the Eastern Front. The Soviets were able to clean up against a severely weakened foe from July 1943 on, as they shifted a huge part of their strength West in increasing amounts from that point on (really actually November 1942 with the Tunisia landings and subsequent loss of 42% of the Luftwaffe in 6 months in the Mediterranean, plus Panzerarmee Afrika). By the time the Soviets went on the strategic offensive in late 1942 the Germans weren't putting 2/3rds of their strength into the East anymore and overextended themselves in the East.
 
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