Ah, but how much of that was Bradley's fault for failing to set out clear objectives for his subordinates and refusing to step in to take charge in a moment of crisis?
I mean, if you were to assess 12th Army Group's whole conduct during that period of time then not only was 1st US Army slogging fruitlessly through the Hurtgen Forest for heavy losses but 3rd US Army was slogging forward against Metz with no real plan and making little progress and taking heavy casualties.
Between them they lost between 80,000 and 100,000 men, made limited (if any) gains, both battles going on far beyond the point that they could have been of any use and neither one strengthening the Allied position or getting them any closer to hastening the end of the war, and Bradley was just content to let them go on and on until their end - good or bad - splitting his Army Group further apart with a region that had been the sight of two major German Offensives - one in WWI and one in WW2 - between the two armies, and to top it off he then refused to take charge of things when the Germans launched their third major offensive through the Ardennes forcing Eisenhower to take away two thirds of his Army Group and transfer command to Monty.
Sure, Hodges certainly should get some blame for things but - for whatever my opinion is worth - I have always considered this period of time a major failing in the Generalship of Omar Bradley.
