The word that Suzuki chose for "ignore" was "
mokusatsu." Mokusatsu means "kill with silence" or "ignore" but also can be translated as "take no notice of" or "treat with silent contempt."
In case there was any doubt about the government's spin on the Potsdam terms, the following day Prime Minister Suzuki stated:
for the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force them also to end the war. That is why they are talking about unconditional surrender. Precisely at a time like this, if we hold firm, they will yield before we do. Just because they have broadcast their Declaration, it is not necessary to stop fighting. You advisers may ask me to reconsider, but I don't think there is any need to stop.
The sticking points in the Potsdam terms for the Supreme War Council members inclined to peace - really only Foreign Minister Togo at this point - were "unconditional surrender" and "preservation of the nationality polity." The two were understood separately in the Japanese government and were unacceptable to different factions for different reasons.
First, let's be clear: the Potsdam terms did
not demand unconditional surrender of the Japanese government, they demanded
the unconditional surrender of Japanese armed forces:
We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
Given the long history of freelance aggression by the Japan military and the widely scattered Japanese forces throughout Asia and the Pacific, there was real Allied concern that the Japanese government could not make a surrender stick and the Allies would have to deal with subduing Japanese forces island by island and country by country even if the government in Tokyo capitulated.
The unconditional surrender clause was unpalatable to the military members of the Supreme War Council (four of the six members) but nobody, even the peace leaning Togo, made the distinction between the Japanese military and the Japanese government, a loophole a wilful diplomat or politician could drive a truck through.
The second sticking point was the fate of the national polity rendered by the term
kokutai. The notion of "national polity" implied by "
kokutai" is slippery and meant different things to different players in the Japanese government.
For the Emperor
kokutai meant preservation of his status as a divine being and all his prerogatives and his status has actual head of government.
For a moderate like Togo, it is not so clear that preserving the Imperial Throne ranked as high as preserving the overall conservative structure of the government.
For the military members of the Supreme War Council,
kokutai meant retaining their stranglehold on political power and much more, avoiding war crimes trials and no disarmament of the the military to name a couple.
All these different political motives could be hidden under the banner of the Imperial Throne but they could just as easily diverge from it.
So the public rejection of the Potsdam terms left Supreme War Council unified 6 - 0 for continuing the war. That did not change until the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, after which Foreign Minister began pushing for accepting the Potsdam terms with a proviso guaranteeing the status of the Emperor. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki and declaration of war by the Soviet Union brought Prime Minister Suzuki and Navy Minister Yonai to Togo's position but the Supreme War Council remained deadlocked 3 - 3 until Emperor Hirohito intervened.