Worse Pearl Harbor Attack

The refuelling boo-boo during Watchtower was Fletcher's worst moment. Had he reacted more aggressively that day, found and whacked that cruiser force coming down the 'Slot', I think we might have been reading of Fletcher in command of the US navy at the Marianas in 1944. Ah, the difference between an also-ran and (arguably) the greatest admiral in American history, riding on a coin flip. And people say this universe isn't random.



Unless Nagumo was there, in which case he'd have been called a genius.

In terms of Fletcher's search to the north east at Midway, this move is indicative of why he may have been the best American carrier commander of the war. Understand that Fletcher had no idea Spruance didn't have proper control of his own TF, hence no clue that Hornet was going to squander nearly its entire strength on a mission to nowhere. He cooly calculated that 4 dive bomber squadrons, TF-16 could handle the target detected. In the meantime he knew that with the previous day's storm front and air search dispositions, the only danger of an ambush came from the northeast. (If Fletcher had been spotted by a submarine on the 3rd, Nagumo's logical counter-move was to steam to the east and bushwack him from the northeast on the 4th, just like had nearly happened in the Coral Sea). So a quick search, perfectly timed to allow the searchers to return and remain the general reserve - a classic example of force optimalisation and contingency planning.

You know, I have been reading Naval History for the better part of 5 decades - and you are the first (and only) person I have ever seen espousing the idea that Fletcher was even a competent CVTF commander, let alone superior to Spruance. Pray tell, can you cite some sources for this idea that Spruance had no control of his TF, and that Fletcher was some type of genius.
 
Except he wasn't just searching, he was effectively searching where the intelligence said Nagumo was never going to be, & more important, placing himself out of an ideal position to strike back--which Point Luck was supposed to be. Here, I'll allow hindsight is probably biasing my views, & I'm no particular fan of Fletcher to begin with. So I won't argue the point further with you.

Fletcher had just come back from the Coral Sea, having just fought a carrier battle with an enemy that was right where intelligence said it was not supposed to be.

The fault for the near-debacle was Spruance's and not Fletcher's. Fletcher gave Spruance orders to hit the target detected with two full-deck carrier strikes, and Spruance did not have control of his task force, meaning that Hornet failed to do as Fletcher had ordered. Fletcher had allocated sufficient resources and was correctly using Yorktown as the reserve force. Hornet had no authority or reason to assign itself that role, and Spruance is on tabs for the fact it did; it sure the heck isn't Fletcher's fault that Hornet's dive bombers took it upon themselves to fly the wrong course.
 
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You know, I have been reading Naval History for the better part of 5 decades - and you are the first (and only) person I have ever seen espousing the idea that Fletcher was even a competent CVTF commander, let alone superior to Spruance.

Fletcher (IMO) was better than Halsey. Whether he was better than Spraunce, that I'm not sure of. Spraunce was very systematic, intelligent, level headed, very good with detail. But he was also fanatically cautious.

Pray tell, can you cite some sources for this idea that Spruance had no control of his TF

I didn't say Spraunce had "no" control of TF-16; you exaggerate. I said that Spraunce did not have proper control of TF-16. Fletcher ordered Spraunce to hit the target detected with the full strength of both his carriers, and Spraunce failed to deliver.

and that Fletcher was some type of genius

No one said that,

http://books.google.ca/books/about/Black_Shoe_Carrier_Admiral.html?id=6sc8FRkWI-4C&redir_esc=y
 

elkarlo

Banned
Basically Yorktown same as OTL, Lexington being lost at Pearl butterflies away Saratoga's January torpedoing, and she takes the place of the Lexington, and the Doolittle Raid is butterflied away, but Hornet is still sent to the Pacific as general reinforcements anyway and can help in the battle.

I'd figure also personnel wise some of the pilots and crew of Enterprise and Lexington could transfer to various positions on the other three carriers to help fill out different positions.

I might throw the USS North Carolina in as well just for the heck of it.


The Doolittle raid was a big reason why the IJN stopped messing around in the Indian Ocean. No raid, and what would have been the IJN strategy?
 
Most likely an offensive in general direction of Samoa-Fiji, attempting to cut off Australia and NZ from the USA. Or an attempt to draw USN to 'decisive battle' or both. Though, just by looking at the map it seems New Caledonia and Fiji are way beyond the capability of Japanese Navy.

Either way, whatever they decide to do, they will meet with disaster in all probability. On the ground they will face fully equipped and trained formations against which they cannot win and on the sea they will be confronted with A-team of USN and experience shattering defeat. Unless some crazy luck intervenes on their part.
 
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