Worse Pearl Harbor Attack

[Hyperion]

Crippled? No. Key? Also no. Ultimately, it was subs that did more harm to Japan's manufacturing & supply than anything. Had Kimmel lost 2 CVs, it's probable IMO Nimitz would've pulled back all subs to Pearl, & that's very bad for Japan. That's enough to take at least 6mo off the length of the war compared to OTL, changing nothing else. If it also means solving the torpedo problems sooner, even worse for Japan.

As for "Japs"...

I've actually considered a TL where the Enterprise and Lexington are in harbor on December 7th.

End result, they are both sunk or capsized, and Halsey is injured and survives, but isn't able to take command at sea again. That being said, a couple of battleships and other damage from OTL doesn't occur due to bombs and torpedoes that in OTL went to battleships going to the carriers.

Conversely, a couple of early carrier raids by the US early on actually manage to do more token damage than OTL, and I actually envision the US winning a decisive battle at Coral Sea.

 

[phx1138]

I actually envision the US winning a decisive battle at Coral Sea.

With loss of 2 CVs, I'd expect Stark to strongly resist (if not outright veto) the Doolittle Raid, which could put more CVs at Coral Sea. Hard to say for sure if Nimitz gets more from the Atlantic Fleet.

I'm wondering if the loss might make CV battles more hazardous for Nimitz. If he ties at Coral Sea, even a single CV lost at Midway (& fewer IJN CVs sunk, with a USN deck or two fewer) might make fleet ops problematic. Does he fall back on subs? (I'd like to believe it, but...)

Take a look at this thread for what I have in mind.

 

[Hyperion]

With loss of 2 CVs, I'd expect Stark to strongly resist (if not outright veto) the Doolittle Raid, which could put more CVs at Coral Sea. Hard to say for sure if Nimitz gets more from the Atlantic Fleet.

I'm wondering if the loss might make CV battles more hazardous for Nimitz. If he ties at Coral Sea, even a single CV lost at Midway (& fewer IJN CVs sunk, with a USN deck or two fewer) might make fleet ops problematic. Does he fall back on subs? (I'd like to believe it, but...)

Take a look at this thread[/ur] for what I have in mind.

Basically Yorktown same as OTL, Lexington being lost at Pearl butterflies away Saratoga's January torpedoing, and she takes the place of the Lexington, and the Doolittle Raid is butterflied away, but Hornet is still sent to the Pacific as general reinforcements anyway and can help in the battle.

I'd figure also personnel wise some of the pilots and crew of Enterprise and Lexington could transfer to various positions on the other three carriers to help fill out different positions.

I might throw the USS North Carolina in as well just for the heck of it.

 

[phx1138]

Basically Yorktown same as OTL, Lexington being lost at Pearl butterflies away Saratoga's January torpedoing, and she takes the place of the Lexington, and the Doolittle Raid is butterflied away, but Hornet is still sent to the Pacific as general reinforcements anyway and can help in the battle.

I'd figure also personnel wise some of the pilots and crew of Enterprise and Lexington could transfer to various positions on the other three carriers to help fill out different positions.

I might throw the USS North Carolina in as well just for the heck of it.

On its face, that doesn't change the war much: draw at Coral Sea & victory at Midway, same as OTL, just change the names. Except, who'd be in charge of the TFs, especially at Midway? Would it still be Fletcher? (I can't recall who was senior for Hornet & Sara, & honestly don't know if either ranked Fletcher.) That does seem to mean somewhat higher chances for a USN disaster in pursuit.

Later on, that suggests better outcomes around Guadalcanal, with Fletcher being out of position claiming a need to refuel. Possibly worse around Saipan (?), where Spruance covered the beaches even when there were opportunities to pursue. Maybe a really good outcome at Leyte, if Halsey isn't in charge: completely destroy both Kurita's heavies & Ozawa's (empty) CVs.

In all, tho, probably not differences anybody but a buff (or somebody here) would notice.

 

[Glenn239]

In "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War", the author makes a case for an invasion of Kauai to establish a land-based air power capability within a day or so after the attack. Land-based fighters and bombers would be sufficient to drive off any B-17 attempting to land at Pearl Harbor and the 1st Air Fleet would be lurking nearby to help the land-based planes in the case the US Fleet comes in force to relieve the Hawaiian Islands. Might make an interesting POD for someone to explore.

Been there, done that, invented the T-Shirt. Kauai is great temporary base if the purpose is to seek a decisive battle, and the IJN wants a forward temporary base for mainly recon purposes. In terms of using Kauai for the attack role, that may take longer to set up than a 48-72 hour battle actually lasts.
Using Kauai alone against Oahu as a forward airbase runs into the fact that the air bases on Oahu are more numerous and robust than the fields on Kauai. Figure something like a 6:1 comparative sortie rate once Oahu has recovered from the carriers strikes.

Later on, that suggests better outcomes around Guadalcanal, with Fletcher being out of position claiming a need to refuel.

Lexington and Enterprise are sunk at Pearl. Saratoga is sunk at Coral Sea, Yorktown was sunk at Midway, leaving only the Wasp and Hornet. Guadalcanal can't happen.

 

[Hyperion]

On its face, that doesn't change the war much: draw at Coral Sea & victory at Midway, same as OTL, just change the names. Except, who'd be in charge of the TFs, especially at Midway? Would it still be Fletcher? (I can't recall who was senior for Hornet & Sara, & honestly don't know if either ranked Fletcher.) That does seem to mean somewhat higher chances for a USN disaster in pursuit.

Later on, that suggests better outcomes around Guadalcanal, with Fletcher being out of position claiming a need to refuel. Possibly worse around Saipan (?), where Spruance covered the beaches even when there were opportunities to pursue. Maybe a really good outcome at Leyte, if Halsey isn't in charge: completely destroy both Kurita's heavies & Ozawa's (empty) CVs.

In all, tho, probably not differences anybody but a buff (or somebody here) would notice.

Hornet was under Halsey during the Doolittle Raid, and at Midway was under Spruance, with Fletcher being in overall command as he was the senior of the two.

In OTL, USS Lexington and TF 11 where under the command of Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch at Coral Sea, and Fitch later brought Saratoga to Midway, missing the battle by a day or so.

 

[phx1138]

Spruance, with Fletcher being in overall command as he was the senior of the two

That I knew.

In OTL, USS Lexington and TF 11 where under the command of Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch at Coral Sea, and Fitch later brought Saratoga to Midway, missing the battle by a day or so.

That, I didn't. Nor am I aware if Fitch or Fletcher would be senior.

Any preference for SOPA at Midway? Or Guadalcanal?

 

[BlondieBC]

I've actually considered a TL where the Enterprise and Lexington are in harbor on December 7th.

End result, they are both sunk or capsized, and Halsey is injured and survives, but isn't able to take command at sea again. That being said, a couple of battleships and other damage from OTL doesn't occur due to bombs and torpedoes that in OTL went to battleships going to the carriers.

Conversely, a couple of early carrier raids by the US early on actually manage to do more token damage than OTL, and I actually envision the US winning a decisive battle at Coral Sea.

For you TL, did you decide what would happen with the extra 1-3 battleships that survive? Would they be used in any important battles in the first year of the war? While often bashed as obsolete, they would have had some value.

 

[BlondieBC]

With loss of 2 CVs, I'd expect Stark to strongly resist (if not outright veto) the Doolittle Raid, which could put more CVs at Coral Sea. Hard to say for sure if Nimitz gets more from the Atlantic Fleet.

I'm wondering if the loss might make CV battles more hazardous for Nimitz. If he ties at Coral Sea, even a single CV lost at Midway (& fewer IJN CVs sunk, with a USN deck or two fewer) might make fleet ops problematic. Does he fall back on subs? (I'd like to believe it, but...)

Take a look at this thread for what I have in mind.

The problem is if you cancel the Doolittle raid (likely butterfly), then the attack on Midway will never be approved. So after the Coral Sea (win, lose, draw), we could well see a low activity period as the USA works to gain the advantage. Say Coral means 1 USA CV, 2 IJN CV; we are looking at the USA being down 3 CV and the Japanese being down 2. Not so sure we do the Solomon Island campaign as fast as OTL. It would be an interesting TL.

 

[phx1138]

The problem is if you cancel the Doolittle raid (likely butterfly), then the attack on Midway will never be approved.

Possibly, but not a certainty. Yamamoto wanted it. And as I understand it, it was approved before Doolittle arrived.

So after the Coral Sea (win, lose, draw), we could well see a low activity period as the USA works to gain the advantage. Say Coral means 1 USA CV, 2 IJN CV; we are looking at the USA being down 3 CV and the Japanese being down 2. Not so sure we do the Solomon Island campaign as fast as OTL. It would be an interesting TL.

Agreed. Also, given MI doesn't go off, & SWPA gets the emphasis, Fiji/Samoa were next up. This is the option I'd have taken, in Yamamoto's place. There are still decent prospects for the "decisive battle" between CV forces.

 

[Ariosto]

In the OP's original scenario, I would think the most damaging element would be the sinking of the St. Louis in the shipping channel. Until it could be raised, the harbor was effectively plugged. I imagine that it could take a couple of weeks before it could be raised. How that affects events needs to be discussed.

I was hoping for some discussion there as well given I have little knowledge regarding the logistics of the Pacific War; never have been good with logistics.
​

In "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War", the author makes a case for an invasion of Kauai to establish a land-based air power capability within a day or so after the attack. Land-based fighters and bombers would be sufficient to drive off any B-17 attempting to land at Pearl Harbor and the 1st Air Fleet would be lurking nearby to help the land-based planes in the case the US Fleet comes in force to relieve the Hawaiian Islands. Might make an interesting POD for someone to explore.

It's not possible. There simply aren't enough supplies, and they would lose the element of surprise on their approach to the isle, or at best some time after they landed.
​

 

[Glenn239]

I was hoping for some discussion there as well given I have little knowledge regarding the logistics of the Pacific War; never have been good with logistics.
​

It's not possible. There simply aren't enough supplies, and they would lose the element of surprise on their approach to the isle, or at best some time after they landed.
​

What logistic questions are you wanting to look at?

 

[Glenn239]

That I knew.

Nor am I aware if Fitch or Fletcher would be senior.

Fletcher is senior.

 

[phx1138]

Fletcher is senior.

That's not looking good for a Midway battle... It was Fletcher who had his CVs out of place... IDK if Fitch was smart or aggressive enough to do what Spruance did & launch at long range. (I would, but for me it's just a map exercise.)

 

[Glenn239]

That's not looking good for a Midway battle... It was Fletcher who had his CVs out of place... IDK if Fitch was smart or aggressive enough to do what Spruance did & launch at long range. (I would, but for me it's just a map exercise.)

See Black Shoe Carrier Admiral for the best rundown of Fletcher as a carrier commander. At Coral Sea, I recall that Fletcher gave tactical control to Fitch for the defence of the force.

At Midway, Fletcher's TF-17 put in a better performance than Spruance's TF-16. The fault lay with Nimitz - Fletcher, now the most experienced carrier admiral after Coral Sea, wanted all three carriers grouped for mutual defence. Nimitz, still influenced by pre-war doctrine that carriers should be separated, demurred. Nimitz compounded his error by keeping the green Hornet with TF-16 instead of moving it to TF-17 where Fletcher's more experienced staff could have better handled it.

 

[Ariosto]

What logistic questions are you wanting to look at?

Alright, in a more simple sense, what would happen if Pearl were bottled up for say, three weeks? Nothing could go in or out in that time.
​

 

[phx1138]

At Midway, Fletcher's TF-17 put in a better performance than Spruance's TF-16. The fault lay with Nimitz - Fletcher, now the most experienced carrier admiral after Coral Sea, wanted all three carriers grouped for mutual defence. Nimitz, still influenced by pre-war doctrine that carriers should be separated, demurred. Nimitz compounded his error by keeping the green Hornet with TF-16 instead of moving it to TF-17 where Fletcher's more experienced staff could have better handled it.

Perhaps. As I understand it, Fletcher was searching about 100mi (more?) out of place, in the wrong direction, when word came Nagumo had been spotted. Neither am I impressed, nor convinced, by Fletcher's claim of a need to refuel at Guadalcanal...

Alright, in a more simple sense, what would happen if Pearl were bottled up for say, three weeks? Nothing could go in or out in that time.

It will delay operations, but not materially change the outcome, AFAICT.

 

[Glenn239]

Alright, in a more simple sense, what would happen if Pearl were bottled up for say, three weeks? Nothing could go in or out in that time.
​

The US carrier TF's are at sea, so Kimmel/Nimitz's primary naval striking tools have no access to Pearl, but they are not mobiliity hindered either. The USN had no significant tasks in the first three weeks, so I don't see a CL block of the channel being that significant. I doubt Fletcher sorties for Wake. The carriers will be milling about defensively until the channel is cleared, then business as usual. The secondary anchorage off Maui presumably could handle traffic until Pearl was restored.

The IJN wants to block the channel mainly if Yamamoto is coming with the Main Body to do a re-enactment of Mers el Kiber. Otherwise, I'm not certain how much it matters in the long term. Even if Nevada had sunk in the channel, I sort of picture US engineers blasting a path through the wreck within a week.

That's my guess.

 

[Glenn239]

Neither am I impressed, nor convinced, by Fletcher's claim of a need to refuel at Guadalcanal...

The refuelling boo-boo during Watchtower was Fletcher's worst moment. Had he reacted more aggressively that day, found and whacked that cruiser force coming down the 'Slot', I think we might have been reading of Fletcher in command of the US navy at the Marianas in 1944. Ah, the difference between an also-ran and (arguably) the greatest admiral in American history, riding on a coin flip. And people say this universe isn't random.

Perhaps. As I understand it, Fletcher was searching about 100mi (more?) out of place, in the wrong direction, when word came Nagumo had been spotted.

Unless Nagumo was there, in which case he'd have been called a genius.

In terms of Fletcher's search to the north east at Midway, this move is indicative of why he may have been the best American carrier commander of the war. Understand that Fletcher had no idea Spruance didn't have proper control of his own TF, hence no clue that Hornet was going to squander nearly its entire strength on a mission to nowhere. He cooly calculated that 4 dive bomber squadrons, TF-16 could handle the target detected. In the meantime he knew that with the previous day's storm front and air search dispositions, the only danger of an ambush came from the northeast. (If Fletcher had been spotted by a submarine on the 3rd, Nagumo's logical counter-move was to steam to the east and bushwack him from the northeast on the 4th, just like had nearly happened in the Coral Sea). So a quick search, perfectly timed to allow the searchers to return and remain the general reserve - a classic example of force optimalisation and contingency planning.

 

[phx1138]

The refuelling boo-boo during Watchtower was Fletcher's worst moment. Had he reacted more aggressively that day, found and whacked that cruiser force coming down the 'Slot', I think we might have been reading of Fletcher in command of the US navy at the Marianas in 1944.

On that, we might agree. I'd sooner Fletcher, I think, than Halsey at Leyte Gulf.

Unless Nagumo was there, in which case he'd have been called a genius.

In terms of Fletcher's search to the north east at Midway, this move is indicative of why he may have been the best American carrier commander of the war.

Except he wasn't just searching, he was effectively searching where the intelligence said Nagumo was never going to be, & more important, placing himself out of an ideal position to strike back--which Point Luck was supposed to be. Here, I'll allow hindsight is probably biasing my views, & I'm no particular fan of Fletcher to begin with. So I won't argue the point further with you.