You want to drastically alter the day's events at PH, Have a bomb hit the Neosho. She was fully loaded with avgas
Worse Pearl Harbor Attack
- Thread starter Ariosto
- Start date
At bottom, no ships in the harbor were critical. Blowing up Neosho would be a help, maybe. Bombing the powerstation, & so shutting down the Navy Yard, is more important. Bombing the Engineering & Repair shop is more important. Bombing the old Admin building, with Hypo in the basement, was much, much more important.
(Bombing the Torpedo Store might actually help the U.S.)
(Bombing the Torpedo Store might actually help the U.S.)Yep. Which requires a complete change in IJN theory of the war...
Admiral Ugaki (Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet) recorded in his diary within a day or two of the attack that if he were in command of the task force he would have expanded the war result to destroy Pearl Harbor altogether. Brave talk from a distance, perhaps, but not the invention of a new theory of warfare.
Other than completely destroying all the ships and the dry docks and fuel reserves. Invasion might be the worst case scenario, due to the fight it would take to retake the islands.
Invasion with what? Their best troops were already slated for invasions of more important goals closer to home, such as Malaya, Phillipines and Dutch East Indies.
For the Japanese Pearl Harbor was the target only because of the fleet based there. Had the battleships been somewhere else, they would have left Pearl Harbor alone. Their doctrine and expectations of how the war would develop, made it imperative to cripple US battle fleet to prevent it from interfering with their operations in the Western Pacific. Outside of this, Attack on Pearl Harbor had no other purpose.
I never mentioned "a new theory of warfare", nor, indeed, doctrine. It required a change in the belief of which would pertain, long or short war, which was being debated. The "short war" faction obviously won. It was also, clearly, wrong.Glenn239 said:
In the first place, IJA had no intention of invading. In the second, it had no capability of invading. In the third, it had no prayer of succeeding.Willmatron said:
"Retaking" was never going to arise.How feasible would have been an attempt at a Dieppe style raid on the base? Or even a commando style attack aimed at infrastructure targets?
This is not an invasion but an attempt to take advantage of the attack to do as much damage as possible - maybe with one of the SNLF units inserted either via submarine or by parachute / flying boat.
A one way mission sure but every time the SNLF met serious opposition later in the war that is what it ended up anyway!
HMS Pinafore on Warships1 has a very bad scenario.
Tha tanker Neosho carrying a full load of avaiation fuel is delayed and it only just unloading when the attack starts. One of the midget subs puts two torpedoes into her and she blows up with similar effects on Pearl and all the ships and facilities as the 1917 Halifax explosion.
Tha tanker Neosho carrying a full load of avaiation fuel is delayed and it only just unloading when the attack starts. One of the midget subs puts two torpedoes into her and she blows up with similar effects on Pearl and all the ships and facilities as the 1917 Halifax explosion.
Dirk_Pitt
Banned
I'd say place our Carriers at Pearl at the time of the attack would have crippled us and would have gained the Japs one or two years.
For those who say the Japs were divided between short and long term war are forgetting one thing: They didn't have the capability of fighting a long-term war. They simply didn't have the logistics infrastructure required for something of such magnitude. They're ace in the hole was taking out the US Pacific Fleet in its entirity. This became much more difficult when they attacked before they declared war. The carriers were key.
For those who say the Japs were divided between short and long term war are forgetting one thing: They didn't have the capability of fighting a long-term war. They simply didn't have the logistics infrastructure required for something of such magnitude. They're ace in the hole was taking out the US Pacific Fleet in its entirity. This became much more difficult when they attacked before they declared war. The carriers were key.
That would mean Yamamoto's Chief of Staff did not understand 'proper' IJN doctrine when he said Nagumo had messed up by not making repeated attacks to destroy Pearl Harbor? And when IJN bombers destroyed Cavite Naval Base on Luzon days later,
http://www.google.ca/search?hl=en&q...urce=og&sa=N&tab=wi&ei=HnCiUKuBM4beqAGgloGQBw
You're saying they bombed it by accident?
Thought it might be - however they probably didn't believe it was as poorly defended against a carrier strike as it turned out........
Crippled? No. Key? Also no. Ultimately, it was subs that did more harm to Japan's manufacturing & supply than anything. Had Kimmel lost 2 CVs, it's probable IMO Nimitz would've pulled back all subs to Pearl, & that's very bad for Japan. That's enough to take at least 6mo off the length of the war compared to OTL, changing nothing else. If it also means solving the torpedo problems sooner, even worse for Japan.Dirk_Pitt said:
As for "Japs"...
Hyperion
Banned
Sabotage was an OTL concern, one of few risks that commanders really went above and beyond to prevent.
Aside from the fact that it would be logistically impractical to do, what good is sending say 500 lightly armed SNLF troops to their deaths, not to mention the potential loss of any submarines or aircraft involved.
Those are troops that can't be used elsewhere, and their use and loss at Pearl Harbor could actually hamper land combat operations elsewhere.
In the OP's original scenario, I would think the most damaging element would be the sinking of the St. Louis in the shipping channel. Until it could be raised, the harbor was effectively plugged. I imagine that it could take a couple of weeks before it could be raised. How that affects events needs to be discussed.
In "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War", the author makes a case for an invasion of Kauai to establish a land-based air power capability within a day or so after the attack. Land-based fighters and bombers would be sufficient to drive off any B-17 attempting to land at Pearl Harbor and the 1st Air Fleet would be lurking nearby to help the land-based planes in the case the US Fleet comes in force to relieve the Hawaiian Islands. Might make an interesting POD for someone to explore.
In "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War", the author makes a case for an invasion of Kauai to establish a land-based air power capability within a day or so after the attack. Land-based fighters and bombers would be sufficient to drive off any B-17 attempting to land at Pearl Harbor and the 1st Air Fleet would be lurking nearby to help the land-based planes in the case the US Fleet comes in force to relieve the Hawaiian Islands. Might make an interesting POD for someone to explore.