World War II breaks out in March 1939

Well actually they still could get hand on bunch of them. Czechoslovakia, especially Czech lands were not defensible after Munich and Czechoslovak army was not mobilized in March 1939.
However parts of Czechoslovak Army would probably manage to retreat to Poland and Romania with their armaments, parts of Czechoslovak Air Force would be very likely to retreat to Poland too.

However, they are unlikely to capture a lot of them intact an even more to get the plant for them intact and have a couple years of production out of it.
 
Well actually they still could get hand on bunch of them. Czechoslovakia, especially Czech lands were not defensible after Munich and Czechoslovak army was not mobilized in March 1939.
However parts of Czechoslovak Army would probably manage to retreat to Poland and Romania with their armaments, parts of Czechoslovak Air Force would be very likely to retreat to Poland too.
The Germans will probably destroy a lot of them.

Production after March was also very important.

My determination on how this goes depends on if France are willing to go for the gutsy and strike into Germany. Germany doesn't have the forces to stop France striking into the Rheinland. France however probably believe they do.
 
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In short, by January 1939 Polish government was aware of German aggressive intentions towards Poland.

My understanding is Polish and French intelligence services separately had collected evidence the nazi policy was to destroy Poland the same as with Cezchoslovakia.
 
My understanding is Polish and French intelligence services separately had collected evidence the nazi policy was to destroy Poland the same as with Cezchoslovakia.
You may be right (I've never seen the claim, myself); if true, it leaves the Poles in a real quandry: trusting the Sovs isn't something they'd want to do (nor I, in their stead...).
 
This demonstrates the damage the USSR could contribute as a Allied state in this early war. It completes the blockade & forces Germany to the levels of industrial shortage and rationing of 1942-43 three years earlier. In this case the nazis only have Czech state to loot for food and consumer goods to sustain the good NSDAP card holders. As the blockade ramps up what can the nazis do? Take the offensive against multiple enemies to gain a bit more grain production, or a couple North Sea fishing fleets?

Germany had replaced Soviet trade by doubling amounts from Poland-Baltics-Finland during 1930's https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi–...1934–41)#Mid-1930s_deterioration_of_relations

historically they lost most of this trading bloc thru ceding sphere of influence to Soviets, so the Soviet trade was critical, are you projecting the Allies (guess Poland would join in voluntarily?) blockade all of this area? (wouldn't this turn out per OTL with Soviets occupying Baltics? Finland? at least part of Poland? but here under Allied agreement?)
 
The Germans will probably destroy a lot of them.

Production after March was also very important.

My determination on how this goes depends on if France are willing to go for the gutsy and strike into Germany. Germany doesn't have the forces to stop France striking into the Rheinland. France however probably believe they do.
Everything depends on how much warning Czechoslovakia will have to prepare. However OTL Germans used 17 Divisions, and at least 3 SS Regiments, plus other Divisions were ready in case they are needed, to occupy Czech and Moravian lands. Czechoslovak army had 13 divisions in Czech and Moravian lands however they were undermanned - and in March 1st new conscript were called for service. Per Czech historian Pavel Minarik (he extensively study Czechoslovak army history, including years 1938-39), real strength of Czechoslovak army in Czech and Moravian lands was 7 divisions.

Germans would be able to cut through Czech and Moravian lands in few days and very likely captured most of the industry intact. There would be some losses on LT-35s tanks but production of LT-38 wouldn't be much affected - LT-38s were not in service as yet.

With Munich western Allies handed Czechoslovakia to Hitler on plate and Sudetenland was just appetizer. Without mountain regions and fortification of Sudetenland Czechoslovakia on border with Germany didn't had strategic depth to seriously defend itself. Only defensible area were Slovak lands and Slovak Moravian Border regions. But for this most of supplies and production would need to be allocated there.
 
Yes, if the USSR is Allied then the resources in this entire region will cease to flow to Germany over the next 5-10 months.

Understand the blockade the British organized for WWII depended more on economic pressure than warships off German ports. London banks were critical for anyone conducting international trade & sanctions from Britain could collapse a nations economy. Germany had little or no cash, its credit was collapsing, and barter arraignments were awkward and led to British sanctions. The US banks were a alternative, but the Warhawks were able to align US banking with the Brits in this. After some ten months of war in Europe the Germans found the 'neutral' Cash & Carry policy of the US a joke as they were restricted to a few sympathetic banks, like Chase.
That was inadequate & trade with the US and South America dried up to a few critical items.

In other words businesses that traded with Germany found their own credit options rapidly shrinking, and the German IOUs worthless as collateral.

Another trick was to out bid the German buyers in neutral nations. From the start the Brits had a policy of inflating the prices on critical items like Wolfram ore (Tungsten) or Chromium.

A important part of this was the naval Certification system for cargo ships. Interested persons should read up on that for further details.
 
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not sure how big a betrayal the Polish leadership would consider this, they were quite committed to French-Polish alliance and true Francophiles.

Jozef Beck, the Polish foreign minister, had been deported from France in the twenties over accusations of spying, he had resented the country ever since. His distrust of the French was one of the reasons that the attempt at Four Power negotiations in 1939 never got off the ground.

If war breaks out in March then you've already had several weeks of the Germans threatening Poland beforehand. The Polish government was disunited and generally indecisive but they were fairly adamant that there wasn't going to be any deal that involved ether Germany or the Soviet Union. All the same, they're likely to guess that they're Germany's next target and will begin to prepare for such an outcome in the hope that they can hold off a German invasion long enough for the Anglo-French to open up a second front.
 
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In all this discussion of Poland's wisdom in suspecting German intentions, which was of course well founded, I am not seeing any discussion of the ramifications of Poland's participation in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, specifically the Polish annexation of "Zaolzie" (aka Teschen) immediately following the Munich Accords of October 1938.

This clearly undermined Poland's moral position in the interim 11 months before the war decisively broke out with Hitler's attack on Poland. I daresay in terms of realpolitik it was a minor irritant versus the larger issues at stake, but I would say that if the Poles feared German intentions as much as they should have, they should not have compromised themselves with this opportunistic act. It is this that makes me suspect that the Poles may have led themselves to believe that they could cut deals with Hitler, and rejected his ultimatum because it demanded too much of Poland, perhaps even in the hope that with moderated demands, they could join the Axis against the Soviet Union.

I agree that Hitler would have to be a different person to honor such agreements in the long run, and that no matter how instrumental an allied Poland might be in aiding Germany against the Soviets, the day would surely come when Hitler turns on them and subjugates and destroys the legal existence of the Polish nation-state utterly, followed of course by ethnic cleansing leading toward genocide with a compromise of enslavement, while of course the Jewish population (some 30 percent of the nation of Poland in interwar years, IIRC) would be slated for total extermination.

But Poles, especially anti-Semitic reactionaries among them, might well convince themselves that Hitler would not be so unreasonable with a useful ally, and a broad spectrum of Poles would be keen to fight the Soviets.

So I'm afraid the notion that such short-sighted stupidity would be unthinkable, among the clique of reactionaries ruling the nation in the late '30s, seems to whitewash the Polish position more than is warranted.

And any possibility that Poland might regard the Germans as the strong power to align with undermines any certainty that Poland will come to the aid of the mutilated Czechoslovak state in March 1939. Remember that the Munich pact had not only stripped Czechoslovakia of the Sudetenland enclaves, which itself gutted the laboriously built up border defenses as well as leapfrogged the natural geographic terrain features they were based on, but also demanded of Czechoslovak authorities that they remove the existing leadership and put in a handpicked leader chosen by Hitler. There has been much discussion on this board of the ability of the Czechoslovak military to blunt a German attack in the fall of 1938, to deny him easy victory and perhaps even so stress the as yet weakly developed Wehrmacht as to discredit it before the world and possibly even provoke a military coup against Hitler. (The latter possibility I largely dismiss since I suppose the Nazi machine will be watching for it and would be pervasive enough to protect Hitler, put spokes in the wheel of military command legitimacy, rally Nazi loyalist and a certain number of the Army particularly recent recruits, and generally break the coup--but at any rate, a coup attempt would further cripple German military ability and encourage the French to attack Germany's western borders). In such a 1938 war, the Soviets could still do nothing without Romanian or Polish cooperation, but if they get the former, as seems more likely if the Reich is on the ropes militarily, then at least token Soviet forces having transited Romania to front lines in central Europe will be in at the kill, more likely than French or British troops would be to be on that front. With Germany tottering on the battlefield, battering against strong Czech defenses, Britain can not only send expeditionaries but also, with Danish acquiescence, pour the RN into the Baltic and give the entire German coast a heavy pounding. If the Danes see Hitler's control tottering ad are willing to stand aside for the RN, they might even be persuaded to join forces with British or French expeditionary forces, who would of course have to do the heavy lifting, and invade Germany from the north, with Denmark to be given the formerly Danish held lands annexed in the 1860s, or anyway the right to run a free plebiscite there giving the residents the choice between a rehabilitated Germany or coming under the Danish crown again.

So much hinges on how long the Czechoslovaks could maintain resistance, how long it would take German forces to be seriously worn down, which also depends on what the French and other Entente/League of Nations powers choose to do, bearing in mind also that the Austrian Anschluss earlier meant Bohemia itself was pretty close to encircled and would be attacked from the south as well as the north. If I had to bet, based on the knowledge I have right now, I would guess the most probable outcome would be the collapse of resistance before other powers made their decisions, in which case the Romanians and certainly the Danes would play it safe. A lot depends on whether this scenario is one where both Britain and France refused to be bullied by Hitler and indicated resolve to help the Czechs versus as OTL where they had already washed their hands of any responsibility. In the latter case clearly Hitler can concentrate more force and it would require an embarrassed change of heart in Paris and London to bring the beleaguered nation any hope.

However--this thread is now talking about 1939, when the loss of Sudetenland, annexed to German lands, and Teschen to Poland followed by massive annexation by Hungary in the south and east of Slovakia, as well as being politically semi-puppetized by German veto over the composition of the government are all realities. Even if we assumed that somewhat Czechoslovak fighting forces and morale remained undamaged, the loss of the fortified former borders puts them on a back foot, and the near certainty that the western Entente powers would do nothing for them demonstrated by the several outrages going beyond the agreement going unanswered all would clearly undermine resistance. Given the whole sweep of ugly reality, if a Czech premier or war minister were to order the forces to fight to defend the nation, there is every reason to think they'd disintegrate fast, and meanwhile of course German preparedness and equipment was leaps and bounds better in March '39 than in October '38. Crushing and assimilating Czechoslovakia will be a mere speed bump for Hitler by this late date; even if minded to Britain and France can do nothing to defend, only to avenge. They will get no cooperation from Denmark or Romania; the Soviets are frozen out.

It is not inconceivable that despite their greed regarding Teschen and guilt, Poland will at this late date recognize the writing on the wall, infer reasonably they are next, and jump in the Czechoslovak side while that nation still exists. Of course it would help in trying to justify that scenario to have a regime in Prague that is not already manifestly a German puppet! Since sadly this was the case, it is hard to see what could motivate any power, great or small, to step in and face the certainty of ongoing war with Germany, especially since geographically speaking few nations were in any position to help directly--in fact, it was down to Poland, and the Poles had already demonstrated contempt.

I don' think we can attribute the fact that Poland simply stood by in March 1939 and did nothing as evidence of solidarity with Czechoslovakia, which practically speaking had ceased to exist the autumn before anyway--rather, with the annexation of Teschen "Zaolzie," which did have a majority Polish population, the last plausible Polish claim on Czechoslovak lands had been satisfied. To go farther the Warsaw government would have to conflict with Germany with no particular grounds for further annexations than right of conquest. Hitler did not need or want their help after all. Hungary too left the remnant of Slovakia to Hitler's political management as an allied puppet state (which Poles would have cause to regret half a year later) presumably on the same combination of "we already have what we had strongest claim to" and "let's not stick our fingers in the mouth of this particular big dog at this particular moment when his bloodlust is up."

The Anglo-French Entente had washed its hands of Czech blood the previous autumn, there is no reason to think they'd put themselves at risk of war over the pathetic remnants they had stood aside to permit the ravaging of. Chamberlain indeed used the fact of German betrayal to steel Britain for war for the most principled of reasons coming up, but prior betrayals were water under the bridge. There would be no probable eruption of general war over Czechoslovakia's ultimate fate after Munich; the spark of general war would have to be over some other nation. As for Hitler forcing a Polish crisis at the same time as he mops up in Central Europe, that would not be smart for him to do, and no one is going to move on Germany preemptively. I don't believe Stalin would have if he could, and anyway the USSR is frozen out.

Only by removing Poland and or the Baltic states as buffers, either by shifting either to Hitler's side or Stalin's, or by one or the other moving in to invade and incorporate it, could Reich and Soviet forces meet face to face.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
In all this discussion of Poland's wisdom in suspecting German intentions, which was of course well founded, I am not seeing any discussion of the ramifications of Poland's participation in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, specifically the Polish annexation of "Zaolzie" (aka Teschen) immediately following the Munich Accords of October 1938.

This clearly undermined Poland's moral position in the interim 11 months before the war decisively broke out with Hitler's attack on Poland. I daresay in terms of realpolitik it was a minor irritant versus the larger issues at stake, but I would say that if the Poles feared German intentions as much as they should have, they should not have compromised themselves with this opportunistic act. It is this that makes me suspect that the Poles may have led themselves to believe that they could cut deals with Hitler, and rejected his ultimatum because it demanded too much of Poland, perhaps even in the hope that with moderated demands, they could join the Axis against the Soviet Union.
Please keep in mind that this small land grab on Poland's part didn't make any difference in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, though; after all, had Poland not acted, Czechoslovakia would have still gotten dismembered.
 
Please keep in mind that this small land grab on Poland's part didn't make any difference in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, though; after all, had Poland not acted, Czechoslovakia would have still gotten dismembered.
Indeed, but the notion that Poland was an absolute bulwark against German ambition would hold a lot more water without this petty betrayal which gained Poland so very little. Perhaps British and French support of Poland would have been more credible--it certainly would not deter Hitler to be sure, but it might mean that the Entente would swing into action more decisively and effectively. On the Danzig/Gdansk issue, of course a big problem there was that the city itself was largely German in population and sentiment and quite welcoming of Hitler's grab for power over it. But perhaps stronger British resolve, for instance in the form of basing some detachment of the RN at Polish ports, which were terribly vulnerable to German air strikes since Poland had only a narrow strip of coastline as part of the Corridor, further compressed and compromised by Danzig itself, sandwiched between Pomerania and East Prussia--but an RN detachment would at least have been a tripwire signaling Britain would surely fight if it were attacked, and would defend its Polish hosts aggressively with bombardment and havoc on German naval assets such as they were. A noble Poland standing up to Hitler might have justified or even compelled such a bold move by Britain. Given that the fleet elements would indeed be vulnerable to Luftwaffe attacks, surely they'd be backed up by some guest RAF and army detachments to defend the forward air fields too. We know in hindsight Hitler would bite the bullet and face the fact that he has touched off war directly with Britain as well as Poland by attacking, but everyone else might reason it would deter him.

Was the seizure of Teschen something so much on the British public mind as to compromise resolve to defend Poland and limit to promises of distant and abstract retaliation that might, in the breach, be foregone for expediency's sake? Certainly the fact of it is rather obscure. I think I myself first became aware of it reading Churchill's own postwar memoirs--but that suggests to me that if it was not a factor on the minds of the voting British public, that elite figures such as Churchill himself did note it at the time.

I quite agree that Poland taking a higher road there would not have made any difference to Czechoslovakia's fate once decided above their heads in Munich--although considering how fast the Poles did seize Teschen, clearly it was something they were planning, and looked to Hitler as at least unintentionally giving them an opportunity they craved. It could be that the Polish rulers' desire to profit from Czech discomfiture had an influence on French and British senses of the general atmosphere in Central Europe and they may have been more firm with Hitler if they had a better sense of general order in the region with Hitler alone being the one disruptive factor. But I will admit Poland's entire attitude would probably have been a very peripheral factor in French and British thinking and probably it made no difference to their decision.

Once the Munich decision was made, Czechoslovakia was doomed and had the Poles not seized Teschen, it would have wound up in Slovak hands most probably, and been an extra opportunity for Hitler to distract and further weaken Polish resistance. But one argument we are having here is whether the Poles were pretty sure Hitler was going to attack them someday no matter what--if they were, they acted shortsightedly and foolishly in the face of that premonition. Granting that they could never place confidence in Soviet support, and granting further (a little bit but not very dubious to me--much less dubious if it were some other German leader than Hitler they faced) that there was no way they would ally with Hitler either (but look, Teschen is an instance of their de facto doing that very thing, a little bit and surreptitiously of course) then their choices were to either get strong, credible assistance from the Entente powers, or to develop a strong, regional alliance--partnering with Czechoslovakia would be the obvious move to make.

The very best light to put the annexation of Teschen into is that the Poles foresaw the complete surrender of all Czechoslovakia to German control, which was actually a fait accompli once France and Britain assented to the Munich accords, therefore they reasoned that Czechoslovakia being a dead duck, the dispute de facto falls to favor Poland by default, especially in view of its value to Polish border defense and in view of its Polish population. Annexing lands on the grounds of ethnic ties was a dangerous affirmation of Hitler's racist pan-Germanism of course, but then again by 1938 Hitler had gotten control over all neighboring German-majority territories except for Alsace-Lorraine and Switzerland. Had the Poles been able to get heavier British support, had the Polish resistance with the aid of a British tripwire expeditionary force been strong enough to hold for a time, I suppose the argument that it was a bloody good thing Poland did hold Teschen would have some weight among the Tommies trying to defend it.
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This whole conversation puts me in mind to assert that Hitler was an example of a single person whose actions single-handedly turned history onto a distinct course. I do not believe that without Hitler, the Nazi party or an equivalent one would have formed anyway. Many parties expressing aspects of the whole Hitler knitted together surely would exist, and between them might command more total numbers of supporters, but they would be at odds with each other and I don't think it is inevitable some one man besides Hitler would tie them all together. And where one of these parties might have gained some strength in terms of voting and street-fighting force, I think it was Hitler who bridged the populist, numbers side of the party with connections to inner circles of influence in the German elite.

What I think would have happened to Germany had Hitler never been born or died on the front or some such is that events would go much as OTL until around 1932; in that year there would be no single Nazi party and the very alarmingly strong showing in the Reichstag OTL would be frittered away with rivals who attack each other as much as they attack either leftists or the bourgeoisie (depending on the balance of "red" and "black" in each). Hindenburg, as the crisis deepened, would as OTL form a committee of the right wing of the Catholic Center and the Junker military/police elite, and in the absence of a single figure like Hitler able to deliver the services of street fighters in one Brownshirt package, recruit various Freikorps leaders piecemeal; none of these thug gangs would be in a position to take over on their own behalf and they would in essence become another arm of state executive power, a dictatorial state acting under emergency decrees to restore and maintain order. They'd be able, and German society general would permit them, to be about as destructive against the Communists as the early Reich was OTL, and they would terrorize the Social Democrats, especially repressing their own street fighters--but not be nearly as able as the Reich was to break and atomize them, and they'd be an ongoing irritant and limiting factor indefinitely, and rebound electorally when the economic crisis finally passes. (The Communists though broken organizationally would also be persistent underground and in exile, and seep back into some influence too).

Such a Germany, without an insane and ruthless individual ruler, a commitment to ethnic cleansing and genocide, an all-conquering foreign policy aimed at total subjugation of the continent and world, would be much more self-checked, and might seem to be a perfectly good foreign policy partner to Poland, up against the Soviet border. Of course much bad blood would persist on both sides, but I do believe in each nation factions would arise who see partnership as natural and beneficial to their respective nations. Poland might represent an opportunity for German industrial recovery, and German capital an opportunity for Polish prosperity as well as reinforced military strength against the feared eastern colossus. Similarly the Baltic states would come to look to Germany more and more for their defense and as trade partners; this generally would include Finland and to an extent, Sweden. Swedish pro-Germanism was strong enough OTL; without Nazis to make the relationship embarrassing it might be decisive, at least among Swedes who are anti-Communist.

Gradually Germany's position would be normalized in Europe, with the Germans seeking opportunity for political and economic partnership wherever they can get it, with southeastern Europe being most up for grabs. Shifting blocs of nations would lean either toward the Anglo-French Entente, which might in this multipolar setting gradually weaken and dissolve.

There might be war in southeastern Europe but I think there never would again be war in the northwest, from that day to this. Poland would serve its role as cordon sanitaire against the Soviets, and Stalin and his successors in turn would exhibit the same sort of caution they have OTL, grabbing at opportunities only when they are very near to hand and guaranteed risk free--but they would never gamble on starting a war with major power protected bordering nations, and those on the Soviet front would never gamble with starting an anti-Soviet war (at least not one they can't shut down again). The USSR may or may not collapse eventually, there are good reasons to think that it eventually would, but probably no sooner than OTL.

There would then be no World War II ever, not in Europe. The war in the Pacific would concern only the Entente powers, the Netherlands and the USA but no-one else in Europe--someone might take some opportunities they otherwise would avoid, but I believe the peace in Europe would be kept--and Japan, knowing the Western powers present in the Pacific have no major distractions back home, would have a serious dilemma for their resource problems would remain the same but their opportunities not be nearly so wide open.

I firmly believe that pretty much the entirety of responsibility for World War II in Europe falls personally on the shoulders of Adolf Hitler. Many people flocked to him to share this burden by choice, and others stumbled into it by circumstance, but without him and his choices the world be a different, probably more inhabited, place.
 
I don' think we can attribute the fact that Poland simply stood by in March 1939 and did nothing as evidence of solidarity with Czechoslovakia, which practically speaking had ceased to exist the autumn before anyway--rather, with the annexation of Teschen "Zaolzie," which did have a majority Polish population, the last plausible Polish claim on Czechoslovak lands had been satisfied. To go farther the Warsaw government would have to conflict with Germany with no particular grounds for further annexations than right of conquest. Hitler did not need or want their help after all. Hungary too left the remnant of Slovakia to Hitler's political management as an allied puppet state (which Poles would have cause to regret half a year later)
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Well Warsaw was playing some time with Slovak independence and actually Hlinka's People Party had strong pro Polish wing. However after Poland occupation of small parts of Slovakia - pieces of Kysuce, Orava and Spis, pro Polish wing in HSLS was death. And siding with Germany in September 1939 was basically seen in Slovakia but also on re acquired territories as liberation.
 
Once the Munich decision was made, Czechoslovakia was doomed and had the Poles not seized Teschen, it would have wound up in Slovak hands most probably, and been an extra opportunity for Hitler to distract and further weaken Polish resistance.
Slovaks wouldn't be interested in Teschen area much. Firstly, Slovak pro autonomy/ indepednence movement was promoting independence of core Slovak territory and if interested in any territories, it were with Slovak population (like Slovak villages in Polish Spis) and no territories with huge foreign population.
Secondly, Germans wouldn't allow. It Teschen area was industrial important for Czechoslovakia, if Poland wouldn't take it in 1938, in March Germans would keep it - after all they took in September.

Interestingly Prime Minister Tuka was playing with idea of requesting small parts of south eastern Moravia from Germany as population living there is culturally and linguistically very close to Slovaks - area of do called Moravian "Slovacko". It never went through but would be interesting to watch Hitlers reaction when seeing diplomatic note from Slovakia requesting Reich's territory. :D
 
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