World War 2 without lend lease for USSR

I'm trying to piece together some information, possibly for a timeline if time permits (excuse the pun).
One thing which always annoyed me is how the Lend Lease from the Western allies to the USSR is often ignored or deemed insignificant.

So i am trying to put together how the lend lease affected the early phase of the war on the eastern front.

E.g. Could Leningrad and with it the important production line of the KV-1 have fallen if the allies had not supplied the USSR with LL.

Would the soviet losses have been significantly larger, and if so by what magnitude, without the additional transport supplied by the Wallies?

Food supply. As i understand there was a famine in 1944 in the USSR. Again, how much impact would this have without the lend lease.

Could Moscow have fallen without the LL?

Edit:
http://www.historynet.com/did-russi...ase-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm

https://rbth.com/business/2015/05/08/allies_gave_soviets_130_billion_under_lend-lease_45879.html
 
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Shameless bump. Actually I'd like some feedback.
no lend lease means the war goes a little longer in Europe, but the end result is still the same.
Soviets bleed more obviously, but when the collapse of german armies takes place, I wouldn't be surprised if it was actually quicker. This is a war of Personal survival not just national for Slavic people. The Urals are still quite a ways off and also I could see Biological weapons being brought into play before the smoldering ruins of Moscow are allowed to be taken.

Lend Lease was quite crucial, but it was more of after the tide impact that sped up the fall of the Third Reich.

do a quick search this conversation comes up every 5 months lots of numbers available in those threads.
 

Deleted member 1487

This has been done repeatedly use the search function. The USSR falls apart due to famine without Lend-Lease. Now are they able to Cash and Carry? They might be able to buy critical things and ship them home, but in much more limited amounts without British and US help building up Iranian infrastructure and potentially limited cash on hand. Plus of course the issue of Murmansk being heavily interdicted by the Germans:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#US_deliveries_to_the_USSR
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#British_deliveries_to_the_USSR

The USSR on it's own could never pay for and ship all the LL goods it got IOTL, nor could they get around the German warships and aircraft in Norway to use Murmansk, while without LL being something the Allies do Iran might not be invaded and used as a supply port for the USSR and the US couldn't spend billions of dollars to build up Iranian infrastructure. Plus if the USSR has to buy up US merchant shipping instead of just being given some they will be burning up their limited cash on hand to buy transportation rather than goods. In the end it is doubtful the Soviets could survive without LL and the Allies doing the shipping for the Soviets.
 
So two opposing views:
1. Soviets bleed more, but end result is the same
2. Soviet Union falls apart due to famine without LL

Personally i think that the weapons, transport and materials allowed for the defense of both Leningrad and Moscow and gave the USSR the much needed breathing room to move their factories east. With that in mind i think that WW2 would end up in victory for the western allies with the soviet union gravely wounded. Without LL any and all conferences about a common strategy against Germany by Wallies and USSR and the important "unconditional surrender" is off the table.

From the two views above, which is the more prevalent?

Edit:
I'll include a link to a previous topic:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/no-russians-lend-lease.393702/
 
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Deleted member 1487

So two opposing views:
1. Soviets bleed more, but end result is the same
2. Soviet Union falls apart due to famine without LL

Personally i think that the weapons, transport and materials allowed for the defense of both Leningrad and Moscow and gave the USSR the much needed breathing room to move their factories east. With that in mind i think that WW2 would end up in victory for the western allies with the soviet union gravely wounded. Without LL any and all conferences about a common strategy against Germany by Wallies and USSR and the important "unconditional surrender" is off the table.

From the two views above, which is the more prevalent?

Edit:
I'll include a link to a previous topic:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/no-russians-lend-lease.393702/
Depends on how you ask in terms of which side of more prevalent. A lot comes down to which trend in historiography is more popular at the moment. As far as the famine issue:
https://www.amazon.com/Hunger-War-Provisioning-Soviet-during/dp/0253017122

In 1941 LL was pretty minimal and most of it was actually purchased by the Soviets. LL though was important for the Soviet counteroffensives starting in December.
http://www.historynet.com/did-russi...ase-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm
http://www.o5m6.de/LL_Routes.html
 
I think the Soviets will still win, but lack of food and transport will slow the advance and give the Germans some breathing room. Not a lot, but enough to make victory even more expensive than it was. Maybe enough for Uncle Joe to consider a truce?

I'm assuming the West continues the bombing campaign that will continue to divert resources from the east though.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think the Soviets will still win, but lack of food and transport will slow the advance and give the Germans some breathing room. Not a lot, but enough to make victory even more expensive than it was. Maybe enough for Uncle Joe to consider a truce?

I'm assuming the West continues the bombing campaign that will continue to divert resources from the east though.
Go back and look at all the stuff the USSR got via Lend-Lease and tell me seriously if you think they could possibly win.
http://archive.is/pcoet
Over 1/3rd of Soviet explosives came from Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease machine tools enabled the Soviets to have a smaller industrial work force than Germany with higher weapons output in specific categories. Most of Soviet aluminum (necessary both for aircraft, aircraft engines, but also T-34 engines) came from Lend-Lease.
https://rbth.com/business/2015/05/08/allies_gave_soviets_130_billion_under_lend-lease_45879.html
http://ww2-weapons.com/lend-lease-tanks-and-aircrafts/

https://perspectivesofthepast.com/e...d-soviet-victory-during-the-second-world-war/
While the premise of the first camp of historiography has centered on the claim the significance Allied Lend/Lease Program was minimal, the second camp of historiography having more access to Soviet World War II archive material argues that the Allied Lend/Lease program played a significant role in the Soviet victory. In fact victory over Germany would not have been possible without the aircraft, tanks, and military transportation provided as a result of the Allied Lend-Lease program. The historian Albert Weeks, to support his claim of the significance of the Lend-Lease, cites the work of renowned post-Soviet historian Boris Sokolov’s The Truth About the Great Patriotic War. In Sokolov’s work, Weeks claims that rather than the often cited figure of a meager four percent of Soviet wartime industrial production that Lend-lease accounted for, Sokolov’s research shows much more significant figures ranging “anywhere from 15 percent to 25 percent and in some upwards to 50 percent.”[4] These figures contrast sharply with historians such as Munting.

In fact in Munting’s Lend-lease and the Soviet War Effort , Munting only really acknowledged the Allied lend-lease contributions in the areas of transport and food commodities as being crucial.
In those two areas alone the Soviets would have lost the war if not for Lend-Lease, but that understates the critical nature of Lend-Lease in other areas.

In a confidential interview with the wartime correspondent Konstantin Simonov, the famous Soviet Marshal G.K. Zhukov is quoted as sayin g “Today [1963] some say the Allies didn’t really help us…But listen, one cannot deny that the Americans shipped over to us material without which we could not have equipped our armies held in reserve or been able to continue the war.[12] Marshall Zhukov according to Weeks even goes on further to state that the Soviet government engaged in the calculated use of propaganda to systemically demean the importance of the Allied Lend-Lease Program, believing that it distracted from the heroism and sacrifice of the Soviet soldier and people. Furthermore Weeks claims that since the end of the 1990’s, there has been a change amongst the Russian historians regarding the significance of the Lend-Lease program, one which more closely approximates the truth. For example Weeks cited the work of the Russian historian Boris Sokolov who claimed that the Lend-Lease figure of four percent of related military goods which has been used in western historiography as fact , is actually an “egregious error …made by Soviet propagandists.”[13] According to Sokolov the true figures of the Lend-Lease Program were much higher than the four percent figures used in other historical works, in fact in “some cases upwards towards 50 percent of various types of military goods as a percentage of what the Soviets themselves were able to produce”[14] is more accurate. These figures tend to support Weeks’ argument that the Allied Lend-Lease Program did play a significant role in Soviet victory, a point also conceded by the historian Robert Hill.

Robert Hill in his work British Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort made a strong argument in support of Lend-Lease, particularly when discussing the significance of British armored deliveries. Hill made the point that during the first year of the war “the Soviet losses [in armor] approached and exceeded domestic supply, making any additional inputs significant.”[15] Hill points out that although Soviet tanks were superior, the Soviets did not have the planned quantities of these tanks because of the heavy losses they suffered earlier in the war, and this made the British deliveries all the more significant, a point also conceded by the Jones.
 
1941 probably won't change much. Lend Lease was not enough to materially affect the war that year. 1942 will probably be worse as Lend Lease made up for some of the industrial loss, but had not yet transformed the Red Army. It is food, raw materials, base materials, and other commodities which are important. But 1943 and later will be unrecognizable as the Red Army cannot become mechanized without Lend Lease and therefore can't exploit any breakthroughs they make. Also, by 1943 if the Soviets aren't getting food, radios, railstock, and other items, their general ability to conduct the war is greatly restrained.

A complete collapse is certainly possible, but a negotiated peace giving Germany a Brest-Litovsk like victory is more likely. Certainly there will not be any sweeping victories like the Red Army experienced from summer 1943-1945. If the Soviets manage to stay in the war, then they'll get their pre-MR Pact borders back and no satellite states in eastern Europe.
 

Deleted member 1487

1941 probably won't change much. Lend Lease was not enough to materially affect the war that year.
Probably. The Soviets mostly survived under their own resources, though the Winter counteroffensive would be significantly impacted by the lack of LL aircraft and tanks. The Germans would take a lot less damage then.

1942 will probably be worse as Lend Lease made up for some of the industrial loss, but had not yet transformed the Red Army. It is food, raw materials, base materials, and other commodities which are important.
Mark Harrison characterized 1942 as the year of decision that Lend-Lease kept the overmobilized Soviet economy from imploding. They were way down on food, lost a lot of industry, even if most of defense industry was evacuated, and had too many people committed to the army to run the economy properly. It was LL that then enabled that huge mobilization of manpower to be sustainable, both by freeing up labor from factories due to the arrival of high capacity US machine tools that were not able to be made in the Soviet economy, the sending of food to make up for losses in Soviet agriculture, and the sending of raw materials to make up for losses in the Soviet economy.
https://www.amazon.com/Accounting-War-Production-Employment-Post-Soviet/dp/0521894247
The Soviet economy was in real danger of collapse in 1942-early 1943 without LL. Even if somehow they were able to conduct the war entirely the same in 1942-summer 1943 they couldn't have produced from those liberate territories food and whatever else they needed before economic pressures caught up, as would the lack of food.

But 1943 and later will be unrecognizable as the Red Army cannot become mechanized without Lend Lease and therefore can't exploit any breakthroughs they make. Also, by 1943 if the Soviets aren't getting food, radios, railstock, and other items, their general ability to conduct the war is greatly restrained.
It goes FAR beyond that. LL food for instance was absolutely critical in keeping the USSR going in 1943, while LL agricultural equipment, seeds, replacement live stock, etc. all were vital at allowing liberated territory to produce again after they were taken back under cultivation in 1943. Then add in the trucks, weapons, fuel, vehicles, raw materials, communications equipment, rail gear, etc. and you have a situation where they USSR could not continue the war into 1944 without that stuff. They also needed that LL gear to liberate Ukraine and start recruiting additional manpower; some 4 million men were recruited for the military from territory liberated in 1943-44.

A complete collapse is certainly possible, but a negotiated peace giving Germany a Brest-Litovsk like victory is more likely. Certainly there will not be any sweeping victories like the Red Army experienced from summer 1943-1945. If the Soviets manage to stay in the war, then they'll get their pre-MR Pact borders back and no satellite states in eastern Europe.
Collapse in 1943 is more likely than anything, followed by perhaps Stalin being willing to give Hitler a deal that would make Brest-Litovsk look mild. It is incredibly unlikely that they survive to wars end then.
 
1941 probably won't change much. Lend Lease was not enough to materially affect the war that year. 1942 will probably be worse as Lend Lease made up for some of the industrial loss, but had not yet transformed the Red Army. It is food, raw materials, base materials, and other commodities which are important. But 1943 and later will be unrecognizable as the Red Army cannot become mechanized without Lend Lease and therefore can't exploit any breakthroughs they make. Also, by 1943 if the Soviets aren't getting food, radios, railstock, and other items, their general ability to conduct the war is greatly restrained.

A complete collapse is certainly possible, but a negotiated peace giving Germany a Brest-Litovsk like victory is more likely. Certainly there will not be any sweeping victories like the Red Army experienced from summer 1943-1945. If the Soviets manage to stay in the war, then they'll get their pre-MR Pact borders back and no satellite states in eastern Europe.

Probably. The Soviets mostly survived under their own resources, though the Winter counteroffensive would be significantly impacted by the lack of LL aircraft and tanks. The Germans would take a lot less damage then.

I'm interested to know how you reached the conclusion that the USSR held out mostly on its own strength in 1941. As i understand the LL hurricanes were the only modern aircraft in the Leningrad theater of war and the majority of medium tanks during the battle for Moscow were lend lease.

Soviet forces were hanging on by threads in both theaters of war and if Leningrad had fallen, and with it the production line for the KV-1, things could have easily gone bad for Moscow as well.

That's just the material side of things. Imagine the impact on moral if the birthplace of the revolution were to fall in enemy hands. It could even be more detrimental than a potential fall of Moscow.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm interested to know how you reached the conclusion that the USSR held out mostly on its own strength in 1941. As i understand the LL hurricanes were the only modern aircraft in the Leningrad theater of war and the majority of medium tanks during the battle for Moscow were lend lease.
http://www.historynet.com/did-russi...ase-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm
The tanks reached the front lines with extraordinary speed. Extrapolating from available statistics, researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and certainly made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of the 750 promised.

The British Military Mission to Moscow noted that by December 9, about ninety British tanks had already been in action with Soviet forces. The first of these units to have seen action seems to have been the 138th Independent Tank Battalion (with twenty-one British tanks), which was involved in stemming the advance of German units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications indicating that German forces had first come in contact with British tanks on the Eastern front on November 26, 1941.
In terms of tanks that means they only entered combat after any German chance of taking Moscow had passed and were starting to become relevant for the December counteroffensive and then much more in the winter 1941-1942 offensives.

A total of 699 Lend-Lease aircraft had been delivered to Archangel by the time the Arctic convoys switched to Murmansk in December 1941. Of these, 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks were in service with the Soviet air defense forces on January 1, 1942, out of a total of 1,470 fighters. About 15 percent of the aircraft of the 6th Fighter Air Corps defending Moscow were Tomahawks or Hurricanes.

The Soviet Northern Fleet was also a major and early recipient of British Hurricanes, receiving those flown by No. 151 Wing of the RAF, which operated briefly from Soviet airfields near Murmansk. As early as October 12, 1941, the Soviet 126th Fighter Air Regiment was operating with Tomahawks bought from the United States by Britain. Tomahawks also served in defense of the Doroga Zhizni or “Road of Life” across the ice of Lake Ladoga, which provided the only supply line to the besieged city of Leningrad during the winter of 1941–42. By spring and summer of 1942 the Hurricane had clearly become the principal fighter aircraft of the Northern Fleet’s air regiments; in all, 83 out of its 109 fighters were of foreign origin.

British and Commonwealth deliveries to the Soviet Union in late 1941 and early 1942 would not only assist in the Soviet defense of Moscow and subsequent counteroffensive, but also in increasing Soviet production for the next period of the war. Substantial quantities of machine tools and raw materials, such as aluminum and rubber, were supplied to help Soviet industry back on its feet: 312 metal-cutting machine tools were delivered by convoy PQ-12 alone, arriving in March 1942, along with a range of other items for Soviet factories such as machine presses and compressors.
Again in terms of aircraft they really only entered action in significant numbers AFTER Typhoon bogged down in the mud of October-November, by which time it was too late to take Moscow. Fighters showed up at Leningrad after the city had already held out initially and when over winter it became important. Surviving the initial invasion was effectively done by the time any significant number of US or UK weapons and equipment showed up, but from December 1941 on LL became important and over the course of 1942 became vital and indeed the only thing keeping the Soviets from economically imploding by 1943.

The Italics section starts to show what I mean, they gave the Soviets quality machine tools they themselves could not produce and had lost in the retreat. The raw materials too were irreplaceable within Soviet economic resources. They had no natural rubber resources and most of their aluminum production had been lost in the invasion; synthetic rubber was less able to handle rigorous use (though it as better for some things like seals), which the Germans found out later in the war when they ran out of stockpiles of natural rubber. LL then was not necessary to surviving the initial invasion, but it was irreplaceable to getting the Soviets through 1942 and able to survive until the Wallies could make a larger military contribution, plus of course allowing the Soviets to go on the offensive and liberate their country.

Soviet forces were hanging on by threads in both theaters of war and if Leningrad had fallen, and with it the production line for the KV-1, things could have easily gone bad for Moscow as well.
Agreed, but as you can see in the posts above LL, both US and British, did not show up until after both of those campaigns had been decided (Leningrad was effectively saved by October and it's survival over the winter was then a function of LL; during Barbarossa it's survival was not dependent on LL at all. Same with Moscow, armor and fighters only showed up after the Germans lost their chance to potentially take the city in October. By mid-November when Typhoon was resumed it was too late; then LL weapons just meant they could inflict a lot more damage on the Germans and push them back further than they would have under their own power).

That's just the material side of things. Imagine the impact on moral if the birthplace of the revolution were to fall in enemy hands. It could even be more detrimental than a potential fall of Moscow.
Agreed, but again LL weapons and materials didn't show up until Winter 1941 is enough numbers to matter by which time the Germans had shot their offensive bolt for that year. We could argue that the counteroffensive then was as successful as it was due to LL equipment, but it was still possible without, just not nearly as successful as it was with consequences for 1942. Once again the big impact came in 1942 when it was the margin between victory and defeat even with the maximum effort by the Soviets. In 1942 the Soviets did not survive and recover without Lend-Lease.
 
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War probably lasts longer, more people die on all sides (including British and Americans), maybe the Soviets wind up with a border further east. But lend-lease just did not put enough through to hugely affect the first period of war (June 1941-November 1942), which was when the Soviets were most on the ropes.

The weapons were probably the least important category. The food, machine tools, boots, telephone wire, rubber, rail cars, and so-on were much more important and most of those of those were only sent in great quantity until from 1943 on...

In 1942 the Soviets did not survive and recover without Lend-Lease.

Except they pretty much did, given that the bulk of lend-lease did not arrive until after 1942. What arrived during that year was too small to massively affect the outcome.
 
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Deleted member 1487

War probably lasts longer, more people die on all sides (including British and Americans), maybe the Soviets wind up with a border further east. But lend-lease just did not put enough through to hugely affect the first period of war (June 1941-November 1942), which was when the Soviets were most on the ropes.
It was in 1942 when LL was most crucial to Soviet survival; they had run out of the fat accumulated in the pre-war years, the Germans were driving deep into the Soviet economic and agricultural heartland, famine was knocking at the front door, and the economic was hand to mouth. 2.5 million tons of Lend-Lease was vital in that period to helping the Soviets survive and then counterattack in winter 1942-43. Then the increased LL enabled the big offensives of 1943 that liberated Soviet economic heartland territory and resources, plus over 10 million citizens in Ukraine and Central Russia/Belarus. Increase LL in 1943-44 meant that the Soviets could then punch harder, more often, and faster until they conquered half of non-Soviet Europe.

Except they pretty much did, given that the bulk of lend-lease did not arrive until after 1942. What arrived during that year was too small to really affect the outcome.
These two concepts do not relate. Just because the bulk of it came after 1942 doesn't mean that what arrived in 1942 wasn't necessary to ensuring survival at the lowest ebb in Soviet economic performance, it just meant that the increase was necessary for the USSR to survive AND THEN go on the offensive in a big way. The increase in LL from late 1942 on enabled the Soviets to go on the offensive from 1942 on and the increasing input of LL then enabled to Soviet steamroller to pick up steam. Late 1941-1942 LL enabled Soviet survival during the furthest push of the German offensive into Soviet territory at the point where there was the real risk of a Soviet implosion.
 
Wiking - I am well aware of just how important Lend-Lease was to the Soviets. Without the food and transport (plus huge amounts of other support material) plus some tanks and aircraft the Soviet Army is going to be severely weakened. But the Germans are at the end of a huge supply line themselves. The lack of Lend-Lease will mean fewer and smaller Soviet attacks, allowing the Germans to better hold what they've taken. But both sides will get to the point of stalemate, which is why I suspect a truce might be offered and accepted so that both sides can regroup and resupply as best they can.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking - I am well aware of just how important Lend-Lease was to the Soviets. Without the food and transport (plus huge amounts of other support material) plus some tanks and aircraft the Soviet Army is going to be severely weakened. But the Germans are at the end of a huge supply line themselves. The lack of Lend-Lease will mean fewer and smaller Soviet attacks, allowing the Germans to better hold what they've taken. But both sides will get to the point of stalemate, which is why I suspect a truce might be offered and accepted so that both sides can regroup and resupply as best they can.
The different is that the Germans sat on roughly 60% of Soviet farmland and had reduced their agricultural output to nearly 40% of what they produced pre-war. It wasn't an issue of screwing up Soviet combat ability, it is an issue of not being able to feed it's people and army and falling into famine and with that social collapse. The Germans of course did have issues with getting supplies to the front, especially in 1941...but they weren't the ones starving in 1942 nor on the verge of social and economic collapse without million of tons of external supplies. Talking about weakened Soviet attack ability is missing the point that the Soviet economy and society was on the verge of imploding without the food and other supplies/equipment they got in late 1941-1942. Especially if they cannot liberate Kuban and Ukraine in 1943 they can't start producing food from it again in 1943-44 (also with Lend-Lease seeds, equipment, and breeding stock).
 
It was in 1942 when LL was most crucial to Soviet survival; they had run out of the fat accumulated in the pre-war years,

Wrong. The Soviets were still burning through their fat in '42 which is how they managed to achieve the armaments production they did. Economic historians like Tooze, Overy, and Harrison are all perfectly clear on this. Now by the winter of '42/'43, there were signs that the fat was running out, but this stabilized in 1943 with the victory at Stalingrad. Then large quantities of lend-lease started coming in.

the Germans were driving deep into the Soviet economic and agricultural heartland,

The Germans had already captured the Soviets industrial-economic heartland in the autumn of 1941.

famine was knocking at the front door

Famine was already there. Masses of people starved to death as it was. Yet the Soviet war effort did not succumb. Famine did not (and does not) automatically mean a Soviet collapse.

and the economic was hand to mouth.

As it had been since autumn 1941. Harrisson quotes a Soviet report from August or September 1941 that noted the Soviet steel industry briefly stopped functioning. The military victory

2.5 million tons of Lend-Lease was vital in that period to helping the Soviets survive and then counterattack in winter 1942-43.

Of all the historians I have read, not one has gone so far as to outright state that for sure, including the ones who have tended toward a German-favorable view. The one who comes closest is Chris Bellamy who suggests that the Soviets might have collapsed without it. None of them assert that without lend-lease the Soviets would have collapsed like you tend to do. None of them assert that it would have been impossible for the Soviets to counter-attack that winter without L-L so long as they survived the summer of '42.

Increase LL in 1943-44 meant that the Soviets could then punch harder, more often, and faster until they conquered half of non-Soviet Europe.

This is all true. And in being able to punch as hard, often, and fast they also inflicted such damage upon the Heer that the Anglo-Americans suffered a relatively painless invasion of Western Europe, allowing them to conquer the other half of non-Soviet Europe at a much lower cost then they otherwise would have. That's why there is no conceivable way lend-lease would never go forward. The reality is that the Anglo-Americans benefit from lend-lease too.

1942 wasn't necessary to ensuring survival at the lowest ebb in Soviet economic performance

The lowest ebb in Soviet economic performance wasn't mid-late 1942. It was late-1941/early-1942 when not even the Soviet armaments industry was performing to snuff...

Late 1941-1942 LL enabled Soviet survival during the furthest push of the German offensive into Soviet territory at the point where there was the real risk of a Soviet implosion.

And that risk was there anyways. All the economic historians you like to cite note that even with lend-lease, the Soviets should have imploded as it was. Harrisson ultimately goes to the point that he had to explain Soviet survival in 1942 social-political terms, the whole "rats and mice" explanation, not economic or military ones (even though he tried to disguise it in terms of economic ones). If the Soviets were going to implode, then they would have OTL irrespective of lend-lease.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Wrong. The Soviets were still burning through their fat in '42 which is how they managed to achieve the armaments production they did. Economic historians like Tooze, Overy, and Harrison are all perfectly clear on this. Now by the winter of '42/'43, there were signs that the fat was running out, but this stabilized in 1943 with the victory at Stalingrad. Then large quantities of lend-lease started coming in.
Tooze hasn't written a book on the Soviet economy that I'm aware of, Harrison talks about in "Account of War" how the Soviets were overheating their economy and Lend-Lease kept them going as they tried to get their industry back into action after the invasion. Note I'm not saying that the Soviets were out of fat in 1942, just that they were using up their fat in the course of 1942 and utilizing their limited resources remaining as Lend-Lease increased to fill in the holes in their economy. By late 1942 even with LL they were overheating anyway, but if you delete the 2.5 million tons of Lend-Lease they got in 1942 there will be massive holes i their economy and the overheating and breakdown would have started sooner and impacted the situation by late 1942 dramatically. The offensive at Rzhev and at Stalingrad only was possible because LL filled in the gaps in the Soviet economy as they pieced together all that was remaining after the invasion. I'm not saying that Soviet resources and work was not the majority of the Soviet war effort, just that without LL there were holes that were impossible to fill and would have collapsed their economy but for Lend-Lease.

The Germans had already captured the Soviets industrial-economic heartland in the autumn of 1941.
Parts of it, the Donbass fall in late Autumn, but most of the defense industry had been evacuated, the Kuban remained, and the Caucasus and Volga/Ural areas remained, as well as most of the Moscow-Upper Volga industrial/resource area. In 1942 pretty much everything west of the Don fell and the Caucasus was invaded, while the Volga was interdicted and the Soviet economy put one life support, which Lend-Lease was part of.

Famine was already there. Masses of people starved to death as it was. Yet the Soviet war effort did not succumb. Famine did not (and does not) automatically mean a Soviet collapse.
Sure and it would have been worse, far worse without the roughly 800k tons of Lend-Lease food that arrived in October 1941-December 1942. That's not counting all the other resources that were shipped, including raw materials, finished weapons, and industrial equipment. Famine and the death of the working class as well as recruitible males does mean collapse is starting. The people that died IOTL were the old, very young without access to food, and the sickly. Famine did not bite hard enough to start biting into the worker and soldier base.

As it had been since autumn 1941. Harrisson quotes a Soviet report from August or September 1941 that noted the Soviet steel industry briefly stopped functioning. The military victory
You have to fill in this thought more.

Of all the historians I have read, not one has gone so far as to outright state that for sure, including the ones who have tended toward a German-favorable view. The one who comes closest is Chris Bellamy who suggests that the Soviets might have collapsed without it. None of them assert that without lend-lease the Soviets would have collapsed like you tend to do. None of them assert that it would have been impossible for the Soviets to counter-attack that winter without L-L so long as they survived the summer of '42.
Actually most historians have been using the Soviet propaganda line, because the Soviets were the only source on the Soviet economy. I've already posted articles that talk about the Soviet historiographical efforts to control access to information about Lend-Lease as a function of Soviet economy so they could pretend it was minimal and maximize their role in victory. Recent works into the Soviet archives is now producing a new picture about the reality of the situation.
https://perspectivesofthepast.com/e...d-soviet-victory-during-the-second-world-war/
https://rbth.com/business/2015/05/08/allies_gave_soviets_130_billion_under_lend-lease_45879.html
https://www.amazon.com/Hunger-War-Provisioning-Soviet-during/dp/0253017122

All true. And it also inflicted such damage upon the Heer that the Anglo-Americans suffered a relatively painless invasion of Western Europe, allowing them to conquer the other half of non-Soviet Europe at a much lower human cost then they otherwise would have. That's why there is no conceivable way lend-lease would never go forward.
Sure, Lend-Lease was the best investment the Allies made in the war. They spent sweat to pay for the Soviets spending their blood to defeat the Germans. There is no POD I can think of that has the US in the war and the Soviets surviving without Japanese entry that has Lend-Lease not happening.

The lowest ebb in Soviet economic performance wasn't mid-late 1942. It was late-1941/early-1942 when not even the Soviet armaments industry..
Overall their lowest GDP was in 1942 as the Germans penetrated to their maximal extent into the USSR; industrial output was probably lower in 1941 in terms of weapons, but overall economic output was lowest in 1942.

And that risk was there anyways. All the economic historians you like to cite note that even with lend-lease, the Soviets should have imploded as it was. Harrisson ultimately goes to the point that he had to explain Soviet survival in 1942 social-political terms, not economic or military ones (even though he tried to disguise it in terms of economic ones). If the Soviets were going to implode, then they would have OTL irrespective of lend-lease.
On that we have to disagree. Famine would be the thing that unravels the system. As it was they skirted the edges of it, but there was not widespread famine; ITTL without LL food there would be.
 
Tooze hasn't written a book on the Soviet economy that I'm aware of,

He makes remarks about it throughout Wages of Destruction which make pretty clear what his views are.

Harrison talks about in "Account of War" how the Soviets were overheating their economy and Lend-Lease kept them going as they tried to get their industry back into action after the invasion.

Harrison attributes the stabilization of Soviet economy to victory at Stalingrad both in that book and elsewhere more then he does to lend-lease. Indeed, he notes in his article on the Soviet war economy in The Soviet Union at War that stabilization of the Soviet economy was necessary to make effective use of lend-lease, not the other way around. He draws a direct comparison to US foreign aide to modern developing countries, much of which is similar in scale to lend-lease, and how it tends to get wasted because of those countries dysfunctional systems and hence has little impact on what their trying to alleviate. Just having the aid provided isn't enough, the aid also has to be effectively utilized. That effort rests on the political-economic system of the receiver.

Note I'm not saying that the Soviets were out of fat in 1942,

Your words were, and I quote:

they had run out of the fat accumulated in the pre-war years,

This in a post about 1942.

Lend-Lease increased to fill in the holes in their economy.

Except the increase in lend-lease came after 1942, not during. Lend-lease actually declined in mid-'42, as a result of the northern route being shut down.

Parts of it, the Donbass fall in late Autumn,

And Moscow was wrecked, Leningrad was put out of commission, and Kharkov-Orel was occupied. And only a portion of the defense industry in all these regions made it out.

Sure and it would have been worse, far worse without the roughly 800k tons of Lend-Lease food that arrived in October 1941-December 1942.

Whether it would be worse enough to cause a collapse you have not at all proved.

That's not counting all the other resources that were shipped, including raw materials, finished weapons, and industrial equipment.

None of which you have demonstrated to be enough

Famine and the death of the working class as well as Add to dictionary males does mean collapse is starting. The people that died IOTL were the old, very young without access to food, and the sickly. Famine did not bite hard enough to start biting into the worker and soldier base.

Wrong. There are reports of armaments plant workers starving to death at their canteens as late as 1943, something Harrisson talks about. Instances of soldiers dying of hunger in '42 also appear.

You have to fill in this thought more.

I did, with some editing.

Actually most historians have been using the Soviet propaganda line, because the Soviets were the only source on the Soviet economy.

These are historians writing in the 90s, 2000s, and 2010s with full access to Soviet archives. I've named them and you have used them in the past (and even in this thread) fully confident that they are not simply using the Soviet propaganda line. Trying to play "it's just Soviet propaganda card" isn't going to cut it.

There is no POD I can think of that has the US in the war and the Soviets surviving without Japanese entry that has Lend-Lease not happening.

Even with Japanese entry, the Soviets would still get their L-L. Overall throughput would fall, but not by 50%. The allies used Vladivostok so much because it was the safest route, as well as the closest to the American west coast. Had Vladivostok been closed they'd have delivered the cargo through the Indian ocean, or the northern route. Longer and more perilous but the allies would have a surfeit of transport. The most likely result is the US puts their shipping in through the northern route to keep it open, with the extra ships more then offsetting any losses. It would have been inconvenient and probably cost them a few more ships and sailors, but it would hardly be fatal to either lend-lease efforts or the Soviet Union.

Plus, if Lend-Lease in 1942 was relatively unimportant compared to 1943, then lend-lease via the Pacific route was even more so constituting only 1/3rd of shipments in 1942 compared to the roughly 1/2 in 1943-45.

Overall their lowest GDP was in 1942 as the Germans penetrated to their maximal extent into the USSR; industrial output was probably lower in 1941 in terms of weapons, but overall economic output was lowest in 1942.

GDP isn't what matters in the military contest. What matters is the industrial output of the defense industry.

As it was they skirted the edges of it, but there was not widespread famine;

Several million dead in three years is on a level comparable to the 1933-34 famines. It definitely is not "skirting the edges".
 
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