Pakistan, late 2000s
Pakistan, late 2000s
Indonesia's particular brand of "reform Islam" never caught on in a big way outside of Indonesia, but did serve as a vague inspiration for other reform movements outside the country. Even these other movements often remained small and largely devoid of influence (or even actively suppressed) in many areas, but in some other areas, they saw greater growth. One such region was Pakistan
The "Islamic Worker's Party" (and associated satellite groups) emerged as the main political vehicle for the reform Islam movement in Pakistan. Pakistan had a history of Islamic socialism, with figures like Liaquat Ali Khan advocating for some form of it. The Bhuttos and the Pakistani People's Party (PPP) had also at times advocated for Islamic socialism, though after a while, they began to shift in a watered down centrist direction in regards to economics, and began pandering more to the conservative and fundamentalist strains of Islam while sidelining the the more liberal/reformist elements. The shift to neoliberal economics and conservative pandering from the PPP, in addition to interspersed periods of authoritarian military dictatorship, saw a move away from the PPP among some quarters. A somewhat awkward coalition of urban and rural poor, ethnic minorities, and urban intellectuals disaffected with the PPP began to emerge, both as a social movement and political force. 1996 saw the creation of the most recent political party to represent this movement, the Islamic Worker's Party (IWP)
Reform Islam in Pakistan took some influences from Indonesia, but had a different character. The reform movement in Indonesia was often explicitly state-supported, with the communist party there seeking to shift values in a more progressive direction by using (at times novel and unorthodox) interpretations of Islam. In Pakistan, on the other hand, there was no state support to assist and direct the movement, and matters of socialist economic change and assistance to the needy tended to take focus over social issues, where (while having a place for more progressive sorts) the public rhetoric has generally been one with a vaguely libertarian stance focusing on opposition to fundamentalist social views. As time has passed, the majority of the movement and its party have shifted to at least vaguely socially liberal stances, and there's a faction of very progressive sorts, but it also retained a somewhat conservative-leaning minority, in contrast to the Indonesian movement
By the 90s, the movement's adherents were estimated to make up around 10% of the population of Pakistan. Since then, the movement has grown further. As for the movement's political organization, the IWP has gone from a very minor thing to one of the major parties in Pakistan
In 1999, the military in Pakistan staged a coup, with general Pervez Musharraf taking power. The 2002 elections saw him retain power (albeit with claims of fraud levelled at his government). The mid 2000s saw his popularity decline, and as the 2008 election approached, it looked like some sort of opposition coalition would have a good shot at taking power. The November 2007 state of emergency, and Musharraf's declaration of indefinite postponement of elections, hurt the regime's popularity even more (despite the regime reversing that decision a week later and allowing elections)
The campaign was shaken up by two events. In late December, PPP leader Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, former PPP leader who was elected and then executed after a military coup) was assassinated, with Taliban claiming responsibility but also with accusations that Musharraf's regime may have played a role, via denying Bhutto security or perhaps an even more direct role. Then, in early January, Asif Ali Zardari - Benazir Bhutto's widow and the co leader of the PPP after her death - was assassinated too. In the aftermath, the PPP (now led by Ameen Faheem, poet and leftist) skyrocketed in the polls. In the election itself, the PPP ended up with a much narrower lead - but still had a solid win, as the largest party in terms of seats and popular support, with the second largest party having over 10% less support
As the election campaign began, a coalition between the PPP and PML (N) (the primary conservative party, also opposed to the Musharraf regime) was the expected result. But Faheem, preferring to take a more left leaning orientation than his party took in past years, instead opted for a different route. The results gave the PPP and IWP a combined 168 seats - just four short of a majority. Faheem thus sought a PPP-IWP minority coalition, which was able to take power with additional support from liberal and leftist parties like the Awami National Movement, Muttahida Quami Movement, National People's Party, and Pakistani People's Party - Sherpao
Faheem and his coalition took office with a bold agenda for social and economic reform - but faced economic disaster with the global economic downturn hitting Pakistan especially hard. At the start, some viewed the election results as something of a "poisoned chalice" for the coalition. But through seizing diplomatic opportunities, the coalition was able to achieve significant success
On one hand, after the Sino-Indian war, the Socialist Republic of China had looked on at Pakistan with increased interest as a pragmatic way to gain some advantage if Indian revanchism led to a rematch. China had already begun to increase ties and relations with Pakistan, and the new left leaning government, while not a communist party like the rulers of China, was nonetheless rather more ideologically aligned than the old government, too, which was conducive to further closeness. On the other hand, the United States had relations with Pakistan, and interest in the area, due to the War on Terror, having gotten the Musharraf government involved. With both the Americans and Chinese having interest in the country, and with those two countries having somewhat chilly relations, Faheem and his coalition sought to extract aid from the both of them, and engaged in diplomacy to try and maximize what could be gained
Some figures in American intelligence and leadership had already been calling for significant increases in foreign aid to Pakistan, suggesting as much as $50 billion in aid to the country (nearly a third of the nation's GDP at the time). Through a lobbying offensive with promises and threats regarding continued involvement in the War on Terror and ties with China among other things, Faheem managed to attain an agreement with America for a large aid package, which was marketed politically as a sort of "Pakistani Marshall Plan", and presented by American leadership as a sort of shift from a more militarist to a more diplomatic approach to the War on Terror. The Chinese, having not really taken the sort of economic hit that many other advanced economies took during the recession, were rather easier to convince - while the government was ideologically opposed to the Americans, it was more focused on domestic affairs and expanding diplomacy and green initiatives in Africa than on directly opposing the US, and didn't actually have any particularly strong issue with Pakistan simply having positive relations with both China *and* the US. So the Chinese, seeing the opportunity for a boost to their international reputation, having not been hit hard by the recession, and having a larger economy by the US anyway and thus having money to spend, simply matched the US investments
Immediately after the 2008 election, economic analysts expected that the Faheem coalition's left-leaning orientation would create a less positive environment for investors and slow economic growth. But the acquisition of foreign aid, primarily domestic rather than military, equating to around 2/3rds of the entire Pakistani GDP, had essentially supercharged the Pakistani economy, making it easier for major economic growth and modernization to coexist with significant left leaning economic reforms. Pakistan was thus able to see significant economic growth and a large reduction of poverty. Furthermore, the economic boom saw a decline in support for fundamentalism and terrorist groups in the hinterlands, with less in the way of poverty to pressure the desperate in that direction, and the governing coalition was able to take advantage of its popularity from the foreign agreements (Faheem somewhat played up the difficulties in negotiating for the aid to the public, to increase his coalition's political gain from it) to pass social reforms while avoiding (or at least limiting) backlash over such reforms
(also, here's a larger version of the map from the 2009 election)
Indonesia's particular brand of "reform Islam" never caught on in a big way outside of Indonesia, but did serve as a vague inspiration for other reform movements outside the country. Even these other movements often remained small and largely devoid of influence (or even actively suppressed) in many areas, but in some other areas, they saw greater growth. One such region was Pakistan
The "Islamic Worker's Party" (and associated satellite groups) emerged as the main political vehicle for the reform Islam movement in Pakistan. Pakistan had a history of Islamic socialism, with figures like Liaquat Ali Khan advocating for some form of it. The Bhuttos and the Pakistani People's Party (PPP) had also at times advocated for Islamic socialism, though after a while, they began to shift in a watered down centrist direction in regards to economics, and began pandering more to the conservative and fundamentalist strains of Islam while sidelining the the more liberal/reformist elements. The shift to neoliberal economics and conservative pandering from the PPP, in addition to interspersed periods of authoritarian military dictatorship, saw a move away from the PPP among some quarters. A somewhat awkward coalition of urban and rural poor, ethnic minorities, and urban intellectuals disaffected with the PPP began to emerge, both as a social movement and political force. 1996 saw the creation of the most recent political party to represent this movement, the Islamic Worker's Party (IWP)
Reform Islam in Pakistan took some influences from Indonesia, but had a different character. The reform movement in Indonesia was often explicitly state-supported, with the communist party there seeking to shift values in a more progressive direction by using (at times novel and unorthodox) interpretations of Islam. In Pakistan, on the other hand, there was no state support to assist and direct the movement, and matters of socialist economic change and assistance to the needy tended to take focus over social issues, where (while having a place for more progressive sorts) the public rhetoric has generally been one with a vaguely libertarian stance focusing on opposition to fundamentalist social views. As time has passed, the majority of the movement and its party have shifted to at least vaguely socially liberal stances, and there's a faction of very progressive sorts, but it also retained a somewhat conservative-leaning minority, in contrast to the Indonesian movement
By the 90s, the movement's adherents were estimated to make up around 10% of the population of Pakistan. Since then, the movement has grown further. As for the movement's political organization, the IWP has gone from a very minor thing to one of the major parties in Pakistan
In 1999, the military in Pakistan staged a coup, with general Pervez Musharraf taking power. The 2002 elections saw him retain power (albeit with claims of fraud levelled at his government). The mid 2000s saw his popularity decline, and as the 2008 election approached, it looked like some sort of opposition coalition would have a good shot at taking power. The November 2007 state of emergency, and Musharraf's declaration of indefinite postponement of elections, hurt the regime's popularity even more (despite the regime reversing that decision a week later and allowing elections)
The campaign was shaken up by two events. In late December, PPP leader Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, former PPP leader who was elected and then executed after a military coup) was assassinated, with Taliban claiming responsibility but also with accusations that Musharraf's regime may have played a role, via denying Bhutto security or perhaps an even more direct role. Then, in early January, Asif Ali Zardari - Benazir Bhutto's widow and the co leader of the PPP after her death - was assassinated too. In the aftermath, the PPP (now led by Ameen Faheem, poet and leftist) skyrocketed in the polls. In the election itself, the PPP ended up with a much narrower lead - but still had a solid win, as the largest party in terms of seats and popular support, with the second largest party having over 10% less support
As the election campaign began, a coalition between the PPP and PML (N) (the primary conservative party, also opposed to the Musharraf regime) was the expected result. But Faheem, preferring to take a more left leaning orientation than his party took in past years, instead opted for a different route. The results gave the PPP and IWP a combined 168 seats - just four short of a majority. Faheem thus sought a PPP-IWP minority coalition, which was able to take power with additional support from liberal and leftist parties like the Awami National Movement, Muttahida Quami Movement, National People's Party, and Pakistani People's Party - Sherpao
Faheem and his coalition took office with a bold agenda for social and economic reform - but faced economic disaster with the global economic downturn hitting Pakistan especially hard. At the start, some viewed the election results as something of a "poisoned chalice" for the coalition. But through seizing diplomatic opportunities, the coalition was able to achieve significant success
On one hand, after the Sino-Indian war, the Socialist Republic of China had looked on at Pakistan with increased interest as a pragmatic way to gain some advantage if Indian revanchism led to a rematch. China had already begun to increase ties and relations with Pakistan, and the new left leaning government, while not a communist party like the rulers of China, was nonetheless rather more ideologically aligned than the old government, too, which was conducive to further closeness. On the other hand, the United States had relations with Pakistan, and interest in the area, due to the War on Terror, having gotten the Musharraf government involved. With both the Americans and Chinese having interest in the country, and with those two countries having somewhat chilly relations, Faheem and his coalition sought to extract aid from the both of them, and engaged in diplomacy to try and maximize what could be gained
Some figures in American intelligence and leadership had already been calling for significant increases in foreign aid to Pakistan, suggesting as much as $50 billion in aid to the country (nearly a third of the nation's GDP at the time). Through a lobbying offensive with promises and threats regarding continued involvement in the War on Terror and ties with China among other things, Faheem managed to attain an agreement with America for a large aid package, which was marketed politically as a sort of "Pakistani Marshall Plan", and presented by American leadership as a sort of shift from a more militarist to a more diplomatic approach to the War on Terror. The Chinese, having not really taken the sort of economic hit that many other advanced economies took during the recession, were rather easier to convince - while the government was ideologically opposed to the Americans, it was more focused on domestic affairs and expanding diplomacy and green initiatives in Africa than on directly opposing the US, and didn't actually have any particularly strong issue with Pakistan simply having positive relations with both China *and* the US. So the Chinese, seeing the opportunity for a boost to their international reputation, having not been hit hard by the recession, and having a larger economy by the US anyway and thus having money to spend, simply matched the US investments
Immediately after the 2008 election, economic analysts expected that the Faheem coalition's left-leaning orientation would create a less positive environment for investors and slow economic growth. But the acquisition of foreign aid, primarily domestic rather than military, equating to around 2/3rds of the entire Pakistani GDP, had essentially supercharged the Pakistani economy, making it easier for major economic growth and modernization to coexist with significant left leaning economic reforms. Pakistan was thus able to see significant economic growth and a large reduction of poverty. Furthermore, the economic boom saw a decline in support for fundamentalism and terrorist groups in the hinterlands, with less in the way of poverty to pressure the desperate in that direction, and the governing coalition was able to take advantage of its popularity from the foreign agreements (Faheem somewhat played up the difficulties in negotiating for the aid to the public, to increase his coalition's political gain from it) to pass social reforms while avoiding (or at least limiting) backlash over such reforms
(also, here's a larger version of the map from the 2009 election)
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