World of the United Front Continued - A graphics TL of China and the world

Burkina Faso, Angola, and Ethiopia in the First Cold War and Beyond
Burkina Faso, Angola, and Ethiopia in the First Cold War and Beyond

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In 1960, Burkina Faso (then called "Upper Volta" gained independence from French imperial dominance. Since independence, the country faced an unstable political situation, with authoritarian rule essentially from the start, and a series of military coups (4 in the 23 years between independence and 1983). In 1983, the country experienced further instability, with a failed coup attempt in February, followed in August by a successful coup by leftist elements in the country's military. The August coup saw Captain Thomas Sankara installed as the President of Upper Volta. Once in power, Sankara instituted an agenda of significant change, in terms of both domestic and foreign policy

A self-described socialist and anti-imperialist, Sankara sought closer relations with the Soviet and Chinese blocs, while denouncing the United States as well as France (which had retained sizable influence and involvement in its former African colonies after they achieved independence in the early 1960s). He also shifted the country's stance on foreign aid, rejecting aid from sources such as the IMF, and generally urging for more in the way of long term developmental aid rather than the sort of short term aid due to potential issues with dependency, distortion, and other factors

Domestically, the Sankara regime engaged in major political and economic reforms. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (modeled after those established in the Cuban revolution) were established to help carry out Sankara's revolutionary programs across the nation. Education and literacy were strongly promoted, with the number of students attending schools multiplying by nearly six, and with many new schools being built. Various public health initiatives and expansions to the healthcare system were launched, with a major program to vaccinate millions of children (saving thousands of lives annually from meningitis, yellow fever, and measles), as well as building thousands of medical centers in the villages throughout the country, and programs to combat child mortality (which declined by nearly 50% under Sankara). Various agricultural initiatives were launched, including various redistributions of land, and a program to combat Sahel desertification via the planting of millions of trees. And various feminist policies were enacted, with FGM, forced marriage, and polygamy being banned, and with women's employment, education, and general independence being encouraged

Under Sankara, the country (which was then renamed "Burkina Faso" in the spirit of anti-colonialism, since the previous name "Upper Volta" originated from the French colonial name for the territory) saw sizable development, but nonetheless remained a rather poor country, and various issues and divisions in Burkinabe society remained. The wealthier in the country, as well as traditional tribal leaders, were sources of significant opposition to Sankara's revolutionary agenda of land reform and denial of traditional tribal privileges. Sankara's government also saw criticism for violence, civil rights abuses, and other excesses in suppression of counter-revolutionary elements, as well as for the arrest of certain trade union leaders. In 1987, Blaise Compaore, a former close associate of Sankara, led an attempted a coup against Sankara, potentially aided by the French government. The attempt failed, with Sankara narrowly escaping an assassination attempt and rallying loyalist elements of the military and crowds of supporters to put down the coup attempt. But opposition to Sankara's rule persisted

As the USSR withdrew from foreign affairs and then fell altogether, Burkina Faso saw a decline in foreign aid and economic downturn, and this along with the global rollback of communism saw Sankara's opposition emboldened and growing by 1991. Protests and demonstrations grew, and morale in the military was low, leading to fears among the regime of another coup. Fearing a potential civil war (or foreign intervention against his rule), Sankara eventually became convinced that continued rule was not viable, proceeded to reach an agreement with opposition forces to resign and allow multiparty elections, and then fled the country to Cuba

Unlike various other former leaders of communist states in Africa and elsewhere, however, Sankara would remain committed to his revolutionary ideals, as well as retain a degree of popularity among the general public. With the establishment of multiparty democracy in Burkina Faso, several political parties espousing socialism and "Sankarism" emerged. Unpopularity from the reversal of various policies enacted under the Sankara regime, as well as various instances of corruption by the new capitalist government, further aided in Sankarism's continued relevance in the country

By the time of the 2008 election, Sankara had returned to Burkina Faso, and had come to lead an alliance of socialist parties in the election. Economic downturn had given Sankara's alliance a boost, and given it a chance at attaining a majority in the election due to disapproval with the capitalist status quo. The alliance was further boosted by certain proposed actions by the government. Fearing a return to socialistic governance, members of the ruling coalition publicly considered simply disqualifying Sankara and his alliance from running at all - in the end, such measures were not adopted, but the fact that they were seriously considered caused mass outrage, and the Sankarist alliance heavily exploited that event. Sankara went on to win a strong victory in the election. In a last-ditch effort, some in the outgoing government appealed to the military to prevent prevent the transfer of power, but while certain elements in the military appeared open to this, the idea never gained momentum

Sankara's second administration began with various actions that immediately generated international condemnation. Arguing that the opposition had clearly demonstrated an unwillingness to abide by democratic outcomes and further demonstrated support for a military junta, the Sankara administration quickly took action to suppress its opposition, and began assembling a constitutional convention to prevent the opposition from taking power again. These measures generated some opposition, but while often denounced by other countries, the unpopularity of the outgoing government and its flirtations with authoritarian rule itself, along with the successful populist campaign of the Sankaran coalition and Sankara's personal popularity allowed for the government to enact such measures without hugely damaging its own popularity with the masses. Sankara also gained a sliver of credit for the way such reforms were enacted - the country saw a return to socialist rule, but with somewhat more freedoms than seen in various other countries during the cold war, and a somewhat novel political structure. At the national level, a sort of multiparty system was established, though also with a requirement of support for socialism in order to attain legal party status, limiting the range of parties and politics that could compete. Some comparisons have been made to the factional systems within the communist parties of countries like China, Korea, and some others, but the Burkinabe system nonetheless goes even further in terms of ideological diversity and pluralism

It is unclear how well the second Burkinabe socialist revolution will persist, but after over a decade since the revolution, it appears to be in a more secure situation the second time around. In 2013, the country managed a peaceful and orderly transfer of power within the socialist system, with Sankara (then 64 years old) deciding to retire rather than run for reelection (though he'd retain respect and influence as an elder statesperson, and the degree to which the new leadership would seek his advice leads some - including himself - to consider him barely even partially retired in actuality)

Today, Burkina Faso remains a quite poor country, but nonetheless wealthier than most of its neighbors. Sometimes called "the Cuba of Africa" (by supporters, detractors, and the apathetic), this country was the first to experience a socialist revolution after the fall of the USSR and first in the post-USSR world to see a restoration of socialism after an initial fall of socialism, and is upheld by some as a success story (or at least partial success story and optimistic work-in-progress) for development and anti-corruption success in very poor countries, while being upheld by others as yet more proof of the continued threat of the red menace. Burkina Faso today has a certain amount of cooperation, cultural exchange, and assistance with and from China (with its nuclear power plant, built with assistance from China's solidarity voyages initiatives, being a particular pride of the nation), as well as friendly relations with the various other socialist/communist party-ruled countries of the world, though its somewhat geographically isolated nature limits things somewhat

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Since the 1500s, Portugal dominated the region of modern Angola as a colony. In the mid 20th century, various different resistance movements to Portuguese imperialism emerged, in the colony of Angola as well as other Portuguese colonies. With the outbreak of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal-proper in 1974, overthrowing the right wing dictatorship that ruled Portugal, the new Portuguese government withdrew from the colonies and accepted their independence

This still left the question of who would rule in Angola, however. By the time of independence, the territory of Angola was divided between a few independence groups, which had taken control of certain parts of the country and had all fought against Portuguese imperialism but also found themselves at odds with each other.

The largest of those factions, and the one which had eventually come to control Luanda (the capital and largest city in the territory) was the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), led by Agostinho Neto, a leftist organization founded in 1956 as a merger of the Angolan Communist Party and two other pro-independence parties. Another major faction was the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), led by Jonas Savimbi, himself a former member of the MPLA who organized cooperation with China and Korea but split with the MPLA in the late 1960s, having shifted ideologically in a Trotskyist direction after contact with certain Korean Trotskyists during his travels. The UNITA was not an explicitly Trotskyist party, and (despite various skirmishes) was not outright opposed to the MPLA, but took a somewhat critical stance towards the MPLA and leaned towards the Chinese bloc, which created a degree of conflict. The third major faction was the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola), an anti-communist and western aligned organization led by Holden Roberto, a descendant of the Monarchs of Kongo (a native African monarchy which had previously ruled in the northern parts of Angola prior to colonization, and up to 1910 as a colonial protectorate. A few other, smaller factions also existed, including the Cabinda separatist FLEC and the Eastern Revolt

Initially, Angolan independence was established via the Alvor Agreement, which sought to establish a transitional government consisting of the big three independence organizations along with Portuguese representatives. But the agreement quickly fell apart, with the factions weary of sharing power with each other, and the MPLA unilaterally declared the People's Republic of Angola after their capture of Luanda. From that point, the MPLA held the dominant position in Angola, though facing armed opposition from the FNLA (supported by the US, South Africa, and Zaire), as well as an uncertain situation with the UNITA

In 1976, conflicts began to emerge within the MPLA. Its leader, Agostinho Neto, was a communist, but sought a somewhat moderate/gradual path of development, and sought generally friendly relations with the USSR but with a general stance of non-alignment in the Cold War. But a growing faction within the party, led by Nito Alves, began to advocate for a more radical approach to domestic policy, as well as closer and more formal alignment with the USSR. As the months passed, these divides continued to grow, with arguments within the party sometimes descending into fistfights, or leading in some cases to open protests in the streets, or even allegations of plots and treachery

Meanwhile, the UNITA was just sort of there, with some presence in Luanda as well as control of territory to the south of MPLA-dominated territory, attempting to negotiate with both factions of the MPLA. Neto had initially been heavily skeptical of the former MPLA splitter-led organization, and had even planned an offensive against them once the FNLA in the north were dealt with. But the escalation of the so-called "fractionalist conflict" between his mainline MPLA leadership and the Alves faction increasingly gave Neto second thought. It would be very unfortunate, after all, if the party were to descend into internal civil war when the actual civil war hadn't even been won yet, and the situation did perhaps create a certain opportunity to try and balance things. He thus proposed a compromise. The Alves faction would be granted concessions, particularly in regards to directly aligning with the USSR, and the policy of non-alignment would be abandoned, and on the other hand, domestic policy would see rather less concession to that faction, and additionally, the UNITA would simply be merged into the MPLA

The proposal was seen as something of a gamble, with some advisors questioning the idea of trying to deal with a factional struggle by throwing a third faction into the mix as well as fearing the difficulty of aligning with the USSR in the first place while uniting with a bunch of vaguely Trotsky-sympathizing militants aligned with China. On the other hand, it was seen as a way to provide a certain balance to the party by avoiding a simple binary divide, as well as an opportunity for Neto's leadership to benefit from leveraging the UNITA in return for it not being simply purged, and then gaining an advantage over the Alves faction with the hopes that this plus the policy concessions and an agreement to not simply purge that faction would calm them down. The UNITA leadership, for their part, were indeed quite happy with the opportunity even when it meant compromising on their own message, and the Alves faction was less happy, but managed to be convinced and intimidated into taking what they could get rather than pushing it further. As for the Soviets, they reluctantly accepted proposals of alignment with Angola - having reservations over the dividedness within the Angolan ruling party, but nonetheless figuring that if they didn't accept Angola, that country would probably end up aligned with China instead (a country the Soviets had at the moment gone back to calling "revisionist"). Thus the proposal was agreed to. The MPLA and UNITA were merged into the "National Union for the People's Movement of Freedom and Total Independence of Angola - Worker's Party" ("UNMPLITA-PT", though most everyone quickly took to simply calling it "the PT" since even the combined acronym is kind of unbearable), and tensions within the new PT began to cool

The Angolan Civil War would carry on on the fringes of the country, with the US and South Africa funding rebels, and with South African forces at times engaging in larger offensives against the Angolan government (with the PT retaliating with support for the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in South African-occupied territory that would later become Namibia. But the Angolans, aided by the Soviets and Cubans, managed to secure most of the country from South African attacks

With Namibian independence in 1990, and the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the war in Angola largely came to an end. The fall of the USSR led to a substantial reduction in foreign aid to Angola, and the PT saw some economic struggle and protest against its rule, but the party managed to weather the storm and hold onto power. Angola has since drifted into close relations with China, among other things hosting a Chinese naval base at Luanda. Angola has benefited significantly from the oil boom and its sizable oil resources - as well as from listening to Chinese economic advisors' urgent suggestions of investing significant portions of the oil wealth into economic diversification for more stable long term growth, which turned out to be quite advantageous in allowing the Angolan economy to relatively quickly go back on the grow after the oil decline in recent years, contrasted to countries like Equatorial Guinea and Venezuela that saw as much as half or more their GDP wiped out and still trending downward. Angola currently is one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, not particularly wealthy on a global scale but a middle income country nonetheless, that has seen marked successes in ending things like extreme poverty. It remains a communist-party ruled single party state, though not dissimilar from the remaining communist-ruled states in regards to being known for having a relatively open and free society for a single-party ruled state. Related, Angola is noted for being rather accepting of LGBT people and rights, especially relative to the norm in Africa, with the country being the second on the continent (after South Africa) to offer some form of marriage-equivalent civil union, as well as having legal protections against discrimination and legal LGBT advocacy groups, with polling suggesting the country is a pretty safe place for LGBT individuals (especially in the capital and larger cities, though in the rural hinterland things can be somewhat less ideal in that regard)

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The Ethiopian Empire is an old country. The current (Solomonic) dynasty originated in 1270 CE, and was preceded by the Zagwe dynasty, and then by the Axumite kingdom which dates back to the first century CE, with proto-Axumite civilization potentially being an extension of the D'mt which extended back to the 10th century BCE. Ethiopian civilization is thus one of the oldest in Sub-Saharan Africa, something that modern Ethiopia prides itself on. Another source of pride for the Ethiopian state is its historical resistance to colonialism, being one of just two African countries to largely avoid European colonization, for the most part. In the first Italo-Ethiopian War (1894-96), Emperor Menelik II led an Ethiopian army against the Italian invaders, winning a decisive victory at the Battle of Adwa, and humiliating the Italians. In the aftermath of the war, Italian control over coastal territories contested by Ethiopia (the Eritrea region) was confirmed, but the rest of Ethiopia was guaranteed independence. The second Italo-Ethiopian War (1936-37) resulted in a defeat for Ethiopia that saw fascist Italy occupying the whole country for a few years, but independence would be restored in the early 40s after the western allies pushed the Italians out of East Africa

Ethiopia was ruled (first as regent and then as Emperor) by Haile Selassie for the majority of the 20th century, over a period of time that saw considerable change in the country and world, stretching from before the First World War to the Cold War. Haile Selassie was something of a reformer, seeking various economic and political modernizations - building of infrastructure, banning of slavery, attempting progressive taxation, enacting a parliament with limited power, among other things. He'd also gained criticism, from across the spectrum. Nobles and landowners disliked his reforms, some of which threatened their wealth and traditional privilege. On the other hand, while he passed some reforms, and instituted a government that was in theory a constitutional monarchy, the continued power and influence of the landed aristocracy on one hand, and continued authority of the Emperor on the other hand, led to dissent from more reform-minded citizens. Furthermore, Haile Selassie governed with suppressive policy towards non-Amhara ethnic groups (Harari, Eritreans, Oromos, and others), and policy of favoritism towards the Amharas, generated opposition (including armed opposition) from various ethnic groups

In the Cold War, Selassie initially sought a policy of nonalignment. But during the 50s, American leadership began to seek closer relations with Ethiopia, in the hopes that the country could serve as a bulwark against the Soviet-aligned bloc (with concerns about Egypt and proposals for Sudan-Egypt unification). Ethiopia's growing internal conflict with ethnic separatists, along with issues with periodic famines, led to the leadership increasingly leaning towards alignment with the United States. As time went on, American military and intelligence aid was useful to the Ethiopian state in the goals of keeping ethnic separatist forces suppressed, as well as aiding in the purging of disloyal generals

Ethiopia saw considerable turbulence during the 1980s. With Haile Selassie's death in 1981, Ethiopia found itself with a new Emperor. Amha Selassie took a rather more liberal path than his father, pushing reforms to allow multiparty democracy, increasing the powers of Parliament, and expanding civil liberties. This led to increased instability, however, as ethnic separatists and communists took advantage of increased freedoms to act against the central government, while the landed aristocracy feared the potential for their traditional privileges to be chipped away at as a result of the reforms. With growing internal chaos, the military simply stepped in, declaring a national emergency, suspending Parliament, and detaining the Emperor - with the stated goal of protecting the Emperor from insurgents. Following this, the military instituted a crackdown against dissent and opposition. A few years later, civilian rule would be restored, as an apparent constitutional monarchy, albeit with a constitution agreed to by the military with significant privileges for itself, and various restrictions on expression of dissent. And thus Ethiopian experienced its first period of military rule - it would not be its last, with the military intervening at other points in the future as well

At present, Ethiopia finds itself in something of a hybrid situation, with a theoretical restoration of civilian rule for the past few years, but with a quarter of the lower house and half of the upper house appointed directly by the military, effectively giving the military (along with a few generally right wing pro military parties) majorities in both chambers. The country has, by most accounts, the strongest military on the continent. Internal dissent remains a sizable issue, due to general political dissent, ethnic separatism, and religious strife (with considerable disapproval among the Muslims who make up 1/3rd of the population over the continued status of Ethiopian Orthodoxy as a state religion). Ethiopia's economy is noted as having high rates of growth in recent decades, though it remains a poorer country, and with high levels of inequality
 
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Would definitely like to see more from this timeline; the hints of Chinese intra-party democracy and the fate of various OTL communist countries (like Cuba or Yugoslavia) could be especially interesting to elaborate on.

Also, with regard to my earlier comments about TTL's anarchism and China's international entanglements, it would be great to see an update on either topic. I'd be particularly curious to know about any communes or other social experiments the anarchists might be up to in China and abroad (how does the Chinese movement relate to Social Ecology, for instance). And as for the international entanglements, it'd be nice to see more examples of its globally sponsored institutions, like its economic and labor federations. If this China is even richer and more militant than OTL's PRC, it may try to displace the US as the global hegemon and institutional trend-setter. 'Peacefully', of course.
 
Would definitely like to see more from this timeline; the hints of Chinese intra-party democracy and the fate of various OTL communist countries (like Cuba or Yugoslavia) could be especially interesting to elaborate on.

Also, with regard to my earlier comments about TTL's anarchism and China's international entanglements, it would be great to see an update on either topic. I'd be particularly curious to know about any communes or other social experiments the anarchists might be up to in China and abroad (how does the Chinese movement relate to Social Ecology, for instance). And as for the international entanglements, it'd be nice to see more examples of its globally sponsored institutions, like its economic and labor federations. If this China is even richer and more militant than OTL's PRC, it may try to displace the US as the global hegemon and institutional trend-setter. 'Peacefully', of course.
Well given that this China is communist it is more isolated and will have a harder time trying to be a hegemon. The fact that there is a militarily powerful Japan lurking nearby is something they're always going to have to keep watch on. Ironically though there might be less disputes with their neighbors given how it's mentioned how the deal with the British and the French saw some of their terriortioral claims validated.
 
Would definitely like to see more from this timeline; the hints of Chinese intra-party democracy and the fate of various OTL communist countries (like Cuba or Yugoslavia) could be especially interesting to elaborate on.

Also, with regard to my earlier comments about TTL's anarchism and China's international entanglements, it would be great to see an update on either topic. I'd be particularly curious to know about any communes or other social experiments the anarchists might be up to in China and abroad (how does the Chinese movement relate to Social Ecology, for instance). And as for the international entanglements, it'd be nice to see more examples of its globally sponsored institutions, like its economic and labor federations. If this China is even richer and more militant than OTL's PRC, it may try to displace the US as the global hegemon and institutional trend-setter. 'Peacefully', of course.
Well given that this China is communist it is more isolated and will have a harder time trying to be a hegemon. The fact that there is a militarily powerful Japan lurking nearby is something they're always going to have to keep watch on. Ironically though there might be less disputes with their neighbors given how it's mentioned how the deal with the British and the French saw some of their terriortioral claims validated.

As for Chinese foreign policy... while generally avoiding military interventionism, this is a China that intervened in the Nepalese civil war and ended up getting involved in a significant war with India. In a sense, in the 20th century, it has gotten into more significant conflict than China of OTL

But in terms of other conflicts, yes, the deal with the French/British led to the South China Sea falling under Chinese control early, earlier than various other neighboring areas even attained independence. So that whole conflict of OTL is far less of an issue. Some nationalists in Malaysia and the Philippines express desire for the territories, but the mainstream political discourse in those countries is generally apathetic, with few considering it "worth it" to bother pressing any official claims. And some in Indochina took some issue with the situation during the first cold war, but with the more recent close integration of Indochina into the Chinese sphere after the fall of the USSR, Indochinese citizens and economic activities have access to the zone, so barely any Indochinese care at this point. The Senkaku Islands dispute of OTL just never ends up happening. So the Liancourt Rocks dispute (between Japan and Korea) is the main territorial dispute that China is (indirectly) involved with (other than the Himalayas dispute with India)

And while the matter of Japan isn't nothing, with there being less direct territorial conflict, and with the absence of the OTL issue of North Korea that adds all sorts of general tension to the region, its something the Chinese keep watch on but don't necessarily put too much worry towards. After all, even a more militaristic Japan vs OTL would be highly outnumbered by China, and with this China also being rather wealthier than OTL, and having a united Korea and united Indochina as close allies makes Chinese even less fearful of attack from Japan. Especially with Japan's demographic issues (China and Korea largely avoid certain demographic issues of OTL, but Japan doesn't similarly avoid them) making Japan's (larger than OTL) military more of a burden even in times of peace

As for China potentially attempting to become a global hegemon...

This China engages in significant foreign aid (with China having an economy perhaps double that of OTL, thanks to an earlier NEP-like policy and then more efficiency, less corruption, and so on, the country is able to dump a lot more towards aid without causing issues at home), particularly to poorer areas and the "global south" in general. This is to a large degree altruistic/ideological (the issues of Chinese investment in Africa OTL, regarding debt-trap matters, labor issues, and such, are avoided, and aid is done with intent to genuinely help), but the aid does a lot to earn China (and Chinese-synthesis communism) good-will in many areas where China gets involved in these ways (especially considering a relative lack of 'western' non-military aid, due to political/public approval issues regarding nationalism and a desire to avoid "undeserved handouts" to foreigners), and the communist party knows this and absolutely takes it into account

Does that help build up the sort of conventional superpower hegemony that the US of OTL had in the initial years after the USSR? No, but it does help expand Chinese soft power, and has the potential over the long term to cultivate a power that might not always be so "soft", also. There's a tendency for ITTL for 'westerners' to look at the Chinese efforts as crawling around in the gutters rather than focusing on hard power, along with assumptions that the efforts aren't helping/won't help (being done instead to use corruption and lies to manipulate the local populations into accepting a Chinese neo-colonialism), and/or that the efforts will ultimately largely be useless with Chinese/communist social ideas being rejected by the general public, and economic ideas rejected by the political/elite class. The Chinese are largely fine with letting the 'west' make such assumptions

As for anarchism...

...well, actually, I have a few ideas for future updates that will touch at least a bit on both anarchism and/or international involvements. The one damned thing is time - I'm having less and less of it these days. But I'll get around to them, eventually

I'll say very generally that the Chinese would look positively on things like social ecology. With the green shift in Chinese communist politics, along with various Chinese anarchist criticisms of aspects of western anarchism, there's some common ground between the two, despite differences. Neither the anarchist faction nor the communist party in general are too picky with establishing at least some degree of friendliness and informal relations with various leftist-oriented movements, anarchist or otherwise, especially if those movements manage to establish some degree of actual relevancy (as the social ecologists did with influence on Kurdish movements, for example)
 
Certain Chinese domestic and military affairs, first cold war to present
Certain Chinese domestic and military affairs, first cold war to present

In 1969, as a reflection of the shifting social views within China, the Ministry of Health and Mental Hygiene officially removed the classification of "mental disorder" from same-sex attraction and relationships. With that, there was no reason for the 'curative mental sanatoriums' to exist, so they were shut down, and the communist party shifted to taking more explicit and active action to protect gay people. In most cases, the shuttering of the sanitoriums saw the former inhabitants leave, going back either to their former homes or to the (generally more open-minded) large cities. In some cases, things went a bit differently

"Curative mental sanatorium 44" was established in what is now the Outer Tibet Autonomous Socialist Republic, a few years after Tibet was brought back under Chinese control. 44 wasn't intended to be any different from the other sanitoriums, but would end up having a reputation as one of the best ones to end up in. Being up in the low-density Tibetan highlands, in the west of China and pretty far away from the great mass of population in eastern and central China, 44 was one of the most isolated sanitoriums. The Ministry of Health and Mental Hygiene attempted to ensure that all sanitoriums were run humanely, but generally had to make some effort to keep up appearances of actually working towards their stated goals. 44's relative isolation, however, gave it greater latitude in comparison to many others. The Han Chinese who took issue with homosexuality were rather far away, and the Tibetan leadership were too bust engaging in delicate negotiations with the national Communist party and with their own aristocrats and traditionalists to do more than cast the occasional anxious eye towards 44. So since early on in its existence, 44 had developed more along the lines of a generic urban settlement than most other of these sanitoriums

When 1969 came, and the sanitoriums were disestablished, many inhabitants of 44 simply stuck around. As the years went by, more people (largely but not solely LGBT people) would move to the area, now by choice - the area's reputation as one of the safest places for at-risk LGBT people in the pre-1969 era, and the existing LGBT community in the area, made it attractive to some. Furthermore, the area had a somewhat peculiar local government - being largely left alone by both the Communist party and the Outer Tibet government, the more hierarchical, planned, party-guided norm was largely absent, with the community developing more along the lines of the anarchist communal model (left-anarchism tended to be pretty popular among the Chinese LGBT community, especially back then)

As the community grew in size, the Communist party looked on it with increasing interest, as did Chinese and Korean social scientists (the oft-cited factoid stating that at one point, nearly 10 percent of the community's population were academics and their assistants is an urban legend, but reflects a genuine interest many in the academic world had for the community). In 1981 (two years after civil unions were legalized), the community was officially established as a township, and five years later (one year after gay marriage and LGBT adoptions were legalized), the community was formally given commune status, being one of the relative few communities to have that status. After consultation among the community, the name "Hexifeierdezhuang" ("Hirschfeld Village") would be chosen - with the community being named after Magnus Hirschfeld ("Hexifeierde" in Chinese), a prominent gay man and early advocate for LGBT rights and sex research who immigrated to China after leaving Germany when the Nazis took power

The growing official recognition and growing size of the commune would generate some worry from the Outer Tibetan leadership - the commune would grow to consist of over 10% of the autonomous socialist republic's total population, with the vast majority of the city being Han Chinese and other non-Tibetans. This created some worries in Outer Tibet, that the commune might be used as a starting point to establish greater numbers of Han and other non-Tibetans in the area, and potentially attempt to make the Tibetans a minority in Tibet. Furthermore, Tibet just wasn't a highly populated area, and there were concerns in regards to how many people the territory could sustain. The Communist party wished to assuage these fears, and while it had given support to the growing commune, it had no desire to replace the Tibetans or shift away from the general policy of avoiding large scale migration into the autonomous socialist republics. So the party stepped in (as was the norm for Chinese anarchist communes, the party retained the ability to intervene, and simply generally chose to do so as little as possible) and placed limits on the area that the commune could expand into. Then, after the city transitioned to extremely high-density building policy and kept expanding in population even more, the party placed limits on density as well, in order to stop the growth of the commune and assuage concerns of the Outer Tibetan leadership

Apart from those limitations, though, the Communist party has generally maintained a hands-off approach to the commune and its anarchist politics. It has become rather acclaimed not just in China but also elsewhere, due to its successes with anarchist communal ideals, its LGBT history and culture (having by some measures the highest percentage of LGBT residents of any city in the world, being well above a majority), its pro-density urbanist policies, and nearby scenic mountains - these various factors have also all contributed to the commune attracting substantial amounts of tourism. The Dalai Lama and Outer Tibetan leadership initially held stances of cautious skepticism towards the commune, but with the passage of time, with Communist party action to assuage their concerns, and with their own shifting ideas on social issues as time went on, they'd come to accept the commune and view it as a positive addition to Tibetan and Chinese society

hexifeierdezhuang commune ib.jpg


Hexifeierdezhuang was far from the only well-functioning anarchist commune in China. But it stood out as an early success at a time when many communes ran into various issues. A number of early experimental anarchist communes suffered from the sort of things referred to as "NIMBYism" in the west, as well as some nasty instances of bigotry in various forms, and simple difficulties in management and organization. The party would generally overcome those issues as time went on, through various means, including being more selective towards those who already leaned towards anarchism or at least had more in the way of general political theoretical education and background, as well as doing more to fight (not just for the sake of improving communes - that was rarely if ever the primary motivator, but it helped nonetheless) the various broader issues that contributed to the problems seen in the communes (with the rise of the green movement in China, for example, the party began to push for very high-density housing and urban policy across the country, and the changing views on that matter helped reduce the NIMBYism seen in communes, among many other things)

Even with the improvements in commune function, the party has not made a major push to expand communes across the country - this matter is representative of a broader tension between the anarchists and the party mainstream. While the party maintains that the eventual communist future will involve an eventual transition further and further in the anarcho-communist direction, that is generally seen as a rather long-term goal. The anarchists tend to urge for much broader expansion of communes, and for things like reducing the workweek, attempting to decrease the amount of work done in society rather than worrying as much about efficiency and productivity, and having a very domestic-focused and borderline isolationist stance regarding foreign policy. But the party mainstream tends to see that sort of thing as somewhat putting the cart before the horse. The goal of assisting the world (particularly the developing world) in green development to fight climate change while also fighting poverty, the goal of expanding communist influence abroad (via the prior goal and other means), the goal of preserving a strong military deterrence to fend off the capitalist powers (who control more of the world than the communists do), and other such goals are seen as shorter term goals that could be necessary to assist the longer term communist goals. So the party maintains work standards to fuel efforts to uplift people elsewhere in the world, rather than maintain similar living standards domestically for less work. Some conflicts between factions have occurred over these matters - some subsections of the anarchist movement have urged for working for as little as possible in order to sustain themselves, and in reaction, some, particularly among the more internationalist-minded elements of the younger generations, have adopted the "945 working hour system" trend, increasing their work-week to 35 hours ("945" referring to "9 am to 4 pm, 5 days a week") in an attempt to increase output to benefit the party's goals (the party actively discourages either extreme)

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youth defense, solidarity, and readiness forces ib.png


The Youth Defense, Solidarity, and Readiness Forces (YDSRF) have evolved considerably over the history of the socialist republic

Since the declaration of the socialist republic, China nominally had a system of limited military conscription, but in practice, the regular armed forces never struggled to fill their ranks with volunteers alone. Still, certain militias and auxiliaries existed as well. With as large a population as China has had, the party figured that while a moderate-to-smallish (for China's size, at least) professional volunteer military would be more than enough for its goals, it would also be useful if the great mass of its people had at least some training in firearm use and basic military concepts, so that if worst came to worst, the great numbers of the population could be utilized in some way. The YDSRF was created for that purpose - initially being a sort of general military reserve that all would serve in for two years after high school completion

As it became clear that China just wouldn't need any sort of general mobilization of tens of millions of people, the YDSRF shifted (first informally, and then very explicitly with national legal/policy changes) towards being more along the lines of a youth mandatory civilian service and education thing. Youth would be sent away for three months a year during their last two years of secondary education, and for the first two years of postsecondary if they went that far. The program was organized so that youth would be sent far from home, and placed among a diverse range of youth from across the country - taking some ideas from the militaries of old empires, the party figured that this could help reduce provincial thinking, with exposure to diverse people and places assisting in national unity while also helping encourage the valuing of diversity and other progressive values. The program itself came to consist of community service/"volunscription", introductory vocational training and job shadowing, political education - both in theory and practice (with considerable focus on democratic involvement - the Chinese system was far from a "western" liberal democracy, with many levels and considerable party guidance, but unions, many workplaces, and generally the lowest levels of local government had considerable room for democratic involvement, among other things), sociological awareness, and other things

The YDSRF began as a military reserve program for adults, and would remain partially under military administration, but as time passes and its existence changed, it would come under the joint administration of various civilian ministries, and by the late 80s had essentially lost all military aspects apart from very brief firearm training, which was presented as intended for "self defense training" rather than for a military purpose, and the forces could no longer legally be called on to serve in any wartime military capacity (they never actually were called up even before that). Despite all that, some overseas felt a certain discomfort with the YDSRF, due to the origins as a military program, or just for the "mandatory service" aspect, and some ardent anticommunists abroad have over the years attacked the program as a "child soldier militia", but the Chinese armed forces have banned anyone under 18 from serving in any military or (actually functioning) militias since well before the ratification of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, so those attacks have had little impact on anything politically or diplomatically

Among Chinese anarchists, inside and outside of the Communist party, the YDSRF has tended to have negative approval, on account if the mandatory element. Some do see a silver lining in the idea that the only conscription-in-practice in China is for civilian purposes and one that has generally been pretty light on the actual "service" element. There's some complicated feelings among anarchists towards the program, though, on account of the political and related training elements, however. With the program's transition to including those elements, including what could essentially be seen as practical experience in a (guided) youth commune among other things, there's been a positive trend in anarchist communes for reduction in various problematic incidents, with the YDSRF generally being seen as having at least some role in this development (along with other expansions in political education at the lower levels), leaving the average Chinese person in the younger generations better prepared for positive involvement in a communal setting

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and one endnote on language - I possess zero Chinese language ability, and have basically just used google translate and some other resources. I don't know for sure if the placename "Hexifeierdezhuang" makes any sense linguistically or if it instead is some sort of linguistic abomination. I generated it simply by taking Magnus Hirschfeld's last name from the Chinese wikipedia, which was, there, presented as " 赫希菲尔德 ", and which google translate seems to transliterate as " Hè xī fēi'ěrdé ". And onto that, I simply tacked " 庄 ", or "-zhuang", which apparently translates as "village" among other things, and has occurred as a suffix for some Chinese settlements (Shijiazhuang, among others). It sounded like the sort of thing that would make sense, but again, I am someone with zero Chinese language knowledge, and I am very much open to alternative suggestions if the current naming doesn't make any sense
 
(And I should have another post up in the next week or two, dealing with Chinese demographics. I was originally going to go in another direction, with something that I will eventually get around to doing, but in the making of this post, I got rather annoyed by only having a rough ballpark for the "size"/numbers of the YDSRF, and went off on a tangent with getting about halfway to figuring out various demographic stuff, population pyramids, and such for China, before setting that aside to finish this one. So the "Chinese demographics" one is already partially completed)
 
Demographics of China, to around 2020
(oops, looks like "next week or two" turned into " a month...)

Demographics of China, to around 2020

china demographics ib.png


After the Second Sino-Japanese War, China saw a long period of domestic peace (with a short exception during the Second World War - but the Japanese offensives from Indochina into southern China gained very little territory, so most of China's involvement in that war was outside of its own territory, as was the much later Chinese involvement in Indochina and then the Himalayas). With China finally having attained peace (both domestically after years of civil war, with all the outright bloodshed as well as organizational/institutional disunity and chaos also involved, and in terms of foreign policy) and with the Communist Party pursuing a gradualist NEP-like policy while avoiding the mismanagement and famine of fellow communists in the USSR under Stalin, the country entered a period of boom years, both economically and demographically

Various elements including expansion of education, improvements in technology, assistance from foreign advisors (particularly Soviet advisors from after the Second Sino Japanese War to after the Second World War), the lack of internal conflict, engagement with foreign trade, and the central government increasingly being able to step in and guide development all helped enable increases in agricultural production output and efficiency, and hastened population growth. This helped enable the funding of, and movement of workers to, the development of an urban industrial base as well. Social changes such as the Party's encouragement of and support for changes in women's roles, with a rapid expansion of women entering the workplace, also contributed to increased output that helped fuel economic growth. Acceleration in expansions in healthcare and sanitation infrastructure were enabled by the economic boom, and, along with increases in worker's rights with improved safety regulations, also assisted in the Chinese population boom

The old Malthusian idea of population growth expanding far beyond the capacity of food and other resources, causing famine and poverty, was on the minds of mid 20th century Chinese leaders as the population of the country grew. The matter of how to respond to population growth was debated by academics, communist party members, and others. On one end of the spectrum of the discourse, some simply saw no problem at all, and even wanted policy to encourage population growth to accelerate even more. On the other end, some proposed harsh policies to reduce the population, potentially including mandates limiting the number of children a family could have, or potentially even forced sterilization of portions of the population. But the great mass of the party ended up taking a more cautious route. Various activists, politicians, and others believed that increasing opportunities and encouraging liberation for women, along with increasing access to birth control and other healthcare measures, and public awareness campaigns on the potential dangers of overpopulation, could be enough, or could at least move things in a more sustainable direction

With the expansion of healthcare and healthcare choices, a new issue emerged - or, rather, an old issue expanded. China had a history with female infanticide and general bias in favor of male children and against female children stretching back to before the republic era. The postwar expansion of healthcare saw an already existent gender ratio expand even more in favor of men. China had seen both social and economic progress, but in this case, the social change hadn't quite caught up with the economic changes, and it became common for families to prefer male children and take advantage of the expanding healthcare system to utilize sex-selective abortion (at times with some degree of duress within the family). This initially occurred with little note, but as the years went by and the trend expanded, while at the same time social values in China continued to change, the trend generated more and more controversy. Women's rights advocates in China argued that it showed a significant cultural bias against women, and concerns were also expressed from others over potential societal issues that might emerge from a very skewed gender ratio. As time went on, and China entered the 70s and 80s, the party began to take more and more action on the issue, loudly advocating for female children, pushing against intentional abortion of girls in favor of boys, and creating various incentives for having daughters

The party's efforts on this issue came at a time of broader change in China, where gender roles and culture in general were increasingly being challenged, and the efforts to unskew the gender ratio were pretty effective due to that context. Actually, they were so effective that for some years, the gender ratio at birth more than equalized and sizably skewed in the other direction, before skewing somewhat closer to neutrality in more recent years

Closer to the end of the millennium, a new demographic trend emerged. Previously, across the globe it was common to worry about out-of-control population growth. But the fall of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact saw major declines in birthrates and increases in mortality across Eastern Europe, with populations falling into a steady decline. And while population decline occurred early in those regions, many other countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia, among other areas, had seen a gradual decline in birthrates that signaled that many of those areas, too, would end up falling into potentially significant population declines in the foreseeable future. Previous more Malthusian-minded theorists would have seen this as a good thing, but now there was growing concern over the ability for a smaller and smaller young population to bear an increasing burden of a proportionally larger and larger young population. So various countries now began to look to ways to increase population growth or at least lead to a roughly stable population rather than a decline

The Chinese government made such attempts, and in part due to having a different political situation, with different opportunities and cultural ideas, it managed to see more success than various other countries. The Chinese took various measures, to attempt to make it easier to have a child if one wanted, including shifting away from the "nuclear family" ideal and making alternatives to that norm, such as single parenthood and more communal-based child-raising, easier to do and more supported by the state and communities. With the combination of more naturally evolving social norms as well as applied influence and awareness-raising campaigns by the party, as well as various fine-tuned economic incentives and other policy changes, China has shifted rather close to having a steady population even at a time when other countries are increasingly seeing declines and struggling to deal with that

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One more key aspect of China's post-revolution demographic history is that of its urbanization

At the start of the 20th century, the majority of the population lived in rural settings. The republic era saw some growth in urbanization due to efforts to industrialize, and the socialist republic era saw an even larger growth in urbanization as the government made it a major policy to attempt to grow urban industry in order to bolster the economy. The post-war era saw such trends continue. By the 80s, the party had already came to staunchly support a policy of encouraging urbanization, in part due to the idea that provision of infrastructure and services was more efficient in cities, as well as to some extent the idea that urban settings simply were more conducive to promoting the sort of progressive values the party wished to promote. With the rise of environmentalism in China, the party also began to support urbanization due to the environmental/climate advantages of cities and especially dense cities compared to rural and suburban areas

Farming collectivization also played a role in encouraging urbanization. China would eventually move to collectivize the agricultural industry, a few decades after the USSR did, but tended to take a rather different path in "collectivization". The USSR had moved early to collectivize many small peasant farms using old farming methods. In China, a more gradual approach was taken, and a relatively modern, efficiency-focused agriculture industry, armed with modern, efficiency-promoting equipment and mechanization, was developed over the course of a few decades. This allowed development of the agricultural industry and substantial increases in production while avoiding the famine and other chaos of the Soviet path, while also significantly decreasing the number of agricultural workers who were actually needed to produce most food that was consumed. The party then began accelerating the transition to collective management of agriculture, and by that point, the party was able to rely on a small ("small" proportional to China's large population, but still more people than the total population of various countries) number of professionally educated farmers using modern technology and ideas to take over much of the agricultural industry with little disruption, allowing for a much smoother transition than that seen in the USSR, and for a rather more efficient agricultural situation post-transition. As for the rural persons who previously worked in agriculture and now found themselves redundant? The party was more than happy to provide them, too, with decent unionized or fully collectivized jobs, but those jobs were often located in cities, and thus collectivization saw a steady stream of grumbling rural residents reluctantly entering the cities

With these factors, the "down from the mountains and up from the countryside" movement had, over several decades, turned China from a very rural country into the heavily urbanized country it is today, with urbanization rates approaching that of various developed "western" countries (or exceeding them in some cases, having a level of urbanization a few points higher than the United States, for example). Of some additional note is the particular sort of urbanization China has seen. In many countries, a sizable chunk of the "urban" population is more along the lines of "suburban", and even non-suburban urban areas may have significant sprawl, automobile reliance, and so on (in the US, for example, a simple "urban vs rural" dichotomy says that 82% of the population is urban, but if we consider a "urban vs suburban vs rural" dichotomy, 52% is suburban). In China, on the other hand, there's been a strong push not just for a general sort of urbanization that is inclusive to suburbs and urban sprawl, but instead specifically for a highly dense sort of city environment

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And so at a time when various countries like India were dealing with heavy demographic biases in favor of male children, when countries like Japan in particular as well as other first world countries were dealing with the threat of potentially significant future issues due to population decline, and when various areas were arguably suffering due to issues of urban/suburban sprawl and an overreliance on personally owned automobiles among other things, China (and its close allies, which generally followed roughly the same policy direction) had managed to largely deal with those sorts of problems. Some in the west and elsewhere looked to China as a exemplar for how to deal with various problems in their own countries, with a minority but not a totally miniscule and entirely invisible one attempting to openly advocate for communism more broadly as well. Others at the very least thought that their own countries might be able to learn a thing or two from Chinese policy implementations, while disagreeing on various aspects too. Yet others saw the Chinese system as a quaint and potentially interesting thing, but also a largely alien thing that folks outside of the system had little reason to take any inspiration from. And of course there were those who looked on at the Chinese system with abject horror, and were rather disturbed that many of their fellow countrypeople weren't as disgusted and angry as they were
 
These recent updates really add a sociological depth to the China you're sketching out here. Overall, TTL's me might genuinely consider moving to China and joining one commune or another. Speaking of which, what is this China's soft power and international outreach like? Is the party trying to propagandize through Western social media? Are they paying for Chinese language courses abroad? In general, how do they position themselves in the global culture?
 
These recent updates really add a sociological depth to the China you're sketching out here. Overall, TTL's me might genuinely consider moving to China and joining one commune or another. Speaking of which, what is this China's soft power and international outreach like? Is the party trying to propagandize through Western social media? Are they paying for Chinese language courses abroad? In general, how do they position themselves in the global culture?
I mean they manage pretty well with regards to soft power even with their controversies.
 
These recent updates really add a sociological depth to the China you're sketching out here. Overall, TTL's me might genuinely consider moving to China and joining one commune or another. Speaking of which, what is this China's soft power and international outreach like? Is the party trying to propagandize through Western social media? Are they paying for Chinese language courses abroad? In general, how do they position themselves in the global culture?
I mean they manage pretty well with regards to soft power even with their controversies.
Indeed, in regards to OTL China despite their issues

For soft power stuff...

Some things already discussed or mentioned can be seen as soft power projection - stuff like Chinese labor union and coop organizations having international branches with millions of members, for example. As well as things like third world foreign economic/energy aid. Soft power projection isn't the primary goal of these things - they are done for ideological purposes first and foremost - but they do also effectively help promote Chinese soft power and international outreach (especially in the "developing world"/"global south"), and the party is also more than willing to play up its programs and successes

In terms of general culture and cultural impact, China has a larger role vs OTL. The media situation is rather less nationalistic and traditionalist than OTL China, and while the media environment isn't one of "total free press", there's more creative freedom. This, along with China simply having a larger economy vs OTL, leads to Chinese media tending to be seen as perhaps higher quality vs OTL, and ending up with higher viewership/listenership abroad. Think something along the lines of how folks in the US and elsewhere can be with British media or K-pop or Japanese media or such - there's probably smallish subcultures in the west that are really hardcore superfans of "any Chinese media", and beyond that, not uncommon for more average folks to consume at least a bit of media from China, plus there's more US/Western remakes of Chinese media, and so on

With that, plus the larger Chinese economy and Chinese economic connections abroad (and to a lesser extent stuff like somewhat greater Chinese tourism abroad), there's more teaching of Chinese language outside of China even without things like China-funded language courses. The government does also make some effort to fund and support this (as well as to a lesser extent a few minority Chinese languages such as Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uyghur) abroad as well

In regards to propagandizing via social media, I imagine a fair amount of that is done - with how the party prefers a softer touch approach to changing hearts and minds vs a more heavy handed approach, it probably would have gotten halfway decent at various approaches of persuasion and propagandizing including social media. On the other hand, there may be limits to how much one can do via all that, and potential for backlash against it too, especially when dealing with efforts to persuade people abroad. I figure a lot of the efforts of persuasion via western social media and at western audiences are in a sense "defensive" vs "offensive", focused more on defending China and the party's programs and policy in China, and on pushing back against some of the more common and influential conspiracy theories in the west against China and their allies, rather than things more along the lines of attempting to more actively push western politics towards the ideals of the party. Sometimes this leads to some frustration among western leftists, especially at the grassroots - for example, there's a common view that the "Occupy movement" (or some TTL rough analogue occurring in roughly the same era) could have been more effective if the Chinese made an active effort to give support and organizational aid to the movement rather than just making the vaguest of positive statements towards the protests and doing no more than that (though others on the left wonder if it would have just caused more backlash for the movement to have been associated closely with the Chinese)

And then there's social media posting by regular Chinese (and Koreans/Indochinese/etc) individuals in support of the general ideals of the party but without any support or prompting by the party itself. That's, as might be expected, very much a mixed bag, ranging from "actually decently effective" at times to "about as dumb and ineffectual as one can expect to see on the internet and social media"
 
Also, oops, its been months since I've done anything with this TL, and since I'm starting school again soon and will be hella busy for the next year and a half, updates in the future will be sparse (though not nonexistent!)

So that I'm at least posting something, here's some maps of China's provinces.

China map provinces 1.png


Not everything is substantially different, but there are some noticeable differences.

China map provinces 2.png


Here's the same map, with an as-of-yet-unnamed autonomous socialist republic (which I've personally been thinking of as the "Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's" Autonomous Socialist Republic, though that's the name of an existing region in Ethiopia so it wouldn't actually make sense for China to just randomly steal the name of some Ethiopian region)

China map provinces 3.png


And here's an alternative I considered going with, with some sort of Southern Chinese autonomous area (based vaguely on language dialect areas, and IIRC I also intended for a Jin dialect area, which would have basically meant part of Shaanxi province was added to Shanxi province). In the end I decided against that idea, though. Its one thing for this China to be more respectful of local minorities and linguistic diversity in various ways, but another thing altogether for it to openly go out of its way to actively promote administrative divisions on the basis of dialect/language differences
 
Also, oops, its been months since I've done anything with this TL, and since I'm starting school again soon and will be hella busy for the next year and a half, updates in the future will be sparse (though not nonexistent!)

So that I'm at least posting something, here's some maps of China's provinces.

View attachment 799434

Not everything is substantially different, but there are some noticeable differences.

View attachment 799435

Here's the same map, with an as-of-yet-unnamed autonomous socialist republic (which I've personally been thinking of as the "Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's" Autonomous Socialist Republic, though that's the name of an existing region in Ethiopia so it wouldn't actually make sense for China to just randomly steal the name of some Ethiopian region)

View attachment 799436

And here's an alternative I considered going with, with some sort of Southern Chinese autonomous area (based vaguely on language dialect areas, and IIRC I also intended for a Jin dialect area, which would have basically meant part of Shaanxi province was added to Shanxi province). In the end I decided against that idea, though. Its one thing for this China to be more respectful of local minorities and linguistic diversity in various ways, but another thing altogether for it to openly go out of its way to actively promote administrative divisions on the basis of dialect/language differences
I also see Xikang and Qinghai were organised into some kind of Amdo-Kham Tibet region? Nice, I’ve always wished for a restored Xikang irl. I assume the bit between that and Gansu is for another group? My first guess is that it’s a Muslim region tied to Ningxia

Is that Yanbian getting province level status in the northeast? Bit surprised they got the nod but the population is comparable to Xizang irl anyway

Was a north-south Xinjiang split ever proposed? I know it’sbeen tossed around from time to time irl for ethnic or geographic reasons.

I’m inclined to agree a southern Chinese AR would have been a bridge too far especially given how that region was often the centre of Chinese nationalism and Republican reformism.

Overall another great update :) your timeline is definitely one of my favourites
 
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I also see Xikang and Qinghai were organised into some kind of Amdo-Kham Tibet region? Nice, I’ve always wished for a restored Xikang irl. I assume the bit between that and Gansu is for another group? My first guess is that it’s a Muslim region tied to Ningxia

Is that Yanbian getting province level status in the northeast? Bit surprised they got the nod but the population is comparable to Xizang irl anyway

Was a north-south Xinjiang split ever proposed? I know it’sbeen tossed around from time to time irl for ethnic or geographic reasons.

I’m inclined to agree a southern Chinese AR would have been a bridge too far especially given how that region was often the centre of Chinese nationalism and Republican reformism.

Overall another great update :) your timeline is definitely one of my favourites

Yeah, Xikang and Qinghai are the Inner Tibetan Autonomous Socialist Republic. Alternatively referred to as... Republican Tibet as a preliminary name, though maybe something else would make more sense. IOTL, the Dalai Lama has expressed sympathy for communism and socialism even after he fled from China after 1959, ITTL the Chinese government with a softer touch don't lead to as much backlash, and the Dalai Lama, albeit with some concerns, remains in China/Tibet. There's still debate within the Chinese central government as well as Tibet as to the final status of Tibet. Eventually it is decided that there will be two Tibetan regions, one (Outer Tibet) where the Dalai Lama gets to retain an official (largely figurehead, like a sub-national constitutional monarchy sort of thing) position, and the other (Inner Tibet) in which the Dalai Lama would have no official role. This emerged out of debates on whether to take advantage of the Dalai Lama's communist sympathies and cooperate with local traditions or whether to push for more secularization - in the end, the party basically just splits the baby down the middle

As for the bit between Inner Tibet and Gansu, actually it was just intended as a rump Qinghai (possibly renamed Xining). Basically, Inner Tibet got all the chunks of Qinghai and some surrounding provinces that were... actually it's been a month or two since I made this, it might have been prefectures that are majority Tibetan, might have also just been some areas that were majority Tibetan plus Mongolian or just not majority Han. At any rate, rump Qinghai was intended to just be the Han majority chunks that are left over (though I also might have gotten the wrong prefectures or something)

Yup, that's Yanbian. ITTL it has somewhat larger population and more Korean population vs OTL due in part to increased cross-border movement and very cordial China-Korea relations (their border is essentially an open border). With all that going on, the area ends up getting its own autonomous republic

As for dividing Xinjiang, maybe. Actually I might end up making a Kazakh autonomous republic in the far north. Will give that more thought. But not a larger split. Apparently the OTL 1953 census had Xinjiang at just 6% Han and 75% Uyghur. The ITTL Chinese government here doesn't end up encouraging substantial migration into Xinjiang, so the province remains with a much larger Uyghur population throughout the non Kazakh areas, and thus a larger sort of divide (like splitting off the OTL Han areas from the rest, for example) doesn't end up being a thing

And thanks, I'm glad you like it : D
 
Here's the same map, with an as-of-yet-unnamed autonomous socialist republic (which I've personally been thinking of as the "Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's" Autonomous Socialist Republic, though that's the name of an existing region in Ethiopia so it wouldn't actually make sense for China to just randomly steal the name of some Ethiopian region)
I mean, if the Ethiopian Empire survives to the present day, then they would probably have kept its provinces unless the 2013 constitution created the "regional states" that currently exist IOTL.
 
If the Ethiopian Empire endures in this timeline, I doubt it will have an area called the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region.
 
You know i wondered what happened to Mao for while yes hes a not exactlly a good chinese leader (ruling a country) hes genuinlly a militarilly brilliant leader and tactician and just like many communist hes created some absolute banger of marxist analysis and theory. I can envision him as some kinda decorated war hero turned politician or a prominent socialist thinker
 
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