Wolfram von Richthofen stays in technical branch

[Deleted member 1487]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfram_Freiherr_von_Richthofen

In 1933 von Richthofen joined the Luftwaffe, commanded by his former commanding officer at JG 1, in 1918, Hermann Göring. By 1934 he was in charge of developing and testing new aircraft in the Technisches Amt, under the overall direction of Ernst Udet. Although Richthofen had known Göring, having served under him in the First World War in JG 1, the two did not get along. They both came from aristocratic backgrounds, but Richthofen was a Silesian from Lower Silesia, a drive commander, a good and hard working staff officer who enjoyed the company of engineers and like-minded men. Göring was a Bavarian, and a playboy who enjoyed talking about First World War stories and his time as an ace while he enjoyed the trappings of power. Göring preferred men like him, and promoted them on that basis. He overlooked the more qualified Richthofen in favour of Udet, a hard drinker and playboy, who like Göring had grown up in Bavaria, to head the Technisches Amt.[12]
Richthofen's role was mainly concerned with aircraft procurement programs for the fledgling Luftwaffe. He was involved in the development of types such as the Dornier Do 23, Heinkel He 111 and Junkers Ju 86. In the event, only the He 111 would make a real impact during the war. Richthofen was following a considerably difficult assignment, stemming from a directive issued to the Reichswehr before Hitler's rise to power.

What if Richthofen never leaves the Technical Branch despite his conflicts with Goering and Udet? This means he never goes to Spain and forces his idea of tactical bombing on the Luftwaffe.

Does tactical bombing achieve the same prominence in Luftwaffe theory? Does Wolfram manage to prevent some the technical disasters under Udet's reign in the development branch?

 

[ivanotter]

Keep going. I (for one) don't know enough about Wolfram and will be delighted to follow this one.

Was he involved in the HE-177 or the Ural Bomber? the Me-262?

Ivan

 

[BlairWitch749]

The ideal for our friend Herr Richtoffen would be for HG to die or be purged; Hitler liked WVR; and unlike many general officers WVR had a doctorate in engineering, so he could speak to people like todt/speer/messerscmidt/tank etc on equal terms and thus he could push through a lot of the bull shit and red tape that HG allowed to be so common place in the LW

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The ideal for our friend Herr Richtoffen would be for HG to die or be purged; Hitler liked WVR; and unlike many general officers WVR had a doctorate in engineering, so he could speak to people like todt/speer/messerscmidt/tank etc on equal terms and thus he could push through a lot of the bull shit and red tape that HG allowed to be so common place in the LW

To a point. Early in his service is tried to get engine development fast tracked from 5-6 years to 2. He caught on eventually and by 1936 was making excellent technical decisions, like wanting to cancel the Bf110 in favor of the FW187.

Keep going. I (for one) don't know enough about Wolfram and will be delighted to follow this one.

Was he involved in the HE-177 or the Ural Bomber? the Me-262?

Ivan

No, it was out in 1936 after refusing to work with the fool Udet, who made repeated, terrible decisions about technical matters and production. Instead his strong personality had a major impact on LW tactical development, where he rendered inspired service in Russia.

 

[BlairWitch749]

To a point. Early in his service is tried to get engine development fast tracked from 5-6 years to 2. He caught on eventually and by 1936 was making excellent technical decisions, like wanting to cancel the Bf110 in favor of the FW187.

A point where I disagree with WVR... the 110 was a successful contemporary aircraft, and the problems were employment and doctrine, which when figured out in field service made it a useful design

it says something that every other major power was experimenting with multi role 2 engine heavy fighters... the germans were in line if not ahead of the curve with that design

 

[Deleted member 1487]

A point where I disagree with WVR... the 110 was a successful contemporary aircraft, and the problems were employment and doctrine, which when figured out in field service made it a useful design

it says something that every other major power was experimenting with multi role 2 engine heavy fighters... the germans were in line if not ahead of the curve with that design

The problem was that the Bf110 wasn't suited for the role it was used for: long range escorting and bomber destroyer. It was too slow and unmaneuverable as an escort and was too slow and vulnerable as a Zerstörer, which made it vulnerable to escorting fighters. Granted as a Jabo the Bf110 was a solid gunship, but the Stuka and Me109E covered that role well enough.

 

[Rubicon]

The problem was that the Bf110 wasn't suited for the role it was used for: long range escorting and bomber destroyer. It was too slow and unmaneuverable as an escort and was too slow and vulnerable as a Zerstörer, which made it vulnerable to escorting fighters. Granted as a Jabo the Bf110 was a solid gunship, but the Stuka and Me109E covered that role well enough.

I disagree, the 110 had greater payload capacity then the 109, and was much, much faster then the Ju-87. So in my opinion there was great potential for the 110 as a fast fighter bomber that neither of the 109 or the Ju-87 could fill adequately.

 

[BlairWitch749]

The problem was that the Bf110 wasn't suited for the role it was used for: long range escorting and bomber destroyer. It was too slow and unmaneuverable as an escort and was too slow and vulnerable as a Zerstörer, which made it vulnerable to escorting fighters. Granted as a Jabo the Bf110 was a solid gunship, but the Stuka and Me109E covered that role well enough.

those were doctrine and employment problems not actual flaws in the aircraft... nobody exactly knew how to use twin engine fighters in the period but everyone built them

originally the 110 was envisioned for long range patrols to follow enemy bombers on the return leg; but due to OTHER failures in German aircraft development and pilot procurement it was pressed into other roles for which it wasn't ultimately suited

it proved to be a solid fighter bomber, artillery spotter, scout, bomber destroyer and the most successful night fighter in the war... the germans got their money out of the design

 

[Deleted member 1487]

those were doctrine and employment problems not actual flaws in the aircraft... nobody exactly knew how to use twin engine fighters in the period but everyone built them

originally the 110 was envisioned for long range patrols to follow enemy bombers on the return leg; but due to OTHER failures in German aircraft development and pilot procurement it was pressed into other roles for which it wasn't ultimately suited

it proved to be a solid fighter bomber, artillery spotter, scout, bomber destroyer and the most successful night fighter in the war... the germans got their money out of the design

Other than fighter bomber and artillery spotter the FW187 could have fulfilled those missions better and would have had a better survivability rate in doing so. And the best night fighter of the war was the Ju88G. The Bf110 was obsolete in that role by 1943 at the latest. Basically at that point night fighter was the only thing it was good for, but it still was too slow.

The Me109 could be a fighter bomber with better survivability and the Ju88, which already was in heavy production, could have been an artillery spotter with much more room and more pairs of eyes...which incidentally helped make it a better night fighter too.

I disagree, the 110 had greater payload capacity then the 109, and was much, much faster then the Ju-87. So in my opinion there was great potential for the 110 as a fast fighter bomber that neither of the 109 or the Ju-87 could fill adequately.

Yes, it had more payload, but a worse survivability rate than the Me109 (and later FW190). The Ju87 was a CAS aircraft that by its very design needed to be slow to do its job, just like the A10 Warthog today. It did the job much more accurately too, meaning less of a need for payload. That and it freed up fighters to do fighter sweeps and escorts, which they really should have focused on.
The fighter bomber did neither role well, as the Ju88 was a better fast bomber, the Ju87 a better tactical bomber, and the Me109 and Fw187 better fighters/escorts. The combined role was less efficient because it did neither job well and increased losses by pulling the aircraft from either specialty.

 

[Just Leo]

Calling Ernst Udet a fool is a little harsh and uncalled for. He was one of the world's greatest pilots, and fighter pilots. He was extremely likable, and was liked by the very people he fought in WWI. He was very enthusiastic about flying, and would fly anything if given the opportunity. That said, he had no interest in world domination, being a Nazi, being technically educated, or being organizationally erudite. He was no more suited to his WWII position than was Goering. But he didn't ask for it. He was assigned. The last chapter of his memoir was ghost written by a Nazi, and the difference is obvious. The person/regime which assigned him was the fool.

I mentioned Wolfram von Richthofen a few days ago, in some thread, regarding his codified combined operations doctrine being significant. Would someone else do it if he didn't? We can presume that he would have made wiser decisions than Udet regarding aircraft procurement, but in the end, it was Goering's air force. What if there were no JU-87 or Me-110 at all? Both aircraft had significant victories and critical weaknesses. How are we to presume von Richthofen would have re-arranged the Luftwaffe?

A few days ago, someone quoted someone saying the JU-88 shouldn't have been built. It was a mathematically poor choice. We can re-arrange Luftwaffe equipment forever, to suit our critical preferences, but the Ju-88 remains the most versatile aircraft in the inventory, rivalling the Mosquito.

Using von Richthofen as a cause, how could we re-arrange the Luftwaffe? Are we to presume he had knowledge of the requirement for a strategic bomber force with long-range escort fighters, a maritime strike force with bombs and torpedoes, and whatever else?

 

[ivanotter]

Where would he have been on the debate on a separate air force, doing strategic bombing (only), winning the war for everyone (the bomber barons) AND the need for a tactical ari force (as LW turned into being very good at)?

Remember, tactical support was NOT the flavour of the month in US/UK.

Ivan