Woevre Offensive v. 2.0

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Deleted member 1487

It started with an intelligence brief. The army of Lorraine was being drawn down for purposes that OHL had not yet confirmed, but the fact was that the Woevre was being systematically abandoned by the French. Recent reconnaissance confirmed local commander for the 5th corps von Strantz’s opinion that the roads through this marshy region were not as bad as first thought. Though the heights of the Meuse were daunting, the forts there were obsolete and two batteries of the dreaded Austrian 305mm mortars were soon to become available. Von Strantz had drawn up plans after the French had withdrawn across the Woevre several days ago after their attacks had failed in the face of the general German offensive. When he proposed a thrust aimed at the crucial railway to Verdun, his army commander the Crown Prince Wilhelm concurred. But without OHL support the plan was pointless. However, with his father’s help, the Crown Prince managed to convince von Moltke to allow the 5th army to launch an attack across the valley and take the heights from the front. It was a bold maneuver, but if successful it could change the course of the campaign.

Of course there remained detractors, mainly Prince Rupprecht, commander of the 6th army, who would have to provide support in the form of his cavalry corps and release the 33rd reserve division from Metz to participate in what he considered to be a silly gamble, but when the French managed to push his forces be to the his start line beyond the Meurthe, suddenly Rupprecht changed his mind. His new strategy was to focus on the fortified city of Nancy and a diversion west of Toul could very well help his plan. However, when told he would also have to contribute the 21st corps and two batteries of heavy mortars, his disposition once again soured to the plan. As operational planning continued, he learned that his newly received Ersatz divisions would be the link between the attack across the Woevre and flank guard at the same time. This would deplete his attacking forces considerably, perhaps dangerously so, as he was to attack through rough terrain of various hills and forests to reach the city of Nancy. However, direct orders were hard to argue with.

September 2nd

By September 2nd the necessary troops were assembled around Metz, with the 33rd reserve division having taking up positions at Etain to allow the entire 5th corps to attack. Rupprecht was launching his offensive against Nancy, which allowed the troops debouching from Metz cover from French intelligence. The 21st army corps, reinforced by two batteries of heavy mortars and supported by a battalion of pioneers with siege train was flanked by the 3rd cavalry corps and trailed by the 55th mixed ersatz brigade as it left its position before Metz on September 2nd, early afternoon. To the north around Etain, the 5th corps had left their positions in the late morning, though reinforced with two batteries of the Austrian 305’s, two batteries of heavy mortars, and a battalion of pioneers with siege train. Respectively they were aiming at St. Mihiel and fort Troyon, both points that if taken would severe the rail link to Verdun and provide crossing points to launch attacks against the rear of the French 3rd army.

Opposing them on the Buttes before the Heights of the Meuse, were the French 55th reserve division, near Troyon, and a brigade from the 56th reserve division, in front of St. Mihiel, but these units were being prepared to move out and confront the main mass of the German 5th army was it pushed through the Argonne. In the next several days division artillery would be moved out first, followed by the infantry. Behind them was the line of forts that were the target of the German advance. The “major” works that were to be focused on were Troyon, Camp de Romain, and Les Paroches, which all barred the way across the Meuse. Once dealt with the rear of the 3rd army would be laid open to the victors.
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW1Pics2/1919-156stmihiel1600.jpg

As the 5th corps was coming from Etain, it was much closer to the front line. The rest of the 2nd of September was spent moving away from the front and then redirecting on a straight line to Troyon. Since the heights of the Meuse dropped off suddenly into a very flat rolling plain, the approach would have to happen during the night, so as to mask the attack and allow for artillery to be set up without harassment. Luckily for the Germans the French were only lightly holding the important buttes around the towns Les Esparges and Dommartin, including the forest of Mortagne. As they had warning orders to pull back in the next few days to reinforce the Verdun garrison as it prepared to maintain contact with the retreating 3rd army, much of the defenses, unprepared as they were by the inexperienced reservists, were even further neglected as the artillery and support formations of the 55th reserve infantry began relocating.

September 3rd

This would work to the 5th corps’ advantage during the evening of the 2nd and early morning of Sept. 3rd, as artillery set up and infantry formations deployed through the night. Amazingly the French outposts at Mesnil to Hattonchatel, where several batteries of motorized 122mm guns were deployed, did not notice the Germans below them until about 7am on Sept. 3rd. By this point the heavy mortars and corps artillery were already registering their guns on the heights above. In front of them stood two regiments of French reservist infantry with another deployed at Mouilly, but the other division troops and most of the artillery had displaced and were in the process of moving back toward fort Troyon. Though the artillery at Hattonchatel joined the battle early, thankfully being overlooked in the early morning light, it was soon subjected to earth-shattering strikes by HE shells from the Austrian 305mm guns, which had set up once it was realized where the fire was coming from.

To the front, the artillery prepared for the attack of the infantry of the 9th and 10th infantry divisions, which were forming up below the heights. The terrified and demoralized French reservists clung to their positions desperately, as their own artillery was trying to redeploy back to the front. Without any reply from their own guns, the French were only able to wait for the German infantry to charge up the steep cliffs to unseat them. The situation was even more desperate due to the French reserves having fewer heavy weapons than active divisions, and much less than the German regulars attacking them. Armed mostly with their rifles, they tried to steel their nerves long enough to resist the coming assault. First they had to survive the screaming shells of the German heavy guns, which covered the masses of soldiers moving forward. Especially effective and terrifying were the 25cm heavy mortars attached to the 5th corps, with the 21cm Mörser and 10.5cm howitzers of the corps artillery making a deadly impact as well.
(Check the specs of these guns here)
http://www.landships.freeservers.com/new_pages/artillery.htm
(Also check the area on googlemaps if possible to closer follow the action and understand the terrain)

Concentrating on the flanks of the buttes, the German infantry swept over the positions around Mesnil, Les Esparges, and Combres, where the roads were the easiest to mount. This was accomplished by the 9th division by the evening of Sept. 3rd, though with significant difficultly thanks to the rough, wooded terrain. The French reservists were able to withdraw in relative order, but with significant losses in men and material, as entire battalions fled their positions when the German infantry had closed in, exposing the flanks of other units. Morale was low after these first engagements, but nevertheless the Germans were halted by the end of the day thanks to the regiment around Mouilly joining the battle. German artillery was moved up and the process was prepared to continue the next day.

Further south the 10th division was not nearly as successful in forcing the forest of Mortagne. With far fewer roads and rougher terrain, the initial defenses were breeched and positions were established, but the woods were not cleared. The badly outnumbered French were able to flee from the initial attacks, but were then able to prepare positions further within the woods, safe from artillery observation. Progress would be slow in the coming days and it would have to come at the point of a bayonet.
 

Deleted member 1487

September 4th

To the north the German 5th corps was struggling with the French resistance. Though the artillery had been brought up overnight to allow for the hammering to continue, progress was slow as the French tenaciously held on in the heavily forested terrain despite their lack of artillery. Attempting to move past Les Esparges was much more difficult than the advance the previous day, as the French were now reinforced and the terrain was more rugged with little opportunity for flanking attacks. The heavy howitzers and mortars of the foot artillery were still grinding the French out brutally, but the French held on and were able to repel several assaults on the heights. The Germans finally managed to mount the front slopes of the hills behind Les Esparges, but were unable to progress much further for the day, as they were forced to rely on their artillery to literally blast holes in the French line so they could move forward.

The story was very similar for the 10th infantry division, as it was forced to clear the forest of Mortange without heavy artillery support and had to rely on close combat to move forward. Their numerical advantage allowed them to flow around French positions and cut them off, but the surrounded reservists often refused to surrender, causing the Germans to launch costly attacks to remove them from the woods. The addition of the 31st division to the flanks of the woods finally caused the defenders to retreat with what they could, finally allowing for an appreciable advance. It also meant that the 10th division could aid the neighboring 9th with flank attacks on the French by Mouilly, but that would only occur the follow day, as the process of clearing the woods of Frenchmen had consumed the whole day.

On the morning of Sept. 4th, the 21st army corps finally had finished it trek across the Woevre and set up its artillery during the night. The brigade of the French 56th reserve infantry entrenched along the heights from Deuxnouds to Apremont was without its artillery regiment, which had been withdrawn and sent across the Meuse to fight near Verdun. As a result, the reservist infantry could only wait anxiously as the Germans formed up leisurely below on the plains, while their artillery began to register on their positions. Additionally, the suppressed artillery park at Hattonchatel, which was supposed to be supporting the reservists now confronting the German 21st corps, found itself further inundated with artillery now from another angle.

The familiar process began again, as the heavy guns of the Germans smashed up the entrenchments of the French infantry on the buttes above. Attempting to hold out as long as possible, the French were finally forced to retire as casualties became prohibitively high, giving the German infantry an easy victory, as they pursued as best they could in the terrain. The sheer numerical advantage gave the 21st corps plenty of room to maneuver, allowing the Germans to flank any French attempt to make a stand. It also allowed the Germans to support their neighboring corps, which was still having trouble clearing the forest of Mortagne. By the end of the day the forest had finally been cleared, though with the French able to withdraw some survivors back toward the fortresses overlooking the Meuse.

Between Vigneulles and Chaillon was a valley with a decent highway allowing the Germans to move up quickly once the French positions had crumbled, and capture Hattonchattel by nightfall, though the position only contained corpses and wreckage of equipment, as the surviving artillerymen had fled long ago after destroying any surviving guns. But the highway was not safe beyond Chaillon, as the last regiment and artillery regiment of the 55th reservist infantry division were covering the road against an attack. The 31st infantry division of the German 21st corps was tasked with aiding the 5th corps and trying to clear the highway for use by the larger artillery pieces. They were frustrated by the guns of fort Troyon for now, but the Austrian 305’s and the 21st corps’ heavy guns were brought up during the evening to aid them. The good quality of the road and relative lack of steepness allowed the Germans to facilitate munitions resupply to the heavy guns overnight.

By now the French 3rd army commander, Sarrail, was well aware of German intentions along his flank. Confident that the forts, supported by the reservists, could hold out until the battle was successfully concluded with the 5th army, he sent back messages to the fort commanders that they would have to hold out with the support at their disposal. As it was, his forces were falling back through the Argonne and he had been forced to commit the garrison of Verdun to the fight so that the fortress could maintain contact with his army. The remaining reserve divisions had been committed along side the garrison forces and were supported by the 7th cavalry division. There were no reserves to send to the heights of the Meuse.

The 2nd army under de Castelnau were also under heavy assault by German forces and were badly outnumber in siege guns and outranged. Pressing down hard from Metz, the German 6th army was making progress toward Nancy and by nightfall de Castelnau was demoralized and preparing plans for a retreat to abandon Nancy. Submitting these plans to Joffre, we was chastised for his defeatism and exhorted to hold on until the German line could be turned around Paris. Nevertheless, the Couronnes were threatened by these assaults, which could mean that Nancy would be brought under direct artillery fire and his flank would crumble. Matters did look up some early the next day and the German assaults further south were completely halted, but the fighting around Nancy intensified.
 

Deleted member 1487

September 5th-6th
Fighting continued throughout the heights of the Meuse as the 5th and 21st army corps cleared the forested hills of French reservists. The progress was much quicker for the 21st corps, south Chaillon, as the brigade of the 56th reserve division opposing them had disintegrated under the onslaught of the German forces. Every attempt to make a stand had vanished in the waves of German infantry washing over the hills, leaving many captured, more killed or wounded, and only a handful left to fall back on fort Camp de Romain. All that remained before them was the rough terrain to be navigated. The single greatest factor in slowing the advance was the lack of decent roads and the need to often strap platoons to artillery pieces and pull with the horses to more them forward. The heaviest pieces relied on motorized tractors, which were confined to the one good highway running through Chaillon, but the road was covered by fort Troyon and several batteries of French 75s that were set up near the fort.

To the north of Chaillon was the 5th corps, still struggling with the French reservists. Luckily a brigade of the 31st infantry division was detached to help the 9th and 10th divisions clear the hills. They were also the first formation to contact the final French regiment of the 55th reserve division, which, with the artillery regiment of the division, was dug in near fort Troyon in support. But before they made contact on Sept. 6th, they helped the 10th division complete their victory over the French regiment opposing them. Now there were only the survivors of one reservist brigade checking the advance of the 9th division. By the 6th, the brigade of the 31st division had continued it forward advance and engaged fort Troyon and its infantry support, though it was mainly conducted with an artillery duel, supported by the Austrian 305s and some of the 21st corps heavy artillery. Fort Troyon was now in range and sight of the artillery observers of the German’s heavy guns, and was brought under fire along with the artillery of the 55th reserve division. Despite several direct hits by German guns, the French fort held on, though the reservists wavered outside it.

The 5th corps was now able to concentrate itself to fight through the remainder of the 55th reserve infantry division still fighting in and around Mouilly. The heavy guns of the corps finally had managed to catch up and were able to shell the French positions into oblivion. By the morning of Sept. 7th the French had given up resistance and the few survivors were pulling back to the Meuse. The 5th corps would not be able to move up its artillery to contact the French line near Troyon until mid day on the 8th, but in the meantime some of the infantry component and the lighter field guns had started to engage partly on the 7th.

The Austrian and German heavy guns finally disengaged fort Troyon on the night of the 6th, as a path had been found that the heavy tractors could use to move on St. Mihiel and fort Camp de Romain. Slowly, overnight the guns were moved up to engage the fortress there, as by the morning of the 7th, the 21st corps and its pioneers were nearing the fortress and getting ready to engage. About two reinforced battalions of reservists had managed to assemble around the fort and were prepared to fight, which delayed the assault preparations. The heavy guns set up to prepare the target for assault, while the infantry waited.

3rd army
From Sept. 4th on, the 3rd army was hard pressed as the German 5th army had managed to push them through the forest of Argonne seemingly with ease. Swinging the line back on the left only, the fortress region of Verdun acted as a hinge for the 3rd army. Though Joffre wanted to leave the area to its own devices, the mayor of the town proper had convinced Sarrail to maintain contact with it as they retreated. The garrison, the 72nd reserve division and a brigade of the 54th reserve division, were committed to battle with the remainder of Sarrail’s reserve corps to hold open the lines of communication. Pressed hard, they were reinforced with the 7th cavalry division, as the rest of the line fell back through the Argonne. By the morning of Sept. 6th the Germans had opened the battle against the left wing of Sarrail’s army, overrunning the French 10th division, in the process killing the commander, splitting the French 3rd and 4th armies at Revigny. Furious fighting happened near the gap, as the French pulled back their flank and tried to hold out. The 15th corps was expected on the 7th, and it was planned to throw them into the gap. However, as the morning of the 7th dawned, it became obvious that the threat around St. Mihiel was too great to let develop. The sole remaining rail line to Verdun was severed by the German 21st corps, which now had the route under artillery observation.

The 15th corps when it arrived in Ligny-en-Barrois on the 7th, was held up while Sarrail vacillated between retreating from Verdun, closing the gap of Revigny, or reinforcing St. Mihiel and Troyon. Ultimately he made the fateful decision to split the 15th corps by sending one of its divisions with corps artillery to St. Mihiel and the other to Revigny. Unfortunately this half measure meant that no objective was effectively reached. The 29th division of the French 15th corps was welcomed at Revigny, but was not decisive in covering the gap. In fact, the German 4th cavalry corps was able to keep the gap open, though not exploit it. For the time being, the 3rd army’s flank remained threatened, which kept them reacting to events instead of dictating them, a crucial handicap if they were to be part of Joffre’s counter offensive. The 30th division, with the 15th corps’ artillery, was late in setting out from Ligny and did not arrive at St. Mihiel before nightfall thanks to the poor quality of roads leading there. As it played out, by nightfall on the 7th, Sarrail’s 3rd army was being pressed back into a pocket.

http://babelfish.yahoo.com/translat...hp3?id_article=62&lp=fr_en&btnTrUrl=Translate
2nd army
The French 2nd army was in a much better position on the 5th, as counterattacks had finally stopped the German advance. Intense fighting continued along the front and the day ended with the German 6th army checked along every axis. But the 6th brought a change in fortune for the French. Though initially successful, their attacks across the Meurthe are halted and the defense of the Grand Couronnes is heavily tested. Though during the day the Germans are checked, the town of St. Genevive is abandoned during the evening by the French. De Castelnau is overcome with feelings of disaster, as the fall of St. Genevive means the Germans can now shell deep into the French rear making Nancy indefensible. Also, his son is killed in action on the same day, further affecting his mood. Prepared to issue orders to abandon Nancy and fall back on the Moselle, Joffre, alerted by members of his staff, calls him and demands that the 2nd army hold. Ready to launch his counteroffensive on the Marne, the loss of Nancy would be an inauspicious start. However, the Germans notice that the hill has been abandoned and move up during the night.

Starting the morning of the 7th the Germans now have observation deep into the French lines, confirming de Castelnau’s fears. However, his mood has improved, as it is realized that part of the hill is still held by French forces that had not retreated. The Germans follow up on their advance by attacking the rest of the hill containing St. Genevive with mixed results, but the other thrusts toward Dieulouard, Champenoux, and Cercueil succeed in taking their objectives. The route to Nancy stands open. Counter attacks later in the day to recapture Dieulouard and St. Genevive are cut down, thanks to the observations points captured on the Grand Couronnes. De Castelnau is beside himself, as all seems lost. He issues orders to pull back, especially as the German heavy guns are now striking the supply lines of the important positions of the Grand Couronnes as well as Nancy. His fears are confirmed and a retreat on the Moselle is ordered. Dubail, commander of the 1st army, is outraged and demands he halt, as it would put his conquests in jeopardy, but is rebuffed. The next several days see a retreat from all the city of Nancy and a coordinated fighting withdrawal to the Haye forest and then to the Moselle. The rest of the line would be anchored on the Meurthe, and the final position would rest south of Nancy in the forest between the Moselle and Meurth.

It was a tremendous coup for Prince Rupprecht and the Kaiser was present when the general entered the city with much pomp. Still near the front line, the visit was short, but the morale boost it gave the devastated German attackers allowed them to continue forward. Moltke, though glad for the success, was now forced to damper the good mood of the emperor. He had to remove more troops from the 6th army to help form the new 7th army in West to support the sorely tried 1st and 2nd armies. Rupprecht heavily protested to the emperor, citing his resent victory as reason not to remove his troops. In a surprise move Kaiser Wilhelm told Moltke to leave the troops with Rupprecht to continue with his successful attacks. He believed that the retreat of the French had also affected their morale, which meant that now was the time to attack, not halt. Frustrated, Moltke argued, but ultimately lost, as Wilhelm, thought to be marginalized as supreme commander, exercised his command prerogative and stubborn personality. Rebuffed, Moltke was forced to issue further orders to his special envoy Hentsch, on his mission to coordinate the 1st and 2nd armies.
 
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