Deleted member 1487
It started with an intelligence brief. The army of Lorraine was being drawn down for purposes that OHL had not yet confirmed, but the fact was that the Woevre was being systematically abandoned by the French. Recent reconnaissance confirmed local commander for the 5th corps von Strantz’s opinion that the roads through this marshy region were not as bad as first thought. Though the heights of the Meuse were daunting, the forts there were obsolete and two batteries of the dreaded Austrian 305mm mortars were soon to become available. Von Strantz had drawn up plans after the French had withdrawn across the Woevre several days ago after their attacks had failed in the face of the general German offensive. When he proposed a thrust aimed at the crucial railway to Verdun, his army commander the Crown Prince Wilhelm concurred. But without OHL support the plan was pointless. However, with his father’s help, the Crown Prince managed to convince von Moltke to allow the 5th army to launch an attack across the valley and take the heights from the front. It was a bold maneuver, but if successful it could change the course of the campaign.
Of course there remained detractors, mainly Prince Rupprecht, commander of the 6th army, who would have to provide support in the form of his cavalry corps and release the 33rd reserve division from Metz to participate in what he considered to be a silly gamble, but when the French managed to push his forces be to the his start line beyond the Meurthe, suddenly Rupprecht changed his mind. His new strategy was to focus on the fortified city of Nancy and a diversion west of Toul could very well help his plan. However, when told he would also have to contribute the 21st corps and two batteries of heavy mortars, his disposition once again soured to the plan. As operational planning continued, he learned that his newly received Ersatz divisions would be the link between the attack across the Woevre and flank guard at the same time. This would deplete his attacking forces considerably, perhaps dangerously so, as he was to attack through rough terrain of various hills and forests to reach the city of Nancy. However, direct orders were hard to argue with.
September 2nd
By September 2nd the necessary troops were assembled around Metz, with the 33rd reserve division having taking up positions at Etain to allow the entire 5th corps to attack. Rupprecht was launching his offensive against Nancy, which allowed the troops debouching from Metz cover from French intelligence. The 21st army corps, reinforced by two batteries of heavy mortars and supported by a battalion of pioneers with siege train was flanked by the 3rd cavalry corps and trailed by the 55th mixed ersatz brigade as it left its position before Metz on September 2nd, early afternoon. To the north around Etain, the 5th corps had left their positions in the late morning, though reinforced with two batteries of the Austrian 305’s, two batteries of heavy mortars, and a battalion of pioneers with siege train. Respectively they were aiming at St. Mihiel and fort Troyon, both points that if taken would severe the rail link to Verdun and provide crossing points to launch attacks against the rear of the French 3rd army.
Opposing them on the Buttes before the Heights of the Meuse, were the French 55th reserve division, near Troyon, and a brigade from the 56th reserve division, in front of St. Mihiel, but these units were being prepared to move out and confront the main mass of the German 5th army was it pushed through the Argonne. In the next several days division artillery would be moved out first, followed by the infantry. Behind them was the line of forts that were the target of the German advance. The “major” works that were to be focused on were Troyon, Camp de Romain, and Les Paroches, which all barred the way across the Meuse. Once dealt with the rear of the 3rd army would be laid open to the victors.
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW1Pics2/1919-156stmihiel1600.jpg
As the 5th corps was coming from Etain, it was much closer to the front line. The rest of the 2nd of September was spent moving away from the front and then redirecting on a straight line to Troyon. Since the heights of the Meuse dropped off suddenly into a very flat rolling plain, the approach would have to happen during the night, so as to mask the attack and allow for artillery to be set up without harassment. Luckily for the Germans the French were only lightly holding the important buttes around the towns Les Esparges and Dommartin, including the forest of Mortagne. As they had warning orders to pull back in the next few days to reinforce the Verdun garrison as it prepared to maintain contact with the retreating 3rd army, much of the defenses, unprepared as they were by the inexperienced reservists, were even further neglected as the artillery and support formations of the 55th reserve infantry began relocating.
September 3rd
This would work to the 5th corps’ advantage during the evening of the 2nd and early morning of Sept. 3rd, as artillery set up and infantry formations deployed through the night. Amazingly the French outposts at Mesnil to Hattonchatel, where several batteries of motorized 122mm guns were deployed, did not notice the Germans below them until about 7am on Sept. 3rd. By this point the heavy mortars and corps artillery were already registering their guns on the heights above. In front of them stood two regiments of French reservist infantry with another deployed at Mouilly, but the other division troops and most of the artillery had displaced and were in the process of moving back toward fort Troyon. Though the artillery at Hattonchatel joined the battle early, thankfully being overlooked in the early morning light, it was soon subjected to earth-shattering strikes by HE shells from the Austrian 305mm guns, which had set up once it was realized where the fire was coming from.
To the front, the artillery prepared for the attack of the infantry of the 9th and 10th infantry divisions, which were forming up below the heights. The terrified and demoralized French reservists clung to their positions desperately, as their own artillery was trying to redeploy back to the front. Without any reply from their own guns, the French were only able to wait for the German infantry to charge up the steep cliffs to unseat them. The situation was even more desperate due to the French reserves having fewer heavy weapons than active divisions, and much less than the German regulars attacking them. Armed mostly with their rifles, they tried to steel their nerves long enough to resist the coming assault. First they had to survive the screaming shells of the German heavy guns, which covered the masses of soldiers moving forward. Especially effective and terrifying were the 25cm heavy mortars attached to the 5th corps, with the 21cm Mörser and 10.5cm howitzers of the corps artillery making a deadly impact as well.
(Check the specs of these guns here)
http://www.landships.freeservers.com/new_pages/artillery.htm
(Also check the area on googlemaps if possible to closer follow the action and understand the terrain)
Concentrating on the flanks of the buttes, the German infantry swept over the positions around Mesnil, Les Esparges, and Combres, where the roads were the easiest to mount. This was accomplished by the 9th division by the evening of Sept. 3rd, though with significant difficultly thanks to the rough, wooded terrain. The French reservists were able to withdraw in relative order, but with significant losses in men and material, as entire battalions fled their positions when the German infantry had closed in, exposing the flanks of other units. Morale was low after these first engagements, but nevertheless the Germans were halted by the end of the day thanks to the regiment around Mouilly joining the battle. German artillery was moved up and the process was prepared to continue the next day.
Further south the 10th division was not nearly as successful in forcing the forest of Mortagne. With far fewer roads and rougher terrain, the initial defenses were breeched and positions were established, but the woods were not cleared. The badly outnumbered French were able to flee from the initial attacks, but were then able to prepare positions further within the woods, safe from artillery observation. Progress would be slow in the coming days and it would have to come at the point of a bayonet.
Of course there remained detractors, mainly Prince Rupprecht, commander of the 6th army, who would have to provide support in the form of his cavalry corps and release the 33rd reserve division from Metz to participate in what he considered to be a silly gamble, but when the French managed to push his forces be to the his start line beyond the Meurthe, suddenly Rupprecht changed his mind. His new strategy was to focus on the fortified city of Nancy and a diversion west of Toul could very well help his plan. However, when told he would also have to contribute the 21st corps and two batteries of heavy mortars, his disposition once again soured to the plan. As operational planning continued, he learned that his newly received Ersatz divisions would be the link between the attack across the Woevre and flank guard at the same time. This would deplete his attacking forces considerably, perhaps dangerously so, as he was to attack through rough terrain of various hills and forests to reach the city of Nancy. However, direct orders were hard to argue with.
September 2nd
By September 2nd the necessary troops were assembled around Metz, with the 33rd reserve division having taking up positions at Etain to allow the entire 5th corps to attack. Rupprecht was launching his offensive against Nancy, which allowed the troops debouching from Metz cover from French intelligence. The 21st army corps, reinforced by two batteries of heavy mortars and supported by a battalion of pioneers with siege train was flanked by the 3rd cavalry corps and trailed by the 55th mixed ersatz brigade as it left its position before Metz on September 2nd, early afternoon. To the north around Etain, the 5th corps had left their positions in the late morning, though reinforced with two batteries of the Austrian 305’s, two batteries of heavy mortars, and a battalion of pioneers with siege train. Respectively they were aiming at St. Mihiel and fort Troyon, both points that if taken would severe the rail link to Verdun and provide crossing points to launch attacks against the rear of the French 3rd army.
Opposing them on the Buttes before the Heights of the Meuse, were the French 55th reserve division, near Troyon, and a brigade from the 56th reserve division, in front of St. Mihiel, but these units were being prepared to move out and confront the main mass of the German 5th army was it pushed through the Argonne. In the next several days division artillery would be moved out first, followed by the infantry. Behind them was the line of forts that were the target of the German advance. The “major” works that were to be focused on were Troyon, Camp de Romain, and Les Paroches, which all barred the way across the Meuse. Once dealt with the rear of the 3rd army would be laid open to the victors.
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW1Pics2/1919-156stmihiel1600.jpg
As the 5th corps was coming from Etain, it was much closer to the front line. The rest of the 2nd of September was spent moving away from the front and then redirecting on a straight line to Troyon. Since the heights of the Meuse dropped off suddenly into a very flat rolling plain, the approach would have to happen during the night, so as to mask the attack and allow for artillery to be set up without harassment. Luckily for the Germans the French were only lightly holding the important buttes around the towns Les Esparges and Dommartin, including the forest of Mortagne. As they had warning orders to pull back in the next few days to reinforce the Verdun garrison as it prepared to maintain contact with the retreating 3rd army, much of the defenses, unprepared as they were by the inexperienced reservists, were even further neglected as the artillery and support formations of the 55th reserve infantry began relocating.
September 3rd
This would work to the 5th corps’ advantage during the evening of the 2nd and early morning of Sept. 3rd, as artillery set up and infantry formations deployed through the night. Amazingly the French outposts at Mesnil to Hattonchatel, where several batteries of motorized 122mm guns were deployed, did not notice the Germans below them until about 7am on Sept. 3rd. By this point the heavy mortars and corps artillery were already registering their guns on the heights above. In front of them stood two regiments of French reservist infantry with another deployed at Mouilly, but the other division troops and most of the artillery had displaced and were in the process of moving back toward fort Troyon. Though the artillery at Hattonchatel joined the battle early, thankfully being overlooked in the early morning light, it was soon subjected to earth-shattering strikes by HE shells from the Austrian 305mm guns, which had set up once it was realized where the fire was coming from.
To the front, the artillery prepared for the attack of the infantry of the 9th and 10th infantry divisions, which were forming up below the heights. The terrified and demoralized French reservists clung to their positions desperately, as their own artillery was trying to redeploy back to the front. Without any reply from their own guns, the French were only able to wait for the German infantry to charge up the steep cliffs to unseat them. The situation was even more desperate due to the French reserves having fewer heavy weapons than active divisions, and much less than the German regulars attacking them. Armed mostly with their rifles, they tried to steel their nerves long enough to resist the coming assault. First they had to survive the screaming shells of the German heavy guns, which covered the masses of soldiers moving forward. Especially effective and terrifying were the 25cm heavy mortars attached to the 5th corps, with the 21cm Mörser and 10.5cm howitzers of the corps artillery making a deadly impact as well.
(Check the specs of these guns here)
http://www.landships.freeservers.com/new_pages/artillery.htm
(Also check the area on googlemaps if possible to closer follow the action and understand the terrain)
Concentrating on the flanks of the buttes, the German infantry swept over the positions around Mesnil, Les Esparges, and Combres, where the roads were the easiest to mount. This was accomplished by the 9th division by the evening of Sept. 3rd, though with significant difficultly thanks to the rough, wooded terrain. The French reservists were able to withdraw in relative order, but with significant losses in men and material, as entire battalions fled their positions when the German infantry had closed in, exposing the flanks of other units. Morale was low after these first engagements, but nevertheless the Germans were halted by the end of the day thanks to the regiment around Mouilly joining the battle. German artillery was moved up and the process was prepared to continue the next day.
Further south the 10th division was not nearly as successful in forcing the forest of Mortagne. With far fewer roads and rougher terrain, the initial defenses were breeched and positions were established, but the woods were not cleared. The badly outnumbered French were able to flee from the initial attacks, but were then able to prepare positions further within the woods, safe from artillery observation. Progress would be slow in the coming days and it would have to come at the point of a bayonet.