Karabulutoglu, Orhan The Balkan Crisis (Salonika University Press: 2005)
The Serbo-Turkish war of 1876 was for all intents and purposes ended by the agreement of Sultan Abdulhamid to the Russian ceasefire ultimatum. Although the Ottomans had won the war quite easily, and were advancing on Belgrade when the ceasefire was announced, fierce international pressure in the wake of alleged massacres in the Balkan Vilayets in revolt forced the Ottoman Army to back down. Abdulhamid was increasingly fearful of the intentions of the Great Powers of Europe after they called a conference in Constantinople to address the revolts and wars that had wracked the Balkans since 1875. This fear became even more marked when it became apparent that the Ottomans themselves were not invited to participate in the discussions. Abdulhamid began discussions with Midhat Pasha, his newly appointed Grand Vizier, to try and find a way to subvert whatever demands may have come from the conference.
The conference ended on the 23rd of December 1876. The European powers demanded that the Ottoman Empire enact “reforms” in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Thessaly (These reforms would result in autonomy for the territories in question). Furthermore, these reforms would be overseen by representatives from each of the Great Powers of Europe. However, on the same day, the Ottoman government issued a proclamation which declared full equality of the different religions of the Empire, in an attempt to subvert the European demands. This gambit did not work, and the European powers insisted that the Ottoman government assent to the demands issued at the end of the conference. Abdulhamid saw the demands of the conference as an attempt to wrest Ottoman sovereignty in large and particularly important parts of the Empire. Because of this, and the feat that it could create a precedent, the Ottoman Empire officially rejected the requests of the Constantinople Conference, in a move that was met with almost violent division in the newly elected Ottoman Parliament, as well as International outrage.
The Russian government was secretly glad that the Ottomans had rejected the terms. Her government had been thirsting for revenge after the end of the Crimean war, but the Ottoman Empire had been protected by Britain, and to a lesser extent, France. However, with the recent troubles in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire had been increasingly isolated from her former protectors, particularly Britain. Even Benjamin Disraeli, a man who personally sought to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian threats to Britain’s Empire, was forced to abandon the Ottoman Empire to the Russians due to the overwhelming weight of anti-Turkish public opinion. This abandonment of the Ottoman Empire was promising for the Russians, who hoped for a military rematch between herself and her Ottoman enemies. The rejection of the terms of the Constantinople Conference had seemingly sealed the Ottoman Empire’s isolation, and gave the Russian government enough confidence to being preparing for war.
The Russian government concluded a secret agreement with Austria-Hungary in the January of 1877, guaranteeing Austrian neutrality in return for a poorly defined offer of “influence” in Bosnia after the successful conclusion of the war. This secured the one European power who would still seriously oppose Russian expansion in the Balkans under the guise of “Liberation”. Russia’s next priority was to plan for the actualities of the campaign. A number of Russian generals had argued that it would be much too difficult to attack the Ottomans via the coastal forts that defended the Dobruja, the most seemingly logical avenue for an attack aimed at Rumelia. Instead, they argued that a move through Romania and then across the Danube would be more surprising, and could allow the Ottoman forces north of the Balkan mountain chain to be cut off from the rest of the Empire, ensuring that the scattered Ottoman armies could be defeated in detail. This was needed as Russia’s finances could not support a prolonged campaign. The Romanians gave their assent to this strategy on April 12th 1877, in return for the promise of the Black sea port of Constanta, currently held by the Ottomans. The Russians had also planned a limited advance into Eastern Anatolia in order to draw some troops away from the Rumelian theater, but beyond taking Kars, had no specific objectives beyond that.
The Ottomans had sensed war was coming from January 1877, and in turn, their war minister, Hussein Avni Pasha, drew up his own, albeit flawed plans for the war. His plan was to use the superior firepower of his forces to wear down the Russians as they advanced down the Black Sea coast, using the Ottoman’s considerable navy to support the land forces with a bombardment of the shore. The Upper Danube, which unbeknownst to the Ottomans would be the site of the Russian’s main thrust, was to be covered only by garrison forces of 20,000 for the whole front, as well as a reaction army lead by Osman Pasha. Meanwhile, the main Ottoman Army in Rumelia, under Mehmed Ali Pasha, was to wait until the Russian Army had been worn down advancing down the coastline, and counterattack at the right opportunity. The one thing that the Ottomans did manage to anticipate was that the Russian incursion into Eastern Anatolia would not be one aimed at any decisive victories, due to the relative isolation of the theater, and so the plan simply aimed for holding ground as much as possible in the region.
Both plans were fairly sound strategies, but both would be thrown into the air by the circumstances and surprises encountered during the war. The two powers were not prepared for the war, and their armies were relatively ineffective and backward (at least organizationally) compared to those in Western Europe. However, despite the fact that the war was fought on the “backward” side of Europe, and the mistakes and blunders that would hamper both of the armies involved, it would also be one of the more decisive wars of world history, forever changing the balance of power in the Balkans and beyond…
_______________________________________________
Most of the coverage of the war itself will be in this "History Book" kind of format, though I'll try to squeeze some narrative here and there.
The Serbo-Turkish war of 1876 was for all intents and purposes ended by the agreement of Sultan Abdulhamid to the Russian ceasefire ultimatum. Although the Ottomans had won the war quite easily, and were advancing on Belgrade when the ceasefire was announced, fierce international pressure in the wake of alleged massacres in the Balkan Vilayets in revolt forced the Ottoman Army to back down. Abdulhamid was increasingly fearful of the intentions of the Great Powers of Europe after they called a conference in Constantinople to address the revolts and wars that had wracked the Balkans since 1875. This fear became even more marked when it became apparent that the Ottomans themselves were not invited to participate in the discussions. Abdulhamid began discussions with Midhat Pasha, his newly appointed Grand Vizier, to try and find a way to subvert whatever demands may have come from the conference.
The conference ended on the 23rd of December 1876. The European powers demanded that the Ottoman Empire enact “reforms” in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Thessaly (These reforms would result in autonomy for the territories in question). Furthermore, these reforms would be overseen by representatives from each of the Great Powers of Europe. However, on the same day, the Ottoman government issued a proclamation which declared full equality of the different religions of the Empire, in an attempt to subvert the European demands. This gambit did not work, and the European powers insisted that the Ottoman government assent to the demands issued at the end of the conference. Abdulhamid saw the demands of the conference as an attempt to wrest Ottoman sovereignty in large and particularly important parts of the Empire. Because of this, and the feat that it could create a precedent, the Ottoman Empire officially rejected the requests of the Constantinople Conference, in a move that was met with almost violent division in the newly elected Ottoman Parliament, as well as International outrage.
The Russian government was secretly glad that the Ottomans had rejected the terms. Her government had been thirsting for revenge after the end of the Crimean war, but the Ottoman Empire had been protected by Britain, and to a lesser extent, France. However, with the recent troubles in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire had been increasingly isolated from her former protectors, particularly Britain. Even Benjamin Disraeli, a man who personally sought to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian threats to Britain’s Empire, was forced to abandon the Ottoman Empire to the Russians due to the overwhelming weight of anti-Turkish public opinion. This abandonment of the Ottoman Empire was promising for the Russians, who hoped for a military rematch between herself and her Ottoman enemies. The rejection of the terms of the Constantinople Conference had seemingly sealed the Ottoman Empire’s isolation, and gave the Russian government enough confidence to being preparing for war.
The Russian government concluded a secret agreement with Austria-Hungary in the January of 1877, guaranteeing Austrian neutrality in return for a poorly defined offer of “influence” in Bosnia after the successful conclusion of the war. This secured the one European power who would still seriously oppose Russian expansion in the Balkans under the guise of “Liberation”. Russia’s next priority was to plan for the actualities of the campaign. A number of Russian generals had argued that it would be much too difficult to attack the Ottomans via the coastal forts that defended the Dobruja, the most seemingly logical avenue for an attack aimed at Rumelia. Instead, they argued that a move through Romania and then across the Danube would be more surprising, and could allow the Ottoman forces north of the Balkan mountain chain to be cut off from the rest of the Empire, ensuring that the scattered Ottoman armies could be defeated in detail. This was needed as Russia’s finances could not support a prolonged campaign. The Romanians gave their assent to this strategy on April 12th 1877, in return for the promise of the Black sea port of Constanta, currently held by the Ottomans. The Russians had also planned a limited advance into Eastern Anatolia in order to draw some troops away from the Rumelian theater, but beyond taking Kars, had no specific objectives beyond that.
The Ottomans had sensed war was coming from January 1877, and in turn, their war minister, Hussein Avni Pasha, drew up his own, albeit flawed plans for the war. His plan was to use the superior firepower of his forces to wear down the Russians as they advanced down the Black Sea coast, using the Ottoman’s considerable navy to support the land forces with a bombardment of the shore. The Upper Danube, which unbeknownst to the Ottomans would be the site of the Russian’s main thrust, was to be covered only by garrison forces of 20,000 for the whole front, as well as a reaction army lead by Osman Pasha. Meanwhile, the main Ottoman Army in Rumelia, under Mehmed Ali Pasha, was to wait until the Russian Army had been worn down advancing down the coastline, and counterattack at the right opportunity. The one thing that the Ottomans did manage to anticipate was that the Russian incursion into Eastern Anatolia would not be one aimed at any decisive victories, due to the relative isolation of the theater, and so the plan simply aimed for holding ground as much as possible in the region.
Both plans were fairly sound strategies, but both would be thrown into the air by the circumstances and surprises encountered during the war. The two powers were not prepared for the war, and their armies were relatively ineffective and backward (at least organizationally) compared to those in Western Europe. However, despite the fact that the war was fought on the “backward” side of Europe, and the mistakes and blunders that would hamper both of the armies involved, it would also be one of the more decisive wars of world history, forever changing the balance of power in the Balkans and beyond…
_______________________________________________
Most of the coverage of the war itself will be in this "History Book" kind of format, though I'll try to squeeze some narrative here and there.
