Initial Armenian demands, as late as 1913 were very moderate. Simply an Armenian vilayet in bitlis, van and Erzurum with autonomous kazas for Muslim majority areas within the vilayet where Armenian law was used instead of normal ottoman law. During Abdulhamids time, all the Armenians really wanted was that the Armenian constitution of 1863 be upheld fully and not be murdered for saying that.
With the Crescent Above Us 2.0: An Ottoman Timeline
- Thread starter Nassirisimo
- Start date
I've always liked presentations of the Grim Reaper as a rather kindly fellow who just has a horrible job to do.
It's actually quite a controversial point. As other posters have pointed out, Revolutionaries tended to be emigre intellectuals who were safeguarded for the most part from the response of the Ottoman Authorities. In a similar way to Osama Bin Laden chilling in Pakistan for however many years he was.
Possibly. The Irish Nationalists fought extremely well as it was, and although they were coming to the end of their ability to fight at the time the war of independence ended, the IRA had nevertheless managed to inflict disproportionate casualties on the British due to their use of ambushes. That's assuming of course, that the Irish issue ends in a war.
This is a very good point. For most of history, it is only the wealthy that have had the free time to actually engage in politics, and the same was true of the Armenians. It is tempting to think of groups such as the Armenians as one homogenous blob, but of course, this was never the case, and different subgroups would have had their own priorities, motivations and ideas.
My point was more that Armenians as a group are seen to some extent as passive victims, only taking up arms in response to atrocities on the part of their Muslim neighbours which wasn't always the case, though one could certainly make the argument that action on the part of armed Armenian groups was justified in light of the constant oppression experienced by Armenians.
In one sense, this is the policy the Ottomans did use in Anatolia, often backing the Kurds, who as Muslims were seen as more reliable elements, against the Armenians.
The Armenian demands seemed moderate, but one should keep in mind that the Armenians likely made a majority in none of the vilayets of the Ottoman Empire. It's also worth keeping in mind that as Sarthaka noted, Armenian demands changed with time and different groups likely had different ideas of what they wanted from armed struggle.
In this case, it's worth keeping in mind the situation of the Bulgarians. Some of the Bulgarian revolutionaries (such as Hristo Botev, who died during the April Uprising of 1876), spoke a lot of all the ethnic groups of Bulgaria including the Turks living in peace, but in reality, once the Bulgarian state was established, the Turkish population was, for the most part, killed or ethnically cleansed. Bulgaria is however a better case than Serbia, which had exterminated almost all its Muslim population following independence. In modern Armenia itself, the large population of Azeris has been whittled down to nothing despite having been almost as large as the Armenian population during the Tsarist Era.
I really want to avoid the justification of Muslim atrocities toward its Christian populations, especially during the last 10 years or so of the Ottoman Empire, but likewise, I feel that it is dishonest to ignore the wave of ethnic cleansing and atrocities against the Muslim populations that followed the loss of Ottoman control, and to some extent may have motivated the genocidal decision of the CUP in 1915. As historians, we must try to understand motivations as much as possible without condoning or justifying the atrocities of history. Though at the same time, calling myself a historian is a bit rich...
Ah, the Latin American question. Long forgotten or neglected by many (including myself). As far as I can tell, the downfall of the monarchy in Brazil is a bit complicated. Pedro II had little interest in staying on the throne and seemed to be looking forward to retirement, and his daughter hadn't been prepared to be a monarch, though that was true of many monarchs throughout history. On the other hand, there doesn't appear to have been a great demand for a republic outside a few limited sections of society. Honestly I'm still working out what Brazil's path will be in TTL, and what impact butterflies may have on it, so there is a chance that the monarchy will survive.
On the road to war - 1895
Timothy Evans; Boldly into the Modern Age - A history of Europe from 1789 to 2000: Oxford University Press
The Road to the Great Balkan War of 1895
The Road to the Great Balkan War of 1895
For some time before 1894, opinions within Europe toward the Ottoman Empire had slowly been shifting. Initially, the Ottoman victory in 1877 had seemed like a key spark in the renewal of the informal “Crimean Alliance” which had tied Britain and France together in an alliance that preserved the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and kept Russia contained. Internal politics as well as changing international circumstances had swiftly taken the Ottomans out of the equation. A key breaking point was Egypt, in which the Ottomans had refused to act as the “policeman” for the European powers. The occupation of Egypt by Britain, France and Italy saw the subsequent creation of a condominium by the former two powers in 1884, pulling Egypt ever further from the orbit of Constantinople and producing a great deal of resentment within the Ottoman elite. More importantly, however, having the Suez Canal directly in the hands of the Franco-British removed some of the security concerns that had plagued the British for decades. By 1890, the once informal guarantee on the integrity of the empire was now dead. Furthermore, this was apparent to every power within Europe. The Ottomans were now in a dangerously isolated position, and this allowed more hawkish elements in the Russian Empire to start seriously considering how best to take revenge for 1877.
If the diplomatic situation had changed by the 1890s, so too had the increasingly important element of public opinion. Increased missionary activity, particularly in Eastern Anatolia, illuminated the ill-treatment of Christians within the empire to an ever-wider audience. A Scottish missionary active in Van noted that “the daily cruelties inflicted upon those near-eastern Christians could scarcely be imagined by even the most savage of African chieftains”. The Turks were now seldom seen in the same light as they were in Crimea but were viewed by a large part of the population as a savage, alien element in Europe whose continued existence as an empire was nothing less than a stain on humanity. “how” one writer asked, “is it that at the zenith of Europe’s power do we tolerate our Christian brethren in the Balkans under the yolk of a most savage Asiatic barbarism?”. Those politicians who still supported a policy of maintaining the Ottoman Empire could not think of a sufficient answer. And in Russia, the Pan-Slavic agitation that had pushed Alexander II into war in 1877 resumed, having undergone a lull in its popularity in the intervening years. This had not gone unnoticed by some in the foreign office, which once again began to imagine how a large Slavic state in the Balkans, dominated by Russia, could enable her to gain control of the straits and protect her soft southern underbelly.
"Together, we are strong"; Pan-Slavic propaganda increased greatly in volume following renewed South Slavic uprisings in the Ottoman Empire
The Sason Uprising in Armenia, as well as the contemporary uprising in Bulgaria, signalled a sea-change in how those governments in Europe which had been previously supportive of the Ottoman Empire would deal with the empire now. The “Crimean Alliance” that had seen France and Britain band together to defend the Ottomans from Russian aggression had been dead for some time, killed by the changing nature of British and French internal politics as well as their intervention in Egypt. No longer did the Prime Ministers and their Foreign Ministers see the empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion in the Middle East and beyond. Instead, they saw the Ottomans, or at least their rule over Christians, as an abomination, and one that provided little real security for Britain in the long term. And as for the public, the thought of Russians dominating the straits had become less sickening than that of continued atrocities against the Christian people of the Balkans and Anatolia. This alone did not indicate that the governments of Britain and France would not come to the aid of the Ottoman Empire, but it represented another consideration for both.
When the uprisings had started, there had been calls from the foreign ministries and parliaments of Europe to exercise restraint. What happened in the empire was something else entirely. Reports soon began to filter out of the Sultan’s troops and irregulars committing atrocities against the Christian populations of Armenia and Bulgaria. Photographs were taken of the aftermath, dozens or hundreds of bodies strewn across fields. The Ottomans had a reputation for massacres before, but the level of violence in 1894 was unprecedented in Ottoman history. Much in the way of academic research needs to be completed to confirm the body count, as the body count is difficult to distinguish from the subsequent war. Even the most Turcophilic of European statesmen would have been hard-pressed to maintain support for the Ottomans in these circumstances, but by the 1890s, attitudes toward the Ottomans had changed greatly. The Liberal MP James Bryce was convinced that for the Ottoman government “the way to get rid of the Armenian question was to get rid of the Armenians”, and he said as much in parliament. Whether or not the central Ottoman government had ordered the massacres that swept the empire in 1894 is a hotly debated matter, but what is unquestionable is that there was a great deal of suffering amongst the Armenian and Bulgarian populations of the empire [1].
The suffering of Muslim populations, although it happened on a smaller scale, was ignored by the European powers in the following crisis, though it is relevant for its effect on Ottoman decision making during the crisis. In Eastern Anatolia the number of Muslim dead was small, perhaps a thousand or fewer civilians in all, but in Bulgaria, perhaps ten thousand Muslims, including members of the civilian administration, had been killed by Bulgarian insurgents. This had been noticed at the highest levels of the Ottoman government and had a demonstratable effect on the mindset, especially of Abdülhamid. When the massacres were reported in Europe and America, Abdülhamid noted: “how much they make of the suffering of my Christian subjects, and how little that of my Muslim subjects”. It was not this fear that pushed the Ottoman decision to mobilize on the 2nd of June 1895 however, but rather the fear that Bulgaria would be able to break away from the empire on its own if more soldiers were not called up to quell the rebellion. As a cautious character, it is unlikely that Abdülhamid had decided on this course of action lightly and may have felt some indignation at the apparent hypocrisy of the great powers.
The shift in the attitude of the Conservative Party toward the Eastern Question, brought about by Lord Salisbury, enabled Rosebery's change in policy toward the Ottoman Empire
The success of the Bulgarian rebels had its own effects on the governments of Europe. The leader of Britain’s Conservative opposition Lord Salisbury had long believed that the Ottoman Empire was doomed to collapse, and he had stated that Disraeli’s desire to maintain it as a buffer was “backing the wrong horse”. The Liberal party had continued its opposition to the Ottoman Empire, seeing it largely as an unreformable despotism. The events of 1894-95 had seemingly vindicated these viewpoints, and now the British cabinet began to wonder whether it would not be better to effect a partition of the empire with Russia. These thoughts were not aired outside of the British cabinet room until the 9th of June when an Ottoman army clearing the city of Stara Zagora of Bulgarian insurgents killed thousands of civilians over the course of three days. This prompted protests in Constantinople by the Christian inhabitants of the city, which very nearly became a riot as they clashed with both police and Muslim inhabitants of the city. Intercommunal relations had often been troublesome in the past but following the massacres in Bulgaria and Armenia, they became practically poisoned, with both Muslims and Christians, blaming each other for the breakdown of relations between their communities. The Young Ottoman dream of the Christian and Muslim populations of the empire united in patriotism that encompassed both communities appeared to be gone, replaced with an ugly kind of bigotry that saw survival as a zero-sum game.
Abroad the impact of the Massacre of Stara Zagora was also substantial. The government of Lord Rosebury was increasingly pressured not only by Salisbury’s Conservative Party but also by members of his own Liberal Party. 1893 had seen the Second Home Rule bill defeated in the house of Lords, and Lord Rosebury’s government was floundering. Convinced that coming up with a durable solution to the Eastern Question could go some way toward saving his reputation and his ministry, Roseberry proved receptive to a suggestion from the German Chancellor Rudolf von Bennigsen that a conference be held to settle the “Eastern Question”, which was now as wrapped up in the question of the position of Christians in the empire as it was with the empire’s weakness. The German government had relatively little sympathy for the plight of the Christians, and indeed still maintained their military mission to the Ottoman Empire under Colmar von der Goltz, though again the opinion of the public was somewhat different in this regard. What the Germans were driven by however was an opportunity to ingratiate themselves with the British, whom they saw as their natural allies and split them off from a feared Franco-Russian entente, one which had little basis. The foreign ministers of the Great Powers were invited to meet in Berlin at the end of June.
The Russian mobilization was the decisive move in pushing the situation toward war
Events moved far too quickly for this conference to take place, however. Already on the 12th of June, the Russians announced a partial mobilization combined with an ultimatum for the Ottomans to stand their soldiers down in Bulgaria and Armenia, pending the German Conference. This shocked the other powers of Europe, some of whom felt as though Russia was exploiting the situation. Although Abdülhamid was fearful of the consequences of a Russian invasion, he also felt as though standing down his soldiers would lead to the collapse of Ottoman authority in these areas and perhaps even the downfall of the empire itself. His only action was to request the Great Powers that they support the Ottomans in forcing Russia to commit to peace until the conference, but in this, he was unsuccessful, based largely on popular revulsion toward the Ottomans within Europe. The Russians in the meantime were in contact with both the British and the French, promising that if it did come to war, the Russians would stay away from the straits and that no Ottoman lands would be annexed by Russia. This went some way toward settling the fears of the French and the British that any war would be a Russian land-grab aimed at the straits, though elements within both countries remained sceptical about Russian intentions. By the 16th of June, a preliminary secret agreement had been made between Russia, France, Britain, and Austria-Hungary.
Russia had not only secured the neutrality (or active support) of the Great Powers in her crusade against the Ottomans, but she had also isolated Germany, which only caught wind of Russia’s backroom dealings when the Romanians published a Russian request for military access to Romanian territory in the event of another Russo-Turkish War. The Romanians were incensed at Russia’s betrayal during the last Russo-Turkish War the Romanians had given up southern Bessarabia in return for nothing, as Russia was not able to provide the promised land in Dobrudja in compensation. In response to the request, King Carol of Romania simply said “România refuză!” Bismarck, now in retirement and side-lined by the ascendency of the liberals in Germany was repulsed by what he saw as the incompetence of Germany’s Kaiser and Chancellor, writing in his diary that “I hoped that I would never live to see the downfall of what I had managed to build”. By the 18th of June 1895, Russia’s diplomatic triumph was complete as she declared war on the Ottomans once again, but this time with the tacit support of almost every other great power. All that remained now was for her army to carry through on the quick victory that would doubtless be needed to make the most of this stunning diplomatic alignment.
[1] – Again this is quite controversial stuff. Some historians have argued that the Hamidian massacres were a precursor, or even a practice run for the genocide of 1915, while others insist that we should examine the Hamidian massacres in their own context.
* * * * * *
Author's notes - This unlikely seeming chain of events does have quite a bit of basis, trust me! Hopefully, within the update itself, I've demonstrated that as in OTL, the willingness of the British and the French to prop up the Ottomans had steadily declined during the latter part of the 19th century, though this was perhaps more true of the British rather than the French.
As for the Russian aggressiveness vis-a-vis OTL, it's worth keeping in mind that despite being known as the "Peacemaker", Alexander III (who is living longer than his OTL counterpart) was not a particularly peaceable man himself and that Russia kept out of the war was largely down to the influence of his foreign minister, Nikolay Girs who has been butterflied out of his position in TTL.
Onto the course of the war itself. The first draft was going to be a monograph-style blow by blow description of the war, but honestly, I found it too boring to write and assumed that you would find it all too boring to read. I don't find the "X corps was defeated at X and general X was replaced" style interesting so instead, we'll be looking a lot less at textbook style updates and a lot more narrative to follow a few characters during the course of the war, with the odd textbook style update here and there. Hopefully you'll find the change in style interesting.
Minor typo: "the yolk of a most savage Asiatic barbarism" should be "the yoke of a most savage Asiatic barbarian" or alternatively, "the yoke of most savage Asiatic barbarism"
If the Ottomans win which great power would they try to side with. Russia no, UK and France is a burnt bridge. Italy has ambition on territory. Austria-Hungary just agreed to screwing the ottomans so no. Germany has no interest.
What were the causes of France and Great Britain to stop fearing Russian rule of Constantinople anyway?
Maudoldu00
Banned
If the ottoman manage to win. I hope AbdülHamid give them the biggest middle finger he could give.
By annexing greece. In all seriousness what happened to the greeks? I think they would take advantage of this situation.
Rooting for the ottoman. The european would probably so shocked if ottoman manage to beat russian three time in a row and I hope the russian would stop screwing with them if they lose.
By annexing greece. In all seriousness what happened to the greeks? I think they would take advantage of this situation.
Rooting for the ottoman. The european would probably so shocked if ottoman manage to beat russian three time in a row and I hope the russian would stop screwing with them if they lose.
Hmm, I don’t expect that it is possible for the Ottomans to win this war. Their efforts at modernization have been more successful than OTL but still sluggish, while Russia continues its ebullient growth. I don’t expect either side to cover itself in glory but the Tsar’s forces will probably end victorious in the Caucasus. We don’t know enough about the state of the navy to comment on that theatre, though it seems that it is a neglected service which may struggle against the similarly neglected Russian Black Sea Fleet. I wonder if perhaps the Greeks will take this moment to strike for Crete as they did in 1897. No idea how the broader Balkan revolt will turn out
Ottoman's for the win, and more laws that protects all the people in the empire coming after the war I hope
Also if the Bulgar and the Armenians help Russia like otl then a lot of killing will happen
Also if the Bulgar and the Armenians help Russia like otl then a lot of killing will happen
As mentioned, after Bulgaria and Serbia I can see where just about any Ottoman administration would strongly oppose this idea on principle,
Yup. Recruiting garrison troops (including officers) among the Armenians in the capital and generally seeing to the personal safely of those not shooting at government authorities would have been the wiser move (and provide PR cover for cracking heads together when people are shooting at one another).
Crap.
As a writer myself, I have a hunch something twisted might happen that will throw all foregone conclusion about the coming war by other parties ( hopelessness of Ottomans and All sure victory of Russians). But again Nassirisimo is 10 years my senior at least, so his writing quirks might be different after all.
You mean like the Americans getting involved and screwing things up for everyone?
More like an incident that pits a great power against Russia, but again it is my assumption and I'm not the author.
Most likely scenario is that the leadership of the revolutionary governments will come to blows with the armies of the intervening nations.
