With an East-first strategy in WWI, how much would Germany benefit from East. European manpower?

Wilson....a visionary. OK, I take it as I know what you mean.

The problem is, even the most skillful German leader will find it hard to sell a vision in the WW1-situation. He would have to be a ruthless pragmatist. But, alas, you don't get a Bismarck every 50 years. (Or one can put it more pessimistically that the political situation of the late Kaiserreich wouldn't allow such smart politicians into leading position until way too late. The Reichstag's majority had understood the realities when they formulated their peace Resolution.)

Bascially, Germany would need to understand that survival alone is strategic victory; if they can pair this with a Mitteleuropa reaching from the Vosges to the Don, that's worth way more than annexing a few km² here and there.

I put it more provocative: at the turn of 1917/18, Germany had won WW1. They lost it by fighting on.
 
I could imagine the Balts and the Russian Jews seeing the CPs as an improvement, but I never read that there were that many IOTL fighting for the CPs. Then again, there are less of them around than Poles.
 
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So, basically, the Germans needed a visionary like Woodrow Wilson on their side in World War I?

Wilson the guy who screwed up the entire WW1 peace process Wilson the racist who re introduced segregation and is arguably responsible for all the facial tension today yeah visionary totally
 
The Balts would POTENTIALLY have been allies, but the Germans screwed the opportunity by insisting to bolster the power of the German-speaking minority into continued political dominance.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
There never was any German "East First" plan.
Simply wrong as proven by Terence Zuber as well as his critics.

Not by their maybe different interpretation but simply by the documentary evidence either side presents.

Some have taken an old German contingency plan for an East only plan (war with Russia and France neutral) and tried to make it an East first plan. It doesn't work without absurd assertions and wild assumptions
When Germanowankers write their East first timelines, they're full of absurd assertions and wild assumptions. The French and the Russians don't notice and attack anyway is a favorite. Or the Germans can just leave the Belgium border undefended. The Austrians don't get curbstomped (the Austrians are defeated by a flank attack. Its going to happen even if the Russians pull an army and send it north). My favorite was when it was suggested that French casualties would go up if the Germans went East- Bizarre as it sounds, someone actually argued that if you took half the German army, half its artillery and half of its machine guns and went East, the French would suffer more. Its all absurd
Pls don't conclude from your own behavior about others.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
This. Despite what people think, Russian rule in Poland wasn't that bad outside of the Jews.
Ahh, yes, that's surly the reason, why after the napoleonic time there were only two uprisings with several tens of thousands dead due to fighting in Poland.
 
Simply wrong as proven by Terence Zuber as well as his critics.

Not by their maybe different interpretation but simply by the documentary evidence either side presents.



Pls don't conclude from your own behavior about others.

Zuber catagorically states that no one planned an East first strike, that there simply was no such plan. You've been given the reference before.

Its not my behavior but the Germanowankers. Absurdities and assumptions galore in every discussion we have on this.

Prime examples: Britain stays neutral. Maybe, probably not. But then there is nothing in the record to make us think the Germans believe in British neutrality. So the Germans are going to have to take precautions

France doesn't go through Belgium. Maybe, probably not. In any case, the Germans don't know that and don't know if the Belgians are going to resist. Since an unopposed French move through Belgium would destroy the German Reich, they are going to post troops there

The Russians won't detect the move- yeah right, Russian intel was off by a single corps as to German depositions in the East yet they are supposed to miss three additional armies- and the French won't miss them


Ahh, yes, that's surly the reason, why after the napoleonic time there were only two uprisings with several tens of thousands dead due to fighting in Poland.

And the last one was in the 1860s. So for fifty years they had managed to keep stability and the only really hostile element was the Jews.

Of course, the Austrian oppression of Slavs in General and Poles in particular are ignored as well as Prussian behavior

But if the Russians were so horrible, why didn't the Poles rally to the German banner. This will prove interesting
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Simply wrong as proven by Terence Zuber as well as his critics.

Not by their maybe different interpretation but simply by the documentary evidence either side presents.
Zuber catagorically states that no one planned an East first strike, that there simply was no such plan. You've been given the reference before.
Could help if you read what you quote before answering/commenting.

It's NOT whatever Zuber or any of his opponents/critics says, I referred to but what's shown by the documents they cite, use and show in their books :
- like the elder Moltkes plans, staff rides etc.
- like Waldersees plans, staff rides, etc.
- like early Schlieffen plans , staff rides comments etc

Its not my behavior but the Germanowankers. Absurdities and assumptions galore in every discussion we have on this.
Hmmm, well, you've just done it with this thread started by you.
 

longsword14

Banned
Hmmm, well, you've just done it with this thread started by you.
Aphrodite is the one that wrote very seriously that the Germans would have simply fractured along local lines, if only someone had thought of doing so.
Victory in an East First plan would still not be finished within a single campaign, but considering the awful performance by the Russians and the results OTL, ATL would certainly be much better.
It would have been an interesting question to ask of Falkenhayn while the Germans were grinding and being ground at Verdun : "Would you take the East First option, had the clock been reset ?".
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
It would have been an interesting question to ask of Falkenhayn while the Germans were grinding and being ground at Verdun : "Would you take the East First option, had the clock been reset ?".
His answer might depend on, if the questioner is able to convince him to consider the question WITHOUT thinking of Hindenburg/Ludendorff and answer from a "just" professional view.
 

BooNZ

Banned
It would have been an interesting question to ask of Falkenhayn while the Germans were grinding and being ground at Verdun : "Would you take the East First option, had the clock been reset ?".
I have read Moltke J told a German minister in 1915 that the Schlieffen Plan was a mistake and Germany should have focused on the Russian steamroller - that suspicously reconciles with my opinion, so I will attempt to did up that reference when I have some spare time.
 
I have read Moltke J told a German minister in 1915 that the Schlieffen Plan was a mistake and Germany should have focused on the Russian steamroller - that suspicously reconciles with my opinion, so I will attempt to did up that reference when I have some spare time.

That is of course full of hindsight.

On the issue of German war planning, I highly recommend Stig Försters works on 1914. He concludes that in the German high command, the following assumptions were widespread :

a- there was a very slim chance only that the war could be won in the course of one campaign
b- that Russia was basically invincible unless one could devote massive ressources over the course of several years
c- b was impossible without decisively weakening or actually defeating France
d- the Schlieffen plan was a gamble, but that even if it failed as it did in 1914, it would provide the best possible conditions for the continuation of the war in the West (fighting on enemy ground, taking away most of France's important industrial regions and much of its ressources, control over Belgium and its industry)

One should also be aware that the impetus for Schlieffen to develop his (mildly put) unconventional concept was not because he had an epiphany on how to win an European war within six weeks, but that in his assessment Germany needed a plan which made the prospect of a successful prolonged war against Russia even possible (because a prolonged two-front-war was unwinnable).

The Germans also knew the Franco-Prussian war. They knew that even a successful "Schlieffen-Plan-campaign" would probably not fully end the war as France had a generation earlier, without any allies, fought on after its initial army had been wiped out; and also that they had ventured into the hellhole of guerilla-warfare ("Franctireurs", which the Germans down to the ordinary Landser feared more than the devil in 1914).

As we all know, however, this planning does not make any suggestions on how to solve the war diplomatically. The Germans venerated Clausewitz, but they had forgotten that his Dictum "war is the continuation of politics by other means" is followed by "the task of warfare is to make the return to politics possible".
 

BooNZ

Banned
That is of course full of hindsight.

Indeed, but from a review of a number of pre-war German military assessments, the shortfalls of the plan were more-or-less anticipated.

On the issue of German war planning, I highly recommend Stig Försters works on 1914. He concludes that in the German high command, the following assumptions were widespread :

a- there was a very slim chance only that the war could be won in the course of one campaign
b- that Russia was basically invincible unless one could devote massive ressources over the course of several years
c- b was impossible without decisively weakening or actually defeating France
d- the Schlieffen plan was a gamble, but that even if it failed as it did in 1914, it would provide the best possible conditions for the continuation of the war in the West (fighting on enemy ground, taking away most of France's important industrial regions and much of its ressources, control over Belgium and its industry)

A & B - agreed although invincible seems like the wrong word to use in respect of Russia.
C & D - the weakening of France was a preference, but this was expected through decisive battle. I have not seen any pre-war assessment on the importance of occupying industrial areas of France and Belgium (which OTL were not particularly well utilized by the Germans). The importance of the captured French industrial areas appears obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but I have never encountered anything that suggested this was a significant part of German pre-war thinking.

I am acutely aware my reading is limited to English language sources, so there may be a wealth of relevant information of which I am ignorant.

One should also be aware that the impetus for Schlieffen to develop his (mildly put) unconventional concept was not because he had an epiphany on how to win an European war within six weeks, but that in his assessment Germany needed a plan which made the prospect of a successful prolonged war against Russia even possible (because a prolonged two-front-war was unwinnable).

The whole subject of German war planning prior to WW1 remains somewhat murky, but it is clear the Schlieffen plan of 1914 had very little to do with von Schlieffen. From what I can gather, the concept put together by von Schlieffen in 1904/05 was one of many. It ignored the Russians, ignored logistics, assumed the French would remain on the defensive, that the Italians would lend a hand and featured German formations not yet in existence. By 1914 it was clear very few of those assumptions remained valid, yet the 1914 version of that plan was the only plan Moltke J kept on the books.

I understand before von Schlieffen retired in 1905 he anticipated a future war where Germany would have to defend itself on multiple fronts against more numerous adversaries. Schlieffen's solution was an emphasis on German counter attack doctrine that used superior mobility arising from the German rail network and internal lines to defeat its enemies in detail close to German rail heads. As I mentioned earlier today on another post, the Schlieffen plan of 1914 was the antithesis of this military thinking.
 
The importance of the captured French industrial areas appears obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but I have never encountered anything that suggested this was a significant part of German pre-war thinking.

I agree. Economic thinking wasn't the German military's strong point anyways.

The whole subject of German war planning prior to WW1 remains somewhat murky, but it is clear the Schlieffen plan of 1914 had very little to do with von Schlieffen. From what I can gather, the concept put together by von Schlieffen in 1904/05 was one of many. It ignored the Russians, ignored logistics, assumed the French would remain on the defensive, that the Italians would lend a hand and featured German formations not yet in existence. By 1914 it was clear very few of those assumptions remained valid, yet the 1914 version of that plan was the only plan Moltke J kept on the books.

What Schlieffen wrote down before leaving office was not a fully worked out operational plan, but a "Denkschrift", a memorandum. Schlieffen repeatedly admitted in the Denkschrift that the army would need massive expansion in order to make the plan feasible and even then it would remain ambitious.

Why did it ignore the Russians? Because they could be ignored in 1904/05 and for a short time afterwards. I am not sure but I wouldn't be surprised if Schlieffen had advocated a preemptive war against France after Russia had been beaten by Japan and weakended further by revolutionary turmoil.

The Denkschrift ignores logistics less than the actual situation in 1914 did as they would have been easier to manage with taking the (Southern part of) the Netherlands. Moltke however found that violating the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium was already enough.
Schlieffen didn't assume that the French would remain on the defensive, but luring them onto the Reich's territory, perhaps even across the Rhine, was part of the plan. What counted was that they would be cut off and caught in the end.
Just like the readiness to leave the Eastern border somewhat open to Russian actions, it showed a total blindness towards the economical, humanitarian and political consequences of such an operational risk.
That Italy would lend a hand was actually about as certain as that the British would land an expedition corps to aid France. Joint German-Italian war plans saw the Italians NOT attacking France in the Alps à la Mussolini, but to rail Italian divisions to the Rhine to help the weak German left wing.

And then there is the matter of the non-existing divisions. This is of course political. It was a subtle hint at the reality that Germany couldn't afford to build Europe's 2nd strongest navy AND a victorious army. Germany's army expanded between 1905 and 1914- but not as much as Schlieffen demanded, and likewise did the French build up forces. (Interestingly, there is a similar approach in the novel "The Third World War" written in the late 1970s by British General John Hackett which describes an ultra-optimistic scenario, NATO beating back a conventional Warsaw Pact attack without losing all of the FRG, but the preface explicitly states that Hackett intended the novel to be a call for expanding Western Europe's conventional military power as to making such an outcome realistic.)

The younger Moltke discontinued the Eastern approach in 1913, and that is a nearly treasonous action. Schlieffen always oscilliated between both approaches, depending on the international situation. I am less harsh concerning on the changes Moltke (respectively the General staff) did when turning the Denkschrift into an operational plan. It adapted a fantasy into reality quite well given the outcome. Imagine the verdict of history if Moltke had given additional troops to the right wing (only to get clogged in Belgium for much of the campaign) while the army in Alsace-Lorraine would be unable to hold and the Western Front would have run through Alsace or even through Baden or Palatinate.

Moltke utterly failed in managing the ensuing battle , and also in creating the operational prerequisites needed in order to conduct the battle in a co-ordinated way.

I am not saying, however, that someone else but Moltke would have brought the Germans into Paris.

I understand before von Schlieffen retired in 1905 he anticipated a future war where Germany would have to defend itself on multiple fronts against more numerous adversaries. Schlieffen's solution was an emphasis on German counter attack doctrine that used superior mobility arising from the German rail network and internal lines to defeat its enemies in detail close to German rail heads. As I mentioned earlier today on another post, the Schlieffen plan of 1914 was the antithesis of this military thinking.

Yes, this is interesting. It appears to me like someone sane having an original and seemingly genius idea which becomes an "idée fixe"...planting itself via groupthink into a whole military elite.

The Schlieffen plan was a stupid gamble. Maybe it'd knock out France, but it certainly helped the British empire entering the war.

In other places on this forum, there is the frequent assumption that British entry on the French side was only a matter of time.
Besides - all 1914 plans were stupid gambles.
 
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