With an East-first strategy in WWI, how much would Germany benefit from East. European manpower?

CaliGuy

Banned
Right, it didn't turn into a rabid Nazi-like atmosphere and the royal family wasn't wanting to push it too far given the origins of the Empress and the heir to the throne. Fact is it was still pushed and got much worse during the war to the point that hundreds of thousands of German-Russians were deported to Siberia and all German owned businesses seized during the war. What is 2-3 years under German rule got to result in beyond people thinking 'hey the Germans are trying to tell us something totally different than the Czar. Let's ignore them too'.
Couldn't a mutual history of oppression by Russia have established a connection between the ethnic Germans in Russia and the other ethnic groups in Russia?
 

Deleted member 1487

Couldn't a mutual history of oppression by Russia have established a connection between the ethnic Germans in Russia and the other ethnic groups in Russia?
Usually doesn't work for most people, especially once the Russians are gone and the Germans are the occupiers. Then they might unite against the Germans depending on how harsh their rules is.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Usually doesn't work for most people, especially once the Russians are gone and the Germans are the occupiers. Then they might unite against the Germans depending on how harsh their rules is.
Wouldn't the smart thing for the Germans to do be to treat these people well, though?
 
Alienating the Ukrainians would have been an extremely stupid move on the part of the Central Powers, though.

For grand geopolitics? That depends somewhat on how deep the rift between the Poles and Ukrainian ends up being and how deeply they can get they Poles to co-operate by selling Ukraine down the river. For the Hapsburg domestic agenda? Its one of the more intelligent moves they could pull off, in my opinion: empowering the Poles isen't going to take anything away from the Magyars (Who were a huge stumbling block to any internal reforms), have stronger ties and loyalties to the dynasties than many of the other potential third legs for their Imperial stool, and were less likely to renegade back to the Russians if things went south (Considering, for religious and historical reasons, they had a more rubust national consciousness and hatred of Moscow). Sure, it would hurt the CP's war effort in the short to medium term, but in the long term the Poles are going to have to be integrated one way or another; being domestics in the Germanic CP's homeland as well as centered right on their internal borders, while the Ukrainians can be kept a the periphery and held down with force with less of a fuss.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wouldn't the smart thing for the Germans to do be to treat these people well, though?
Smart and what WW1 and WW2 Germany did in the treatment of Eastern European peoples are different things.
 
Smart and what WW1 and WW2 Germany did in the treatment of Eastern European peoples are different things.

To be fair, they were smart for a short term military standpoint.

The German eastern armies in both wars faced a pretty fundamental problem of food availability; operating outside of your internal boundaries in areas of poor/non-integrated infrastructure and (more in the former case than the later, but it still stands) a lack of international food/food producing additives (such as fertilizer) from abroad at pre-war levels means the army needed to more or less feed itself. If in WW I at least if the German soldiers hadn't confiscated those wheat and potatoes and set the population to producing more... well, the German homeland can't feed them from an empty pot, assuming they could find the pack animals or railway capacity to get it to them in the first place alongside the rest of their supplies.

Wouldn't the smart thing for the Germans to do be to treat these people well, though?

Its hard to be charitable when you're already spending all your money fighting a war. Germany NEEDED to exploit the east in WW I to keep the army feeding itself, thereby avoiding it totally starving the home front. Armies living off the land is a tale as old as warfare itself.
 
To Poland, Germany was the lesser and Austria the least evil.

I think that the main problem can be attributed to the concepts post-1914. Especially the Germans were unable to do any "Realpolitik" which would have allowed them to create an ally in Poland (and with such a positive example, elsewhere). Without understanding that any new annexations (and any other fancy imperial plan) or the Habsburg dream to create a union with Poland would be a no go, the idea was stillborn. This is quite easy to research. Men like Pilsudski were able to go -some- lenghts , especially as long as Russia was still part of the international equasion, but not beyond.

And one of those hugely unpopular things would have been sending Poles, Baltics, Ukrainians to be slaughtered in Italy or France. Policing a new Russian border, perhaps. But Russia had beaten itself OTL as well, so the net gain for the Central Powers would actually be moderate.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
To Poland, Germany was the lesser and Austria the least evil.

I think that the main problem can be attributed to the concepts post-1914. Especially the Germans were unable to do any "Realpolitik" which would have allowed them to create an ally in Poland (and with such a positive example, elsewhere). Without understanding that any new annexations (and any other fancy imperial plan) or the Habsburg dream to create a union with Poland would be a no go, the idea was stillborn. This is quite easy to research. Men like Pilsudski were able to go -some- lenghts , especially as long as Russia was still part of the international equasion, but not beyond.

And one of those hugely unpopular things would have been sending Poles, Baltics, Ukrainians to be slaughtered in Italy or France. Policing a new Russian border, perhaps. But Russia had beaten itself OTL as well, so the net gain for the Central Powers would actually be moderate.
For what it's worth, the logic would be keeping Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, and Jews on the Eastern Front where they could fight Russia while this allows Germany to transfer some of its own troops from the Eastern Front to the Western Front.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Doesn't that fly in the face of their doctrine that France was the supreme threat?
The Germans believed they were better than both, but certainly had a greater respect for the French army. Anyone with a full compliment of fingers could figure out the Germans were not going to defeat France before Russia was fully mobilized.
 
Doesn't that fly in the face of their doctrine that France was the supreme threat?

The Germans thought that the French were the most immediate threat. France could mobilize faster and the Rhineland was too valuable to risk. France was also seen as an intractable enemy. While a settlement with Russia might be possible, one with France was not. Getting back to the military situation- the Germans thought, correctly, that if they went East the French would defeat what forces they left in the West. There never was any German "East First" plan. Some have taken an old German contingency plan for an East only plan (war with Russia and France neutral) and tried to make it an East first plan. It doesn't work without absurd assertions and wild assumptions

Didn't seem to get them very far IOTL. Their allied 'governments' did not have much support among the locals, while the Polish Legion, an Austrian project, turned on them and only numbered about 25k men at it's peak (they became the nucleus of the post-war Polish government). Actually it seems that the Germans had more success recruiting people in WW2 to fight for them! And of course wasted the chance to recruit many more.
Here was the basically failed German WW1 effort to recruit Poles:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polska_Siła_Zbrojna
Later though it helped provide part of the nucleus for the post-war Polish army.

The Russians had more success recruiting from the Central Powers armies IIRC.

This. Despite what people think, Russian rule in Poland wasn't that bad outside of the Jews. Just like the thought of Austria Hungary collapsing because of ethnic rivalries, this is more wishful thinking than reality

Couldn't a mutual history of oppression by Russia have established a connection between the ethnic Germans in Russia and the other ethnic groups in Russia?

The Russians do a pretty good job of coopting the local elite. Many of the most prominent Russian families were of Germanic origin as were many of their military officers- Rennenkampf for example
 
The Germans believed they were better than both, but certainly had a greater respect for the French army. Anyone with a full compliment of fingers could figure out the Germans were not going to defeat France before Russia was fully mobilized.

....but an greater respect for the Russian geography.
 
Key advantage of going east

1) Seizing Agricultural areas from Russia
2) You would assume that Hapsburg armies dont get curb stomped 1914 into winter the way they did with 3 more German armies in the east.
3) East first means no Belgium. German armies in A-L launch spoiling attacks that bog down quickly and then they mow down wave after wave of French attacks. Front is much easier for Germans.

You would figure that by 1916 CP are far stronger than historic and Russia has been knocked out of the war.
 
That's why you shouldn't plan to win in Russia in just one military campaign, though.

But the Germans would have only one campaign. Contrary to popular belief, the Germans don''t have enough to go East and defend the West They know it and Moltke is clear in his writings this is their thought. The campaigns of August 1914 bear it out as well- if Germany sends anything more than two or three armies East, the French will breakthrough the west and reach the Rhine. Their iron deposits would be lost even if the Germans merely fall back to their fortresses and manage to hold. The loss of the Rhineland is impossible for Germany

Nor are they going to accomplish much in the East. They never really do until the spring of 1915 when the Russians run out of ammunition. Invading east Prussia is a nightmare but so is attacking from it. The bad roads, the many lakes and the fortresses would all aid the Russians instead of the Germans

When Germanowankers write their East first timelines, they're full of absurd assertions and wild assumptions. The French and the Russians don't notice and attack anyway is a favorite. Or the Germans can just leave the Belgium border undefended. The Austrians don't get curbstomped (the Austrians are defeated by a flank attack. Its going to happen even if the Russians pull an army and send it north). My favorite was when it was suggested that French casualties would go up if the Germans went East- Bizarre as it sounds, someone actually argued that if you took half the German army, half its artillery and half of its machine guns and went East, the French would suffer more. Its all absurd

For a quarter of a century, no one in the German army proposed doing anything than sending a spoiling attack East but its the master plan that gives the Kaiserreich mastery of the world (outside of Britain of course)
 

CaliGuy

Banned
But the Germans would have only one campaign. Contrary to popular belief, the Germans don''t have enough to go East and defend the West They know it and Moltke is clear in his writings this is their thought. The campaigns of August 1914 bear it out as well- if Germany sends anything more than two or three armies East, the French will breakthrough the west and reach the Rhine. Their iron deposits would be lost even if the Germans merely fall back to their fortresses and manage to hold. The loss of the Rhineland is impossible for Germany

Nor are they going to accomplish much in the East. They never really do until the spring of 1915 when the Russians run out of ammunition. Invading east Prussia is a nightmare but so is attacking from it. The bad roads, the many lakes and the fortresses would all aid the Russians instead of the Germans

When Germanowankers write their East first timelines, they're full of absurd assertions and wild assumptions. The French and the Russians don't notice and attack anyway is a favorite. Or the Germans can just leave the Belgium border undefended. The Austrians don't get curbstomped (the Austrians are defeated by a flank attack. Its going to happen even if the Russians pull an army and send it north). My favorite was when it was suggested that French casualties would go up if the Germans went East- Bizarre as it sounds, someone actually argued that if you took half the German army, half its artillery and half of its machine guns and went East, the French would suffer more. Its all absurd

For a quarter of a century, no one in the German army proposed doing anything than sending a spoiling attack East but its the master plan that gives the Kaiserreich mastery of the world (outside of Britain of course)
Is France going to invade Germany through Belgium in this TL? Else, I certainly don't see how exactly they could quickly reach the Rhine; after all, in this TL, the Franco-German front line is going to be much shorter and thus much easier to defend than it was in our TL.
 
Is France going to invade Germany through Belgium in this TL? Else, I certainly don't see how exactly they could quickly reach the Rhine; after all, in this TL, the Franco-German front line is going to be much shorter and thus much easier to defend than it was in our TL.

Most likely they do or at least through Luxembourg. Even if they don't, the Germans will have to assume that they might and send forces to cover the frontier. In any event the Germans simply don't have the troops to meet the French and send four armies East. The Germans use four armies to defend Alsace and the Ardennes. It leaves nothing to defend against the French 5th Army, the Army of Lorraine, the Army of Alsace or the Army of the Alps- none of whom are committed OTL.

there are just a whole host of problems for the Germans-

the German iron deposits are all West of their fortress line. If they fall back to it (the only logical thing to do if your on the defensive) you've already lost the war.

they suffer 300,000 casualties OTL. That's more than enough to decimate an army of 800,000.

The French can make good their losses (the French don't commit their reserves initially while the Germans do),

the French can strip their fortresses of artillery

the Germans can only commit three armies to the East, the fourth army has to wait for the rails to be freed


The Germans had many competent generals. Not one thought of going East. That should tell you how bad it is. If that doesn't convince you, consider that the Germans preferred going to war with Belgium and Britain rather than going East Moltke was clear: there is no East first plan and you cant leave an undefeated France in the rear
 
However, the idea of putting earlier emphasis on an offensive in the East is not the question here- but the recruitment of Eastern Europeans.

And here once again I would like to point to the general impediment that the 1910s central powers-leadership were horrible in recognizing what Bismarck had called "die Kunst des Möglichen" (the art of the possible), they were also incredibly bad at diplomacy (which limited possibilities further)....but even worse at PR.

Basically, they had no sound concept for the countries east of Germany and Austria-Hungary. And this was also due to the very complicated situation given. Of course, Polish independance is a temptation; however Germany would not have been ready to give (at least parts of) Posen or West Prussia to such a new state; and likewise Austria-Hungary was hardly ready to give up the Kingdom of Galicia (which is a huge territory) for little in return - especially as the Polish in Galicia had been a vital stabilizing factor within the complex political framework of Cisleithania. To Vienna, the logical idea was either an Integration of Poland into the Danubian monarchy or giving away Galicia with the Polish accepting a Habsburg guy on the throne. Both ideas didn't appeal to Berlin however as they felt that Austria-Hungary didn't deserve what appeared to be their sphere of influence...

Also, Berlin simply couldn't let go of the idea of making "some annexations" on Polish grounds just for the heck of it. An idea which was antagonizing short-term, mid-term and long-term.
A weak excuse might be that they reckoned for too long that they will be confronted with the Tsarist behemoth after the war.

Similarly confused is the situation in the Baltics. Of course, German planners wished for the political supremacy of the German elites to be retained, however this was to be easier without war...

Compare that to the French or Italian war aims in the simplicity.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
However, the idea of putting earlier emphasis on an offensive in the East is not the question here- but the recruitment of Eastern Europeans.

And here once again I would like to point to the general impediment that the 1910s central powers-leadership were horrible in recognizing what Bismarck had called "die Kunst des Möglichen" (the art of the possible), they were also incredibly bad at diplomacy (which limited possibilities further)....but even worse at PR.

Basically, they had no sound concept for the countries east of Germany and Austria-Hungary. And this was also due to the very complicated situation given. Of course, Polish independance is a temptation; however Germany would not have been ready to give (at least parts of) Posen or West Prussia to such a new state; and likewise Austria-Hungary was hardly ready to give up the Kingdom of Galicia (which is a huge territory) for little in return - especially as the Polish in Galicia had been a vital stabilizing factor within the complex political framework of Cisleithania. To Vienna, the logical idea was either an Integration of Poland into the Danubian monarchy or giving away Galicia with the Polish accepting a Habsburg guy on the throne. Both ideas didn't appeal to Berlin however as they felt that Austria-Hungary didn't deserve what appeared to be their sphere of influence...

Also, Berlin simply couldn't let go of the idea of making "some annexations" on Polish grounds just for the heck of it. An idea which was antagonizing short-term, mid-term and long-term.
A weak excuse might be that they reckoned for too long that they will be confronted with the Tsarist behemoth after the war.

Similarly confused is the situation in the Baltics. Of course, German planners wished for the political supremacy of the German elites to be retained, however this was to be easier without war...

Compare that to the French or Italian war aims in the simplicity.
So, basically, the Germans needed a visionary like Woodrow Wilson on their side in World War I?
 
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