Winter War in WWII-less ATLs

There are quite a few timelines with either no or reduced WWII, like Faeelin Stresemann timeline, EdT’s Greater Britain or any other you could think of.

What are your general thoughts about Winter War equivalents in these timelines? Is there still an incentive for the Soviets to start such a war? What if the war is fought in more favorable conditions, like in the summer or without Mannerheim? What happens with Finland afterwards?
 
Magnificate said:
What are your general thoughts about Winter War equivalents in these timelines? Is there still an incentive for the Soviets to start such a war?

In my view the Soviet Union certainly has an incentive to gobble up Finland as well as the Baltics. Stalin was quite consistent in his quest to reclaim the rightful lands of the Russian Empire under his umbrella, and securing the access to St. Petersburg/Leningrad is one of the most basic goals of age-old Russian geostrategy.

The motive is there, but without WWII the problem is opportunity. Winter War and the Baltic takeovers IOTL happened because the Western European powers were suitably distracted (or contracted) not to intervene decisively. Without a general war or a systemic political crisis in Europe in, say, '37-'41 Stalin would be still careful not to provoke Germany or the Anglo-French by such actions: he would probably think that a war in the Baltic area could quite as well lead into a creation of a strong and belligerent anti-Soviet bloc.

So I think the possiblity of Soviet offenses north or south of the Gulf of Finland in this timeframe is directly tied to the general prevalence of stability (or lack thereof) in Europe. World war, limited war, German Civil War, Fascist France etc. = stronger likelyhood of *Winter War; stable democratic Germany, fruitful Anglo-French-German relations, a working LoN etc. = smaller likelyhood of *Winter War.


Magnificate said:
What if the war is fought in more favorable conditions, like in the summer or without Mannerheim?

In the case of a Summer War Finland is very likely toast. The force multiplier that was the one of the coldest winters in living memory is obviously not applicable. The Red Army will not suffer so much for being ill-equipped, while the Finns' lack of heavy weaponry will hurt them badly. While the Soviets would win a Summer War eventually and grind their way into Helsinki, I believe the Finnish front could still hold for a couple of months. The Karelian isthmus makes it necessary to concentrate the attacking force effectively to achieve a breakthrough: the Red Army was not ready to do that IOTL and the problem exists as well during the summer months. Also, the sea, the lakes and the fens will not be frozen: that means there will be more obstacles for armored and motorized troops. On the other hand, in summer the Soviets will probably try amphibious operations along the southern coast: these might lead to problems for either side of the conflict.;)

The Finnish Army DID repel a strong Soviet attack on the isthmus in Summer 1944 IOTL. But it is very hard to compare the armies of '44 and '39: when we look at the earlier formations, both sides are in a definite disadvantage. Do the disadvantages balance themselves out, or does one side come out a definite (comparative) winner?

Be it as it may, I believe the fate of Finland will depend, as it did IOTL, on the Soviet will to fight. If the Soviets are ready to keep going and disregard their losses, Finland will fall eventually.

Early collapse of the Finnish front(s) is the only surefire way to decisive Soviet victory: the longer the Finns hold out, the stronger grows the possibility of a political settlement. This is, of course, also dependent on the general situation in Europe and the world: if no-one abroad is interested in the conflict, the steam roller will continue to trudge forward, but if the other powers start talking about intervention, Finnish diplomats will receive a summon to Moscow pretty fast.

As for Mannerheim: he was a great leader and a fine strategist to be sure. But, and I am sorry for any Mannerheim fans out there, he was not exactly a military genious. Finland had a quite capable cadre of general officers, and I believe they could have conducted a Winter War as effectively without the old war horse in overall command. Maybe even better and more creatively, at times.

I believe that Mannerheim's strong points during Winter War/WWII were in diplomacy and acting as a morale-boosting figurehead. His existence and presence united the nation and the army and gave the people hope. Without him as C-in-C the armed forces might have seen more infighting between leading generals, but overall I think that in terms of pure fighting ability the lack of Mannerheim would not be a decisive factor during Winter War.

Whoever replaces him, however, would have needed to establish himself well before the war, preferably for years. The way I can see his absence having a major impact would be if he happened to die just a short time before the war broke out or during the early days: it would have been seen as a bad omen, seriously eroded morale and thrown the highest leadership in confusion during a crucial time.


Magnificate said:
What happens with Finland afterwards?

If foreign powers do not intervene in Finland's behalf, there will be concessions pretty much as per OTL.

Or then the country is occupied and a Communist government installed. This would most likely be a Kuusinen government or an equivalent, one consisting mostly Finnish emigrant Communists of the SKP. The bourgeois leaders will get an all-expenses-paid trip to Siberia. A government-in-exile will spring up, in Britain, France or America, possibly Germany. Socialist Finland rearranges its borders with the USSR, receiving most if not all of the Karelian ASSR and losing the isthmus, islands and parts of the south-east. Åland is a wild card, in some cases it might go to the USSR. Soviet bases will be established in strategic locations.

Finally, Finland quite likely "asks to join the USSR" like the Baltic states did IOTL. There is of course the possibility of Finland staying as a nominally independent People's Republic, though I believe this is pretty unlikely and would require, say, earlier changes in Soviet leadership and theory.
 
In the case of a Summer War Finland is very likely toast. The force multiplier that was the one of the coldest winters in living memory is obviously not applicable. The Red Army will not suffer so much for being ill-equipped, while the Finns' lack of heavy weaponry will hurt them badly.

In main theater, the Karelian Isthmus, it was not as much of a case of cold but rather Soviet incompetence in attacking. In a summer campaign their attacks will become even more canalized as the opposed crossings will be vastly more difficult. For example, crossing the Bay of Viborg will not be as easy as in OTL. One point should be also noted is field hygiene. With as much troops massed in Karelian Isthmus as in OTL Winter War, with so much Soviet bodies around the Soviets will have a rather large sanitation problem. In OTL 1944 Summer campaign the problem was already very difficult for Soviets.

North of Lake Ladoga the battles will likely be similar to OTL. It was not the winter as much as Soviet incompetence which made the results to what they were. This was proved in 1941 and 1944 battles in same surroundings. Finnish troops had the definite edge in forest warfare.

As for amphibious landings they're a definite possibility alongside interdiction of vital Sweden-Finland convoy traffic but in OTL 1939-1940 and 1941 Soviet Navy proved to be very inept in it's actions.

So, given exact Winter War equipment, troop training and motivation levels for the opponents I'd say a Summer War would be quite similar.
 
In main theater, the Karelian Isthmus, it was not as much of a case of cold but rather Soviet incompetence in attacking. In a summer campaign their attacks will become even more canalized as the opposed crossings will be vastly more difficult. For example, crossing the Bay of Viborg will not be as easy as in OTL. One point should be also noted is field hygiene. With as much troops massed in Karelian Isthmus as in OTL Winter War, with so much Soviet bodies around the Soviets will have a rather large sanitation problem. In OTL 1944 Summer campaign the problem was already very difficult for Soviets.

North of Lake Ladoga the battles will likely be similar to OTL. It was not the winter as much as Soviet incompetence which made the results to what they were. This was proved in 1941 and 1944 battles in same surroundings. Finnish troops had the definite edge in forest warfare.

As for amphibious landings they're a definite possibility alongside interdiction of vital Sweden-Finland convoy traffic but in OTL 1939-1940 and 1941 Soviet Navy proved to be very inept in it's actions.

So, given exact Winter War equipment, troop training and motivation levels for the opponents I'd say a Summer War would be quite similar.

I mainly agree about Soviet incompetence, but there is also the danger of overemphasising it. Incompetence will be there in summer too: what I was trying to point out were the obvious differences.

The Red Army lost great amount of living power due to the cold: in summer, there would not be over 132,000 frostbite casualties (as recorded in Soviet sources). Without men freezing to death due to inadequate shelter the Soviet casualties will be much lower and morale, even if it is low, will still be better than while fighting the belaya smert in a pitch black, frozen hell.

In 1944 Finnish anti-tank capability was much better, artillery more numerous and effective and Kuhlmey's fliers added a huge bonus. But like I wrote, the Soviets had also improved their game substantially: it is very hard and possibly misleading to use Tali-Ihantala as a model for a Soviet attack on the isthmus in Summer 1939.

While a Summer War will be in many ways similar to OTL Winter War, I think comparatively the Red Army still has somewhat of an advantage due to no snow or freezing cold. The Soviets benefit disproportionately in comparison to the Finns, who could manage winter as it was. The question is, then, how much the Soviet advantage would actually benefit them on the battlefield. You might be right in that there would be little difference, but it is also possible that lower casualties and better morale translate themselves into a greater chance of a breakthrough on the isthmus within two to three months. Most of the troops lost to the cold IOTL would be thrown against the Finnish positions, further burdening the defenders: even if led incompetently, three attack waves more could have broken a position where the previous five did not. We know that the Finnish front was on its last legs at the end of the Winter War IOTL: ITTL the Red Army has received a boost while the Finnish Army is comparatively at the same level.
 
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While the Soviets would win a Summer War eventually and grind their way into Helsinki, I believe the Finnish front could still hold for a couple of months.
That seems like an apt time for the West, unless as you noted it’s distracted, to send in weapons, volunteers, supplies, maybe even expeditionary forces. Is there a possibility for Finland to fold sooner, maybe as result of political meltdown or panic? Is there an easy way to break through the isthmus?
Socialist Finland rearranges its borders with the USSR, receiving most if not all of the Karelian ASSR and losing the isthmus, islands and parts of the south-east.
That’s an interesting prospect, Finland actually gaining some land, before being merged with the Soviet Union. Is Greater Socialist Finland (with Karelia) plausible?
 
I tend to agree with those who think the soviets wouldn't start the war, but I'm not so suer. Soviet military doctrine int he area empashsized the idea of premeptive wars on their neighbors' soil. Striking towards Finland, as such, therefore seems unlikely to me, but it doesn't seem impossible.
 
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