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It was generally agreed that Woodrow Wilson would have to include one Republican in his Paris peace conference delegation. But his selection of Henry White for that post astonished Wilson's supporters and outraged his enemies. (Wilson had first offered the one GOP position to Associate Justice William R. Day, who had not dealt with foreign affairs since 1898, and who turned Wilson's offer down.) To be sure, White was a distinguished diplomat--Theodore Roosevelt, while president, had called him "the most useful man in the entire diplomatic service" and Root and Lodge were also his close friends. (One Republican who did not have a high opinion of him was William Howard Taft, who said "he is of the type of your life-trained, hide-bound, traditional English Continental diplomatist...He is more of an Englishman than he is an American.") But White had been retired since 1909 and had absolutely no influence in Congress or in his party. Many observers thought a more prominent Republican should have been chosen. However, that's easier said than done, when you look at the possibilities (Richard Leopold presented a good review of them in his textbook *The Growth of American Foreign Policy*, p. 362):

(1) A senator? The use of senators on the 1898 peace commission had aroused sharp protests. More important, the naming of any GOP senator other than Lodge would be considered an insult, and Wilson and Lodge were already bitter enemies, each regarding the other as unscrupulous and untrustworthy.

(2) Outside the Senate? Well, first there's TR but he was in failing health and way too bitter an enemy of Wilson to be considered.

(3) Hughes? Wilson regarded him as too inexperienced in foreign affairs.

(4) Taft is an interesting possibility. He was an ardent supporter of a league to enforce peace, and at least until the 1916 campaign had been one of the most moderate of Republicans in his criticisms of Wilson's foreign policy, even saying in June 1915 "If we had a jingo in the White House [not too hard to imagine who Taft had in mind!] this country would now be at war with Germany. Instead, our Chief Executive is a man who appreciates his responsibility." He did issue a joint statement with TR criticizing Wilson during the 1916 campaign, and later thought that was the reason he was not selected. He joked that he would only have been chosen by Wilson had the latter's choice been limited to ex-presidents. Wilson, however, supposedly thought Taft was ill-fitted by temperament for diplomacy.

(5) Finally, there is one man who could never be accused of lack of experience or lack of diplomatic skills--Elihu Root. Unfortunately, Wilson disliked Root, and called him "a hopeless reactionary" whose appointment "would discourage every liberal element in the world." Root was indeed a conservative, but it should have occurred to Wilson that if he wanted a treaty that would get the necessary two-thirds support in the Senate, the support of at least some conservative Republicans was probably necessary. The rejection of Root may have been especially tragic because Root had a very interesting idea about the proposed Article X of the League Covenant, which could have made it much more acceptable to the Senate. According to Philip Jessup's biography of Elihu Root (*Elihu Root*, Volume 2, 1905-1937 [New York: Dodd, Mead 1938], pp. 379-80):

"Almost immediately after the Armistice on November 11th, 1918, the question of the personnel of the American delegation to the Peace Conference began to be discussed in the United States. The press generally aired the view that Root would be selected. It was argued that Root's participation in the drafting of the treaty would assure Republican support in the Senate. Taft was also prominently mentioned. The choice of Root was urged upon Wilson from many quarters. Joseph Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, records that he discussed the appointment of Root with President Wilson and with Lansing and that both men were in favor of it. Secretary McAdoo urged Root's appointment. Later consideration, however, convinced the president that the choice would be unwise because 'the reputation which Mr. Root had gained of being rather conservative, if not reactionary, would work a prejudice toward the Peace Commission at the outset.' It is probable that the opposition of American labor to Root played a part in Wilson's determination but those objections would not have disqualified Taft. Wilson's distrust of lawyers undoubtedly militated against the choice of Root or of Taft, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that Wilson was unwilling to take with him any outstanding Republican leader. His appointment of Henry White, a Republican, but a career diplomat entirely removed from politics, did nothing to satisfy the opposition party's demand for recognition, even though White's friends, Roosevelt and Lodge, were delighted with his selection."

So what if Wilson had taken Root along (instead of Henry White)? Root, it is true, thought that it was unwise for Wilson himself to go to Paris (he thought the delegation should be headed by Lansing) but let's say that despite their disagreement on this, Root agrees to go. (He expressed some doubts about whether he would have done so, but did not rule it out.) What difference would that make for the treaty?

One indication is Root's reaction when the draft of the League Covenant was made public. He had a number of suggestions for change, but the most important dealt with Article X (by which members of the League were to undertake "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League"):

"Looking at this article as part of a perpetual league for the preservation of peace, my first impression was that the whole article ought to be stricken out. If perpetual, it would be an attempt to preserve for all time unchanged the distribution of power and territory made in accordance with the views and exigencies of the Allies in this present juncture of affairs. It would necessarily be futile....It would not only be futile; it would be mischievous. Change and growth are the law of life, and no generation can impose its will in regard to the growth of nations and the distribution of power, upon succeeding generations.

"I think, however, that this article must be considered not merely with reference to the future, but with reference to the present situation in Europe. Indeed, this whole agreement ought to be considered in that double aspect. The belligerent power of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey has been destroyed; but that will not lead to future peace without a reconstruction of Eastern Europe and Western Asia. The vast territories of the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs have lost the rulers who former kept the population in order, are filled with turbulent masses without stable government, unused to self-control and fighting among themselves like children of the dragon's teeth. There can be no settled peace until these masses are reduced to order...[Henry White in his letters to Root had been stressing the disturbed conditions in Germany and sounding a warning note.] The allied nations in their council must determine the lines of reconstruction. Their determinations must be enforced. They may make mistakes. Doubtless they will. But there must be decisions and decisions must be enforced.

"Under these conditions the United States cannot quit. It must go on to the performance of its duty, and the immediate aspect of Article X is an agreement to do that. I think, therefore, that Article X should be amended so that it shall hold a limited time, and thereafter any member may withdraw from it. I annex an amendment to that effect." He suggested a term of five years. Perhaps it would have been hard to get Britain and France to accept an Article X with such a short time limit, but if Wilson and Root pressed for some kind of time limit, and explained there was no way the Senate would ratify a completely open-ended Article X, I think there is a good chance the Allies might agree, especially since Root also favored an Anglo-French-American alliance to guarantee France from a future German attack, and again Wilson and Root could explain to the French that there is no way such a treaty would be ratified by the Senate if a League Covenant acceptable to the US were not arrived at...
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