WIF WWI ended in 1917 how would the Washington treaty of gone

[DD951]

Interesting. Never read that before although as you may have gathered most of my knowledge comes from a while back.

The stuff about US and UK stances on warship size and armament played a major role in the 1930 & 35 naval conferences, but was a continuation of earlier policies and analyses. As for the opinions of US designers regarding treaty limits, if one reads the sections dealing with the treaty era in the various design histories of US warships by Friedman, there's a clear trend of designers essentially having to make a blivet work in order to get something that meets operational requirements in hull of treaty-limited tonnage, even with all the advances in construction and propulsion technology that took place between the wars.

Again interesting. Was this used in the later standards or the 1916 designs?

The Tennessees were the next to last class of the standard type and had 4 basic changes from the preceding New Mexico class- introducing that new type of TDS, turbo-electric drive allowing for greater compartmentalization, a revised bridge-conning tower arrangement, and a new, heavier type of cage mast that could support a top containing FC director equipment and was much less likely to be affected by wind.

The Colorados, the last version of the standard type was essentially a Tennessee, slightly altered to carry 8x16"/45 instead of 12x14"/50- the barbette diameters were about an inch apart.

That type of TDS was also planned for the other ships of 1916, and refined versions of it, of varying degrees of effectiveness, were used on all subsequent US capital ship designs except for Alaska (a scaled-up heavy cruiser from the post-treaty design studies of 1938-40 in terms of design), and almost all fleet carriers, except for Ranger & possibly Wasp (my copy of Friedman's carrier book isn't with me at the moment.)

Sounds like the interlock would be the major problem in TTL. The problems from being too lightly built would be avoided without a treaty. [Or if the US & Japan had raised the bar by building ships of similar size]. In terms of the lighter shell hopefully the faulty research that suggested it would be avoided. Failing that, with far more interest in capital ship development during the 20's there's a good chance of a heavier shell being developed then, preventing the wear problems and giving better accuracy as a result.

Assuming that in this ATL post-treaty era, and with Germany still a strategic threat, the British government doesn't respond to economic downturns such as a Depression-equivalent with a version of the 10-year rule or other similar questionable thinking, or decides to build up Bomber Command as the best means of attacking Germany (buying the line of the airpower theorists hook, line, and sinker) at the expense of everyone else, then there probably would be more money to correct design flaws with the mounting and the gun/shell combo, and the ATL British 16"/45 wouldn't have such a bad reputation compared to its foreign counterparts.

Ah. Sorry. I see where your coming from here. Think you might still have some problems getting further spending through Congress after such a big programme, especially if Japan and Germany are struggling to complete major new ships. However definitely possible.

That's the wild card, as even though that modification would make military sense, and would be to some extent reallocating money and authorizations already made for the existing program, and Congress did have a history of playing around with appropriations to the detriment of the fleet (part of the blame for the USN being imbalanced in the WW1 era can be laid at Congress only buying half of the battleships and destroyers, and none of the cruisers the USN had asked for between about 1908-16.) However, one of the big OTL drivers towards the US starting the WNT process, Germany being eliminated as a threat, hasn't taken place here, while another, having a comfortable margin over Japan, is less clear here, on top of everyone else in Europe is probably looking to build new ships as soon as they can come up with the money, so this ATL looks like a much more dangerous place from the US perspective. This all goes back to British & German construction between 1918-21 being a significant part of what eveyone else does and what the treaty will look like.

The problem was the US policy was to make Japan vulnerable to a US attack. That was the entire purpose of the 60% ratio at OTL Washington and why the Japanese wanted 70%. Heading a book about this a year or so back and both nations calculated under Mahanian theory that the US needed to restrict Japan to a 60% ratio to be able to defeat them in a straight war - without new construction. Which is pretty much what you seem to say above? No one was suggesting equality between Japan and the US, at least before the more extreme claims of the Japanese militarists in 1930. The debate in OTL Washington was whether it would be a 60% or 70% ratio.

I'm not saying everything was the US's fault but I think there are arguments that Japan had considerable fears and concerns. Have considered that if it hadn't been so isolated and the alliance retained we might have avoided the collapse into militarism in Japan. Note that one of the arguments given by the foreign office for maintaining the alliance was that it also gave Britain influence over Japan.

Steve

A 70% ratio would have been parity in practice, which the US & Britain were aware of, and probably not willing to go for, since Japan was already becoming a disruptive force that directly threatened both US & UK interests in East Asia. Even a 60% ratio wasn't that great of a margin considering the minimum 25% attrition of combat power the US expected in a Plan Orange offensive, other commitments the US & UK might have that might keep them from committing everything unlike the Japanese, and the Japanese using aircraft and increased development of lighter units (as they did OTL) to seek asymmetric advantages in a fleet action.

Japan also played a big role in isolating itself, as even by 1921, it was an agressive, expansionist power, that took advantage of the European powers being distracted by the war to try to turn China into a de facto colony at the expense of everyone else there, only backing down in the face of a near-ultimatum from the US after Britan expressed its displeasure with Japan, tried to take advantage of the Russian Civil War to get a chunk of the Russian Far East, and had shown itself a questionable ally in WW1, only joining because of treaty obligations, and not doing much more than grabbing the low-hanging fruit of German colonies in the Pacific and escorting some convoys. Even before WW1, British policy tended to regard war with the US as something to be avoided if at all possible, and by 1920 or so, when the Anglo-Japanese treaty was about to expire, Britain feared, quite justifiably, that Japan was likely to provoke a war with the US over China (as ultimately happened), and under the terms of the alliance, could quite likely be dragged into a conflict it wanted no part of.

The anger over the percieved humiliation of the WNT, added to that over racist incidents on the US West Coast and Australia, being blocked from aggandizement at the expense of China & Russia by the other powers, (as it would interfere with the interests of the US & UK), and memories of the way Japan's gains in the 1895 war with China were curtailed by Germany, France, and Russia led to the rise of Japanese militarism, but that anger was almost sort of a national temper-tantrum over more powerful nations not allowing Japan to have its way at the expense of their own regional interests and third parties unable to defend themselves in the years leading up to the WNT. In turn, that led to the Japanese military starting to use the power it already have to effectively control the government- under the Meiji constitution, the resignation of one minister casued the entire government to fall, and the Army & Navy ministers had to be serving flag officers (tending to be mid-level ones subject to the orders of the respective staffs), which gave the military effective veto power over the government. Bit of an oopsie there....

 

[stevep]

Well, the first British design sketch to feature all main turrets forward didn't show up until October of 1920, and it is a major innovation, not one of those things that designers would naturally come to if ordered to come up with a design a year early. As such, I rather doubt a G3 analogue could possibly be laid down in 1920.

Please read the OP. This assumes the war ends at least a year earlier. Also that Britain is in a much more dangerous position, with a still powerful Germany and the US and Japan constructing like mad. As such I think having the G3's advanced a year over OTL is the latest that construction will start.

The lowest estimates I've seen for the cost of the G3 design are somewhat over 11 million pounds, which is nearly twice that of the Hood, 4x that of a QE, or 5x that of a R. Using the lower estimate of 11 million, 12 ships would be 132 million pounds, or over half the total British naval expenditures from 1908 to 1914. Assuming we want the 12 ships over 6 fiscal years 1920-1926, (which is really rather long, since it means the final ships will be entering service about the same time as the first vessels of the response from the U.S. and Japan) adding in the costs of necessary escorts, manning and maintaining the existing fleet, manning and maintaining the new ships as they are built, and expanding support infrastructure, and we are looking at naval expenditures 3+ times that of the height of the last naval race at the minimum on a rather less fit economy. Maybe Britain can pull it off, but I wouldn't bet on it.

Let's see. We have a markedly richer, compared to OTL Britain, which is feeling very threatened. It still has a large industrial base and vast potential wealth in the empire as well as at home and now has a strong incentive to use it. Also markedly cheaper costs for shipbuilding than anyone else, especially the Americans. It may well not be easy but its definitely possible when considering the circumstances. Also, I suspect some savings would be possible for producing such sizeable numbers of ships. [Alternatively, if that proves too much a N3 type design, which would be markedly cheaper as much slower, might be built instead]. There are a number of possible ways extra funds could be developed - land tax, tariffs, greater exploitation of the empire etc. Just using a lower

I don't know if there would be any 'response' to the British response to the American/Japanese race. Japan is highly likely to be exhausted even if if completes its 8:8 programme, which was unlikely even before the 1923 quake. The US will have more money but will they have the will to expand the navy even further? Not to mention the problem of operating it. OTL even the markedly smaller US navy struggled to man the fleet in the depth of the 1930's depression. Furthermore, while Britain will not want to concede naval superiority to the US, it has long accepted that war with the US is highly unlikely so to a large degree the size of the US fleet is irrelevant.

Especially if the changed circumstances means that the alliance survives. This not only means that even the most reckless US leaders are likely to consider an attack it also gives a lot of influence with Japan and provides a lot of security for the Pacific and Far Eastern interests of the empire.

Steve

 

[stevep]

The Tennessees were the next to last class of the standard type and had 4 basic changes from the preceding New Mexico class- introducing that new type of TDS, turbo-electric drive allowing for greater compartmentalization, a revised bridge-conning tower arrangement, and a new, heavier type of cage mast that could support a top containing FC director equipment and was much less likely to be affected by wind.

The Colorados, the last version of the standard type was essentially a Tennessee, slightly altered to carry 8x16"/45 instead of 12x14"/50- the barbette diameters were about an inch apart.

That type of TDS was also planned for the other ships of 1916, and refined versions of it, of varying degrees of effectiveness, were used on all subsequent US capital ship designs except for Alaska (a scaled-up heavy cruiser from the post-treaty design studies of 1938-40 in terms of design), and almost all fleet carriers, except for Ranger & possibly Wasp (my copy of Friedman's carrier book isn't with me at the moment.)

Good point. Forgot to check up and the Tennessee's were the next to last class. of the standards.

Assuming that in this ATL post-treaty era, and with Germany still a strategic threat, the British government doesn't respond to economic downturns such as a Depression-equivalent with a version of the 10-year rule or other similar questionable thinking, or decides to build up Bomber Command as the best means of attacking Germany (buying the line of the airpower theorists hook, line, and sinker) at the expense of everyone else, then there probably would be more money to correct design flaws with the mounting and the gun/shell combo, and the ATL British 16"/45 wouldn't have such a bad reputation compared to its foreign counterparts.

I can't see a Bomber Command fetish developing. Apart from anything else the OP and POD would probably prevent the RAF being formed. Also, with the state of Germany, not to mention the naval race between America and Japan a 10 years rule is highly unlikely. Also, in the changed circumstances the RN would still be seen as the vital defender of Britain against the still massive threat of Germany.

That's the wild card, as even though that modification would make military sense, and would be to some extent reallocating money and authorizations already made for the existing program, and Congress did have a history of playing around with appropriations to the detriment of the fleet (part of the blame for the USN being imbalanced in the WW1 era can be laid at Congress only buying half of the battleships and destroyers, and none of the cruisers the USN had asked for between about 1908-16.) However, one of the big OTL drivers towards the US starting the WNT process, Germany being eliminated as a threat, hasn't taken place here, while another, having a comfortable margin over Japan, is less clear here, on top of everyone else in Europe is probably looking to build new ships as soon as they can come up with the money, so this ATL looks like a much more dangerous place from the US perspective. This all goes back to British & German construction between 1918-21 being a significant part of what eveyone else does and what the treaty will look like.

It will all depend on the circumstances. Could have that effect but not sure if Germany under those circumstances would be able to maintain a major naval build-up, at least in the short term [say a decade or so]. Japan will struggle but it all depends on how high a level of superiority the US would want over Japan.

A 70% ratio would have been parity in practice, which the US & Britain were aware of, and probably not willing to go for, since Japan was already becoming a disruptive force that directly threatened both US & UK interests in East Asia. Even a 60% ratio wasn't that great of a margin considering the minimum 25% attrition of combat power the US expected in a Plan Orange offensive, other commitments the US & UK might have that might keep them from committing everything unlike the Japanese, and the Japanese using aircraft and increased development of lighter units (as they did OTL) to seek asymmetric advantages in a fleet action.

Look at that from Japan's point of view for a moment. Your talking about America, which has show hostility to Japan and has a major base directly across their trade line, demanding superiority over Japan in the latter's home water. They did put a huge amount of effort into night fighting and lighter element, after the Washington Treaty, as a way of countering the threat that the USN potentially posed.

Japan also played a big role in isolating itself, as even by 1921, it was an agressive, expansionist power, that took advantage of the European powers being distracted by the war to try to turn China into a de facto colony at the expense of everyone else there, only backing down in the face of a near-ultimatum from the US after Britan expressed its displeasure with Japan, tried to take advantage of the Russian Civil War to get a chunk of the Russian Far East, and had shown itself a questionable ally in WW1, only joining because of treaty obligations, and not doing much more than grabbing the low-hanging fruit of German colonies in the Pacific and escorting some convoys. Even before WW1, British policy tended to regard war with the US as something to be avoided if at all possible, and by 1920 or so, when the Anglo-Japanese treaty was about to expire, Britain feared, quite justifiably, that Japan was likely to provoke a war with the US over China (as ultimately happened), and under the terms of the alliance, could quite likely be dragged into a conflict it wanted no part of.

The anger over the percieved humiliation of the WNT, added to that over racist incidents on the US West Coast and Australia, being blocked from aggandizement at the expense of China & Russia by the other powers, (as it would interfere with the interests of the US & UK), and memories of the way Japan's gains in the 1895 war with China were curtailed by Germany, France, and Russia led to the rise of Japanese militarism, but that anger was almost sort of a national temper-tantrum over more powerful nations not allowing Japan to have its way at the expense of their own regional interests and third parties unable to defend themselves in the years leading up to the WNT. In turn, that led to the Japanese military starting to use the power it already have to effectively control the government- under the Meiji constitution, the resignation of one minister casued the entire government to fall, and the Army & Navy ministers had to be serving flag officers (tending to be mid-level ones subject to the orders of the respective staffs), which gave the military effective veto power over the government. Bit of an oopsie there....

Japan had a lot of internal problems, such as the political influence of the military that you mentioned. In many ways at the time it was no different from most of the other developed [compared to others] nations. Britain, America and several of the continental powers had done or attempted similar things in recent history. It was only later, from the 30's onwards, that it developed a more savage side.

Steve

 

[xchen08]

Please read the OP. This assumes the war ends at least a year earlier. Also that Britain is in a much more dangerous position, with a still powerful Germany and the US and Japan constructing like mad. As such I think having the G3's advanced a year over OTL is the latest that construction will start.

You misunderstand my point. Certainly Britain might be laying down the successors to the Hoods by 1920. However, the odds of what is layed down being as revolutionary (or revolutionary at all) as the G3s is exceedingly unlikely, since the design only arose nearly a year after Britain first started looking at responses to the American/Japanese new construction, and a Britain desperately needing new ships would not take so long before settling on a design and building it. By far the most likely would be a straight forward evolution of the Admirals, adapted to 16in guns, followed by a jump straight to 18in guns with the hope of trumping the American/Japanese 16in ships without having to spend the ruinous sums to match them in numbers.

Let's see. We have a markedly richer, compared to OTL Britain, which is feeling very threatened.

Eh, I'm not comparing TTL Britain to OTL Britain of 1919-1920. I'm comparing TTL Britain to OTL Britain of the period immediately preceding WWI, during which it also felt very threatened. Even a somewhat shorter war still means Britain financially far worse off than it started, and you are asking about burdening Britain with 3x the its naval spending during its last naval race. 12 G3s cost as much as ~44 QEs. If Admiralty had asked Parliament in 1911 for 44 QEs to be built in 6 years, what would you say Parliament's response would be?

Also markedly cheaper costs for shipbuilding than anyone else, especially the Americans.

I rather have doubts on this. Post 1914, once the U.S. stopped trying to delay construction and spread things out over as many yards (and constituencies) as possible, U.S. costs weren't markedly higher than British. USS Tennessee for instance were built for $12.75 million and HMS Queen Elizabeth for ~3 million pounds, ie roughly the same, despite Tennessee being a more modern design and being considerably more powerful, alongside all the extra costs for turbo-electric drive. The projected costs for a SoDak is in the order of ~$25 million, for instance, which is less than 2/3rds that of a G3.

Certainly, with over 3x the GDP by 1917, even the most extreme levies placed on the Empire wouldn't allow Britain going full out to outspend the U.S. going half as hard.

 

[stevep]

You misunderstand my point. Certainly Britain might be laying down the successors to the Hoods by 1920. However, the odds of what is layed down being as revolutionary (or revolutionary at all) as the G3s is exceedingly unlikely, since the design only arose nearly a year after Britain first started looking at responses to the American/Japanese new construction, and a Britain desperately needing new ships would not take so long before settling on a design and building it. By far the most likely would be a straight forward evolution of the Admirals, adapted to 16in guns, followed by a jump straight to 18in guns with the hope of trumping the American/Japanese 16in ships without having to spend the ruinous sums to match them in numbers.

However, since the US is starting its designs in 1917 and the war ends then, but with possibly an even more substantial threat from Germany [at least as it will be seen by many] do you honesty think Britain will delay? I'm just assuming it moves at the same speed as OTL in developing the G3's, which were a fairly logical response to wartime experience, but with event moved up a year earlier because the war ended at least a year earlier.

The option of a more conventional design might occur but they will be laid down even earlier if Britain takes that route. Probably 4 more ship in 1918 to start the programme. However think its more likely that the RN will seek to absorb the lessons of the war and come up with something like the G3 design. Especially since it fits the needs of the time, fast, well armoured and very powerful ships.

Eh, I'm not comparing TTL Britain to OTL Britain of 1919-1920. I'm comparing TTL Britain to OTL Britain of the period immediately preceding WWI, during which it also felt very threatened. Even a somewhat shorter war still means Britain financially far worse off than it started, and you are asking about burdening Britain with 3x the its naval spending during its last naval race. 12 G3s cost as much as ~44 QEs. If Admiralty had asked Parliament in 1911 for 44 QEs to be built in 6 years, what would you say Parliament's response would be?

If there had been the need I suspect they would have at least attempted that. However what is being talked about here is something less dramatic by a long way. The G3's may cost more but not as much as that once you start serial production. They would also be a lot cheaper to man than twice their number of Queens, let alone the number you mentioned.

I rather have doubts on this. Post 1914, once the U.S. stopped trying to delay construction and spread things out over as many yards (and constituencies) as possible, U.S. costs weren't markedly higher than British. USS Tennessee for instance were built for $12.75 million and HMS Queen Elizabeth for ~3 million pounds, ie roughly the same, despite Tennessee being a more modern design and being considerably more powerful, alongside all the extra costs for turbo-electric drive. The projected costs for a SoDak is in the order of ~$25 million, for instance, which is less than 2/3rds that of a G3.

Funny. As far as I'm aware that is still going on today. To a limited degree as military production is now so complex and hence forces more concentration but pork barrel is still an important part of the US system. [Plays a part in Britain as well of course but markedly less].

If a naval board I used to be a member of was still active - unfortunately got hit by cyber attack and seems to have failed to recover - I could point you in the direction of a number of very expert people who could give a hell of a lot more detail. Remember one reference that even as late as WWII there was a significant difference, as the US CAs were costing about as much as the KGV class BBs.

Certainly, with over 3x the GDP by 1917, even the most extreme levies placed on the Empire wouldn't allow Britain going full out to outspend the U.S. going half as hard.

Never disputed that. Just that since Britain needs a big fleet and the US wants one the key question is relative will, especially of the political establishments and general population. Quite possibly see some agreement a few years down the line that sees equality agreed, provided a suitable solution can be found to the question of 3rd party navies. However if the US builds a lot of its 1916 programme ships or you still have a rampant, militarised Germany, let alone both Britain will be building a sizeable number of new capital ships.

Steve

 

[xchen08]

However, since the US is starting its designs in 1917 and the war ends then, but with possibly an even more substantial threat from Germany [at least as it will be seen by many] do you honesty think Britain will delay? I'm just assuming it moves at the same speed as OTL in developing the G3's, which were a fairly logical response to wartime experience, but with event moved up a year earlier because the war ended at least a year earlier.

The option of a more conventional design might occur but they will be laid down even earlier if Britain takes that route. Probably 4 more ship in 1918 to start the programme. However think its more likely that the RN will seek to absorb the lessons of the war and come up with something like the G3 design. Especially since it fits the needs of the time, fast, well armoured and very powerful ships.

I suppose, though 1) I just don't see a revolutionary design as something that'll naturally pop up, especially when not all of the conditions that led to its development are satisfied, 2) the G3s are just so very expensive a design. Sure the combination of speed, power and protection is pretty awesome in the abstract, but building capital ships more than half again as expensive as those of your rivals, but still no more capable in battle just so you can combine all 3 in a single ship doesn't seem the best idea when you are pinched for funds. It's one of those things that supports the idea that the G3/N3 were designed more to scare the U.S./Japan into agreeing to a Treaty than to be actually built.

The G3's may cost more but not as much as that once you start serial production.

If you look at the various British capital ship classes, the 18% difference between the most expensive and the least expensive ship in a class for the QE's is about the highest you get, and there is no consistent pattern of later ships costing less. I don't think capital ships are simple enough or build in enough numbers to gain any real advantages from serial production.

Funny. As far as I'm aware that is still going on today. To a limited degree as military production is now so complex and hence forces more concentration but pork barrel is still an important part of the US system. [Plays a part in Britain as well of course but markedly less].

Yeah, the U.S. loves its pork, but the current iteration of the problem is from the exact same cause as the pre-WWI iteration, as in Congress is unwilling to fund enough ships to make full use of existing yards, yet both Congress and the Navy remain unwilling to give up construction capacity. Thus contracts are parceled out to keep all the yards in work and to satisfy as many constituencies as possible, clearly driving up costs. It gets alot different if Congress is funding a large enough program to keep all the yards going full speed. Like 1920, when in December, the U.S. was simultaneously building 1 Tennessee, 3 Colorados, 5 South Dakotas, and 4 Lexingtons, as well as 10 cruisers and god knows how many destroyers. More than enough to keep costs per ship low. Like I said, the costs of the later Standards compare very favorably with the QEs, Nelsons, and Hood.

Remember one reference that even as late as WWII there was a significant difference, as the US CAs were costing about as much as the KGV class BBs.

Don't think that would be a good comparison, since some of the U.S. WWII cruisers were designed without regard to cost, like the Des Moines CAs and Worchester CLs, and their insane prices is not an accurate reflection of what it would take to build a cruiser without it needing to be the absolute best at everything, plus British pre-WWII and WWII naval construction is famous for use of low quality materials, shaved corners, and sloppy workmanship to get ships in service as soon as possible without regard to what that does to their service lifespans.

 

[David S Poepoe]

It's one of those things that supports the idea that the G3/N3 were designed more to scare the U.S./Japan into agreeing to a Treaty than to be actually built.

That an interesting idea, which I never heard before and which inclines me to think its bogus. Well, from what I've read about the WNT I know it is bogus. Exactly where did you read about this relationship between the G3s, the Japanese and the WNT?

 

[xchen08]

That an interesting idea, which I never heard before and which inclines me to think its bogus. Well, from what I've read about the WNT I know it is bogus. Exactly where did you read about this relationship between the G3s, the Japanese and the WNT?

Oh, just a random idea I've heard on the interwebs here and there. I am by no means tied to it being true, and indeed am well aware of evidence against it, such as the ordering of and beginning of fabrication of long lag items already done by the Washington Treaty. Still doesn't rule out Britain preparing the build the things all while hoping it doesn't need to and designing so as to maximize both this hope as well combat utility should it have to be. If you are aware of more conclusive evidence, please present it, and I'll be happy to accept that the idea is without merit.

 

[David S Poepoe]

Oh, just a random idea I've heard on the interwebs here and there. I am by no means tied to it being true, and indeed am well aware of evidence against it, such as the ordering of and beginning of fabrication of long lag items already done by the Washington Treaty. Still doesn't rule out Britain preparing the build the things all while hoping it doesn't need to and designing so as to maximize both this hope as well combat utility should it have to be. If you are aware of more conclusive evidence, please present it, and I'll be happy to accept that the idea is without merit.

I think what one has to do is split the definition of 'Britain' in two here since there are two entities - the Admiralty and the British Government. They are fairly pulling in opposite directions regarding post-war rearmament. Everything I've read firmly indicates that the G3s were going to be built to take into account the war experience gained and replace the older 12in gunned dreadnoughts. The Royal Navy needed the G3s to remain on par with the Amerians and Japanese regarding 16in gunned ships.

I don't believe that the N3s would have been coming quickly down the slips because of the lackluster record of the 18in guns mounted on Furious. The Royal Navy recognized that it needed newer ships and probably would have scrapped a lot more of its 13.5in gunned ships.

 

[stevep]

David

I think what one has to do is split the definition of 'Britain' in two here since there are two entities - the Admiralty and the British Government. They are fairly pulling in opposite directions regarding post-war rearmament. Everything I've read firmly indicates that the G3s were going to be built to take into account the war experience gained and replace the older 12in gunned dreadnoughts. The Royal Navy needed the G3s to remain on par with the Amerians and Japanese regarding 16in gunned ships.

Very true OTL. Although in TTL, with the much greater threat to Britain still present and greater resources, there will be much closer agreement between the two.

I think if Britain constructs a number of new ships, say 10-12 over the next few years, then very likely all the 13.5" ships will be retired pretty rapidly. Given the 12x15" and new ships then barring Germany going fairly insane and trying to resume the race itself I think that would be enough to meet British needs.

I don't believe that the N3s would have been coming quickly down the slips because of the lackluster record of the 18in guns mounted on Furious. The Royal Navy recognized that it needed newer ships and probably would have scrapped a lot more of its 13.5in gunned ships.

That could be a point. Also have read that there might have been concern about not escalating matters further by increasing gun size to 18". [Although this would depend of course on what happens with the Japanese programme and possible American and German construction]. One of the more knowledgeable people on the naval site I mentioned above suggested that the follow on to the G3's might be a larger Nelson type with 12x16" guns and about 26kt. That would probably be cheaper than more G3's because of the much reduced powerplant required.

Steve

 

[Grimm Reaper]

If Germany is trying to match the RN in a post-WWI 'Germany victorious' world then the British have no choice but to throw Japan over the side and begin coordinating with the US.

The US is vastly wealthier and more powerful than Japan and any arms race between the two is likely to have painful consequences as London decides whether they need to keep up with the US(AND Germany) or a separate Pacific fleet capable of holding Japan.

God forbid the UK chooses Japan over the US only to see Japan come to an arrangement with Germany, leaving the British in a hopeless position trying to keep even with the US, Germany and Japan at the same time.

Japan is dangerously likely to find an arrangement with Germany, if only due to a desire for new colonies and the current owners of the proposed target colonies are, so since relations between the US and Japan are reaching the point where an alliance with one is mutually exclusive with an alliance with the other, the British has to make a choice.

The fact that Canada will under no circumstances choose Japan over the US is liable to be a factor as well...

 

[stevep]

If Germany is trying to match the RN in a post-WWI 'Germany victorious' world then the British have no choice but to throw Japan over the side and begin coordinating with the US.

The US is vastly wealthier and more powerful than Japan and any arms race between the two is likely to have painful consequences as London decides whether they need to keep up with the US(AND Germany) or a separate Pacific fleet capable of holding Japan.

God forbid the UK chooses Japan over the US only to see Japan come to an arrangement with Germany, leaving the British in a hopeless position trying to keep even with the US, Germany and Japan at the same time.

Japan is dangerously likely to find an arrangement with Germany, if only due to a desire for new colonies and the current owners of the proposed target colonies are, so since relations between the US and Japan are reaching the point where an alliance with one is mutually exclusive with an alliance with the other, the British has to make a choice.

The fact that Canada will under no circumstances choose Japan over the US is liable to be a factor as well...

Grimm

That's one way of looking at it but as OTL shows its very, very dangerous for Britain.

The other alternative is to stick with the proven ally, who fulfilled its commitments, hence safeguarding Britain's interests in the Pacific and Far East. The alliance gave Japan a lot of prestige and also a measure of security against American aggression, despite the wording of the 3rd version of the alliance. If Britain dropped Japan, especially under the current circumstances, I can't see anything more likely to prompt a disgruntled Japan looking for allies, which would almost certainly mean Germany.

An alliance with America might be a better option if America is a reliable ally but at this point it definitely lacks that status. The US is strongly committed to isolationism and has an history of refusing overseas commitments so it would be a very weak reed at this point in time.

I'm working on the basis here that while America might be entering a more xenophobic phase its unlikely to actually start a war, while Japan, reassured by a defencive alliance is also likely to be more moderate in behaviour and to keep its own extremists under control. As such Britain, France and Italy would seek to keep Germany in check in Europe and with alliance with Japan probably seek to minimise communist influence in the Far East, presuming the latter have won in Russia.

The only exception here might be if a non-communist government won out in Russia and was struggling to maintain itself against both German and Japanese pressure. Under those circumstances you might see Britain and France looking towards Russia rather than Japan and looking more friendly on American pressure on Japan.

Steve

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Except that this alliance didn't stop Japan from sniffing around German offers for much of WWI and if things had gone less favorably for the Allies one suspects that Japan would have been delighted to see what the alliance market would bear.

And given that Japan embarked on a quarter century of aggression ending in national catastrophe in China and Russia(unsuccessfully) while the alliance was still in effect...


There is also the problem that the US will not allow Japan to even match the USN(or even come close) so any perception that the US might have to consider British support for Japan in a war will only ensure a naval arms race which will undoubtedly delight Germany but not England, while stressing to the Americans that this is purely a defensive alliance is liable to be seen as an attempt to hedge the British commitment by Japan.

 

[JedidiahStott]

Grimm

That's one way of looking at it but as OTL shows its very, very dangerous for Britain.

The other alternative is to stick with the proven ally, who fulfilled its commitments, hence safeguarding Britain's interests in the Pacific and Far East. The alliance gave Japan a lot of prestige and also a measure of security against American aggression, despite the wording of the 3rd version of the alliance. If Britain dropped Japan, especially under the current circumstances, I can't see anything more likely to prompt a disgruntled Japan looking for allies, which would almost certainly mean Germany.

An alliance with America might be a better option if America is a reliable ally but at this point it definitely lacks that status. The US is strongly committed to isolationism and has an history of refusing overseas commitments so it would be a very weak reed at this point in time.

I'm working on the basis here that while America might be entering a more xenophobic phase its unlikely to actually start a war, while Japan, reassured by a defencive alliance is also likely to be more moderate in behaviour and to keep its own extremists under control. As such Britain, France and Italy would seek to keep Germany in check in Europe and with alliance with Japan probably seek to minimise communist influence in the Far East, presuming the latter have won in Russia.

The only exception here might be if a non-communist government won out in Russia and was struggling to maintain itself against both German and Japanese pressure. Under those circumstances you might see Britain and France looking towards Russia rather than Japan and looking more friendly on American pressure on Japan.

Steve

I agree. Assuming that the Great War ended before the USA became involved, there would not be all that much respect (or liking) for the USA in Britain.Well, not amongst the chaps that mattered, anyway - Exeter Hall obviously preferred the USA (which possibly distorts modern understanding somewhat); but that would just be another reason to favour Japan in the eyes of chaps that went to the right schools.

At the turn of the century the US was much disliked by British leaders, and her naval strength deprecated and even despised (cf Oscar Wilde's sneers at the US navy).

Johnny Jap , on the other hand was considered a very pukka little fellow. Played the game, kept a straight bat, very white. Knew his place, too.

And, importantly, Johnny didn't actively threaten any significant British interests. Unlike the USA, which was considered both dangerous and decidedly ill bred.

And the British and Japanese ruling classes instinctively understood each other , and their social conventions, which certainly could not be said of British-USA understanding then (or even today, for that matter). A English gentleman will probably still feel much more comfortable today amidst upper class Japanese than amongst rich Americans.

The interests and emotions of the ruling classes would both have favoured continuing the Anglo-Japanese treaty.

Even in the 30s, when tensions rose, there was a unarticulated sense of disappointment and betrayal at Johnny's behaviour. He was supposed to be One of Us.

 

[xchen08]

As I understand it, that was mostly the Japanese Navy faction and the upper aristocracy that adopted all manner of British mannerisms and a general pro-British viewpoint. The Army faction on the other hand, would be much stronger TTL without the defeat of Germany, and is by no means pro-British. Fact is that with the German Pacific possessions gone and Russia knocked out, Japan and Britain no longer have any common or potential common enemies except the United States, which no British government would be insane enough to want as an enemy, no common strategic interests, and plenty of conflicts of interest and friction between spheres of influence. Plus relations between Japan and Australia/NZ aren't great, and Canada would be quite displeased at worsening relations between the Commonwealth and the U.S. which an ongoing Anglo-Japanese alliance would ensure. Thus, Japan has no rational reason to want a furtherance of the alliance since it would be impossible to get Britain to agree to the alliance applying to the U.S., leaving just sentiment, which would be much weaker TTL thanks to a stronger Army faction. Similarly, Britain has no rational reason to want a continued alliance either, other than some half-baked notion of gaining influence in Japan's high councils. Certainly, Britain is unlikely to gain sufficient influence to convince Japan to give up its ambitions in China, which is going to lead to war with the U.S. sooner or later.

That could be a point. Also have read that there might have been concern about not escalating matters further by increasing gun size to 18". [Although this would depend of course on what happens with the Japanese programme and possible American and German construction]. One of the more knowledgeable people on the naval site I mentioned above suggested that the follow on to the G3's might be a larger Nelson type with 12x16" guns and about 26kt. That would probably be cheaper than more G3's because of the much reduced powerplant required.

I rather doubt you can get it cheaper with 1/3 more main armament while only giving up 4-5 knots. The Montanas were projected as at least ~60% more expensive than the Iowas while having 19% less installed power giving up 5-6 kts. Admittedly, they had thicker armor too, but clearly the smallish reduction in installed power you can get away with isn't going to make up for more of everything else.

I always figured a straightforward non-treaty Nelson would be the most likely followup. Afterall, the initial designs that led to the Nelsons were already drawn up by December 1921, so clearly the idea of a cheaper followup to the G3s other than the N3s was already floating around. In a non-treaty environment, the need to cover 3 oceans as opposed to the U.S.'s 2, and Japan/Germany's 1, plus Britain's financial position should point to more, cheaper units, rather than revolutionary and individually supremely powerful (and thus escalating) designs. (that would be Japan's schtick) Plus 26 knots seems a particularly awkward speed. Too slow to keep up with the fast wing, too fast for the slow wing. Makes a lot more sense to go for a straight 23 kts to match the QEs and Rs, same as the N3 design, and that would allow you to get away with a lot less installed power.

Incidently, anyone have a reliable source as to the construction cost of the KGVs? I found one source giving 2.9 million pounds, which even exclusive of armor and guns sounds like something missing a zero unless either Britain went through some major deflation in the 30s or shaving corners pays a lot more dividends than I thought.

 

[David S Poepoe]

Johnny Jap , on the other hand was considered a very pukka little fellow. Played the game, kept a straight bat, very white. Knew his place, too.

And, importantly, Johnny didn't actively threaten any significant British interests. Unlike the USA, which was considered both dangerous and decidedly ill bred.

And the British and Japanese ruling classes instinctively understood each other , and their social conventions, which certainly could not be said of British-USA understanding then (or even today, for that matter). A English gentleman will probably still feel much more comfortable today amidst upper class Japanese than amongst rich Americans.

The interests and emotions of the ruling classes would both have favoured continuing the Anglo-Japanese treaty.

Even in the 30s, when tensions rose, there was a unarticulated sense of disappointment and betrayal at Johnny's behaviour. He was supposed to be One of Us.

What you are talking about would probably be a return to pre-Great War relations between Britain and Japan - which isn't going to happen. The only the Japanese are going to be paramount in Asia is at the expense of Britain and the United States - which isn't going to happen either or without reluctance.

If the British ruling class had such a positive view of the Japanese they certainly weren't intermarrying with them for their money. So I think your whole point is questionable.

 

[stevep]

Except that this alliance didn't stop Japan from sniffing around German offers for much of WWI and if things had gone less favorably for the Allies one suspects that Japan would have been delighted to see what the alliance market would bear.

Evidence? Seems unlikely since Germany could offer Japan nothing. While Britain had possessions and interests in competition with Japan it also had bases and forces that could defend them and Japan was as happy as Britain with the situation under the alliance where Britain was able to keep the bulk of its forces in European waters.

And given that Japan embarked on a quarter century of aggression ending in national catastrophe in China and Russia(unsuccessfully) while the alliance was still in effect...

There was the attempt to pressurise China in 1916 and the part in the anti-Soviet intervention. Both to a degree seeking to take advantage of the weakness and distraction of other powers, which wasn't exactly unusual then, or now.

There is also the problem that the US will not allow Japan to even match the USN(or even come close) so any perception that the US might have to consider British support for Japan in a war will only ensure a naval arms race which will undoubtedly delight Germany but not England, while stressing to the Americans that this is purely a defensive alliance is liable to be seen as an attempt to hedge the British commitment by Japan.

Why? America only started its massive build-up in 1916 when the alliance had already been in place for 15 years. Also, for all the propaganda of the navalists desperate to get funding for their extreme schemes it was known that the alliance was defensive and no threat to America. If elements in America decide to try and out-build both powers when the existing US programme is causing a reaction in Japan and [coupled with the situation in Germany] with Britain its likely that such extreme schemes are quickly going to become extremely unpopular. The US is not imperial Germany, let alone the SU so has to pay some attention to public opinion and attempts to gain 'security' by outbuilding everyone are going to be very unpopular with the voters.

I remember reading a quote about this time by a politician who opposed anything that interfered with the RN because he considered the RN the best protection the US had. An ex President by the name of Roosevelt, you may have heard of him.

Unless you presume a US that goes over the edge into complete insanity and considers attacking the alliance, a loud and aggressive US navalist bloc making threatening gestures is actually fairly good for Britain. It gives an incentive for a steady naval build-up and means Japan has extra reason for the renewal of the alliance. It also, as in OTL ~1919-21 makes it likely that there's a lot of internal opposition in Congress hamstringing the programme by budget cuts to make it even more costly to the US.

Steve

 

[stevep]

As I understand it, that was mostly the Japanese Navy faction and the upper aristocracy that adopted all manner of British mannerisms and a general pro-British viewpoint. The Army faction on the other hand, would be much stronger TTL without the defeat of Germany, and is by no means pro-British. Fact is that with the German Pacific possessions gone and Russia knocked out, Japan and Britain no longer have any common or potential common enemies except the United States, which no British government would be insane enough to want as an enemy, no common strategic interests, and plenty of conflicts of interest and friction between spheres of influence. Plus relations between Japan and Australia/NZ aren't great, and Canada would be quite displeased at worsening relations between the Commonwealth and the U.S. which an ongoing Anglo-Japanese alliance would ensure. Thus, Japan has no rational reason to want a furtherance of the alliance since it would be impossible to get Britain to agree to the alliance applying to the U.S., leaving just sentiment, which would be much weaker TTL thanks to a stronger Army faction. Similarly, Britain has no rational reason to want a continued alliance either, other than some half-baked notion of gaining influence in Japan's high councils. Certainly, Britain is unlikely to gain sufficient influence to convince Japan to give up its ambitions in China, which is going to lead to war with the U.S. sooner or later.

Depending on the circumstances. Germany is still the major threat so a powerful ally in the Far east is very useful as it enables the concentration on European waters. [Why do you think the alliance was renewed after Britain and Russia became friendly in 1907?] There might be some who would prefer America for this role but its not available so Japan is the only player. Also, while you want the idea of influence on Japan to be half-baked that doesn't make it so. Furthermore concern about what Japan might do if it wasn't allied was a major reason why Australia and New Zealnad strongly supported renewal of the alliance. Canada was unhappy because of the US but I doubt many would consider the US is going to start invading neighbours in a temper tantrum because Britain looks to its own defences.

Also, what is the situation in Russia? If the earlier end to the war means a Provisional government survives then a lot could be up in the air depending on what's happening the Russia. If you have a Bolshevik coup and their winning the following civil war then both Britain and Japan have a common interest in watching them.

If America is building a massive fleet with clear targeting at both powers and seeking to pressurise Britain to desert its ally why do you think the navy will lose influence compared to the army? It will be the service that is required to keep the yank from the door in the event America becomes belligerent.

I rather doubt you can get it cheaper with 1/3 more main armament while only giving up 4-5 knots. The Montanas were projected as at least ~60% more expensive than the Iowas while having 19% less installed power giving up 5-6 kts. Admittedly, they had thicker armor too, but clearly the smallish reduction in installed power you can get away with isn't going to make up for more of everything else.

A cutting of ~6knots in speed greatly reduces the power plant required. The difference between the G3 and the Nelson is between 160,000shp and 45,000shp. While there is a drop in size the major proportion of that is the drop from 32kts to 23.5kts. Wouldn't be as big in the sort of ship being suggested but quite possibly still at least 50%. Which is a lot of powerful machinery and the space needed to store it. Check up on the lengths of BCs compared to BBs to see how much longer and bigger overall the former were.

I always figured a straightforward non-treaty Nelson would be the most likely followup. Afterall, the initial designs that led to the Nelsons were already drawn up by December 1921, so clearly the idea of a cheaper followup to the G3s other than the N3s was already floating around. In a non-treaty environment, the need to cover 3 oceans as opposed to the U.S.'s 2, and Japan/Germany's 1, plus Britain's financial position should point to more, cheaper units, rather than revolutionary and individually supremely powerful (and thus escalating) designs. (that would be Japan's schtick) Plus 26 knots seems a particularly awkward speed. Too slow to keep up with the fast wing, too fast for the slow wing. Makes a lot more sense to go for a straight 23 kts to match the QEs and Rs, same as the N3 design, and that would allow you to get away with a lot less installed power.

The 'initial designs that led to the Nelson' were ideas for a design within the limits suggested by the US at the conference. Nothing to do with any planned G3 successor. More to do with the strong technical support the British delegation had at the conference. Hence their support for a 35k limit as the smallest that a trimmed down G3 could make rather than the 32k initially suggested by the US.

The Queens are normally rated at 24kts and the R's at 21kts so there's not a common lower speed for the older ships. Also possibly 26kts was being suggested to match the Nagatos' and give an edge over the SDs.

Incidently, anyone have a reliable source as to the construction cost of the KGVs? I found one source giving 2.9 million pounds, which even exclusive of armor and guns sounds like something missing a zero unless either Britain went through some major deflation in the 30s or shaving corners pays a lot more dividends than I thought.

Don't know on that. There had been major deflation of course during the 30's and a steep decline in the shipping industry, which while it meant a desperate shortage of capacity is also meant that the surviving yards and workforce had been cut to the bone by the long drought which might had been a factor.

Steve

 

[xchen08]

[Why do you think the alliance was renewed after Britain and Russia became friendly in 1907?]

Because Japan still had something to gain from a Treaty? Well that and sentiment which is utterly unpredictable. With Britain definitively unwilling to extend the treaty to cover the U.S., Japan has absolutely no incentive to renew the Treaty except sentiment. With a semi-victorious Germany definitely opposed to Britain, Britain will be seeking alliance with whoever rules in Russia even if it is the Bolsheviks.

Also, while you want the idea of influence on Japan to be half-baked that doesn't make it so.

Indeed, what I want has no bearing on the issue. But the absurdity of an alliance based purely on sentiment and wishful thinking on both sides granting Britain sufficient influence to successfully discourage Japanese ambitions in China, which had been building since the Meiji restoration, and other than attacking the European colonizers including Britain is now the only means of satisfying Japanese ambition, now that is relevant.

If America is building a massive fleet with clear targeting at both powers and seeking to pressurise Britain to desert its ally

That is no different from OTL. Except of course TTL, that massive fleet will also be targeting Germany, which Britain has every reason to encourage.

why do you think the navy will lose influence compared to the army? It will be the service that is required to keep the yank from the door in the event America becomes belligerent.

Because the Navy is tied to Britain, which failed to win WWI. Because the Army is tied to Germany which (apparently) won. Because the liberals are weakened by the failure of the Liberal democracies, while the militarists are strengthened by the success of their role model.

A cutting of ~6knots in speed greatly reduces the power plant required. The difference between the G3 and the Nelson is between 160,000shp and 45,000shp. While there is a drop in size the major proportion of that is the drop from 32kts to 23.5kts. Wouldn't be as big in the sort of ship being suggested but quite possibly still at least 50%. Which is a lot of powerful machinery and the space needed to store it. Check up on the lengths of BCs compared to BBs to see how much longer and bigger overall the former were.

1) We are talking 5 knots at the most, since from the initial G3 design to the finalized, it swelled by a few thousand tons while power remained the same. Plus the 32 knots was always theoretical. (obviously) Compare to the Iowa, which is lighter, has a hull form more optimized for speed, more advanced propeller designs, and 52000 more shp, giving a theoretical max of 35 knots, but which never made much more than 33 in practice. So the Montana sounds like a good example.

2) The design you mentioned sounds a lot like the Super Lion designs tossed around in 38, ie 12 16/45 guns, 26 kts, and that design had 130000 shp.

The 'initial designs that led to the Nelson' were ideas for a design within the limits suggested by the US at the conference. Nothing to do with any planned G3 successor. More to do with the strong technical support the British delegation had at the conference. Hence their support for a 35k limit as the smallest that a trimmed down G3 could make rather than the 32k initially suggested by the US.

Eh, the initial (ie F3, O3) designs were definitely for 35 kt, and were drawn up in December 1921, which would be at the very beginning of the Conference, and thus definitely not within U.S. limits given your claim of U.S. suggested limit of 32 kt.

The Queens are normally rated at 24kts and the R's at 21kts so there's not a common lower speed for the older ships.

Before their rebuilds, the Queens never made much more than 23, while I believe the Rs did a bit better than expected, hence a lot of references to them being at 22-23 kts. So a 23.5 knot design like the Nelsons would slot in perfectly to the existing Slow Wing. It doesn't make much sense to have a slow wing, a mid wing, and a fast wing, just so that the mid wing can match the Nagatos, or outmanuever the SoDaks if they were willing to leave the rest of the battleline behind.

Don't know on that. There had been major deflation of course during the 30's and a steep decline in the shipping industry, which while it meant a desperate shortage of capacity is also meant that the surviving yards and workforce had been cut to the bone by the long drought which might had been a factor.

My main problem with that is that the deflation would need to be both incredibly severe, and ending rather quickly. Ie compare the 7.5-8 million for the Nelsons, and 9 million for the Vanguard, which of course was mostly an off the shelf design, and whose main armament was free. So there would need to be major deflation in the decade between Nelson and KGV, and then massive reinflation in the 3 years from KGV being laid down to Vanguard. Sure, there was a war on, but that's a bit extreme.

 

[stevep]

Guys

Found out my old naval board has a new lease of life and asking there got pointed towards some links on another one. That tends to be rather argumentative in some cases but a lot of interesting details. The links I received were

A number of threads were lost when Bob's new phpbbplanet forum went down, but take a look at these threads over on Warship1/NavWeaps:

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/383

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/613

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/3958

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/6622

IIRC, we had addressed costs on this forum before it went Yuku, but that thread had fallen off the end of the board before we changed over to phpbbplanet...

Of particular interest to some of the matters being discussed:

a) thread 1 has a figure of ~£40M for 4 G3s and 4 spare turrets, see post 18. This also has details which makes clear that Britain could fairly easily afford 4G3's and also later in the discussion the possibilities of N3 production.

b) thread 2 quotes costs for hull and machinery for a G3 + £700000 profit for 3 cmps from which the ships were ordered. In each case that was <£4M. See post 27.

c) thread 3, post 89 [amongst others] have a very frustrating mention that Britain had the chance to build 2G3's instead of the two Nelson's if we scrapped Tiger. Unfortunately Balfour, the political leader of the British delegation made the decision to reject this without checking with his technical staff. If so they would probably have informed him that contary to popular view at the time that the G3's were fast BCs with 7" side armour they were actually fast Bbs with 12" and much, much better options.

d) thread 4 has a reference for 4G3s and 4N3 of £65M.

A lot of interesting detail here, if you have the time to plough through it all. Some dead wood as well but got to expect that. However might prove interesting. [Might get back to that site if I ever have a few months free.]

Steve