WIF WWI ended in 1917 how would the Washington treaty of gone

[Douglas]

I agree, there would have to some negotiations to end the war. As for the WNT they wouldn't start until a good 4 years after the war ended, and there would be so much to be gained by all sides that I think recent enemies would tolerate each other to reach an agreement.

Namely...?

 

[xchen08]

1. Someone needs to explain the 1917 end to the war much better, because if I recall correctly Russia was knocked out of the war and the Entente didn't stop fighting and by that point the United States already had entered the war. Something awe-inspiring like a massive geological event that obliterates London or Washington or a full-on French mutiny or the Royal Navy getting Letterstime-d (completely obliterated, ASB anyway) is going to have to happen.

I think for the purposes of discussion, we might as well assume that either Germany was able to knock out Russia a bit earlier or the U.S. entered the war later/not at all. It's the easiest way to get the Allies to agree to a more or less white peace, ie combine sane leadership in Germany along with the Russian collapse and French troop mutinies at much the same time without hope of American reinforcement. I mean, if we instead assume that Germany was outright victorious, there surely won't be a naval limitations treaty while an autocratic power dominates the Continent, while if the U.S. is already in the war and mobilizing, there's not much reason for the Allies to accept peace.

6. The WNT was a close-run thing in OTL, even though it consisted entirely of nations that had just fought the most devastating war up until that point on the same side. Can you really see the British and Americans in a room with a German delegation that just practiced total war on those nations' merchantmen? Or the vanquished French, with the Germans twirling their mustachios and commenting on what a nice fort Verdun makes? This, IMHO, is ASB within 15 years of a 1917 draw in WW1.

I can still see it happening though, perhaps later than OTL. Japan was going to bankrupt itself with the 8-8 program, and while Britain can probably afford the G3s, it likely can't afford the N3s and certainly can't afford to keep going after. And without a continent to loot, Germany's certainly not going to be able to afford a naval race either. That only leaves the U.S., and once it becomes clear that Germany is far less of a threat than previously thought, Congress is going to be looking to axe the budget. You'll still end up with all the powers unwilling/unable to keep up a naval race, yet none being willing to unilaterally back down.

 

[Douglas]

I can still see it happening though, perhaps later than OTL. Japan was going to bankrupt itself with the 8-8 program, and while Britain can probably afford the G3s, it likely can't afford the N3s and certainly can't afford to keep going after. And without a continent to loot, Germany's certainly not going to be able to afford a naval race either. That only leaves the U.S., and once it becomes clear that Germany is far less of a threat than previously thought, Congress is going to be looking to axe the budget. You'll still end up with all the powers unwilling/unable to keep up a naval race, yet none being willing to unilaterally back down.

This is the point I question. Great Britain will always have the funds to build more battleships than Germany, even if it cripples the country, simply by the RN's nature. Great Britain demanded (and got) 5:5:3 at Washington with a non-existent German fleet. What do you think they'll demand with a present Germany? Is it a number that anyone can accept, then turn around and show to their people back home? "Yeah, we just made a deal with Great Britain. 8:5:3 limit it is! Lucky us, right?"

The issue is that if the powers are unable to keep up a naval race, then there won't be a naval treaty, simply powers building warships as they require them (or can afford them). If the powers are unwilling to build new battleships, than they won't build them, and the powers that require superiority will soon rest easy once they have a "safe" margin.

 

[Riain]

Namely...?

Are you serious? Would avoiding an ultra-expensive naval race hard on the heels of a ruinous war or for no apparent purpose count as something that all sides would consider a positive?

 

[Douglas]

Are you serious?

Yes.

Would avoiding an ultra-expensive naval race hard on the heels of a ruinous war or for no apparent purpose count as something that all sides would consider a positive?

The RN would have a very apparent purpose in ensuring naval superiority over a Europe-dominated German Empire. The WNT makes no sense as a comparison, as the powers involved there, while somewhat mistrustful of another, had not killed millions of citizens of the other signatories.

 

[xchen08]

The issue is that if the powers are unable to keep up a naval race, then there won't be a naval treaty, simply powers building warships as they require them (or can afford them). If the powers are unwilling to build new battleships, than they won't build them, and the powers that require superiority will soon rest easy once they have a "safe" margin.

Eh, by that logic the OTL Treaty would never have happened either. It's all a matter of incentives. An arms race is a pretty basic prisoners' dilemma. A treaty would make all the powers better off vs. the scenario you present, where Japan keeps trying for the 8-8 until it collapses, Germany does the same, while Britain desperately tries to outbuild both as well as an U.S. determined to be second to none. Sure, you'd eventually reach an equilibrium of exhaustion, but that's not exactly a good thing.

The RN would have a very apparent purpose in ensuring naval superiority over a Europe-dominated German Empire. The WNT makes no sense as a comparison, as the powers involved there, while somewhat mistrustful of another, had not killed millions of citizens of the other signatories.

This is assuming that the various national leaders cannot behave rationally, or that their publics would not accept rational thinking even when the pocketbook strongly favors otherwise. Japan in OTL pretty much demonstrates this is not the case, or at least potentially is not the case. The Japanese public and military were as irrationally determined to aim above Japan's capacity as the hypothetical British public and military would hate their German counterparts and vice versa, but the Treaty still went through.

 

[Douglas]

Sure, you'd eventually reach an equilibrium of exhaustion, but that's not exactly a good thing.

I'm not sure its a bad thing necessarily. I just cannot see powers that were at each others' throats a few years previously sitting down and necessarily agreeing to limits imposed/suggested by their enemies, especially GB/Germany.

I could see an informal agreement between UK/US/Japan, though I believe that's unlikely too. The WNT wasn't particularly likely in OTL, and in a world where the attrition and death and cost of WW1 didn't even result in a "winner", I think it isn't possible for a decade or so, at which point the diplomatic situation will have evolved to allow new agreements.

 

[Riain]

By 1937, according to Paul Kennedy, truncated Versailles Germany (considerably smaller than 1914 Germany and much smaller than TTL 1917 Germany) had 40% more total war industrial potential than Britain.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Presumably a Germany that was victorious in the east in 1917 would have a larger economy than the interwar Germany of OTL. It would also have economic sattelites which would futher strengthen the economy, making TTL German war economy well over 40% larger than Britians by 1937. So in the longer term Germany could create the means to close the capital ship gap with Britain. If Britain decided to build new capital ships the German govt could use it's newly gained economic resources to establish another capital ship building yard and start turning out capital ships so that Britain doesn't get too far ahead.

 

[Douglas]

If Britain decided to build new capital ships the German govt could use it's newly gained economic resources to establish another capital ship building yard and start turning out capital ships so that Britain doesn't get too far ahead.

But why would Germany do that? I can't help but suspect that building battleships in a frantic attempt to catch Great Britain (good luck, you're down at least a dozen to start!) is a domestic non-starter after this

ruinous war.

I'd also seriously question the idea that Great Britain had less than 70% of the war-making potential that Germany had in the 1920's, even without Versailles.

 

[Douglas]

For those who believe a WNT possible in the aftermath of a WW1 draw, I have a question: when has a major war been fought to a draw in OTL, and then been followed by arms limitations by the combatants without outside arbitration or pressure?

 

[Douglas]

Really, my whole argument can be based on Great Britain. No WNT* can take place without Great Britain. Therefore, GB must get something out of a WNT to participate.

Germany can either try to "even the odds" against the RN (improve its relative force ratio), or not.

If Germany does attempt to do so, the RN will try to build more than Germany (warmaking potentials aside, Great Britain requires a navy but no army, while Germany requires an army but not necessarily a navy: GB will succeed). A treaty proposed under such circumstances is ridiculous: why would Germany sign a treaty when she had already engaged in a (doomed) attempt to improve the force ratio? More importantly, why would Great Britain acquiesce to a flagrant attempt of Germany's to gain naval parity, when she does not have to?

If Germany does not attempt to do so, the RN will find itself perfectly happy where it is, without any need for a WNT.

 

[Riain]

I don't think Germany has to surpass Britain, but Germany can afford to build a lot of battleships and Britain will be forced to build 60% more than that. If this is the case then why not agree to create these levels before the looming arms race occurs.

I'm paraphrasing Kennedy from Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Britain's relative economic power peaked in about 1865, Germany's was still growing strongly, leading the world with modern things like electronics and industrial chemicals. If Germany wasn't shrunk by Versailles then I see no reason why the economic power gap wouldn't continue to grow and Germany wouldn't have an even larger share of economic power by 1937.

 

[xchen08]

But why would Germany do that? I can't help but suspect that building battleships in a frantic attempt to catch Great Britain (good luck, you're down at least a dozen to start!) is a domestic non-starter after this.

Indeed, so Germany would have a strong incentive to accept an arms limitation treaty. As would Britain, which is in a strictly worse position than OTL sans Treaty. (most likely with a treaty as well, but not quite as bad) And since it's their mutual hatred that makes a WNT equivalent less likely than OTL...

For those who believe a WNT possible in the aftermath of a WW1 draw, I have a question: when has a major war been fought to a draw in OTL, and then been followed by arms limitations by the combatants without outside arbitration or pressure?

Hardly a fair argument, since how many arms limitation treaties have their been total? As for an actual answer, the negotiations for SALT took place while Soviet missile troops were still shooting at U.S. bombers, and American Wild Weasels were doing their level best to kill them. Sure, you might not call that a major war, but you certainly can't deny both sides hated one another at this period of time. For that matter, there is potential outside arbitration/pressure, namely the U.S., since a WWI without U.S. entry is pretty much necessary for a white peace in 1917. As the only power with the resources to finish an arms race, yet possibly the least willing to begin one, the U.S. has quite a bit of clout here.

If Germany does not attempt to do so, the RN will find itself perfectly happy where it is, without any need for a WNT.

Wait, what? Britain was very much not happy with where it was in OTL, hence the WNT in OTL, what with it being stuck in a naval race with only Japan and the U.S. around. With Germany also around, Britain is in a strictly worse situation, and is strictly more in need of arms limitation.

 

[Douglas]

Wait, what? Britain was very much not happy with where it was in OTL, hence the WNT in OTL, what with it being stuck in a naval race with only Japan and the U.S. around. With Germany also around, Britain is in a strictly worse situation, and is strictly more in need of arms limitation.

Which is why I can see an informal agreement with the United States and Japan, just not a formal agreement with Germany.

 

[Susano]

Hm, as said earlier: Could the Peace Treaty act as (base of a) Naval Treaty? Obviously this would be more of a British cocnession to Germany than the other way round, but thats possible. OTOH, Germany is not in a position to uniliterally demand that of Britain, so I think its possible that if such things are included then the peace treaty might make naval regulations for every participant...

 

[Riain]

German naval strength was set at Versailles and Russia was now a pariah so wasn't invited. However without a dictated peace arrangements concerning naval and possibly army strengths would have to be set outside armistace negotiations.

 

[stevep]

Guys

Douglas is correct. If some sort of compromise deal is established in 1917 then the basic question, of whether Germany will militarily dominate Europe or not, hasn't been decided. Neither France nor Britain will rest comfortably with the German military still rampant, even if eastern France and Belgium have been liberated. Especially with Russia KOed so no balancing power to the east. What's being talked about is an armed peace, with the emphasis on the armed. Under those circumstances there is no way that a naval treaty is going to occur unless the Germans are going to agree a drastically inferior navy to Britain.

It might be that after a couple of years, in which quite possibly the eastern gains become a quagmire costing both blood and money Germany no longer possess, that you may see a change. If a different government in Germany is will to reassure the western powers that its no longer a threat, which is Britain's case will mean Germany agreeing a navy considerably smaller than the RN. Otherwise there will be continued tension and an arms build up. The Germans can not compete with the RN while still facing an arms race with France and Britain.

Don't forget that OTL, after a longer war, all the main combatants largely stopped construction while they recovered and readjusted to the situation. It was the US and Japan, which had been largely unaffected by the war that began the new race. If there is still a lot of tension in Europe with and undefeated [and to many rampant] Germany then Britain, which had suspended capital construction since virtually the start of the war will respond much earlier. As I said, probably with the other 3 Hoods completed [as well as the original much earlier] while working out new designs. This will increase Britain's lead and make an agreement far more difficult. [Also will give the capital ship builders in Britain a valuable boost].

Under those circumstances I can't see the US getting a 1:1 ratio and definitely no way will Germany. The US might, provided it can find the Congressional will, which is a huge IF, complete the 1916 programme and possibly plan other ships later on but any later agreement will leave the major powers with markedly larger fleets.

Steve

 

[Ward]

The War was were both sides lost more men on the Western Frount and Both the French and British Armys Muntined against there commanders ording them to attack .

And the Naval war went very much against the British in 1916 and 1917 . With most of the British BC being Sunk . And The German Ship Designs were able to stand up to punishment Better then the British ships were .

When Russia Fell in 1917 to the Red Revolt and spiled down to Civil War the Western allies And Central powers started to look at there own troops with fear .
Germany offered the Allies a way out when they Offered to Pull back to there Boarders of 1914 on the Western Frount and in the Balkans also .

The British were forced to hand back over South West Africa to Germany as well as free the Boar Republic .

The Japanise Ended up paying the Germans For the German Territories in the Pacific and China that they had taken .

The US in Early 1916 went to War against Mexico and Hatia and conqured both of them by 1918 with over 300,000 dead and 400,000 wounded by the end of the War .

 

[HMS Warspite]

The general point was that the WNT in the OTL and this scenario, is focussed on the idea, that no state wanted to get involved in yet another arms race, which eventually had sped up the Great War to begin with. Shortly after the War, the Allies, especially teh UK and France, but also the USA and to a lesser sence the Japanese Empire, wanted to ease down armaments and especially the cost of it, given the more urgent domestic needs.

Althought the UK were in a poor economical situation, shortly after the war, it still had all its resources and manpower in its empire, besides its infraastructure to continue a large scale naval building program. The infrastructure was dramatically scaled down, following the WNT signings, but was still intact in the period prior to 1925. In theory, the UK could easily have produced new large warships at the same speed as before the Great War, although the budget would not have allowed so.

The USA also could produce quite a lot of equipment, if needed. Economy was not yet the problem here, but the enormeous size of the program would eventually leed to problem, sicne most economic power was already on loan and credit, eventually resulting in its collapse in the late twenties. The large program would have aided to speed this proces, propably with worse results domestically, as it would also overlap with the same period of the Roaring Twenties. The US politicians were qute happy, the buildingholliday was called, so more attention could be turned into the own economy and domestic issues.

Japan was actually not at all happy with the WNT in the OTL and would neither have been in the Scenario, as it was not getting its wanted large pwoer status, being limmited to a more regional power only. It wanted to be able to dominate Asia, without interverence of other large powers, especialy the UK and USA. For this it wanted to have more or less parity with the other large powers, including the UK, which remained the strongest, given the knowledge the UK and USA could neither deploy their whole fleet against the Japanese, given their other reponsibilities in the Atlantic. Dispite Japa'n's much weaker economy at this period, it seems not impossible to get at least the reduced variant of the 8-8-8 program would eventually be completed, as in the OTL Japan still continued to produce quite a large number of expensive navalunits in a short period of time. (The development and buildingcoast of the new Heavy Cruisers of 10,000 tons official was about equal to building a larger, more conservative battleship. Japan produced 8 Takao's and Atago's in the late twenties, besides quite a large number of other navalships, including the first large superdestroyers, which were also quite expensive.)

In the OTL the USN may have had a large fleet, only slightly lesser in numbers than the Royal Navy, but considerably larger than the Japanese. It was however somewhat illballanced, having almost no cruisers until the 30's and a very old design of destroyers to support the fleet, hardly capable of performing in its inteded role, due to lack of range and capabilities. Only its two large Carriers were superior in layout and number of aircraft, which became valuable in the next war.

The Royal Navy was left with a large number of old and worn out ships, all with lots of heavy warservice of heavy steaming. The 15 inch gunned ships were good, but needed refits to make them usefull in the modern period. Its excelent support force was a bit onesided at first, being focussed on the North Sea only, but the UK quickly started to construct new cruisers for its colonial and Imperial tasks (County Type). The Royal Navy also had a very large number of destroyers, of whom the V&W types were exelent and modern enough to continue in the postwar fleet, while a few older and smaller ones were retained for otehr services. New additions continued to be added, of the A-I types, who all were much better than anything the USN had at the time and most of the IJN, except the Special Type.

Japan was also producing and upgrading its fleet constantly, with interesting and powerfull designs. On the whole a quite ballanced strikefleet was created, only weak in the secondary considered ASW. For some reason, the economy did not suffer that much, as some might expect, although the lack of industrial production limmited the production of essential materials. This may also have happened, when Japan continued to construct the 8-8 plan, in stead of the new heavy cruisers, who essentially replaced them on the buildersyards. For the 8 heavy cruisers of the Takao and Atago class, Japan needed only to have completed just the already being constructed Kaga's and Amagi's, plus four additional battleships not yet laid down. The four Amagi's and both Kaga's were quite well advanced, when the WNT ordered them to be canceled. Money already was expended before thism, so only four more ships needed to be funded, rather than the 8 ships of the new, post WNT cruiser program. (Amagi was lost during the 1923 Tokio earthquake, so a fifth ship might be added, after the this.)

 

[DD951]

I agree with these comments, as these were mostly OTL considerations. The scenario subscribes something entirely different, with a USA still out of the war and absolutely no warexperience, even compared to Japan, who only scarcely did something in the war. In the Scenario, the USA is not the industrial giant, it would become, as there was no warproduction of the Great War. It still was the economical power, without the millitary hardware to force on its will, which it did not do by the way. Bribing was a more common practice (and a much cheaper one too.)

You are aware of the large amount of war material that the Entente powers ordered from US factories because of US industrial power that already existed and expanded to meet these orders, including a number of heavy guns, lots of shells, small arms ammo, several million rifles (British P14 & Russian Mosin-Nagants), machinery, strategic metals, food, in addition to money. Sir Edward Grey said that the one thing that would be the most fatal for the Entente was to have an open diplomatic breach with the US, because the Entente was dependent on US financial and industrial support. Entente war orders and loans turned the US from a debtor into a creditor nation, so much so that it was a popular, if inaccurate, canard of the 20s & 30s that the US entered the war to safeguard the investments of Wall Street and the ‘munitions-makers’ in the Entente powers, which is what led to restrictions on US loans and munitions exports becoming a prominent part of US neutrality legislation of the 1920s & 1930s.

You’re also missing the focus of US military strategy of the era, which was based on having a strong fleet to keep potential enemies well out to sea, and protect commercial interests; the Army was considered secondary, and kept at not much more than cadre strength, as it was figured that in a serious war, the Army could be built up as needed, while the Navy would buy whatever time was needed to build up the Army if it was actually necessary. The strategy of using economic leverage as a carrot to exert control over Latin America and the Caribbean, with the prospect of a rather anti-social call by a couple cruisers and a Marine battalion being the stick for those who didn’t play along was premised on the power of the USN acting as a shield to prevent outside interference.

Japan on the other hand could build a large Navy, for its own policital means, namely the security of its empire against especially the USA and Russia, who were considered the most important foes. This in itself was not problematic, as long as the USA had no territorial ambitions. In the OTL the Phillippines were a protectorate of the USA and this was the most crucial problem for both, eventually leading to War, as this occupied land was simply in the way for Japan. Had it not been a US Protectorate, it would have been possible to leave the USA out of the WW2.

Perhaps a more Isolationalist and anti colonialistic US Government could have deleted the Phillippines, as these lands were of no economic value and only a burden on the economy. Without the need to Protect the Phillippines, the USN would be more or less a coastal defense Navy, protecting the East and West Coast, plus the Hawaii Islands. Nothing more or less.

The real point of contention between the US and Japan was China- Japan basically wanted to turn China into a glorified colony, which was detrimental to US commercial interests (that existed well before the US ended up with the Philippines, what was seen as the most likely causus belli between the wars, and indeed, what was ultimately caused the US and Japan to end up at war.

US naval strategy was built on the Mahanian concept that was predicated on having a fleet of battleships strong enough to successfully contest for control of the sea, as the only true way to protect ones coasts or trade, or do anything else was to have control of the sea. The impetus for the great expansion of the USN was actually Germany, and fears that Germany would start dicking around in the Carribean, given several US-German war scares in the 1890s. When the US started building a big navy in the 1890s, the ultimate goal was to have a fleet, that making allowance for keeping a sufficient force on the Pacific Coast, was at approximate parity with the Germans, which would be large enough to deter European adventurism in the Western Hemisphere (i.e. being able to enforce the Monroe Doctrine without having to rely on Britain supporting the US diplomatically) as such a fleet could stand off anything a European power would be willing to risk. Even though the operational requirements of a war against Japan dictated ship characteristics, the primary strategic threat as seen by the US was Germany, with superiority over Japan if it came to a clash in the western Pacific being a nice secondary benefit. As far as the US would be concerned, even though the European powers beat themselves up quite a bit in a war that ends in a compromise peace, the fundamental strategic situation remains unchanged. Plan Orange only became the focus of US naval strategy after Germany had been eliminated as a threat, which obviously wouldn’t have happened here.

As for the IJN, it was already really bigger than it should have been in economic terms, as to support their peacetime military establishment, the percentage of the Japanese GDP devoted to defense expenditures was at mobilization levels, and it’s generally accepted that a Japanese attempt to complete the 8-8 Plan anywhere close to on schedule, even if the 1923 Tokyo Earthquake is somehow butterflied away TTL, would most likely have bankrupted the country.

Secondly, the USN Dreadnoughts were all inferior in design, being of a pre-1914 design mainly, but postponed, due to other reasons. The Japanese Nagato's and their successors were designed in 1916 and the British, with their valuable warexperience, designed the new breed in 1921, with the G3 as primary focus, which outclassed all that was afloat or being built at that time. With Germany still second, also with tons of warexperience, the USNB and even the IJN would be considered as secondary powers in terms of Naval technology.

So, even if the USN was allowed to built a larger battlefleet, it would make not much difference in the ballance of Power, as its ships were of the pre Great War Period Design. (even the South Dakota essentially was a continuation of the 1914 designs, with no radical new differences, compared to the older designs.) Compared one to one, the G3 and Nelson's outclassed even the heavier gunned South Dakota's in terms of layout and protectionschemes, as well as seaworthyness, given the new high in the water hulldesignes of the 1921 breed.

For the THIRD TIME- the reason why so many of the US ships were postponed was because in 1917, it was deemed necessary to divert resources to a crash program to build destroyers and merchant ships in order to combat the German U-boat threat. If the US is not involved in the war, than no delay because the reason for that delay no longer exists.

And the standard type is inferior to which British and German ships- the closest equivalents in terms of design year, size, protection, and firepower would be the R and Bayern classes. This article comparing the standards with their British and Japanese contemporaries may be of interest.

With armor, the US ships had a 13.5” belt covering 2/3 of the waterline, some distance forward and aft of the barbettes that was 17.5’ high, half if it below the waterline. Depending on the class, deck armor was 3-3.5” with a 1.5” splinter deck. Barbettes were 13”, while turrets had an 18” face, 9-10” sides and rear, and a 5” roof. The first three classes had a two void TDS with several bulkheads in the middle, some of which were effectively extra double-hull sections. With the last two classes, the TDS was a major leap forward, a system with five light armored bulkheads and multiple spaces which can be used for voids or liquid layers, and in competitive tests by the Soviets in the 1930s, was found to be the most effective concept. That basic concept, by the way (although heavily refined) is still used on aircraft carriers today, which is why some details of the design of the Tennessee and Colorado classes, as well as subsequent capital ship and carrier designs are still classified today. Once the clipper bow and secondaries in the superstructure were used, starting in the New Mexicos, there were no complaints about their seakeeping behavior.

The South Dakotas, although derived from the last standards was not just a stretched one, as she had a massive increase in firepower- 4 extra barrels and a more powerful main gun, and going to 6” secondaries, a one-third increase in displacement, a two knot speed increase, a waterline extension of the main belt from where the full height ended that went 60’ forward, and heavy deck armor outside the main armored box- taken together, the most radical evolutionary jump in ship characteristics in the pre-treaty era the USN took.

The Rs had a 13” main belt that was 12.75’ high, and extended to about the middle of the end barbettes, 6” end belts that extended a bit beyond the end barbettes, and a 6” upper belt that covered the secondary batteries and the side above the main belt, from about the middle of ‘A’ barbette to the middle of ‘X’ barbette. Deck armor was about the same as the Queen Elizabeth class. Turrets had a 13” face, 4.5” roof, 11” sides, while barbettes were 10”. The TDS was based on a double hull with a single inboard armored bulkhead. (Arrangements on the QE class were similar except that the belt armor was about half the height, with the difference being covered by additional 6” armor.) In service, they didn’t stand up too well to torpedo hits, even after the modernizations of the 1930s.


Bayern also used an incremental armor scheme, with a 13.8" main belt, 6.7" upper belt covering the secondary batteries, and other parts of the ends and sides covered by 6.7-7" armor, deck armor ranging from 2.5to 3.9", turret faces & barbettes 13.8", turret roofs 3.9". A single 2" armored bulkhead and extensive compartmentilzation comprised the TDS.

The Nagatos were essentially knock-offs of the QEs, and the Tosa and Amagi classes stretched versions of the Nagato, incorporating a few advances such as sloped armor (Amagi trading a couple inches for speed), and although the first ships to get close to the US ones in protection, from the comments in Friedman's about what the USN was thinking in terms of for the undesigned South Dakota successors would have surpassed that.

Relative firepower between the standards, the R & QE classes, Bayern, and Nagato would have been approximately the same (broadside throw weight: Colorado about 16880 lbs, the 12x14” ships 16800 lbs, the British ships 15336 lbs (post-WW1 APC Mk. Va), Bayern 13248 lbs, and Nagato 17640 lbs. ) The debate between the relative effectiveness of a heavier shell with more kinetic energy and penetration potential versus the greater volume of fire and more gun barrels would be a rehash of the arguments about whether light or heavy cruisers were more effective for the same tonnage.

The G3s, had they been built, would have had an ‘A-B-Q’ arrangement, while the Nelsons (themselves a product of the treaty, being a version of one of the design studies cut down to treaty size) had an ‘A-B-C’ arrangement, neither of which are optimal for gunnery. For gunnery purposes, the optimal arrangement is the classical 4-turret, 8-gun ‘A-B-X-Y’ arrangement, although other design considerations can very often dictate other arrangements.

However, the G3s would have likely fallen victim to TTL treaty as well, as the design was a 1920-1 one, and probably wouldn’t have been started entering until 1925-6, and thus only partially built, and at nearly 50000 tons, well over the likely tonnage limits (35,000 tons being a British suggestion) assuming the government would have been willing to pay for them. The G3 design would have been several years newer, as well as nearly 20000 tons bigger than the standard type classes and 10000 bigger than the South Dakota, although the British 16” was something of a lemon. (TTL, barring any treaty interference, the first South Dakotas would have been entering service about 1921.) Furthermore, US designers had come up with concepts for a 30-knot fast battleship of about 50-55 thousand tons, with improved battleship protection, using inclined armor and substantially improved deck armor for long-range combat, and between 8-12 16”/50 Mk. 2 guns (also used on South Dakota), but the General Board didn’t want to go ahead with it just yet, for fear that it would start another revolution in battleship design that it didn’t want to have happen if it could be helped. Moreover, these guns were as powerful as anything else planned at the time, so much so, that they would have been used on the Iowas had there not been a major miscommunication between the designers and ordinance people, making the old guns in new turrets incompatible with the hull and requiring the new Mk. 7 gun to be designed.

The Lexington or two that would’ve been completed by 1920-1 would have been a real lemon, as the POD here would have meant the original 1916 design would have been built, without the 1918-9 revisions or much chance of a different change, although by 1919-20, the USN probably would have been looking at ways to complete a couple as carriers and cancel the other pair in favor of a new design.

Finally, the scenario had subscribed the USA would participate, how unlikely it may have seemed, so would have had to accept the agreement.

<Quote> "WWI Ended in 1917 when Germany forced Russia out of War and the Rest of the Allies sign a cease fire .
By 1920's the US pushes for the Washington Naval Treaty How would this treaty end up with Germany , A-H and the Ottoman Empires still around .
What would the German Fleet look like in the 1940's and how large would it be . "

This concludes that the Western Allies offered the cease fire and not the Central Powers. This move in it self was a geusture of accepting the Central Power's win in the Great War, resulting in the possition of Germany as primary European Power, also claiming oversea territories. In the peacetreaty, these would be returned to Germany, so Germany also wanted a big portion of the Naval Power needed for this. (The Japanese did not get the Bismarck Archipello and not the other possessions of the Germans in the Pacific, so they did not needed to be the second largest power either.) (as the USA lacked oversea possessions, except the Phillippines, it too did not need the largest fleet, according to this theory.)

Finally, the Scenario states: "The USA pushed foreward the WNT to end the new armsrace, being developped."
This meant, the USA were actually advocating the reduction in Navalpower in the world, by putting limmits on numbers of vessels to be built and maintained. Therefore, the USA would not be able to remain reliable, if itself wanted to get the most largest and most powerfull Navy. To make a good guesture, it would accept a secodnary role and could not allow to blow up the treaty, itself wanted.

Yes, I read the OP as well.

The German Pacific colonies were of practically no value to Germany, very difficult to defend especially if there’s a hostile power in Europe. A narrow CP victory isn’t going to make Germany the recognized dominant power in Europe; rather Europe is going to look like a replay of the 18th Century and the old Anglo-French rivalry because of concerns about the balance of power, old grievances left unaddressed, and minor border and colonial adjustments; the two sides are going to lick their wounds, and stare at each other for the better part of a generation before finding some excuse to have another go. Rinse & repeat until someone gets nukes making the old cycle too dangerous to continue. More or less a return to what was before the war with things adjusted a bit more in Germany’s favor, and if Germany with the #2 navy before the war didn’t make a substantial effort to defend them because of more pressing threats closer to home, why would they later, especially since the fundamental strategic calculus wouldn’t have changed much. And that’s assuming that the Germans even bother asking for them back (snapped up very quickly by the Japanese and Australians in 1914), which is not a common feature of CP victory scenarios (most of them simply have them sending Japan & the UK a bill), because of their basic indefensibility by Germany, which would have to send most of it’s fleet and a couple army corps halfway around the world to contest control of them, which would be difficult because of the short range of many German ships (designed for the North Side) and a lack of friendly bases, nor did the Germans really study long-range operations.

You’re also operating under a misapprehension over the US goals in calling for a naval conference- the US political leadership wasn’t seized by some sort of crazy pacifist brainbug. By 1920-21, there was starting to become considerable unease about paying for a new naval arms race, which was developing, and trying to limit the size of fleets through a treaty so that the goals of US naval strategy (rough parity with the strongest fleets in Europe to deter Eurpoean adventures in the Americas and maintain the superiority over Japan that it had for more than a decade) could be achieved by putting a lid on everything and not having to pay for another arms race. But again, on multiple threads, you’ve demonstrated considerable misunderstandings about US politics and consistent failures to do a complete job of researching your claims, so I’m not surprised you’d put the US in a borderline ASB situation.

Japan only came because the other powers were there and a few civilians in the government realized that after looking at the balance sheet, they couldn’t afford to build the fleet the Navy wanted. Britain came because their economy was still in sorry shape, and although they could still squeeze a few ships out, having to outbuild both the US & Japan would have been too much. Germany, in this scenario would have been in a similar situation, a heavily strained economy where a new naval race would muck things up even further. Britain and Germany would have had similar goals in using a treaty to nip the nascent arms race the US and Japan are starting off in the bud, likely saddle them with some older ships to keep numbers up, while using a provision to build Nelson-analogues to have a few ships better than anything else that could be built for several years.

Besides, if someone decided that they were going to get screwed in the negotiations, it wouldn’t have been that hard to push the Japanese into scuttling the talks- they almost did over Mutsu and several other points, and even despite everything they extorted, the negotiators were excoriated back home for subjecting Japan to what was seen as a ‘national insult and humiliation’- Japan signing on was a very narrow thing, and if anyone refuses to budge for Japan on a point, the whole thing could easily fall apart.