WI Zhukov given command of the winter war, and given as much latitude

Zhukov would have won a quick victory if in charge of the Winter War

  • Yes

    Votes: 25 33.3%
  • No

    Votes: 50 66.7%

  • Total voters
    75

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Zhukov's formal argument in PC about the November 4 intervention in Hungary was entirely about casualties. I think your impression of the man is under refined.

Possibly so. However, standards probably changed in the post-WWII Soviet Union and the world in general.
 
My second suggestion is that the acceptable casualty standards for Zhukov aren't related to the vozhd in 1941-1944 so much as the need to achieve definite military ends. 1945's excessive pace is widely agreed to be Stalin
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
My second suggestion is that the acceptable casualty standards for Zhukov aren't related to the vozhd in 1941-1944 so much as the need to achieve definite military ends. 1945's excessive pace is widely agreed to be Stalin

Obvious what if then. What if Stalin breaks his neck falling down the stairs in October 1944? What do the “non excessively paced” final European campaigns of 1945 look like then?
 
As @DrakonFin notes, 2 months probably benefits Finland more than the Soviets in terms of increased equipment availability.

I'm extremely skeptical the Soviets taking the actual time to prepare benefits the Finns more then the Soviets, given that the Soviets can commit proportionally much more massive resources then the Finns could ever hope to acquire. As it was, the Finns did acquire all the stuff DrakonFin talked about and even more from captured Soviet stocks from those first disastrous months… yet when the Soviets stopped dicking around with non-existant preparation, ditched the overcomplicated maneuver schemes, and brought up the appropriately equipped and trained troops, they managed to brute force the Mannerheim line after almost two months of attritional skirmishing to wear the Finns down followed by a week of all-out assault.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I'm extremely skeptical the Soviets taking the actual time to prepare benefits the Finns more then the Soviets, given that the Soviets can commit proportionally much more massive resources then the Finns could ever hope to acquire. As it was, the Finns did acquire all the stuff DrakonFin talked about and even more from captured Soviet stocks from those first disastrous months… yet when the Soviets stopped dicking around with non-existant preparation, ditched the overcomplicated maneuver schemes, and brought up the appropriately equipped and trained troops, they managed to brute force the Mannerheim line after almost two months of attritional skirmishing to wear the Finns down followed by a week of all-out assault.

I agree

What are the least difficult ties of the year to invade Finland by the way?
 
I'm extremely skeptical the Soviets taking the actual time to prepare benefits the Finns more then the Soviets, given that the Soviets can commit proportionally much more massive resources then the Finns could ever hope to acquire. As it was, the Finns did acquire all the stuff DrakonFin talked about and even more from captured Soviet stocks from those first disastrous months… yet when the Soviets stopped dicking around with non-existant preparation, ditched the overcomplicated maneuver schemes, and brought up the appropriately equipped and trained troops, they managed to brute force the Mannerheim line after almost two months of attritional skirmishing to wear the Finns down followed by a week of all-out assault.

A few months of extra time would increase the Finnish readiness for war pretty much automatically, the Finnish military leaders and politicians in the fall of 1939 being in agreement that immediate defence purchases would be necessary. Which they were: Turku, the city that became the premier trade port of Finland during Winter War IOTL, started the war with only three batteries of AA machine guns as the only active AA defence of the city, the shipyard and the port. The field artillery would use 1870s vintage artillery pieces. The Vickers 6-ton tanks the army had didn't have guns installed in their turrets. The first line fighter force of functional planes was made of thirty-three Fokker D.XXIs and ten Bristol Bulldogs. The list goes on. In these conditions every month of new acquisitions for the military will make significant improvements to the Finnish readiness for fighting a war for survival. IOTL, when the Finnish forces took new weapons and materiel in use during the war, they had to do this in conditions where the great majority of all trained personnel was engaged in wartime roles. If they could instead introduce this new equipment in peace-time conditions, albeit with increased readiness, this process would be easier and faster. Only a very small part of the weapons and equipment captured during the Winter War was used in that war, and most would only be used in the Continuation War: in the event, there was scarcely enough time and resources available to collect, fix, and field these captured goods during the short conflict.

Now, for the Soviets the question is not just time, but also the military and political leadership making the decision that Finland is a serious enemy, not a pushover. Not only would Zhukov have to understand this, he would also have to convince Stalin to give him his support for using significantly more resources and troops for the Finnish campaign that he had originally slated for the invasion. If this happens, if the Soviet leadership understands that Finland is not a military nonentity that will cave in after the Red Army kicks in the door, then giving the Soviets some months more time will probably work in the attackers' favour - just because of the huge disparity between the resources Finland and the USSR can commit to the fight. But just time alone will not help the Soviets to the extent it would help the Finns: if there is no joint understanding in the Soviet leadership about Finland being a serious adversary (more than "White militia" stuck in 1918 patterns of thought, strategy and tactics, with pro-German officers lording it over a mass of recalcitrant conscripts who will revolt or abandon their posts soon after the war begins), then some months of additional time will not fix the basic problem behind the Red Army's failure IOTL. Which was underestimating the enemy.


I agree

What are the least difficult ties of the year to invade Finland by the way?

From early June to mid-September. This avoids the problems of winter and rasputitsa, and allows the Soviet naval superiority to be used for the best advantage. Invading in the summer would bring some additional challenges for the Soviets, too. On the Karelian isthmus and north of the Ladoga the lakes and various swamps and marshes would be a bigger obstacle when they are not iced over. Generally, a Soviet invasion of Finland in the summer of 1940 would probably look like a mix between the OTL Winter War and the fighting of the summer of 1944. Both sides would in this scenario be stronger than in 1939 but weaker and not as effective as in 1944. Looking at these two OTL examples, I'd say that unless the Red Army here can somehow draw Finnish strength into secondary sub-fronts (like I mentioned above, for example with amphibious landings), then they will still have to use a lot of troops and put in a significant effort to smash through the Finnish defences on the isthmus and in southern Karelia. Assuming some real preparations by the Soviets to fight a real enemy in an actual war, this would probably take them from four to eight weeks, depending on various things on both sides. Eventually, the Finns would lose. The question is how long they can keep up a coherent front, and what political developments happen in the surrounding world: will they get outside help like IOTL (the Allied plans of intervention convincing Stalin to wrap up the war) or not? If not, Finland will fall and be occupied by the Red Army within two to three months from the beginning of the main Soviet attack.

The thing is, like I have said before, whether the Red Army uses four weeks or two months to get from the 1920 border to Helsinki, the war would still not make the Soviet Union look good in military terms. Like the OTL contemporary views of the war outside Finland show, in 1939-40 almost everyone saw Finland as a military midget and the USSR as a major, if not a great power. Given these expectations that practically, structurally make politicians, soldiers and the general public in Europe and America underestimate the difficulties the Soviets would have in invading Finland, I think that it is pretty much impossible that the world in general would not see the war as a Soviet failure, at least to some extent, even if they manage to wrap up the conquest of Finland in the smallest realistic number of weeks.
 
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He wins after a hard campaign.

Two months later, Citizen Zhukov, Georgi K., is unmasked as having always been a bonapartist in the pay of foreign intelligence services working for the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, and sentenced to the supreme measure of social self-defense --- RASSTREL!, death by shooting with confiscation of all personal property. Within a year the campaign is declared to be yet another act of military genius by Comrade Generalissimo Stalin, the First Marshal of World Communism.

Stalin could not permit any threats against his power.
 
But just time alone will not help the Soviets to the extent it would help the Finns: if there is no joint understanding in the Soviet leadership about Finland being a serious adversary (more than "White militia" stuck in 1918 patterns of thought, strategy and tactics, with pro-German officers lording it over a mass of recalcitrant conscripts who will revolt or abandon their posts soon after the war begins), then some months of additional time will not fix the basic problem behind the Red Army's failure IOTL. Which was underestimating the enemy.

That's kinda my point: the Soviets didn't take the time for serious preparations because they didn't take the Finns as a serious enemy. If their taking the time for serious preparations, then that means they've taken the Finns as a serious enemy and this problem of underestimation doesn't exist... or at least, is vastly reduced.

That does, of course, leave the question of whether Zhukov would view the Finns in such a manner and how he would get the rest of the Soviet leadership. I freely admit that those are open questions with unclear answer.

He wins after a hard campaign.

Two months later, Citizen Zhukov, Georgi K., is unmasked as having always been a bonapartist in the pay of foreign intelligence services working for the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, and sentenced to the supreme measure of social self-defense --- RASSTREL!, death by shooting with confiscation of all personal property. Within a year the campaign is declared to be yet another act of military genius by Comrade Generalissimo Stalin, the First Marshal of World Communism.

Stalin could not permit any threats against his power.

Yeah, sure. This is why, turning things around for the Soviets in the Winter War, Boris Shaposhnikov was arrested and executed in 1940-oh, no wait. He died of natural causes in 1945, while serving as the head of a military academy.

Well, let's look at all the famous Marshals who rose to prominence during the war. Surely such great successes would be arrested and executed for being threats to Stalin! Let's see... Zhukov: died 1974 from natural casuses. Rokossovsky: died 1968 from natural causes. Vasilevsky: Died 1977 from natural causes. Konev: Died 1973 from natural causes. Ya know... I'm having trouble finding senior Red Army commanders being arrested and executed after 1941. Strange. It seems that it took a lot more then mere success for Stalin to regard people as a threat.
 
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That's kinda my point: the Soviets didn't take the time for serious preparations because they didn't take the Finns as a serious enemy. If their taking the time for serious preparations, then that means they've taken the Finns as a serious enemy and this problem of underestimation doesn't exist... or at least, is vastly reduced.

That does, of course, leave the question of whether Zhukov would view the Finns in such a manner and how he would get the rest of the Soviet leadership. I freely admit that those are open questions with unclear answer.



Yeah, sure. This is why, turning things around for the Soviets in the Winter War, Boris Shaposhnikov was arrested and executed in 1940-oh, no wait. He died of natural causes in 1945, while serving as the head of a military academy.

Well, let's look at all the famous Marshals who rose to prominence during the war. Surely such great successes would be arrested and executed for being threats to Stalin! Let's see... Zhukov: died 1974 from natural casuses. Rokossovsky: died 1968 from natural causes. Vasilevsky: Died 1977 from natural causes. Konev: Died 1973 from natural causes. Ya know... I'm having trouble finding senior Red Army commanders being arrested and executed after 1941. Strange. It seems that it took a lot more then mere success for Stalin to regard people as a threat.

Wasn't he supposedly winding up to another purge before his death?
 
Well, let's look at all the famous Marshals who rose to prominence during the war. Surely such great successes would be arrested and executed for being threats to Stalin! Let's see... Zhukov: died 1974 from natural casuses. Rokossovsky: died 1968 from natural causes. Vasilevsky: Died 1977 from natural causes. Konev: Died 1973 from natural causes. Ya know... I'm having trouble finding senior Red Army commanders being arrested and executed after 1941. Strange. It seems that it took a lot more then mere success for Stalin to regard people as a threat.

Wasn't he supposedly winding up to another purge before his death?

Zhukov - sent to a nothing job after the war, given authority briefly by Khrushchev to be used against the Anti-Party Group, then sent back to the sticks.

Rokossovsky - dragged out of the GULag and given command, sent to Poland

Why not also count people like Budenny, Mekhlis, and Voroshilov? They were loyal Stalinist followers, and no threat to the Vozhd.

And, as Alanith said, the Doctors' Plot was the lead in to a whole new set of purges.
 
Wasn't he supposedly winding up to another purge before his death?

Sure. But we don't precisely know who would be purged (although we could make educated guesses... it seems like Molotov was boned). Stalin purged people he considered a threat, so it depends on his criteria of what constitutes a threat. And merely being successful obviously isn't enough.

Zhukov - sent to a nothing job after the war, given authority briefly by Khrushchev to be used against the Anti-Party Group, then sent back to the sticks.

Command of a military district may be a downgrade from Deputy Commissar of Defense, but it's far from a "nothing job". And he was also actually made defense minister for quite a long time after Beria's arrest and execution.

Rokossovsky - dragged out of the GULag and given command, sent to Poland

And basically made it's de-facto military ruler, a extremely important position given the importance Stalin attached to securing Poland.
 
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