WI Yugoslavia survives?

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OK, so there's no real agreement on the role of Serb domination or whether it existed at all. But it seems that we have relyable data which imply that Croatia and Slovenia (or more generally speaking the northern part of Jugoslavia), were economically better off than the rest. As I stated above, most separatist movements and movements for more autonomy in Western Europe are based on a simple economic slogan: "Why should we pay for THEM?". This is the case in Spain, Italy, Belgium. It was the case in Scotland, the richer southern German parts demand more autonomy...
And it was basically the case in Jugoslavia.

To conclude, there's a "We against them"-sentiment. I think the "We against them" situation got out of hand because
-there are clear religious barriers along which the "We" and the "Them" can be grouped
-there already were historical barriers along which one could construct the "We" and the "Them"
-it may seemed that many of "Those" were in the ruling class
-foreign countries (Germany, Austria) were willing to accept separatism.
 
The first one was dominated by Serbs. And Milosevic had such ideas as well.



Confederacy? Yugoslavia? No. It was a federation, and didnt to meet the requirements for a confederacy.

The Yugoslav central government, in the end, wasn't even able to control the "printing press" : Ante Markovic's aushterity program was undermined when Slovenia and Serbia abusively printed a billion or so dinars each, without asking Beograd.
 
OK, so there's no real agreement on the role of Serb domination or whether it existed at all. But it seems that we have relyable data which imply that Croatia and Slovenia (or more generally speaking the northern part of Jugoslavia), were economically better off than the rest. As I stated above, most separatist movements and movements for more autonomy in Western Europe are based on a simple economic slogan: "Why should we pay for THEM?". This is the case in Spain, Italy, Belgium. It was the case in Scotland, the richer southern German parts demand more autonomy...
And it was basically the case in Jugoslavia.

To conclude, there's a "We against them"-sentiment. I think the "We against them" situation got out of hand because
-there are clear religious barriers along which the "We" and the "Them" can be grouped
-there already were historical barriers along which one could construct the "We" and the "Them"
-it may seemed that many of "Those" were in the ruling class
-foreign countries (Germany, Austria) were willing to accept separatism.

Croatia had mainly economic and linguistic issues, Slovenia was concerned by centralization, both economical and political, and by the rising role of the Army.
 
What does "economic centralisation" in case of Yugoslavia mean?

Basically stronger State regulation at a federal level, and wealth redistribution towards Bosnia, which Slovenia considered advanced enough to survive on its own (while asking the federal government to maintain fixed prices in BiH, in order to buy capital goods at lower prices :D ).
 
OK, so there's no real agreement on the role of Serb domination or whether it existed at all. But it seems that we have relyable data which imply that Croatia and Slovenia (or more generally speaking the northern part of Jugoslavia), were economically better off than the rest. As I stated above, most separatist movements and movements for more autonomy in Western Europe are based on a simple economic slogan: "Why should we pay for THEM?". This is the case in Spain, Italy, Belgium. It was the case in Scotland, the richer southern German parts demand more autonomy...
And it was basically the case in Jugoslavia.

To conclude, there's a "We against them"-sentiment. I think the "We against them" situation got out of hand because
-there are clear religious barriers along which the "We" and the "Them" can be grouped
-there already were historical barriers along which one could construct the "We" and the "Them"
-it may seemed that many of "Those" were in the ruling class
-foreign countries (Germany, Austria) were willing to accept separatism.

This is a very good list, and economy was definately a large reason as well (see Croatian Spring).
 
Yes, Serb nationalism was an enormous problem but so were the other nationalisms; Croatia's Tudjman was every bit the thug Milosevic was.

If you get rid of Milosevic, you got rid of Tudjman as well. You see, Croatian and Slovenian nationalism was primarely economically-based before Milosevic, and their mainstream didnt involve far-right claims.

Get rid of Milosevic, and you stop the one person that was able to uplift nationalism in Yugoslavia. By diminishing the threat that was far-right Serbian nationalism, Croatian nationalism wont end up being far-right as a response. Tudjman was a nobody before Milosevic had started his far-right rethoric.
 
The Yugoslav central government, in the end, wasn't even able to control the "printing press" : Ante Markovic's aushterity program was undermined when Slovenia and Serbia abusively printed a billion or so dinars each, without asking Beograd.

A Confederacy is between independent states. None of the Yugoslavian ones were such states before the 1990-s. They also had one army. And a central government (ineffective as it was...).

The only thing that binds a confederacy is basically an international contract, and a common governing body whose decisions are not obligatory to the member-states. This would be the EU, even though it walks a fine line between a confederacy and a quasi-federation.
 
A Confederacy is between independent states. None of the Yugoslavian ones were such states before the 1990-s. They also had one army. And a central government (ineffective as it was...).

The only thing that binds a confederacy is basically an international contract, and a common governing body whose decisions are not obligatory to the member-states. This would be the EU, even though it walks a fine line between a confederacy and a quasi-federation.

De jure it surely was a federation: but when you have six central banks, and republican self defens armies, along with veto power on almost every issue, I don't think we are that far from extreme decentralization ;)
 
And yet most of the post-war armies were made up of former TO soldiers.

OK then. A couple of my friends have an airsoft club. If some of them join the army, does that make the airsoft club an army too?

The point was that Yugoslavia has a central standing army. Its millitary is not made out of the armed forces of the federal states. Therefore it cant count as a confederacy, since a confederacy doesnt have a central army.
 
OK then. A couple of my friends have an airsoft club. If some of them join the army, does that make the airsoft club an army too?

The point was that Yugoslavia has a central standing army. Its millitary is not made out of the armed forces of the federal states. Therefore it cant count as a confederacy, since a confederacy doesnt have a central army.

They weren't soft-air club, they were Yugoslavia's equivalents of the National Guard: TO stands for Territorial Defence, and they were trained militia organized roughly on the swiss model. The bulk of the much succesful secessionist armies was built on them, and their preparation was well known in the high ranks of the JPA.

For Tito's sake, how can we say that Yugoslavia's problem was excessive centralization if it was impossible even to know exactly how much public debt there was, and who had created it, due to the lack of control on Republican budgets !

In any case, I'm not arguing that Yugoslavia was a full confederacy, only that power was so devolved that a further decentralization woukd had meant the collapse of the State (as it happened, by the way, in 1990-1992).
 
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They weren't soft-air club, they were Yugoslavia's equivalents of the National Guard: TO stands for Territorial Defence, and they were trained militia organized roughly on the swiss model. The bulk of the much succesful secessionist armies was built on them, and their preparation was well known in the high ranks of the JPA.

For Tito's sake, how can we say that Yugoslavia's problem was excessive centralization if it was impossible even to know exactly how much public debt there was, and who had created it, due to the lack of control on Republican budgets !

Eh, Im tired of this. My point was that Yugoslavia was not a confederacy.
 
Also, a little correction on wealth differences between republics. It's true that Slovenia was way richer than the rest of the country, but not as much as it was written before in the thread : the 2:1 ratio was true only for Kosovo, compared to much of Yugoslavia Slovenia had a 20% advantage on medium income, while Croatia had a tinier gap.
 
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