WI: Yu-Go sakusen successful

Morison, volumes VII and VIII; Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in WW II; Maurer, Air Combat Units of WW II; etc. Morison, at least, should be in any college or major municipal public library in the US; may not be elsewhere in the Anglopshere (too many uncomfortable truths, even when gilded by Cold War courtesies), although Roskill is pretty easy to find in the US... as are Bryant, Churchill, and quite a few other rather "focused" texts.

If not, a tremendous amount of this material is available on the website of the Naval Historical Center, the Army War College, the Air War College, etc, and it is free - the Army Historical Center has the majority of the Army's official histories (the "Green Books") on-line, for example, and the NHC had some of the Administrative Histories as well...

If you really want a Pacific War where the Japanese "last longer" (forget "win"), though, 1941-45 is not going to be it, any more than 1941-45 can ever be folded, spun, and mutilated enough to yield a German "win" ...:rolleyes:

After Dec. 10, 1941, the result is clear; it's just a matter of time, given all else as historical up to that point.

Best,

Thank you for the detailed list of sources, would not be able to access any of the library works (or buy), but online materials would be interesting to peruse through. Hyperwar is one source i have read in the past.

As for the rest (especially Germany) let's agree to disagree, that's a subject for another topic anyway.

Have some other RL things on my head right now, so i'll have to offer only a brief reply to what CalBear posted earlier (regarding what is "acceptable" to make alternative history scenarios about), but i'll say i definitely do not agree to that concept. I have read all the forum regulations several times, and i can't find anything there about this "consensus". I have seen enough topics here in this section that imo are far more general, far less improbable to happen and improbable to even predict the flow of events after a given POD than things like Seelowe, and a few scenarios i have written about regarding IJN. However personally i have no problem with that, alternative history (as i understand it at least) is about exploring just that. What i have a problem is however pushing pet opinions as "consensus" and trying to inhibit folks from discussions challenging these said opinions. Trying to censor talking about the possibility of a succesful Seelowe or about some scenario in which IJN might do better in this or that battle i truly find it absurd! I don't understand why those who have a particular dislike for such scenarios just don't participate in. Is this to be traced to the exceptionalism mentioned by at least another member not long ago? If it is just that, then it is truly a pity.
 

CalBear

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One of the things seems clear about the IJN as an institution is the value placed on audacity and daring in opposition to organizational strengths seems like it was the offspring of the RN and the RM, taken to the extreme, and without the organizational abilities of the RN.

Best,

If there was something that the japanese were never lacking, that is agressiveness. As i have read the book i mentioned, the main and crucial problem was one of tactics, not of men. They used picket line type of operations until 1944, and when they changed that, it was far too late, the Ultra intelligence and numerical and technological ASW oposition was overwhelming.

As it was, probably catastrophic losses would not have been avoided but changing their tactics much earlier to more flexible ones would have at least gave them the chance to land a few more blows of their own.

Obviously, in retrospect the best way to use their subs would have been as the germans did.
Actually the Japanese were nowhere near as audacious or aggressive as is sometimes stated. They were masters of the hyper aggressive plan, but far from masters of completing it. Two really easy examples are Savo Island, and Samar.

In both cases the IJN commander had a strong degree of success in hand, but failed to press home the advantage. At Savo, the cruiser commander quite literally had the entire transport force, not to mention landed stores, at his mercy but withdrew to avoid possible air attack. This was probably a wise course of action, but it was also far from aggressive. At Samar Kurita failed to press an advantage that comes once in a lifetime, even though it wasn't the advantage he believe it was. He had the CVE force of Taffy 3 at his mercy, likely at least Taffy two as well, but chose to withdraw. The popular idea that he would have been able to waltz into the Leyte landing zone and wipe out the 'phibs is demonstrably wrong, but he believed he had several fleet carriers under his guns and chose to withdraw. Again, probably the right choice to save his remaining ships, although he was on what was effectively a suicide mission from the moment he left port and very much knew it, but the withdrawal was hardly audacious.

For that matter the unwillingness of the IJN senior command to risk what they saw as the Fleet's seriously high value units, their true battleships, in the struggle for Guadalcanal was anything but aggressive. The actions of the various submarine officers in the Solomons, who in 50-60 day patrols in a very crowded combat zone with both combat vessels and transports coursing through the area on a nearly daily basis, would claim that they found no targets in attack range, were hardly aggressive.

Aggressive was sending in the only two fast BB in the South Pacific into combat on November 13th with only four destroyers as an escort. Aggressive was sending two carriers (i.e. half the Pacific Fleet's offensive firepower) to launch an attack from 500 miles off the Japanese coast in April of 1942 or sending ALL of the fleet's available firepower to conduct an ambush based on, to that point, unproven code decrypts that were only able at the time to get about 20% of the messages decoded. Aggressive was conning a submarine into the Inland Sea, where the water was shallow and entry/exit point both narrow and poorly charted.

The IJN's reputation for aggression was built, as is the case with so much of the Empire's military myth, on the opening weeks of the war, when they launched a series of surprise attacks that were remarkably successful. From May of 1942 forward, with a few noteworthy exceptions, the IJN was, at best, initially aggressive but unwilling or unable to press their advantage. As the Allied force stopped reeling from the initial shock of the surprise attacks, and as their technological advantage began to show, the IJN became almost entirely reactive, hoping long after the ship had sailed, for the "Decisive Battle" in home waters where they would have all the advantages.

The IJN was in many cases brave, in most cases willing to die, but not aggressive. Suicidal =/= audacious.
 
There is no doubt of the faults within the the japanese leadership and bad calls they have made, i agree to that. Especially things like not commiting all the available forces at Guadalcanal, the examples you give, though i would not necessarily share the same opinion about the submarine operations off Guadalcanal. I find it very hard to believe the IJN sub derivers were cowards, because that's what would imply the lack of stronger activity and more results. Rather i would say it was due to the tactics, ie subs disposed in static positions, which continued into 1944. When US ships happened to cross IJN subs at Guadalcanal they got badly hurt as we know (Saratoga, Wasp etc.)

But indeed it is ironic that Japan had the most fearless and selfless (some would call it fanatism, it's a matter of angle i guess- bravery is some sort of fanatism after all) troops of those days, but in too many cases they didn't had a higher leadership to match, or not when it mattered.
 

iddt3

Donor
Thank you for the detailed list of sources, would not be able to access any of the library works (or buy), but online materials would be interesting to peruse through. Hyperwar is one source i have read in the past.

As for the rest (especially Germany) let's agree to disagree, that's a subject for another topic anyway.

Have some other RL things on my head right now, so i'll have to offer only a brief reply to what CalBear posted earlier (regarding what is "acceptable" to make alternative history scenarios about), but i'll say i definitely do not agree to that concept. I have read all the forum regulations several times, and i can't find anything there about this "consensus". I have seen enough topics here in this section that imo are far more general, far less improbable to happen and improbable to even predict the flow of events after a given POD than things like Seelowe, and a few scenarios i have written about regarding IJN. However personally i have no problem with that, alternative history (as i understand it at least) is about exploring just that. What i have a problem is however pushing pet opinions as "consensus" and trying to inhibit folks from discussions challenging these said opinions. Trying to censor talking about the possibility of a succesful Seelowe or about some scenario in which IJN might do better in this or that battle i truly find it absurd! I don't understand why those who have a particular dislike for such scenarios just don't participate in. Is this to be traced to the exceptionalism mentioned by at least another member not long ago? If it is just that, then it is truly a pity.

You won't find the consensus in any of the Forum Rules, it's what's been hashed out through literally thousands of pages of discussion, citation, and aggressive research. WWII being possibly the single most researched / popular area of AH, the most effort has gone into that, and the consensus is strongest. It's not a few people's opinions being taken as gospel or some sort of nationalist bias. Based on the forces arrayed against them, once the US was at war, Japan was going to lose. Full stop. The US had the resources to defeat Japan and any possible combination of it's allies, forces and technology, and the Japanese were so Doctrinaire and rigid so as to be incapable of responding to the US's advantages even as they grew more and more insurmountable.

Germany is slightly less certain to be defeated, it's theoretically possible, though abysmally unlikely, that Germany could defeat the USSR after Dec '41, make Europe more or less impenetrable, while the US simultaneously screws up in every way possible, completely flubs / ignores Manhattan, and gives up trying to conquer Europe as a bad job. Seelow, on the other hand, wasn't happening. Germany lacked the naval lift to get and supply forces to the UK, the naval forces to protect said lift, the aircraft to provide air cover for said lift, the institutional experience to *plan* said lift, the ground forces trained to execute said lift... and there is no changing that with any PoD after 1939.

The other big problem, and why both scenarios are normally avoided, is when you go prewar and try to set up either Japan winning or Sealion, the actions the Japan and Germany take end up butterflying the scenario that you're trying to create. Maybe Japan builds more carriers and breaks the Washington Naval treaty early, and gets better training. The US as a result builds more carriers of it's own and still swamps Japan. Or maybe Japan never signs the WNT in the first place and goes all out on building? Japan ends up bankrupted in the resulting arms race well before WWII even happens. Likewise, for Germany, attempting to build the fleet that can defeat the British is both likely to provoke a British response, and comes at the cost of some other part of it's armed forces.

To make either one happen you need more than just a finger on the scale, you need to weigh the odds absurdly heavily, across the board, for years. Every British bomb dropped needs to be a dud, every incompetent prompted, every good officer slain by freak chance, and every round fired by the Wehrmacht needs to strike home. In light of all this, rather than rehash the details and citations everytime we get a new member who is excited about this new thing they've heard of that's Sealion, we just tell them that the consensus is no.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
You won't find the consensus in any of the Forum Rules, it's what's been hashed out through literally thousands of pages of discussion, citation, and aggressive research. WWII being possibly the single most researched / popular area of AH, the most effort has gone into that, and the consensus is strongest. It's not a few people's opinions being taken as gospel or some sort of nationalist bias. Based on the forces arrayed against them, once the US was at war, Japan was going to lose. Full stop. The US had the resources to defeat Japan and any possible combination of it's allies, forces and technology, and the Japanese were so Doctrinaire and rigid so as to be incapable of responding to the US's advantages even as they grew more and more insurmountable.

Germany is slightly less certain to be defeated, it's theoretically possible, though abysmally unlikely, that Germany could defeat the USSR after Dec '41, make Europe more or less impenetrable, while the US simultaneously screws up in every way possible, completely flubs / ignores Manhattan, and gives up trying to conquer Europe as a bad job. Seelow, on the other hand, wasn't happening. Germany lacked the naval lift to get and supply forces to the UK, the naval forces to protect said lift, the aircraft to provide air cover for said lift, the institutional experience to *plan* said lift, the ground forces trained to execute said lift... and there is no changing that with any PoD after 1939.

The other big problem, and why both scenarios are normally avoided, is when you go prewar and try to set up either Japan winning or Sealion, the actions the Japan and Germany take end up butterflying the scenario that you're trying to create. Maybe Japan builds more carriers and breaks the Washington Naval treaty early, and gets better training. The US as a result builds more carriers of it's own and still swamps Japan. Or maybe Japan never signs the WNT in the first place and goes all out on building? Japan ends up bankrupted in the resulting arms race well before WWII even happens. Likewise, for Germany, attempting to build the fleet that can defeat the British is both likely to provoke a British response, and comes at the cost of some other part of it's armed forces.

To make either one happen you need more than just a finger on the scale, you need to weigh the odds absurdly heavily, across the board, for years. Every British bomb dropped needs to be a dud, every incompetent prompted, every good officer slain by freak chance, and every round fired by the Wehrmacht needs to strike home. In light of all this, rather than rehash the details and citations everytime we get a new member who is excited about this new thing they've heard of that's Sealion, we just tell them that the consensus is no.
It even goes beyond that. I asked pretty much the same question, albeit in somewhat less confrontational manner, when I first joined. Even then there were subjects, like Sealion, that had been pretty much demonstrated as impossible (Ian actually wrote a rather nice essay on the impossibility that is accessible on the log-in page IIRC) an all that pushing up the dead issue did was cause fireworks (there is a reason that it is called the Unmentionable Sea Mammal).

It was also noted that to post in the Main Forum (there was no pre/post 1900 split at the time) the standard was being able to defend the POD, maybe not with the rigor of a Doctoral dissertation, but to demonstrate that it was possible, assuming certain, non "Divine Intervention" changes occurred. In essence the main forum was about alternates, but reality grounded ones. Ones that were not defensible, even if they were of low probability (I'll offer up my set in AANW, as an example of stretching, they were possible, given the individuals and systems involved, but far from likely). Once the POD itself was established then the rest of the T/L had somewhat more freedom, but again, the reality had to be maintained (you don't go from Pattern 1853 Enfield rifled muskets to AK-47s without a number of intermediate steps, that goes back to the "Divine Intervention" bit).

There were, it was explained (and still are), two different forums for T/L or scenarios that do not requite this, admittedly rather high, bar. They are ASB (which, unfortunately has become rather less than it could be) and the Writer's Forum. The Writer's Forum, in particular, is all about the quality of the work, and much less about the research into the POD, although there are some pretty good POD to be found there.

All of this was firmly in place by 2005, carried over from the "Old Board". This was in part because the site was set-up to allow discussion and postings that were not subject to the dreck that killed alt.AH on Usenet (yes, I remember Usenet), but also in part because it helped to ensure a civil discourse.

AH.com has grown enormously during the time since I signed up. I believe that a large reason for that is the general consensus regarding how things work, based on Ian's basic rule of being civil and discussing issues, not flaming other members.
 
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