WI: Yamato is sent to the Solomon Islands

[Athelstane]

Most of the good points have been made so well by Calbear, TFSmith and others. I can only add two more points for consideration:

1. If Yamato gets sent, she's not going by herself. Up through Leyte Gulf, that sort of thing wasn't IJN practice. Even setting aside the support ships and minimum of escort destroyers, it's quite improbable that Yamamoto would send a Yamato class battlewagon to the Solomons without a considerable surface force along with her, including at least one or more other capital ships.

It also seems unlikely that this deployment of major surface units - which would, along with forces already present or near the Solomons, essentially amount to a critical chunk of its "Decisive Battle" force - would not be accompanied by additional air assets, either carrier or land-based. It's also a considerable expenditure of fuel - which as Glenn has noted, Japan could manage, but would nonetheless mean a major drawdown of reserves, fuel that could not be used elsewhere.

2. With that in mind, Calbear's observation that the U.S. is going to know that the IJN is sending in the heavy cavalry from her various intelligence means will take on extra force, and therefore "it is very possible that Halsey doesn't send Admiral Lee into harm's way (Halsey was aggressive, not stupid)." And it's hard to imagine them blundering into it by accident. Running into a handful of cruisers by accident (Savo Island) is one thing; the kind of force that Yamato would be sailing with would be a lot harder to miss.

Indeed, it means that Nimitz and Halsey would have to alter strategy a fair bit. In the slightly longer run, it very likely means additional capital ships get deployed to the South Pacific as soon as possible, since the poker table will increasingly have the look of Yamamoto going "all in," or something close enough to it.

 

[CalBear]

Sorry I goofed.

Alright, BB fights. If the American ships can keep their distance they can do some serious damage in the right circumstances, However the Japanese still had night-fighting plus they're masters of surprise.

"The Great Cruiser Massacre?" anyone.

It will probably be written as a masterstroke and may cause the US to try to get Montana's up and running if they put together what the Yamato really was. Remember until 1945 they thought the big bastard had 16 inch cannon. Holes the size of 18 inch is going to cause a collective shit in the US Navy.

Biggest difference from Savo Island is that Admiral Willis (Ching) Lee was not only able to understand that radar had changed everything, but was a gunnery expert. His command was one of, if not the, best drilled in the Fleet. Getting into a fight with his command at knife fighting range was poor choice.

 

[Scafcom]

Mutsu is at Truk as well during most of the campaign. She even sortied a couple of times and I believe was at Eastern Solomons with Nagumo.

 

[TheYoungPretender]

Biggest difference from Savo Island is that Admiral Willis (Ching) Lee was not only able to understand that radar had changed everything, but was a gunnery expert. His command was one of, if not the, best drilled in the Fleet. Getting into a fight with his command at knife fighting range was poor choice.

I particularly like the wiki quote about the man - "he knew more about radar than the radar operators."

 

[Glenn239]

Yamamoto wasn't housed on the Yamato for its luxurious accommodations, or to make him fell important. He was there (and some have postulated was initially promoted to C-i-C, which placed him afloat) to keep some hyper-nationalist Army officer from splitting his brisket. To say that Yamamoto was unpopular among the ultra-nationalists is similar to noting that the Pacific Ocean is wide, true but far from fully descriptive.

During the Solomons Campaign the IJN cruiser and destroyer crews dubbed the Yamato "Hotel Yamato", apparently for its never participating in active operations while having the best food and drink.

 

[173rd LRRP]

Admiral Willis Lee was one of the finest small arms shooters in the world at both pistol and rifle. He took five Gold Medals (plus a Silver and Bronze in shooting at 1920 Olympics. He was the gunnery expert in the US Navy.

 

[mack8]

A few more points in reply to some of the posts above.

South Dakota was damaged as it is well known (including by a 14 inch hit), she wasn't unscathed.

Reading what CalBear said, thanks again for more interesting info, i'll just comment on the quality of the armour tested, it may well be that the subpar performace of some plates meant for Shinano was caused by the pressures of war (ie poor quality steel). It may well be that the quality of armour in Yamato was approaching that of the 7'21'' plate (afterall it was their most powerful super-battleship, they surely didl their best to use the best quality materials for her), we don't know.

As for the importance of radar, looking at some summaries of those battles it appears that while the US ships spotted their opponents on radar first the japanese were not far off in spotting the US ships in return. It is said Yamato's optics were of very good quality, and coupled with her height, it's entirely conceivable she could spot the US ships in timely manner.

As for Athelstane said, i fully agree with the logic of it, however if Halsey choses not to engage what would likely be the bulk of the japanese fleet (if Yamamoto really goes all in) that means leaving the US troops on Guadalcanal at the mercy of the japanese. If he declines to engage then the airfield is ripped to pieces, aircraft destroyed and probably a lot more japanese troops and supplies are landed. And with no apparent US opposition they can bombard the US troops more than one night. Would the japanese manage to take the airfield now? Who knows, but the US troops will feel betrayed (again), and there will be a lot more misery ahead.

On the other hand, if Halsey will still engage in this scenario he risk his forces being literally anihilated, regardless of the japanese losses he's risking even the BBs lost, it is not unlikely they will be overwhelmed by even just Yamato and the Kongos with their CA and DDs, let alone having the Nagatos there too.

But really, if somehow Yamamoto would have had an epiphany moment and decided to go all in, the best times would have been August, September (one single US CV operational) or October at the latest to have a good chance to take Guadalcanal back.

Ironically, every available combat ready IJN carriers have been commited to the Guadalcanal battles, but of the 11 BBs only the four Kongos ever fired in anger.

 

[Glenn239]

A few more points in reply to some of the posts above.

Armor and armoring piercing discussions are above my pay grade. According to Navweapons -

Yamato's 18.1" guns fired a 3219lbs shell at 2559fps.
North Carolina was 2700lbs at 2300fps

1/2 mass * velocity squared. At the end of the barrel, Yamato's 18.1" shell had a whopping 48% more kinetic energy than did North Carolina's 16".

 

[CalBear]

Armor and armoring piercing discussions are above my pay grade. According to Navweapons -

Yamato's 18.1" guns fired a 3219lbs shell at 2559fps.
North Carolina was 2700lbs at 2300fps

1/2 mass * velocity squared. At the end of the barrel, Yamato's 18.1" shell had a whopping 48% more kinetic energy than did North Carolina's 16".

It goes WAY beyond pure velocity. There is, however, no doubt that the 460mm guns could penetrate the armor of the U.S. ships at certain ranges and angles, as is the reverse. The question is, again, a matter of gun crews, drilling and not just spotting, but gunnery accuracy.

Too big a force and Halsey doesn't send in Lee (the U.S. had eyes on the Japanese both days before the battle joined, both aircraft and subs, in addition the coastwatcher network was in use). One quest is, how large a force makes Halsey blink. If it is five battleships he will not send them out. Even odds he will. the question comes in at 2:3 odds.

That might be enough to let Halsey throw the dice. If the ships were Yamato, Mutsu and Kirishima, that would not be a good thing. Of course the first battle, where Hiei was crippled, happened a full day before the battleship action, and Halsey would have good information of the super sized IJN ship (which, BTW would have been much less effective in the bombardment role than the Kongos, since she had almost no HE in her magazines, and none available closer than the Home Islands).

As has been said, sending any of the super heavies, including Mutsu, much less Yamato, means that Yamamoto has abandoned four decades of IJN strategic policy and is gambling the entire war on one action in confined waters. It is not at all out of the question that the Admiral Nagano countermands him if he tries it.

 

[TheYoungPretender]

Armor and armoring piercing discussions are above my pay grade. According to Navweapons -

Yamato's 18.1" guns fired a 3219lbs shell at 2559fps.
North Carolina was 2700lbs at 2300fps

1/2 mass * velocity squared. At the end of the barrel, Yamato's 18.1" shell had a whopping 48% more kinetic energy than did North Carolina's 16".

If it hits... If it hits!

http://www.combinedfleet.com/b_fire.htm

I'm linking to that because it underlines, in one of the footnotes, the feats that US fire control was capable of. Capable of maintaining a solution while engaging in violent evasive maneuvers is effectively being able to have your cake and eat it too - you can inflict damage while, especially at night, also being to break the solution the other ship has on you. The test ship is Washington's sister ship, it's a good data point.

Combine that fact with Washington is under Lee, a man who's somewhat justly convinced that when it comes to guns, he's the best that ever was. This is a well drilled ship, with an excellent fire control system, that can perform evasive maneuvers whilst putting shells on its target. This is a ship which as someone has noted above, was putting enough shells on target that shells from the same turret may have gone through the same hole as the previous shells.

I think there is a case to be made that if South Dakota hadn't had a power failure, the OTL fight would have been even more like Tsushima. Bring Nagato, bring Yamato if you like - the big thing is that, unlike it's cruisers and destroyers, the IJN's battleships may have been shooting for the previous war.

 

[1965 Timelord]

To Reply 'In Harm's Way'(the movie by Duke) for the WI

The only thing that was shown of what a Yamato BB involvement could have done in a Solomon/Guadalcanal Campaign scenario was in a 1965 war movie directed by Otto Preminger in which on the last scenes of the aerial reconnaissance spotted a IJN reinforcement fleet with the Yamato BB in that fleet and the defending USN scrambled with the available bombardment fleet assets(CA's, CL's, DD's, DE's, FAC's). IJN brushed aside sea mines and FAC attacks(with some damage and sinking on their screening fleet assets). Then only after mauling the DD's, DE's and the CL's and CA's, the IJN admiral commanding the reinforcements blinked on the defending USN fleet's tenacity(and seeing the elephant ) retreated. Of course, if the admiral commanding the reinforcement was a ruthless glory hound, then the battle would be different because he doesn't believe that the defending USN fleet has help coming within minutes and has no compunction of sacrificing his screening assets for greater accolades from his emperor due his super BB supposed invincibility. But I think he'll blink on the USS South Dakota and the USS Washington among the cruisers