WI: Yamato is sent to the Solomon Islands

On paper, anyway, Yamato was at Truk for the balance of the Guadalcanal campaign acting as headquarters and if I recall correctly, a source of fuel.
 
On paper, anyway, Yamato was at Truk for the balance of the Guadalcanal campaign acting as headquarters and if I recall correctly, a source of fuel.

Yamato was Yamamoto's floating hotel. The USN was more advanced in this sense, placing Nimitz in a shore facility where any possible corruption of luxurious accommodations would, at least, not tie down a vital fleet asset. Yamamoto seemed a politically astute manipulator that knew to kiss the Emperor's ass. But really, the Emperor should have booted him off "his" ship and told him it was for combat purposes.

In terms of the IJN logistics and capacity to use Yamato off Guadalcanal. Fuel logistics for the IJN at Truk were like a family budget which could be spent on this or that, but not everything. If the intention was to make a major fleet sweep, then the logistics to that were to move the five (or so) tankers from the NEI (or Japan) to Truk, fuel up the units, and execute the mission. The tempo of operations would fall off, but the capacity to use the battleship existed because the IJN did have the oil production and the tankers to make it happen.
 
Many have made some very good posts here, regarding the capabilities and value of the opposing ships, the japanese fuel situation etc. If i'm to chime in, i of course believe that if Yamamoto decided to commit Yamato and all the Kongos to Guadalcanal, it would have been the best damn decision he could have taken (regardless who won the war). I also think that it's quite unlikely Yamato would have been sunk by the available US air power even if damaged, there were only a few dozens of aircraft available on Cactus anyway. As pointed out it took HUNDREDS of carrier aircraft to sink Yamato and Musashi.

Commiting Yamato and at least the Kongos would probably mean the first battle will result in almost the whole US naval force being wiped out regardless of damage to the japanese, as there could be 3-5 IJN battleships there, not 2.

Of course, the next battle is what we all would like to see, especially if Yamato is there. If South Dakota's electrics choose to go off at this very inoportune time, she's in big trouble. Historically the japanese initially concentrated on her no? With more japanese BBs there than means more 14 inch and EIGHTEEN inch hits. Even if Washington fires on Yamato at close range, Yamato could do the same, and anyway this frees the remaining japanese BBs and CAs to go after Washington. Maybe a classic duel won't sink any of the opposing battleships, but the torpedoes would. Historically Washington was unbelievably lucky to not be hit by the Long Lances thrown at her. If both US BBs are damaged, slowed and with fires on, they're in mortal danger.

Conversely, Yamato is of course in a whole different class compared to Kirishima and even the US ships as far as armour is concerned. I don't think those hits taken by Kirishima would stop her, damage yes, but not stop her.

This is my opinion anyway, a possible scenario, we may never know what would have really happened.
 

CalBear

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Yamato was Yamamoto's floating hotel. The USN was more advanced in this sense, placing Nimitz in a shore facility where any possible corruption of luxurious accommodations would, at least, not tie down a vital fleet asset. Yamamoto seemed a politically astute manipulator that knew to kiss the Emperor's ass. But really, the Emperor should have booted him off "his" ship and told him it was for combat purposes.

In terms of the IJN logistics and capacity to use Yamato off Guadalcanal. Fuel logistics for the IJN at Truk were like a family budget which could be spent on this or that, but not everything. If the intention was to make a major fleet sweep, then the logistics to that were to move the five (or so) tankers from the NEI (or Japan) to Truk, fuel up the units, and execute the mission. The tempo of operations would fall off, but the capacity to use the battleship existed because the IJN did have the oil production and the tankers to make it happen.

Yamamoto wasn't housed on the Yamato for its luxurious accommodations, or to make him fell important. He was there (and some have postulated was initially promoted to C-i-C, which placed him afloat) to keep some hyper-nationalist Army officer from splitting his brisket. To say that Yamamoto was unpopular among the ultra-nationalists is similar to noting that the Pacific Ocean is wide, true but far from fully descriptive.
 
Well, i did read that was indeed the situation before the war, but is that really going to happen in autumn 1942? Yamamoto did moved from Yamato to shore in Rabaul for I-Go, before he was killed by the P-38s.

Have read an anecdote, not sure if true, but it is said that an army officer pleaded with Yamamoto for help with the desperate situation on Guadalcanal, and Yamamoto said something to the effect of "i'll give you help even if i'll have to park Yamato next to Guadalcanal to bomb the enemy positions" or something like that. But he only sent the Kongos unfortunately, and only 2 of them.
 

CalBear

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Many have made some very good posts here, regarding the capabilities and value of the opposing ships, the japanese fuel situation etc. If i'm to chime in, i of course believe that if Yamamoto decided to commit Yamato and all the Kongos to Guadalcanal, it would have been the best damn decision he could have taken (regardless who won the war). I also think that it's quite unlikely Yamato would have been sunk by the available US air power even if damaged, there were only a few dozens of aircraft available on Cactus anyway. As pointed out it took HUNDREDS of carrier aircraft to sink Yamato and Musashi.

Commiting Yamato and at least the Kongos would probably mean the first battle will result in almost the whole US naval force being wiped out regardless of damage to the japanese, as there could be 3-5 IJN battleships there, not 2.

Of course, the next battle is what we all would like to see, especially if Yamato is there. If South Dakota's electrics choose to go off at this very inoportune time, she's in big trouble. Historically the japanese initially concentrated on her no? With more japanese BBs there than means more 14 inch and EIGHTEEN inch hits. Even if Washington fires on Yamato at close range, Yamato could do the same, and anyway this frees the remaining japanese BBs and CAs to go after Washington. Maybe a classic duel won't sink any of the opposing battleships, but the torpedoes would. Historically Washington was unbelievably lucky to not be hit by the Long Lances thrown at her. If both US BBs are damaged, slowed and with fires on, they're in mortal danger.

Conversely, Yamato is of course in a whole different class compared to Kirishima and even the US ships as far as armour is concerned. I don't think those hits taken by Kirishima would stop her, damage yes, but not stop her.

This is my opinion anyway, a possible scenario, we may never know what would have really happened.
It did take hundreds of aircraft. Overall they put ~12 1,000 pound SAP bombs and ~7 torpedoes into Yamato, for a total of 19 major weapon hits in just over two hours.

Washington put at least 9 16" 2,700 pound AP shells, and at least 40 5" AP high velocity rounds into Kirishima, probably many more. She did this in SEVEN MINUTES.

Based on data from both survivors and remote undersea vehicle inspection by Bob Ballard, Robert Lundgren estimates that 20 16" rounds struck Kirishima and some 19 secondary battery strikes. This included six hits on or below the waterline (and one hit that appears to have struck one of her rudders). Lungren is of the opinion, based on damage assessments that match survivor statements, that several hits were so close together (likely from neighboring guns in the same turret) that observers on Washington assumed they were single hits.

In all likelihood Washington did more damage to Kirishima, in seven minutes, than Yamato absorbed off Okinawa, based on Robert Lundgren's analysis and the relative damage between 1,000 pound SAP and Mak 15 torpedo warheads and 16" AP shells. One of Kirishima's surviving officers (her loss is noteworthy in addition to the manner, in the number of survivors, some 80% of her crew survived) states that he observed two 10 METER (33 foot) holes in her main armored deck where main gun rounds struck. That is considerably more damage than a SAP bomb could accomplish.

There is no doubt that aircraft spelled the death of big gun warships, but it was not because those warships were anything but death incarnate. It was because the aircraft could kill that armored monster hundreds of miles from their mother ship, killing it a full day before it could attempt to return the favor.

Washington OR South Dakota could have sunk or mission killed Yamato with the same sort of performance that sank Kirishima. The question is if Yamato could have sunk or mission killed them before they had the chance to return the favor.

http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf
 
It did take hundreds of aircraft. Overall they put ~12 1,000 pound SAP bombs and ~7 torpedoes into Yamato, for a total of 19 major weapon hits in just over two hours.

Washington put at least 9 16" 2,700 pound AP shells, and at least 40 5" AP high velocity rounds into Kirishima, probably many more. She did this in SEVEN MINUTES.

Based on data from both survivors and remote undersea vehicle inspection by Bob Ballard, Robert Lundgren estimates that 20 16" rounds struck Kirishima and some 19 secondary battery strikes. This included six hits on or below the waterline (and one hit that appears to have struck one of her rudders). Lungren is of the opinion, based on damage assessments that match survivor statements, that several hits were so close together (likely from neighboring guns in the same turret) that observers on Washington assumed they were single hits.

In all likelihood Washington did more damage to Kirishima, in seven minutes, than Yamato absorbed off Okinawa, based on Robert Lundgren's analysis and the relative damage between 1,000 pound SAP and Mak 15 torpedo warheads and 16" AP shells. One of Kirishima's surviving officers (her loss is noteworthy in addition to the manner, in the number of survivors, some 80% of her crew survived) states that he observed two 10 METER (33 foot) holes in her main armored deck where main gun rounds struck. That is considerably more damage than a SAP bomb could accomplish.

There is no doubt that aircraft spelled the death of big gun warships, but it was not because those warships were anything but death incarnate. It was because the aircraft could kill that armored monster hundreds of miles from their mother ship, killing it a full day before it could attempt to return the favor.

Washington OR South Dakota could have sunk or mission killed Yamato with the same sort of performance that sank Kirishima. The question is if Yamato could have sunk or mission killed them before they had the chance to return the favor.

http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf
A good point, plus heaven help the Yamato if a shell gets the drop on its wooden decks. Thats right, wood, and people attack the British for sending Hood after Bismarck.

And the ship was noted for having structural stiffness that lowered its protective ability in the torpedo area.
 
Thank you for the Kirishima report CalBear, that was an interesting read. Imo, it shows that likely it would taken a helluva lot more than even 20 16 inch hits to sink the Yamato, there must be buffs outhere who know Yamato inside out, she must be a far, far tougher nut to crack. Are there any details as to the penetration ability of US 16 inch shells such as used by Washington?

A good point, plus heaven help the Yamato if a shell gets the drop on its wooden decks. Thats right, wood, and people attack the British for sending Hood after Bismarck.

And the ship was noted for having structural stiffness that lowered its protective ability in the torpedo area.

Obviously the wooden deck was there for functionality reasons only, there was 75mm armour under it if i'm reading right.
 
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CalBear

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Thank you for the Kirishima report CalBear, that was an interesting read. Imo, it shows that likely it would taken a helluva lot more than even 20 16 inch hits to sink the Yamato, there must be buffs outhere who know Yamato inside out, she must be a far, far tougher nut to crack. Are there any details as to the penetration ability of US 16 inch shells such as used by Washington?



Obviously the wooden deck was there for functionality reasons only, there was 75mm armour under it if i'm reading right.

An interesting perspective, considering the fact that fewer, less damaging weapon hits sank Yamato outright. It is also worth noting that Washington checked fire, not due to lack of ammunition, but to search for other, still dangerous targets. She only fired a total of 117 main gun rounds (meaning about 1 in 6 actually hit, a remarkable figure) or around 10% of her magazine. She could, in different circumstances, have maintained that rate of fire, and hit percentage, for over an hour or until the guns were too hot to fire, whichever occurred first .

The Mark 33 SAP was rated for a maximum penetration of 5" of armor, depending on height and/or speed of aircraft, as was the heavier, and much more rare Mark 1. Neither weapon was rated to penetrate more than 5" of armor. Interestingly, this means that the bombs should not have been able to do significant damage to Yamato, since her deck plating was 200-226mm (7.9-8.9"), yet it is clear that they were quite lethal.

http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/B/o/Bombs.htm

At the engagement ranges found in the 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, which was at relative knife fighting range for super-dreadnoughts (5-12,000 yards) penetration for the 2,700 AP Mark 8 from the 16"/45 was between 23.5" & 26" (597-676mm) at zero degrees (this performance is increased by roughly 15% for the 16"50 found on the Iowas and planned for the Montana class). Yamato's max belt was 410mm (16"). While armor thickness alone is not the only factor, in fact the way the armor and defensive scheme is designed is more critical, but they are indicative of probable base success.

The fact that the Mark 33 made major damaging hits, as did the Mark 13 air dropped torpedo, when they should not have, on paper been capable of causing the sort of damage inflicted, is suggestive of just how effective the heavy gunfire of the USN ships would have been.

Japanese armor has also found to be of remarkably uneven quality in post war U.S. testing. Some was far below expectations, others were quite impressive. In tests on the turret armor meant for Shinano, one plate suffered a complete failure, barely slowing the shell down, to the point that the shell passed through the plate, exited the testing facility, and wound up in the Potomac, never to be seen again. the other suffered a penetration, as was to be expected, but stopped the shell although it again failed to deform it in any way except for the AP cap and wind shield. The same USN facility, however, tested a piece of 7.21" armor and found it to be the BEST piece of armor in its class ever tested.

There is no doubt that the 16" Mark 8 would have been capable of doing the same level of damage as any of the aircraft delivered weapons. Based on actual testing the shells would have provided several times the penetration and accompanying damage of the smaller, much lighter, bombs, although the comparison of torpedo damage to shell damage is more difficult to quantify. Even the previous generation 2,240 pound Mark 5, as used on the Colorado class, would have been far more damaging than the 1,000 pound SAP.

Question is, can non radar directed gunnery be as effective as millimeter radar directed gunnery, or at least effective enough to score major hits before Yamato was snowed under by 16" salvos.

edit: In all likelihood, Yamato would have proved to be like almost all true battleships, and been impossible to sink exclusively with gunfire. Likely killed by guns, finished by torpedoes (maybe even IJN torpedoes, there is no way the Japanese would have risked her falling into U.S. hands as a prize).
 
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Sorry I goofed.:eek:

Alright, BB fights. If the American ships can keep their distance they can do some serious damage in the right circumstances, However the Japanese still had night-fighting plus they're masters of surprise.

"The Great Cruiser Massacre?" anyone.

It will probably be written as a masterstroke and may cause the US to try to get Montana's up and running if they put together what the Yamato really was. Remember until 1945 they thought the big bastard had 16 inch cannon:eek:. Holes the size of 18 inch is going to cause a collective shit in the US Navy.
 
The USN probably would not have been too worried if they knew all the truth about the Yamotos. The 16 inch guns Mark 7 guns on the Iowas, particularly with the Mark 8 shells, were the equal of, if not superior to, the 18 inchguns on the Yamoto. Further, as CalBear noted, the protection scheme Yamotos had issues and in reality was probably far less impressive than on paper.
Sorry I goofed.:eek:

Alright, BB fights. If the American ships can keep their distance they can do some serious damage in the right circumstances, However the Japanese still had night-fighting plus they're masters of surprise.

"The Great Cruiser Massacre?" anyone.

It will probably be written as a masterstroke and may cause the US to try to get Montana's up and running if they put together what the Yamato really was. Remember until 1945 they thought the big bastard had 16 inch cannon:eek:. Holes the size of 18 inch is going to cause a collective shit in the US Navy.
 
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The USN probably would not have been too worried if they knew all the truth about the Yamotos. The 16" guns Mark 7 guns on the Iowas, particularly with the Mark 8 shells, were superior to the 18" guns on the Yamoto. Further, as CalBear noted, the protection scheme Yamotos had issues and in reality was probably far less impressive than on paper.
I'd pay to see the head rolling though for this one, this is the second time an allied force has been bushwacked like this and if its anything like Savo Island (Limited Japanese Damage, Massive US Damage) there's going to be much butchering of commanders. Especially the battleship commanders.
 
Why start with the assumption of a Savo Island? That's regarded as the worst defeat in US history. Given that the new battleships generally had better crews and officers than the ships involved in Savo Island, this sort of outcome seems unlikely.
I'd pay to see the head rolling though for this one, this is the second time an allied force has been bushwacked like this and if its anything like Savo Island (Limited Japanese Damage, Massive US Damage) there's going to be much butchering of commanders. Especially the battleship commanders.
 
Yeah, there is that...:rolleyes:

The point is that quantity has a quality all of its own; when one combines quantity with quality - as in the USN in WW II - there's really no way that exemplars and outliers (wonder weapons or not) are going to make a significant difference.

From 1941-45, the Japanese commissioned (roughly) a half dozen capital ships and fleet carriers (Shokaku, Zuikaku, Yamato, Musashi, Taiho, maybe Unryu if one squints)...

The USN commissioned Hornet, 14 Essex class fast carriers, 10 fast battleships, and two battlecruisers ... and rebuilt, almost from the keel up, the Big 5 Standards, for that matter.

4 or 5 to 1 odds in modern capital ships is rather indicative, one would think.;)

Best,

...which doesn't even delve into the vast armadas of other smaller surface ships, submarines, amphibious and support ships the U.S. churned out - which includes nine light carriers, and (by my count) 88 escort carriers, not including the two Great Lakes wonders.

One quibbble: I count 17 Essex class carriers commissioned before VE-Day. Granted, Antietam, Boxer, and Lake Champlain were not able to see action before war's end. And then there's Midway, commissioned a week after the ceremonies in Tokyo Bay.
 
It did take hundreds of aircraft. Overall they put ~12 1,000 pound SAP bombs and ~7 torpedoes into Yamato, for a total of 19 major weapon hits in just over two hours.

Washington put at least 9 16" 2,700 pound AP shells, and at least 40 5" AP high velocity rounds into Kirishima, probably many more. She did this in SEVEN MINUTES.

Based on data from both survivors and remote undersea vehicle inspection by Bob Ballard, Robert Lundgren estimates that 20 16" rounds struck Kirishima and some 19 secondary battery strikes. This included six hits on or below the waterline (and one hit that appears to have struck one of her rudders). Lungren is of the opinion, based on damage assessments that match survivor statements, that several hits were so close together (likely from neighboring guns in the same turret) that observers on Washington assumed they were single hits.

In all likelihood Washington did more damage to Kirishima, in seven minutes, than Yamato absorbed off Okinawa, based on Robert Lundgren's analysis and the relative damage between 1,000 pound SAP and Mak 15 torpedo warheads and 16" AP shells. One of Kirishima's surviving officers (her loss is noteworthy in addition to the manner, in the number of survivors, some 80% of her crew survived) states that he observed two 10 METER (33 foot) holes in her main armored deck where main gun rounds struck. That is considerably more damage than a SAP bomb could accomplish.

There is no doubt that aircraft spelled the death of big gun warships, but it was not because those warships were anything but death incarnate. It was because the aircraft could kill that armored monster hundreds of miles from their mother ship, killing it a full day before it could attempt to return the favor.

Washington OR South Dakota could have sunk or mission killed Yamato with the same sort of performance that sank Kirishima. The question is if Yamato could have sunk or mission killed them before they had the chance to return the favor.

http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

Thanks for the analysis of just how much iron those ships could throw. Radar directed gunnery, with a commanding officer that knew how to use it. Turns a Treaty battleship into the avatar of Kali herself. It's not about the size of the guns, its whether you can hit what you are aiming at.

Sorry I goofed.:eek:

Alright, BB fights. If the American ships can keep their distance they can do some serious damage in the right circumstances, However the Japanese still had night-fighting plus they're masters of surprise.

"The Great Cruiser Massacre?" anyone.

It will probably be written as a masterstroke and may cause the US to try to get Montana's up and running if they put together what the Yamato really was. Remember until 1945 they thought the big bastard had 16 inch cannon:eek:. Holes the size of 18 inch is going to cause a collective shit in the US Navy.

Have you concerned yourself with the details of the OTL battle? The USS Washington was engaging at what are in naval terms, knife fight in a telephone booth ranges. It's very hard to hide warships from a millimeter band radar operated by crews and commanders who know how to use it; a certain amount of the "master of surprise" reputation comes from un-forced errors by US cruiser commanders who should have known better.

Optical gunnery at speed, at night is a chancy proposition. Radar doesn't care if the sun is up or if its isn't. Given the information on hand, both US ships will see a huge contact on their scopes, and let fly. Given the range the OTL battle took place at, it's not just the 16" - the 5" 38' is a viciously effective weapon in its own right, accurate, high velocity, excellent rate of fire, and directed by the same world-beating radars. Not a good time to be in the superstructure even of Yamato. Against ships which might have bombardment ammunition on hand, and have to scramble to get the AP up and ready to fire.

I'm inclined to think that the factors in OTL that had Washington and South Dakota emerge unscathed would dominate. 14" or 18", the IJN had aiming issues with its big guns at night, issues that meant that while both sides fired, one side hit at a far greater rate. Radar means the US force comes in with a better idea of what is going on. I think Yamato at Savo ends with aa severely beat up battleship, and probably just as many dead Kongos, probably with more OTL US loses - but not devastating.

In other news, I have just realized that "Dead Kongos" would be excellent alt-history punk cover band name.
 
Actually this might make a nice series of POD's showing a shift away from the "Decisive Battle" and just go out for more conventional warfare allowing the Japanese to start focusing on intelligence. The U-boat campaign would be interesting to say the least.
 
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