WI: Xenophon's ideas for a central bank and joint-stock companies in Ancient Athens were realized?

Deleted member 97083

In a treatise Ways and Means by Xenophon (yes, that Xenophon, of the Ten Thousand) from 354 BC, he suggested a joint-stock bank for Athens. He proposed that by lending from the public stock, encouraging commercial enterprises and enacting fair regulations, it would be possible to raise significant revenues from commercial enterprises, rather than militarism.

What if these ideas had been implemented? How much more advanced would the economies of ancient Greece have become? Would it eventually lead to a Renaissance/Enlightenment/Industrial Revolution type situation if accompanied with agricultural advances?

On Revenues by Xenophon, 354 BC

Here are the passages in question from Gutenberg:

With regard to the price then of the men themselves, it is obvious that
the public treasury is in a better position to provide funds than any
private individuals.
What can be easier than for the Council (18) to
invite by public proclamation all whom it may concern to bring their
slaves, and to buy up those produced? Assuming the purchase to be
effected, is it credible that people will hesitate to hire from the
state rather than from the private owner, and actually on the same
terms? People have at all events no hesitation at present in hiring
consecrated grounds, sacred victims, (19) houses, etc., or in purchasing
the right of farming taxes from the state. To ensure the preservation
of the purchased property, the treasury can take the same securities
precisely from the lessee as it does from those who purchase the right
of farming its taxes. Indeed, fraudulent dealing is easier on the part
of the man who has purchased such a right than of the man who hires
slaves. Since it is not easy to see how the exportation (20) of public
money is to be detected, when it differs in no way from private money.
Whereas it will take a clever thief to make off with these slaves,
marked as they will be with the public stamp, and in face of a heavy
penalty attached at once to the sale and exportation of them. Up to
this point then it would appear feasible enough for the state to acquire
property in men and to keep a safe watch over them. (21)

But with reference to an opposite objection which may present itself
to the mind of some one: what guarantee is there that, along with the
increase in the supply of labourers, there will be a corresponding demand
for their services on the part of contractors?
(22) It may be reassuring
to note, first of all, that many of those who have already embarked
on mining operations (23) will be anxious to increase their staff of
labourers by hiring some of these public slaves (remember, they have a
large capital at stake; (24) and again, many of the actual labourers now
engaged are growing old); and secondly, there are many others, Athenians
and foreigners alike, who, though unwilling and indeed incapable
of working physically in the mines, will be glad enough to earn a
livelihood by their wits as superintendents. (25)

Let it be granted, however, that at first a nucleus of twelve hundred
slaves is formed. It is hardly too sanguine a supposition that out of
the profits alone, (26) within five or six years this number may be
increased to at least six thousand. Again, out of that number of six
thousand--supposing each slave to being in an obol a day clear of all
expenses--we get a revenue of sixty talents a year. And supposing twenty
talents out of this sum laid out on the purchase of more slaves, there
will be forty talents left for the state to apply to any other purpose
it may find advisable. By the time the round number (27) of ten thousand
is reached the yearly income will amount to a hundred talents.

As a matter of fact, the state will receive much more than these figures
represent, (28) as any one here will bear me witness who can remember
what the dues (29) derived from slaves realised before the troubles at
Decelea. (30) Testimony to the same effect is borne by the fact, that
in spite of the countless number of human beings employed in the silver
mines within the whole period, (31) the mines present exactly the
same appearance to-day as they did within the recollection of our
forefathers. (32) And once more everything that is taking place to-day
tends to prove that, whatever the number of slaves employed, you will
never have more than the works can easily absorb. The miners find no
limit of depth in sinking shafts or laterally in piercing galleries. To
open cuttings in new directions to-day is just as possible as it was in
former times. In fact no one can take on himself to say whether there is
more ore in the regions already cut into, or in those where the pick has
not yet struck. (33) Well then, it may be asked, why is it that there
is not the same rush to make new cuttings now as in former times?
The answer is, because the people concerned with the mines are poorer
nowadays. The attempt to restart operations, renew plant, etc., is
of recent date, and any one who ventures to open up a new area runs a
considerable risk. Supposing he hits upon a productive field, he becomes
a rich man, but supposing he draws a blank, he loses the whole of his
outlay; and that is a danger which people of the present time are shy of
facing.

It is a difficulty, but it is one on which, I believe, I can offer some
practical advice. I have a plan to suggest which will reduce the risk of
opening up new cuttings to a minimum. (34)


The citizens of Athens are divided, as we all know, into ten tribes.
Let the state then assign to each of these ten tribes an equal number of
slaves, and let the tribes agree to associate their fortunes and proceed
to open new cuttings. What will happen? Any single tribe hitting upon a
productive lode will be the means of discovering what is advantageous to
all. Or, supposing two or three, or possibly the half of them, hit upon
a lode, clearly these several operations will proportionally be more
remunerative still. That the whole ten will fail is not at all in
accordance with what we should expect from the history of the past. It
is possible, of course, for private persons to combine in the same way,
(35) and share their fortunes and minimise their risks. Nor need you
apprehend, sirs, that a state mining company, established on this
principle, will prove a thorn in the side (36) of the private owner, or
the private owner prove injurious to the state. But rather like allies
who render each other stronger the more they combine, (37) so in these
silver mines, the greater number of companies at work (38) the larger
the riches they will discover and disinter. (39)


This then is a statement, as far as I can make it clear, of the method
by which, with the proper state organisation, every Athenian may be
supplied with ample maintenance at the public expense. Possibly some of
you may be calculating that the capital (40) requisite will be enormous.
They may doubt if a sufficient sum will ever be subscribed to meet all
the needs. All I can say is, even so, do not despond. It is not as if it
were necessary that every feature of the scheme should be carried out at
once, or else there is to be no advantage in it at all. On the contrary,
whatever number of houses are erected, or ships are built, or slaves
purchased, etc., these portions will begin to pay at once. In fact,
the bit-by-bit method of proceeding will be more advantageous than a
simultaneous carrying into effect of the whole plan, to this extent:
if we set about erecting buildings wholesale (41) we shall make a more
expensive and worse job of it than if we finish them off gradually.
Again, if we set about bidding for hundreds of slaves at once we shall
be forced to purchase an inferior type at a higher cost. Whereas, if we
proceed tentatively, as we find ourselves able, (42) we can complete any
well-devised attempt at our leisure, (43) and, in case of any obvious
failure, take warning and not repeat it. Again, if everything were to be
carried out at once, it is we, sirs, who must make the whole provision
at our expense. (44) Whereas, if part were proceeded with and part
stood over, the portion of revenue in hand will help to furnish what is
necessary to go on with. But to come now to what every one probably will
regard as a really grave danger, lest the state may become possessed of
an over large number of slaves, with the result that the works will be
overstocked. That again is an apprehension which we may escape if we are
careful not to put into the works more hands from year to year than
the works themselves demand. Thus (45) I am persuaded that the easiest
method of carrying out this scheme, as a whole, is also the best. If,
however, you are persuaded that, owing to the extraordinary property
taxes (46) to which you have been subjected during the present war, you
will not be equal to any further contributions at present, (47) what you
should do is this: (48) during the current year resolve to carry on
the financial administration of the state within the limits of a sum
equivalent to that which your dues (49) realised before the peace.
That done, you are at liberty to take any surplus sum, whether directly
traceable to the peace itself, or to the more courteous treatment of
our resident aliens and traders, or to the growth of the imports and
exports, coincident with the collecting together of larger masses of
human beings, or to an augmentation of harbour (50) and market dues:
this surplus, I say, however derived, you should take and invest (51) so
as to bring in the greatest revenue. (52)


But now, if it is evident that, in order to get the full benefit of all
these sources of revenue, (1) peace is an indispensable condition--if
that is plain, I say, the question suggests itself, would it not be
worth while to appoint a board to act as guardians of peace? Since no
doubt the election of such a magistracy would enhance the charm of this
city in the eyes of the whole world
, and add largely to the number
of our visitors. But if any one is disposed to take the view, that by
adopting a persistent peace policy, (2) this city will be shorn of
her power, that her glory will dwindle and her good name be forgotten
throughout the length and breadth of Hellas, the view so taken by our
friends here (3) is in my poor judgment somewhat unreasonable. For
they are surely the happy states, they, in popular language, are most
fortune-favoured, which endure in peace the longest season. And of all
states Athens is pre-eminently adapted by nature to flourish and wax
strong in peace. The while she abides in peace she cannot fail to
exercise an attractive force on all. From the mariner and the merchant
upwards, all seek her, flocking they come; the wealthy dealers in corn
and wine (4) and oil, the owner of many cattle. And not these only, but
the man who depends upon his wits, whose skill it is to do business and
make gain out of money (5) and its employment. And here another crowd,
artificers of all sorts, artists and artisans, professors of wisdom,
(6) philosophers, and poets, with those who exhibit and popularise their
works. (7) And next a new train of pleasure-seekers, eager to feast on
everything sacred or secular, (8) which may captivate and charm eye and
ear. Or once again, where are all those who seek to effect a rapid sale
or purchase of a thousand commodities, to find what they want, if not at
Athens?

Again, is any one persuaded that, looking solely to riches and
money-making, the state may find war more profitable than peace?
If so,
I cannot conceive a better method to decide that question than to allow
the mind to revert (19) to the past history of the state and to note
well the sequence of events. He will discover that in times long gone by
during a period of peace vast wealth was stored up in the acropolis, the
whole of which was lavishly expended during a subsequent period of war.
He will perceive, if he examines closely, that even at the present time
we are suffering from its ill effects. Countless sources of revenue have
failed, or if they have still flowed in, been lavishly expended on a
multiplicity of things. Whereas, (20) now that peace is established by
sea, our revenues have expanded and the citizens of Athens have it in
their power to turn these to account as they like best.

But if you turn on me with the question, "Do you really mean that even
in the event of unjust attacks upon our city on the part of any, we
are still resolutely to observe peace towards that offender?" I answer
distinctly, No! But, on the contrary, I maintain that we shall all the
more promptly retaliate on such aggression in proportion as we have done
no wrong to any one ourselves. Since that will be to rob the aggressor
of his allies. (21)​
 
I suspect that such operations would be rather small initially - more of the "ten ships owned by ten people, 1/10 each" model than a modern stock company. But, of course, this offers a great amount of time for the concept to mature. If Rome still emerges, the result is that it would take the concept to a whole new level, assuming no one has already done so.

Assuming this doesn't butterfly away Alexander the Great, these concepts could spread across the Hellenic sphere of influence. For instance, we could see joint stock companies in Maurya India!

All in all, a deeply intriguing concept.
 
What would be really interesting would be if it did butterfly the rise of Macedon; part of the reason the Macedonians succeeded was because they had the economic muscle for a large-ish professional army that walked all over the citizen hoplite militias of Greece proper. If more Athenians or Thebans can afford to have 'their weapons always in their hands' as a result of new financial institutions, the Macedonians would be facing considerably stiffer opposition.
 
Are we sure "joint stock companies" didn't exist? Corporate partnerships certainly existed, and the publicani in Rome appear to have been basically stock companies.
 
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