WI: WWII Germans more willing to use suicidal tactics

From 1944-1945, the Germans experimented with Japanese-style kamikaze tactics on two fronts. One front was the Leonidas Squadron, a idea created by Otto Skorzeny, Hajo Hermann and spearheaded by female pilot Hanna Reitsch. The idea was to attack Allied shipping by ramming Messerschmidt ME 328s loaded with 900 kilogram bombs into Allied shipping. Hitler at first, disliked the idea, believing self-sacrifice to be inconsistent with the German character, but eventually supported it. Problems with converting the ME 328s resulted in a manned version of the V-1 flying bomb called the Fiesler Fi 103R (codenamed Reichenberg) being developed instead.

Another front was the Sonderkommando Elbe, a special unit of the Luftwaffe in which pilots would deliberately ram their planes into Allied bombers, under the command of Major Otto Kohnke. Sonderkommando Elbe planes, mostly consisting of Messerschmidt BF 109s, were fitted with steel propellers and their weapons were removed, their only weapon being 1 MG-131 millimetre machine gun with 60 rounds of ammunition. The idea was that the planes, four in each squadron, consisting of novices except for the leader who was to be a experienced pilot, were to climb to 36,000 feet, higher than US escort fighters could reach and then dive into their targets.

Both squadrons would only see action in April 1945. The Leonidas Squadron took part in suicide missions between 17-20 April 1945, consisting of ramming into bridges held by the Red Army on the Oder River. The Luftwaffe reported seventeen bridges destroyed, though this is dismissed as a exaggeration.

Sonderkommando Elbe saw action on April 7, attacking a US bombing raid. Out of the 1,380 US aircraft attacked that day, 17 were lost and 189 damaged This was the only action in which the Sonderkommando Elbe took part.

So, what if earlier in the war, the Germans decided to adopt the Japanese concept of death before dishonour and encouraged their soldiers, sailors and airmen to participate in suicidal tactics (human wave attacks by the Wehrmacht, kamikaze attacks by the Luftwaffe, manned torpedoes by the Kriegsmarine, etc)? What impact would this have on the war?
 
The Germans would need significantly worse enemies than OTL. Part of the Japanese suicide tactics were driven by a widespread belief that American troops did not want to take prisoners, as described in John Dower's War Without Mercy. Which had an element of truth in it. American high command clearly wanted more prisoners (for both humane and pragmatic purposes - it's actually really inconvenient for people to fight to the death) and constantly had to berate low-level soldiers who refused to take prisoners. However, that also shows there was a widespread problem, which was widespread enough to more less create a widespread belief in the IJA that prisoners weren't taken. Even though it was probably only a small minority of American soldiers, if say, someone had a 30% chance of being shot upon surrendering, they'd often still just take their chances in a suicide attack. IIRC, a Gallup poll revealed that 13% of Americans wanted to exterminate all Japanese and in these situations, you only need one crazy racist shell-shocked private with a SMG.

The notion that Japanese soldiers refuse to ever surrender was proved kind of dramatically wrong in Operation August Storm, when hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers surrendered to the Red Army, which had not acquired such a reputation. Well, a mix of that and the fact that organized surrenders are easier in a land front.

There's no real way the Americans would have the same racial attitudes against Germans as they did Japanese, so I guess the way to do is to make the Soviets much much much crazier than OTL. Red Army war crimes weren't celebrated by the Red Army (they were in fact, vociferously covered up). So I guess you need a USSR that's well, as crazy as the Nazis, openly encourages its troops to commit war crimes and then celebrates them as what they have planned for all of Germany. Which has all kinds of butterflies (for example, the Western Allies are probably not going to want to support/work with someone who makes Stalin look like a well-adjusted, normal guy).
 
American high command clearly wanted more prisoners (for both humane and pragmatic purposes - it's actually really inconvenient for people to fight to the death) and constantly had to berate low-level soldiers who refused to take prisoners. However, that also shows there was a widespread problem, which was widespread enough to more less create a widespread belief in the IJA that prisoners weren't taken. Even though it was probably only a small minority of American soldiers, if say, someone had a 30% chance of being shot upon surrendering, they'd often still just take their chances in a suicide attack. IIRC, a Gallup poll revealed that 13% of Americans wanted to exterminate all Japanese and in these situations, you only need one crazy racist shell-shocked private with a SMG.

The notion that Japanese soldiers refuse to ever surrender was proved kind of dramatically wrong in Operation August Storm, when hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers surrendered to the Red Army, which had not acquired such a reputation. Well, a mix of that and the fact that organized surrenders are easier in a land front.

A really bad analysis here. I could use stronger wording.

The Kwantung Army surrendered en masse upon orders of their commander, and that was after the Emperor himself had announced the general surrender of all Japanese forces in the field.

The Japanese soldiers on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, on the contrary, had been explicitly ordered to fight to death.

See the difference? The reputation of the Red Army is nearly as relevant as the reputation of the Martian Army here.

As to the tendency of US troops not to take Japanese prisoners, in all likelihood that is simply self-preservation. One way to fight to death, and to take a few more enemies with you in death when everything is lost, is to hide a grenade on you and feign surrender. Which the Japanese soldiers did, presumably often enough to warrant the take-no-chances attitude by their enemies.
 
It also didn't help the Japanese had this whole 'victory or death' mentality - and many would say 'death either way, so let's get some victory in there too'. The Japanese were openly contemptuous of their own troops (one nickname for an Imperial Japanese soldier was on how much it cost to mail a conscription notice, implying they thought of their own men that little), and encouraged brutality and corporal discipline among the troops. This lead to the rank-and-file so brutalized and desentized to violence they'd take it out on POWs and enemy troops, often with encouragement from overzealous officers. Naturally, it lead to the Allies being incredibly ruthless when it came to Japanese troops, not helped by many cases of Japanese soldiers faking a surrender only to try and ambush the enemy.

Furthermore, while the German mentality prized quiet obedience (something which worked wonders for the Germany army discipline, but also facilitated the Nazi takeover), the Japanese post-Meiji had been raised on increasing propaganda about the beauty of dying with honor, something exacerbated after Japanese armchair generals were displeased with the results of the land forces in Korea during the Russo-Japanese War. Due to the displeasure of the "unacceptably large" surrender and defeat rates (which were normal for even the most powerful armies of the time under similar circumstances), they worked hard to ensure no Japanese soldier would ever surrender a single step to the enemy. This is on top of the traditionally strong Japanese obedience and deference to authority, which prevented them from questioning such decisions.

The suicidal tactics were a combination of traditional mindset, rabid zealotry (where the Imperial Japanese believed that it was the holy duty of the soldiery to die honorably in the service of the Emperor), and increasingly ruthless Allied reprisals.

While the Germans had done some suicide attacks and some even attempted fake surrenders, for the most part the Germans abided by the rules of engagement, preferring not to push the Allies to the point where it was simply more expedient to burn entire swathes of Germany to flush out ambushes and suicide attacks than suffer excessive casualties. While Hitler and his cronies would have preferred a 'Scorched Earth' strategy, Germans were obedient, but to a limit, unlike the Japanese.

EDIT: Just remembered another nickname for Japanese soldiers - teppodama, meaning 'bullets'. Basically, soldiers were regarded as expendable munitions to try and kill something, which added to the low regard for infantry self-worth. They're bullets to be fired en masse from a rifle or machine gun to kill your enemies.
 
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These guys didn't have a high survival rate:
images
 
These guys didn't have a high survival rate:
images
Ah yes, the manned torpedo. Yet another brilliant napkinwaffe in action. I think both German and Japanese manned torpedoes ended up getting more of their pilots and support staff killed than actually killing the enemy.

Then again, that's what happens when you mismanage your navy so bad you come up with manned torpedoes in a desperate attempt to kill the other guys' navy.
 
Tell it to the LW fighter pilots - IIRC over 90% were KIA during the war - most of the rest crippled or horrifically injured

Towards the end of the war you had teenagers trying to stop tanks with Panzerfausts

Sounds like they were already conducting suicidal tactics
 
Mass Kamikaze assault against Operation Overlord might have some effects and could utilize older planes.
 
Tell it to the LW fighter pilots - IIRC over 90% were KIA during the war - most of the rest crippled or horrifically injured

Towards the end of the war you had teenagers trying to stop tanks with Panzerfausts

Sounds like they were already conducting suicidal tactics
Admittedly, yes. By late 1944, the Third Reich's manpower situation was so dire it was forced to use old men, young boys, and convicts to hold the line, and Hitler's orders often meant that German units were to hold the line, even if the line was no longer remotely tenable due to a combination of heavy firepower, improved airpower and Allied numerical superiority.

The "Fly till you Die" approach to pilots is an operational failure on behalf of the Germans. It meant that their aces would be the best of the war, but it would only be a tiny percentage of their pilots by 1945 that even remotely had any skill in combat. A smarter move would have been to copy the Allies' pilot cycling program, where a skilled veteran is pulled off the line of duty for a few weeks to train the rookies. It would have meant far fewer 'superaces', but a much bigger pool of skilled and properly trained pilots. Not that it would have mattered with the horrible materialschlacht the Third Reich was suffering by them. It just meant that you'd have a handful of experienced aces leading a mess of untrained rookies up against a literal horde of deadly Allied pilots with full combat training.

But the Japanese took it to a whole other level. You had fake surrenders with hand grenades, people charging machine gun nests with samurai swords and bayonets, and greenhorns trying to crash planes filled with explosives into ships with highly effective AAA systems. And that's not getting into the fact the Japanese were training schoolgirls to use bambo spears and training little kids to carry explosives to dive under tanks in case the Allies ever carried out Operation: Downfall.
 
Admittedly, yes. By late 1944, the Third Reich's manpower situation was so dire it was forced to use old men, young boys, and convicts to hold the line, and Hitler's orders often meant that German units were to hold the line, even if the line was no longer remotely tenable due to a combination of heavy firepower, improved airpower and Allied numerical superiority.

The "Fly till you Die" approach to pilots is an operational failure on behalf of the Germans. It meant that their aces would be the best of the war, but it would only be a tiny percentage of their pilots by 1945 that even remotely had any skill in combat. A smarter move would have been to copy the Allies' pilot cycling program, where a skilled veteran is pulled off the line of duty for a few weeks to train the rookies. It would have meant far fewer 'superaces', but a much bigger pool of skilled and properly trained pilots. Not that it would have mattered with the horrible materialschlacht the Third Reich was suffering by them. It just meant that you'd have a handful of experienced aces leading a mess of untrained rookies up against a literal horde of deadly Allied pilots with full combat training.

But the Japanese took it to a whole other level. You had fake surrenders with hand grenades, people charging machine gun nests with samurai swords and bayonets, and greenhorns trying to crash planes filled with explosives into ships with highly effective AAA systems. And that's not getting into the fact the Japanese were training schoolgirls to use bambo spears and training little kids to carry explosives to dive under tanks in case the Allies ever carried out Operation: Downfall.

Oh totally - there are varying levels of 'suicidal'

The practice of superstars was all well and good until a given unit suddenly lost them - as happened to JG27 in North Africa in the space of a month (including their best Marseilles) and the unit had to be withdrawn effectively conceding air superiority to the British
 

Deleted member 1487

Tell it to the LW fighter pilots - IIRC over 90% were KIA during the war - most of the rest crippled or horrifically injured

Towards the end of the war you had teenagers trying to stop tanks with Panzerfausts

Sounds like they were already conducting suicidal tactics
No, the Uboatwaffe with 75% casualty rate was the highest for the Germans and AFAIK that was substantially higher than any other branch of service. So the fighter pilot losses were considerably lower that that.
 
No, the Uboatwaffe with 75% casualty rate was the highest for the Germans and AFAIK that was substantially higher than any other branch of service. So the fighter pilot losses were considerably lower that that.

I always thought that as well but I was watching a lecture recently that disputed that very fact and gave the 90% loss rate for the LW (with the majority of the survivors WIA in some fashion unless they had become POW).

I'm at work so I cannot spend time looking for it but try too this evening
 
Mass Kamikaze assault against Operation Overlord might have some effects and could utilize older planes.
The whole idea of the preparations up to D-Day were a massive maskirovska against German command, so their forces wouldn't be ready to repel Allied forces the moment they tried to make a landing. To actually have planes ready to suicide-attack the ships, they'd need to know the ships were there in the first place.
With what planes?
This was the other problem with the idea. The German fighter defense had withdrawn to the Rhine and important industrial centers in Germany to protect them against relentless Allied bombing. And the rest were all focused against the massive Soviet force rolling in after Bagration.

Overall, by the time Germany needed to do suicide strikes, it was either too late or they had no idea what was happening, and they had nothing to spare for said suicide attacks.
 

Deleted member 1487

I always thought that as well but I was watching a lecture recently that disputed that very fact and gave the 90% loss rate for the LW (with the majority of the survivors WIA in some fashion unless they had become POW).

I'm at work so I cannot spend time looking for it but try too this evening
For the total LW? I can only think that would be true if you count PoWs at the end of the war.
So far I can only find an unsourced claim by a former Luftwaffe fighter pilot that there were 28,000 Luftwaffe fighter pilots in WW2 of which ~8,500 were killed and another 2700 missing plus 9100 injured or wounded:
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=36759
That left about 8000 unharmed by the end (the injured included people injured/wounded repeatedly).
 
With what planes?

In June 1944 the Luftwaffe operational strength was close to 5000 aircraft and in 1944 total of 35000 aircraft were produced. That's enough to set, say, 2000 aircraft aside for special attack. They would not need to be operational for every day, just for one day. Even in 1944 I would guess, say, 2000 fanatics could be found for "special missions".

Use them en masse, the results would be better than OTL attacks against invasion fleet.

The whole idea of the preparations up to D-Day were a massive maskirovska against German command, so their forces wouldn't be ready to repel Allied forces the moment they tried to make a landing. To actually have planes ready to suicide-attack the ships, they'd need to know the ships were there in the first place.

It's enough to go after resupply fleet after landings have been confirmed.
 
In June 1944 the Luftwaffe operational strength was close to 5000 aircraft and in 1944 total of 35000 aircraft were produced. That's enough to set, say, 2000 aircraft aside for special attack. They would not need to be operational for every day, just for one day. Even in 1944 I would guess, say, 2000 fanatics could be found for "special missions".

Use them en masse, the results would be better than OTL attacks against invasion fleet.
Again:
A) The planes were not there in time to matter; the D-Day deceptions had thrown off the Germans, and most of the German air power operational strength was either tossed against the Soviets, or defending the Vaterland. Hell, nobody even believed June 6th would be an invasion because it had horrible weather the week prior and was expected to continue. While that would have crippled Allied air, it would have also been dangerous to German planes too. The Allies literally had boats in the water waiting for the break; the moment it happened, they rushed in like mad.
B) Those 2000 pilots would be better used against soviet forces (numbering millions strong with tens of thousands of tank and artillery, not to mention their own rapidly growing and improving air power) and the continuing bombardments of the RAF and USAAF against German industry and infrastructure. There was even a German joke at the time:
"How can you tell the planes? By their color: British planes are blue, American planes are silver, and our planes are invisible."
The RAF used camouflage, the Americans just rolled them off the assembly lines with minimum paint, and the Germans had absolutely nothing to fight them off with. The Luftwaffe had 5,000 planes and they had 35000 planes produced in 1944, sure, but the Allies, including US, British, and Soviets, outnumbered them at 5:1:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_aircraft_production
https://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/300000-airplanes-17122703/
The USA alone had it at more than 3:1, even if it was fighting a war against Japan at the same time. Meanwhile, the British and Soviets were equal in numbers to the Germans, and were largely focused in Europe. Quite simply, those 2,000 planes would not survive long enough to do any notable damage to the snowballing Allied effort.
C) The Luftwaffe was the private fief of Hermann Goering. He would never, under any circumstances, allow his precious pilots to be treated as disposable. The man was extremely arrogant and overprotective of his stuff.
It's enough to go after resupply fleet after landings have been confirmed.
Which would be utterly useless; by that time, Allied air cover was a literal wall of death to German fighters. They literally had no chance of getting that close; USAAF and RAF fighters operating out of southern England had more than enough operational range to block the Luftwaffe from even getting close.
 
Ah yes, the manned torpedo. Yet another brilliant napkinwaffe in action. I think both German and Japanese manned torpedoes ended up getting more of their pilots and support staff killed than actually killing the enemy.

Then again, that's what happens when you mismanage your navy so bad you come up with manned torpedoes in a desperate attempt to kill the other guys' navy.
It was more of the germans triing to copy the italian frogman and manned torpedo successes.
I think only the italians managed to actualy do more damage then losse with them, even after they gave there playbook to the britisch. Fun fakt: in every britisch manned torpedo operaration at least one disappered or was lost.
 
In June 1944 the Luftwaffe operational strength was close to 5000 aircraft and in 1944 total of 35000 aircraft were produced. That's enough to set, say, 2000 aircraft aside for special attack. They would not need to be operational for every day, just for one day. Even in 1944 I would guess, say, 2000 fanatics could be found for "special missions".

Use them en masse, the results would be better than OTL attacks against invasion fleet.



It's enough to go after resupply fleet after landings have been confirmed.

Except that Overlord waited until the Luftwaffe was barely a factor to oppose the landings. Where would they have hidden 2000 planes, and housed the pilots?
 
A really bad analysis here. I could use stronger wording.

The Kwantung Army surrendered en masse upon orders of their commander, and that was after the Emperor himself had announced the general surrender of all Japanese forces in the field.

The Japanese soldiers on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, on the contrary, had been explicitly ordered to fight to death.

See the difference? The reputation of the Red Army is nearly as relevant as the reputation of the Martian Army here.

As to the tendency of US troops not to take Japanese prisoners, in all likelihood that is simply self-preservation. One way to fight to death, and to take a few more enemies with you in death when everything is lost, is to hide a grenade on you and feign surrender. Which the Japanese soldiers did, presumably often enough to warrant the take-no-chances attitude by their enemies.

When the Kwantung Army officially surrendered on August 20th, the Soviets had already occupied and forced the surrender of most the Kwantung Army. So that's not really a relevant point. The conduct of many individual American soldiers was not exactly fringe knowledge - it was criticized by FDR himself.
 
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