WI: WW1 began in 1924

Lets handwavingly say that nobody tries to assassiante Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo 1914 and the Great Powers manage to avoid war for the next decade. Is this possible, or would Germany have found some reason to start a war soon anyway out of fear of the increasing relative power of the Franco-Russian alliance? But assuming it is, what would happen when the Great War begins in 1924, with the same participants as in OTL WW1 (perhaps Italy would have been formally allied with France by this point though)?

Would Russia be effectively defeated in this version of the Great War as it was in OTL? Or would it be able to capture Constantinople? Would Germany be defeated significantly more quickly? Would the Americans end up getting involved?
 
A lot would depend on the state of the Russian Empire by 1924. There's a good possibility it will have collapsed into revolution by then, or be so weakened internally as to be unable to participate in the war. This would certainly make things easier for Germany, assuming all else stays the same.
 
Very hard to determine. The changes will be large over that time. Technology wise I guess it would be a war of the airplanes (which develops fairly much without war investments) and the armoured car.
 
Well no WW1 could lead to a more stable Russia, If Nicholas doesn't leave St Petersburg to the machinations of Rasputin and Alexandra it would result in alot less frivolous cabinet changes. Even then Nicholas II by virtue of Rasputin's public behavior managed to alienate everyone outside of his family that him being forced to abdicate seems likely. With no war Russia could at least have alot more soldiers in fighting condition than it did. Could a world war erupt over China if Yuan Shikai and the Great Chinese Empire and the rebellions against it still happen.
 
France and Britain were pouring a lot of money into Russia in the years leading up to WWI in order to ensure that the Russian Army could be moved quickly on railways, supplied quickly from armaments factories, and distract the German army. One can reasonably assume that investment would continue to pour in with another decade if the status quo of 1914 is maintained. In 1924, the Russian Empire, assuming it gets through any political crises with minimal stress, will be much more formidable than it was in 1914.

The question is, would this be balanced out by the growth of the German economy?

Would the Kaiser continue his useless and money-draining quest for a Navy, or devote the resources to army development (be it general improvements or more experimental weapons like tanks) or general economic and scientific growth?
 
A lot would depend on the state of the Russian Empire by 1924. There's a good possibility it will have collapsed into revolution by then, or be so weakened internally as to be unable to participate in the war. This would certainly make things easier for Germany, assuming all else stays the same.

Actually quite the opposite, without the tensions of the war, and with industrialization going at a steady clip, it may well be a very potent force in the war. The Russian Empire was not precisely plagued by internal unrest except in times of great national duress such as the Russo-Japanese War and WWI.
 
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Actually quite the opposite, without the tensions of the war, and with industrialization going at a steady clip, it may well be a very potent force in the war. The Russian Empire was not precisely plagued by internal unrest except in times of great national duress such as the Russo-Japanese War and WWI.

I think it's a bit of both. The forces for change are only going to get stronger as time passes by; and IIRC, WWI actually initially slightly delayed a potential revolution (until the Russian military started losing).

On the other hand, there is the fact that based on German projections, by around 1917, Russia would be functionally unbeatable.
 
On the other hand, there is the fact that based on German projections, by around 1917, Russia would be functionally unbeatable.

That calculation gets thrown around a lot in these discussions. Is there any way to gauge how correct it is? It would have to be balanced against similar development in Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, just for one thing.
 
That calculation gets thrown around a lot in these discussions. Is there any way to gauge how correct it is? It would have to be balanced against similar development in Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, just for one thing.

I believe it's based on the projected completion date of the Great Military Programme, a Russian military expansion programme that the German military leadership was convinced would rebuild the Russian army into an unbeatable force.
 
I think it's a bit of both. The forces for change are only going to get stronger as time passes by; and IIRC, WWI actually initially slightly delayed a potential revolution (until the Russian military started losing).

I definitely don't disagree, Russia undoubtedly was going to have to change one way or the other as time went on, but the absence of the deprivations and tumult of the war years would likely mean that said change would occur at a slower pace than the sudden revolution that completely, irreparably destroyed the Russian monarchy IOTL.

Nicholas II was not the sort of guy who would have willingly embraced reform (and indeed had a history of going back on the reforms he did make). Nationalism would certainly have remained a potent force among certain peoples of the empire (Central Asia and Siberian indigeous peoples not so much, but Poles, Finns, Azeris, etc.) These were groups that were a time bomb.

That said, Russia has a long history of eventually making reluctant reforms when the need arises. There are a lot of ways to resolve the various nationality problems as well as political issues. The repression route (i.e. having the Okhrana just wreck anyone who tries to cause trouble), if applied harshly enough, could very well work.

I believe it's based on the projected completion date of the Great Military Programme, a Russian military expansion programme that the German military leadership was convinced would rebuild the Russian army into an unbeatable force.

That and industrialization programs, which ultimately would have been a far larger boon to Russia's ability to wage a war.
 
I definitely don't disagree, Russia undoubtedly was going to have to change one way or the other as time went on, but the absence of the deprivations and tumult of the war years would likely mean that said change would occur at a slower pace than the sudden revolution that completely, irreparably destroyed the Russian monarchy IOTL.

Nicholas II was not the sort of guy who would have willingly embraced reform (and indeed had a history of going back on the reforms he did make). Nationalism would certainly have remained a potent force among certain peoples of the empire (Central Asia and Siberian indigeous peoples not so much, but Poles, Finns, Azeris, etc.) These were groups that were a time bomb.

That said, Russia has a long history of eventually making reluctant reforms when the need arises. There are a lot of ways to resolve the various nationality problems as well as political issues. The repression route (i.e. having the Okhrana just wreck anyone who tries to cause trouble), if applied harshly enough, could very well work.

Thinking about it, I suppose you could say you could see a combination of those changes manifesting themselves in the USSR. The USSR used both a combination of state terror and a national unifying ideology that transcended ethnicity to suppress internal dissent and create national devotion and unity.

That and industrialization programs, which ultimately would have been a far larger boon to Russia's ability to wage a war.

And the USSR of course, was quite successful in this regard.
 

JAG88

Banned
Russia was doing well economically, was always increasing its army and introducing heavy artillery... and believed Iran looked yummy.

Germany was also doing well, had finally got nervous about Russians and French buildups and was increasing the size of the army. It was well aware of the growth on Polish railroads and would have to match it in Prussia in order to be able to actually deploy its larger army.

France was stretched to the limit militarily, already conscripting 83% of its male population it looked like the 3-year service law might be reverted shrinking the size of France's military forcing France back into a more defensive posture.

Grey was starting to regret the Entente due to Russia's actions in Iran and considered resigning to let someone more amenable to the Germans take his place.

Austria-Hungary... it was improving militarily, doing well economically... but its right next to Russia and the Balkans, sooner or later something will go wrong here. So I think we have to concentrate on what reforms Franz Ferdinand would have implemented on the AH Empire and its effects on the region.

Italy will backstab whomever looks weaker or tastier.
 
Thinking about it, I suppose you could say you could see a combination of those changes manifesting themselves in the USSR. The USSR used both a combination of state terror and a national unifying ideology that transcended ethnicity to suppress internal dissent and create national devotion and unity.

Aye, and one of the key factors in the Reds getting support over the Whites was that they were very flexible when it came to nationality policy: they allowed the Ukrainians, Georgians, and such to teach schools in their own local languages, and in the case of Central Asia actually created Cyrillic-based alphabets and standardized language systems for predominantly illiterate peoples and areas. This of course all served Soviet interests because literate workers were going to be the backbone of Soviet industrialization. Eventually, the Tsars would have had to found a way to grapple with the same issue.

But before the Soviets, the Tsars were actually rather successful in playing divide-and-rule games with certain nationalities, they either co-opted local elites for their own ends, or granted autonomy to people who cooperated with Russian rule. However, brute repression worked in some cases as well, in the case of Ukraine, the Russian Empire basically so completely suppressed any expression of nationalist sentiment (and all the Ukrainian intelligentsia who advocated it) that the real focal point of Ukrainian nationalism came from parts of Ukraine that had been under Polish and later Austrian rule in western Ukraine. So in cases like that... why change a winning formula?
 

katchen

Banned
If no World War O and no Communist Revolution, at some ppint Great Britain's opinion of and entente with Russia has got to shift. Probably about the time Russia completes a railroad to Murmansk (and possibly a backup port at Indigya Bay farther east which is not built IOTL) both of which are ice free all year and starts building a year round North Atlantic fleet that includes submarines. Germany at least can be hemmed in in the North Sea by the Island of Britain itself but Russia fronts on the open Atlantic.
And ITTL there will be no reason other than the United States wishes for the UK to break it's alliance with Japan and every need to contain Russia.
So it would not surprise me at all if Great Britaiin forges an alliance with Germany -and the Ottoman Empire--at the expense of France and Russia and Italy which remain allies.
Has anyone run a WWI TL in which France and Russia and Italy and Austria-Hungary are the aggressors against Germany and Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire (and perhaps Spain) and Japan?
 

Kongzilla

Banned
I doubt Britain would get involved in this war, Germany and AH will be battling it out with Russia and France will sit there twiddling it's thumbs trying not to get invaded. Britain won't have an excuse to join because the CP will be tied up in the east.
 
I doubt Britain would get involved in this war, Germany and AH will be battling it out with Russia and France will sit there twiddling it's thumbs trying not to get invaded. Britain won't have an excuse to join because the CP will be tied up in the east.

There's so many factors that make it far too unlikely for Germany to ignore France (or vice-versa).

Quite the contrary, a distracted Germany may well make France more liable to go to war. It's not at all a hard-sell to the French government: Germany's troops are distracted fighting for their lives against the Slavic hordes, how hard can it be to waltz into the Alsace-Lorraine and make good on the loss in the Franco-Prussian War? France was not bound by any great loyalty to Russia, a nation it had gone to war with not much less than fifty years earlier, it was fear of Germany that motivated the French partnership with Russia, and if you get down to it, there's not many ways France cannot get involved: if Germany gives Russia a thrashing, the French would have to join the war for fear of having their greatest asset against Germany overwhelmed, if Russia was winning, no sitting French government could reasonably be expected to sit idly by while the Germans were in the east and not in the Alsace-Lorraine.

The Germans were not stupid, and wouldn't want to hand the French so golden an opportunity. The absolute smartest decision they ever made in WWI was assuring that the Western Front was not going to be fought on German soil, whoever "gets" the war so to speak is the one that's going to take it the hardest, regardless of whether or not they win. France and Belgium had most of it fought on their soil, and they both won. France did so at the cost of roughly one-third of all men of draft age in the country, Belgium suffered similar deprivations, but these deprivations, like most of Belgian history, are forgotten by all except the Belgians.

Neither of them got a glorious, inexpensive victory by any stretch.

The hope, the absolute hope and desire of the Germans was to absolutely assure they would not be caught fighting a deadly two-front war. The two-front war they had hoped to avoid occurred precisely because of a mistaken belief that they could easily blow one side or the other out of the war and then refocus their resources to deliver a smashing blow to the remaining side. Great powers involved in regional conflicts don't tend to stay regional, they draw in other great powers. To have that be different would require drastic alterations to the balance of power in Europe that would make the early 20th century utterly unrecognizable.

As for Britain, splendid isolation was more a splendid facade, Britain's status as an island did not make it any less of a crucial part of the European balance of power. It relied upon its strategic friendship with France and other colonial powers to keep the peace in its empire. It relied upon a large, and uninterrupted trade with the European continent. The workhorse of British dominance was its economy just as much as its navy. Not to mention the fact that Britain could not allow the formation of a continental hegemony.

Any threat to either its trade or the balance of power on the continent pretty much meant Britain had to be involved.
 
Actually quite the opposite, without the tensions of the war, and with industrialization going at a steady clip, it may well be a very potent force in the war. The Russian Empire was not precisely plagued by internal unrest except in times of great national duress such as the Russo-Japanese War and WWI.

While the industrialisation might stabilize Russia it's wrong to assume that the unrest Russia would stop if there was no war. The two war certainly enhanced Russian unrest but there was enough unrest in the interwar to make the Russian empire fall. There were also fairly much unrest before the Russo-Japanese war, especially against the ministers. After the Russo-Japanese war there were considerable less unrest, fewer strikes, but after the Lena massacre 1912 there was a rapid increase again. The unrest mostly manifested in strikes and to some extent terrorism shows that Russia was still fairly unstable even during peace time. The needed reforms would however be quite hard to do, especially after the death of Pyotr Stolypin and with the Tsar's unwillingness to relinquish power.
 
Has anyone run a WWI TL in which France and Russia and Italy and Austria-Hungary are the aggressors against Germany and Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire (and perhaps Spain) and Japan?

Don't see why Spain would get involved.

A war between France, Russia, Italy, and Austria vs. Germany, the UK, the Ottoman Empire and Japan...hmm. This would be a difficult war, I'm not sure who would win.

Seems like an interesting scenario.
 
What would Italy gain from such a war? I don't see them getting anything since nearly all of what they wanted would be French or Austrian.

If France and Austria allied, Italy would ally with Germany if anything.
 
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