WI: World war 1 - Germany abandoned Schlieffen Plan in last minutes, AND some other butterflies

NoMommsen

Donor
@Perkeo
"Yes, we can." ... or they could have I would summarize the post-war work of Hermann v. Staabs about the subject, with exactly as you described it :
deployment of 6th and 7th army almost exactly as per "valid" plan, some changes to detrain-stations for parts of 4th and 5th army (on the lines they were already "earmarked" for).
Keeping other troops in garrison until the railways section commands got their first panicking fit eased (couple of days) and then 1st, 2nd, 3rd army to the east.

However, what he also names as an very important necessity : the will AND the dicision on 1st/2nd August to do so by the goverment/"Reichsleitung"
and
an overall idea of how to deploy with what strategic/tactical goals ... as well as a person to push, formulate and insist for this towards the officers corps.

Btw : an "idea of how to deploy with what strategic/tactical goals" they had a blueprint at hands : all the plans for the Eastern deployment until 1912/1913, the last time this concept was updated. These concepts weres till there (otherwise Terence Zuber couldn't have brought them to general knockledge ;)).
(as said : only the detailed orders for single units where and when to meet which train at what station etc., etc. were destroyed every year)
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Anyone got the original source for the Schlieffen Plan being the only option?
AFAIK Moltke himself has written in his posthumly by his wife published "Memoirs", that the Eastern "BIG" deployment (Aufmarsch Ost) wasn't updated/further worked on from late summer/earky autumn 1913.(Plz correct me if I'm wrong.)

But ther might be other sources as well I'm not aware of.
 

BooNZ

Banned
To me 4-6 or even 12 pages sounds like the plan you give to an Army commander to be going on with once his Army is mobilised and deployed to the theatre. Something like; X corps will be deployed between towns A and B to guard area C and Y corps will be kept in reserve for contingency.......... Or ; once Liege falls your army will advance through Belgium without violating Dutch territory and your initial objective will be Brussels with the aim of taking the Franco-British Armies on their outer flank..........

Sorry I 'mis-remembered' - the hard copy of the aforementioned Zuber book makes reference to 3 pages of notes summarizing the Eastern plan, of which the original was apparently lost. Suffice to say, the Eastern plan appears to have been less prescriptive and subject to fewer renditions than the Belgium option.
First :
In the ITTL scenarion still about half of the army would deploy in the west on the prepared mobilisation orders, timetables and schedules (the "thousands, that were burnt" with every new mobilisation plan).
To a layperson such as myself, the 'Eastern' option where half the Heer heads East and half the Heer heads West, appears a more reasonable task than the OTL Belgium option where 85% of the Heer heads West.

In regards to the burning of planning materials, was that for security purposes or for version control. I have read that the Eastern plan was not updated after 1912/13, but that is a different beast to abandoning the concept altogether. I would expect the 1912/13 Eastern plan would be available as a point of reference, but if not, even the annual drafting of the Eastern plan means those responsible for German logistics would not be starting from scratch.

Second :
I would give Staabs with his assumptions of the possibility of a western-to-eastern deployment switch on 1.August credit. He had the knockwledge serving in Groeners post for 5 years, though only to 1908. But this let me assume his thoughts even more to be true, as his knockwledge of the capabilities of the railway-department might have been a bit outdated. These capabilities for planning and changes increased in the years after his reign of the department.

yes, I understood Moltke reintroduced the Eastern option in 1909, so the German railway department would have done considerably more work on the eastern front after Stabb's departure.

But I have to admitt, that the mere fortnight to achive battle/attacking readiness in the east he assumed seems also to me a wee bit too optimistic.

Agreed, but with the benefit of hindsight, the longer it takes, the longer Joffre and the Russians maintain the initiative and the better it is for the German cause. I think a German eastern offensive around week four would have been perfect timing...
 
I would expect the 1912/13 Eastern plan would be available as a point of reference, but if not, even the annual drafting of the Eastern plan means those responsible for German logistics would not be starting from scratch.

Definitely, but the further away from the last update the more work needs to be done on the next update. For example by 1914 had an extra 135,000 troops and an 8th Army compared to 1912, which would have a significant impact on the detail of the mobilisation plan, indeed this increase in Army size may have been a reason for only having a singe plan in 1913 and 1914 and once the main plan was bedded down with the extra troops other variants could be added as planning resources permitted.
 

BooNZ

Banned
AFAIK Moltke himself has written in his posthumly by his wife published "Memoirs", that the Eastern "BIG" deployment (Aufmarsch Ost) wasn't updated/further worked on from late summer/earky autumn 1913.(Plz correct me if I'm wrong.)

But ther might be other sources as well I'm not aware of.

This is consistent with my understanding, but in itself does not really support the argument the Eastern option was no longer viable (as others have suggested).

Definitely, but the further away from the last update the more work needs to be done on the next update. For example by 1914 had an extra 135,000 troops and an 8th Army compared to 1912, which would have a significant impact on the detail of the mobilisation plan,...
Probably not. In 1912/13 the limitations of the eastern rail infrastructure meant the eastern plan only contemplated three of the allocated four eastern German armies being immediately deployed by rail. In 1914 the limitations of the rail infrastructure meant the execution of the eastern plan could only contemplate three of the allocated four eastern German armies being immediately deployed by rail. An extra 135,000 troops does not change the immediate deployment plan, because an initial mass deployment in the East is already restricted by infrastructure to a much lower number.

...indeed this increase in Army size may have been a reason for only having a singe plan in 1913 and 1914 and once the main plan was bedded down with the extra troops other variants could be added as planning resources permitted.
Probably not. I doubt arranging short haul train transportation through central Germany for a couple of corps is going to stretch the planning team in the German railway department in any way, shape, or form.
 
Probably not. In 1912/13 the limitations of the eastern rail infrastructure meant the eastern plan only contemplated three of the allocated four eastern German armies being immediately deployed by rail. In 1914 the limitations of the rail infrastructure meant the execution of the eastern plan could only contemplate three of the allocated four eastern German armies being immediately deployed by rail. An extra 135,000 troops does not change the immediate deployment plan, because an initial mass deployment in the East is already restricted by infrastructure to a much lower number.

IIRC an army was mobilised in East Prussia itself, another was bought in by train, a third was detrained east of the Vistula and was to road march into EP and the fourth was to be deployed a bit after the others once the railway lines were cleared.

Probably not. I doubt arranging short haul train transportation through central Germany for a couple of corps is going to stretch the planning team in the German railway department in any way, shape, or form.

It's not the deployment plan that would be changed with the extra 135,000 troops, it would be the gathering of 15% more troops from all over Germany and reconfiguring the make-up of armies now an 8th army was formed, since so often the devil is in the details.
 

BooNZ

Banned
IIRC an army was mobilised in East Prussia itself, another was bought in by train, a third was detrained east of the Vistula and was to road march into EP and the fourth was to be deployed a bit after the others once the railway lines were cleared.

...and those plans would not have changed between 1912/13 and 1914.

It's not the deployment plan that would be changed with the extra 135,000 troops, it would be the gathering of 15% more troops from all over Germany and reconfiguring the make-up of armies now an 8th army was formed, since so often the devil is in the details.

1. Check your math - 1.3 million German troops were initially deployed in the west alone, so you are probably looking at an overall difference of substantially less than 10%
2. The additional armies had already been reconfigured and the collection point of their appointed units (i.e. companies etc) identified. I understand the railways conducted their own war games to deal with such details, which is incidentally their core area of expertise.
3. The creation of an army in peacetime is merely the re-allocation of existing units to a different command, so should not impact on the deployment plans. The Russians created the 10th army on the fly, so I suspect the German railways department could cope with any additional paperwork generated.
4. Stabbs (a subject matter expert) has suggested a late move east could have been achieved in 2 weeks. With the benefit of hindsight, the eastern plan was not time sensitive and even a partial deployment within six weeks would have done the job (i.e. collapsed the Russian front before full winter).
 

NoMommsen

Donor
In regards to the burning of planning materials, was that for security purposes or for version control. I have read that the Eastern plan was not updated after 1912/13, but that is a different beast to abandoning the concept altogether. I would expect the 1912/13 Eastern plan would be available as a point of reference, but if not, even the annual drafting of the Eastern plan means those responsible for German logistics would not be starting from scratch.
What was 'burned' were all the single troop orders, literally thouisands. They were burnt mostly due to ... space for storing.

What WAS kept were the concepts, overall plans and considerations of intended operations.
The stuff that was used by the compiler Zuber cites and which were lost in WW II, due to bombing of the archives.

Therefore : yes, IF an 'easternswitch' would have been ordered, these concepts would have been all available.

This is consistent with my understanding, but in itself does not really support the argument the Eastern option was no longer viable (as others have suggested).
Absolutly agree with you. Unfortunatly most of the post-war pubications by most of the generals used this argument to justify their own doings and performances. ... and blame someone else for Germanys defeat.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Agreed, but with the benefit of hindsight, the longer it takes, the longer Joffre and the Russians maintain the initiative and the better it is for the German cause. I think a German eastern offensive around week four would have been perfect timing...
Now it becomes interesting ...

IOTL the the decision to set-up 9th (and later also a 10th army) by 'stripping' 1st and essentially 3rd army with the 1st Corps and Guards Corps to be sent to Warsaw for a deep attack into Germany via Posznan was made at 6th/7th August.
To pleasure the french insisting on an attack via Posznan or Silesia.
The intel the russians had at that time :
  • from agents that II., V. and VI. Corps are being entrained westwards (the reports of (border)troops of V. and VI: Corps advancing in Silesia (Czenstochao, Kalisz) were ... !ignored/downplayed! (the deployment of them to the west just fitted so nicely their and the frenchs expectations, considerations and own plans).
  • from France : there is a lot of movement going on in the west (they didn't received exact info on whichh troops were comming to the border regions).

What would be the russians reaction ITTL with the following intel ?
  • Let's assume the the forces for the west stay on the OTL deployment plans - including the "early" moved brigades. -> The french still see " a lot of troop movements" though they don't know it's less than OTL.
  • Let's assume V. and VI. german corps advance as OTL - but now being reinforced by the later mobilised units : the russians (might) see/assume them advancing in Silesia (instead of East Prussia) in full strength.
  • maybe the "early mobilized" brigade of II. Corps or the 4th division of II. Corps from Bromberg and Gnesen are moved quickly into West-Prussia to be seen there by russians.

but the redeployed forces for the "new" armies in East-Prussia starts to ge moved not on 5th/6th August as OTL but on 7th/8th August with their first units arriving at their new deployment/concentration areas in East-Prussia at 9th/10th August ?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Now it becomes interesting ...

Under the eastern option nothing will halt the advance of the Russian 1st and 2nd armies before those are eliminated by 2-3 German armies in East Prussia. 1. They are unlikely to receive sufficient decision useful information to cause them to halt their offensive - they expected to meet far more German forces that OTL. 2. The Russians like other military powers believed in maintaining the initiative and halting the offensive (due to vague uncertainties) would be surrendering the initiative to the Germans. 2b. Part of that initiative is knowing the limitations of the German infrastructure. 3. At that time, the Russian leadership did not appreciate the vast qualitative discrepancies between the German and Russian forces. The question is how quickly the German forces regain cohesion after eliminating and mopping up the Russian 1st and 2nd armies.

The more interesting parts are the deployment (or redeployment) of the Russian 4th and 5th armies and whether/how the OTL creation of the Russian 9th and 10th armies would proceed after it becomes apparent a good number of German armies are coming East? When and to what extent do the Russians refocus those forces against the Germans and abandon their offensive against A-H? When do the Russians realise those forces will not hold the Germans and at that point in time, how are they placed for a great retreat/escape eastward?

The difficulty is the eastern option easily deteriorates into a Willie wank, which tends to offend quite a few people around these parts...
 
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As many have already said the UK is gojng to be neutral at the moment, we also all expect a Russia defeat, the extra armies in the east what can achieve? Warsow fall in few weeks? Possible a full trust to riga? Can we expect 1915 advance in 1914? Will AH perfor better in Galizia? If we obtain a full russia retreat, will the diplomatic situation change? Will the UK join if the German behave good? The Italian were also convinced that AH was almost collapsing, wikk they be firmly neutral ITTL? Or even pro CP? The ottoman? The bulgarian?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@BooNZ
Very much agree with you on the first part. ... and really good questions in the second. ... and (unfortunatly) true conclusion in the last. ;)

IOTL the russians had a similar problem as the germans : a Two-Front War ... one against Germany, one against A-H.
A-H was the enemy they wanted to fight ... for all their war-aims there might be.
Germany was the enemy they had to fight ... for their commitment to the Franco-Russian Alliance and to ensure victory over A-H

Therefore they decided for attacking A-H and Germany. To please France they even decided to conduct/prepare a THIRD offensive action against eastern Germany (via Posznan) as wished (demanded ?) by France : the formation of 9th and later 10th army.
A decision that considerably weakend the cornerstone and pivot to conduct the former two objectives : the 4th army which was brought down to only 3 Corps.
(For russian operational and strategic thinking and decisionmaking I just came across a VERY interesting and quite recent article here.)
Therefore I would think the russians would not abandon the idea of attacking AH and Germany the (almost) same time as IOTL.


However, I could imagine with the expected, sudden advance of Germany in the west NOT happening, the french position of asking/demanding more than what the russians were prepared to do against Germany (attacking East-Prussia) would be much weaker and the third offensive might not be pushed at that moment but become a "thought for the time only after the first battles are fought".

Therefore 4th army might be deployed as prepared in 1913 (see attachement) WITH I.Corps, ITTL perhaps more towards the Vistula and/or the fortress of Iwangorod as cover against possible german/A-H advances west of the Vistula.
Maybe a lil' shift between 1st and 2nd army, in that II.Corps (for ease and speed of concentration) might get allocated to 1st army (enforcing it left wing against stronger german forces) and Guards Corps to 1st army in Warsaw area. (XVII.Corps for 10th army wasn't expected to arrive before 27th August.)

That would still leave 1st army with 4 Corps to "lure" german troops to the east of East-Prussia for 2nd army with 4 Corps to stab through the "soft belly" of West-Prussia against weaker forces to conduct the by STAVKA planned for cutting off of the german main forces more easternly. (Operation of OBKHOD [turning move with lesser fighting] instead of OKHVAT [fighting flank attack], See the article I've linked above, plz.)

... Sounds plausible/reasonable giving the thinking of the time ?
02 Deployment Plan A 1913.jpg

EDIT :
Maybe something that also should not be forgotten :
The russians had kind of a ... order when which army should start action :
1st : 1st army on the 15th day of mobilisation (as promised and commited in franco-russian staff-talks)
2nd : 2nd army couple of days after 1st army has "tied down" the german main force
3rd : 4th and 5th army starting the pushing southwards for ...
4th : 3rd and 8th army pushing westwards to complet the encirclement of A-H forces at Lemberg
 
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The move east has no effect on the plans for four of the eight German armies, the 8th, which is already in the east, and the 5th, 6th, and 7th which deploy as planned on the French border in any scenario. Really in August the only armies they try to move are the 1st and the 2nd. The 3rd and 4th can stay in place and be used to feed reinforcements to the others as the situation develops.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@Galba Otho Vitelius
With hindsight of given IOTL performance of russian troops in East-Prussia you're right : the addition of german 1st and 2nd army to 8th army might have been sufficient for a defeat of russian 1st and 2nd army.

However, this wouldn't have fitted german/prussian doctrine very well, which called for as much as available at the point of interest/decision.
Therefore the german planners at the moment of the west-to east-switch would have first asked IMO:
"How many troops/Corps do I really need to defend the west/hold off the french ?" ... and then send all what's available to the East.
 
I'm with the sort of thinking that it would end the war early and in A-H/GE favor. The British and Germans did have favorable relations until the build up of the war. Post-War the British could spin a story of a German Threat, but it would probably be WWII, that they would way in.

The real reason for the British involvement was the naval buildup by Germany. It was a direct challenge to the British Naval Dominance. With or without WW1 the British are going to do something about it eventually. Without the Schlieffen Plan, there is no way to convince the British People to go onto a war footing. There are a lot of men who thought in the Crimean War still alive and probably happy to see the Russians take a beating.

Whats going to be very interesting is what happens next. Germany will undoubtedly become a dominant power in Europe but very isolated. France/UK will be against Germany and at most the A-H has another 10-20 years before it falls apart. I wouldn't be surprised if that civil war spilled over into the OE. IJ might have a go expanding earlier.
 

BooNZ

Banned
(For russian operational and strategic thinking and decisionmaking I just came across a VERY interesting and quite recent article here.)

An interesting article - very much on point. It highlights if the Germans came East, there were no good options for the Russians. With the benefit of hindsight, we know immediately abandoning the A-H offensive and Russian Poland would have been prudent, but those were not the choices on the table.

My ad hoc interpretation would be if Russians had known immediately the Germans were coming East in numbers, the third offensive concept would have been abandoned and the Russian 1st and 4th armies strengthened (or at least not weakened per OTL). The Russian 4th, 9th and 10th armies would be earmarked for the Northern Front, the A-H offensive largely abandoned, with the Russian 4th and 5th armies shuffled a bit eastward to avoid the risk of being flanked.

If the Russians suspect the Germans are coming East in numbers around day 10 or so, the Russian plans for the third offensive would be put in place initially, but rescinded after German numbers in the east are confirmed. The first preference would be the above re-strengthening of the Russian 1st and 4th armies, but if the third offensive concept was too far advanced, then I guess I would 'hand wave' one of each 'spare' corps to the Russian 4th, 9th and 10th armies - the ultimate destination of those corps would actually be a lottery. I think the Russian 9th and 10th Armies would be immediately earmarked for the northern front, but the Russian 4th Army might loiter supporting the A-H offensive until the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies are crushed - uncertain.

In respect of the German forces in East Prussia, those may loiter (after eliminating the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies) until the last of the four German armies arrive in the east before renewing their offensive - or not. The article makes mention of the OTL A-H losses resulting in a proposed strategic encirclement of the Polish salient being abandoned by the Germans. As far as I was aware, this was only ever a pipe dream of Conrad's and never contemplated in OTL German planning, because they never had the numbers. I am happy to be corrected. However, in this scenario, the mere threat of being encircled by German forces would require an almost immediate withdrawal eastward of the Russian 4th and 5th Armies, while the Russian 9th and 10th Armies fend off the Germans to the North. The 4th and 5th Armies are likely to be harassed by advancing A-H forces and depending on timing, perhaps the last of the four German armies arriving in the East.

I am happy to be educated on any misconceptions included in the above. I would expect both the Russians and the A-H forces to make numerous suboptimal decisions that might lead to worse outcomes.

Therefore 4th army might be deployed as prepared in 1913 (see attachement) WITH I.Corps, ITTL perhaps more towards the Vistula and/or the fortress of Iwangorod as cover against possible german/A-H advances west of the Vistula.
Maybe a lil' shift between 1st and 2nd army, in that II.Corps (for ease and speed of concentration) might get allocated to 1st army (enforcing it left wing against stronger german forces) and Guards Corps to 1st army in Warsaw area. (XVII.Corps for 10th army wasn't expected to arrive before 27th August.)
Any Russian forces used in a serious attempt to hold Warsaw or defend Vistula are vulnerable to being encircled in an eastern option. In truth, it may be more probable than the scenario I provided above, but would likely be even worse for the Russians...
 
So ideally for the germans they crush russian 1st and 2nd armies and encircle russian 4th and maybe even 5th armies. Were would this leave Russia?
 

BooNZ

Banned
So ideally for the germans they crush russian 1st and 2nd armies and encircle russian 4th and maybe even 5th armies. Were would this leave Russia?

Speculation follows:

Even if there was a "miracle of Vistula" and the Russian Armies escape encirclement, the Russian 9th and 10th Armies are likely to on the receiving end of a thrashing. The loss of the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies alone, coupled with an additional 3 German Armies in the East would force the Russians into an early Great retreat (if they are quick enough). This results in the Russians losing shedloads of territory and vast quantities of heavy equipment and munitions. In respect of manpower it might not be as dire, since a Russia in headlong retreat may not lose as many men as the OTL winter battle of attrition with A-H.

I would be interested on opinions on what a Russian great retreat in the winter would look like. OTL the Russians effectively lost 1.5 million men during their 1915 'Great Retreat', but would a similar exercise in winter create greater difficulties for the pursuing CP powers?
 
Speculation follows:

Even if there was a "miracle of Vistula" and the Russian Armies escape encirclement, the Russian 9th and 10th Armies are likely to on the receiving end of a thrashing. The loss of the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies alone, coupled with an additional 3 German Armies in the East would force the Russians into an early Great retreat (if they are quick enough). This results in the Russians losing shedloads of territory and vast quantities of heavy equipment and munitions. In respect of manpower it might not be as dire, since a Russia in headlong retreat may not lose as many men as the OTL winter battle of attrition with A-H.

I would be interested on opinions on what a Russian great retreat in the winter would look like. OTL the Russians effectively lost 1.5 million men during their 1915 'Great Retreat', but would a similar exercise in winter create greater difficulties for the pursuing CP powers?

Lets say there is no miracle. Wouldnt so bad a trashing so early in the war coupled with an impotent France in the west and a Brittain sitting out (lets say they didnt react to France attack through Belgium) be enough to consider a not so harsh peace for Russia? I expect that Germany doesnt have such high losses yet that it must demand a very harsh peace and I dont imgaine they want to fight a two front war for long. So making easy peace with Russia and see if they have to mop up France or will they also sue not wanting to fight alone?

What of the rest? I think that A-H will be in much better shape than OTL that could result in Italy sitting out as well - they will join CP if Russia peaces out as they want their part of the loot of France. However without Brittain angering the Ottomans by taking their ships will the Otto's join? A seemingly collapsing Russia might be tempting so who knows?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Lets say there is no miracle. Wouldnt so bad a trashing so early in the war coupled with an impotent France in the west and a Brittain sitting out (lets say they didnt react to France attack through Belgium) be enough to consider a not so harsh peace for Russia? I expect that Germany doesnt have such high losses yet that it must demand a very harsh peace and I dont imgaine they want to fight a two front war for long. So making easy peace with Russia and see if they have to mop up France or will they also sue not wanting to fight alone?
With Britain sitting it out, the war will be over by Christmas - with or without a miracle. In this scenario I always hand wave Britain an invitation, since some members are offended at the thought of Britain missing out.

What of the rest? I think that A-H will be in much better shape than OTL that could result in Italy sitting out as well - they will join CP if Russia peaces out as they want their part of the loot of France. However without Brittain angering the Ottomans by taking their ships will the Otto's join? A seemingly collapsing Russia might be tempting so who knows?
With the collapse of the Russian front you likely have the early entry of Bulgaria, the subsequent early exit of Serbia, Belgium neutral (along with Italy, Romania and Greece).
 
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