WI: World war 1 - Germany abandoned Schlieffen Plan in last minutes, AND some other butterflies

Perkeo

Banned
Once Belgians call UK to help, they defacto temporarily surrender their sovereignty to London. That gives Grey field of manoeuvrer.

UK sends BEF to Belgium as peacekeeping force, and then "demands" from French to give up what French never wanted, such as "forcing them" to stay south of Meuse, but simultaneously guarantee French unobstructed passage through Wallonia south of Meuse.
Belgium: "UK, why you didn't kick out French out of Belgium?!"
UK: "Its called tactful diplomacy and compromise, you Ardennian barbarians. You're the ones who called us for help, so don't question the means by which we provide it."
And if Germans accidentally, for example during counter-attack against French violate Belgian territory, UK has its CB to declare war on Germany, for "escalating already inflamed situation in Belgium".

Then the Belgiums have to call Berlin instead of London, haven't they?

Diplomacy was very important in WWI. If the Entente messes that up like Germany did IOTL, they might well loose like Germany did IOTL.
 
Yeah, equating the organizational and military capabilities of 1914 AH to the Heer is entirely legitimate. You only need to look at the Battle of Tattenburg or the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes to see how terribly the Heer operated without a rigid battle plan to guide them...

Are you suggesting that rearranging on the fly the administrative deployment of over a million men over hundreds of miles is similar or easier to fighting a multi-Corps encounter battle?

I would suggest that given it took a year to draw up the mobilisation plan with a single option I'd suggest that its demands are different to an army level encounter battle and perhaps more exacting and less forgiving of error on a strategic scale given the AH mobilisation experience.
 
The OP said that Germany abandoned Schliffen plan. But as many of you argue its near ASB for them to do that as the germans werent nearly that incompetent OTL. So if in TTL they decide to abandon Schliffen plan it most likely means that they have an Eastern mobilisation plan as its really hard to imagine of the OHL to make such a decision without one. Or the german military leadership is changed drastically for them to allow to make such a decision without an Eastern plan.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Are you suggesting that rearranging on the fly the administrative deployment of over a million men over hundreds of miles is similar or easier to fighting a multi-Corps encounter battle?

Yes. Repeatedly winning multiple multi-Corps encounters decisively when you are heavily outnumbered is easier than organizing train transportation.
I would suggest that given it took a year to draw up the mobilisation plan with a single option I'd suggest that its demands are different to an army level encounter battle and perhaps more exacting and less forgiving of error on a strategic scale given the AH mobilisation experience.

The Germans went to the effort of maintaining up to date battle plans for an Eastern strategy up until 1912/13. Those battle plans rarely exceeded 4-6 pages in total, so clearly the German High command did not share your fear of logistics or train travel...
 
?? Could you please explain ?
There's nothing to explain here. I accept that not everyone agrees that Grey would want to enter the war once it erupted, but everyone knows that a lot of people think he would. You're being disingenuous. You don't get to tell me to "read up", when apparently you've never ever heard of widely known theory that Grey wanted to enter the war once it already erupted. You might disagree with it, but don't act like you've never heard of it.

Grey "threatened" France (aka ambassador Cambon) until 31.August NOT to go at war on behalf of France.
Surely you meant 31 July? That is, before Russia and Germany went to war? Back when it looked like its possible it'll be just another Balkan war?
You just confirmed my point. Grey wanted to de-escalate before war became inevitable. Then once it erupted, he wanted to join it. If he didn't, he'd actually make it clear to Germans that violating Belgium meant war, precisely so he wouldn't be "forced" to declare war in defence of Belgium.

POD put forward in this thread, very neatly proves that Grey wanted to enter war once it erupted. Belgium not being attacked takes away one of excuses interventionists had to enter war. So why he didn't threaten Germany with war unless Belgium is left alone, which supposedly gives him small chance of avoiding war in case Germans fold, if not threatening Germany means that Belgium is violated and UK "has to" go to war?
 
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Deleted member 94680

You don't get to tell me to "read up", when apparently you've never ever heard of widely known theory that Grey wanted to enter the war once it already erupted.

That's one interpretation, I was always under the impression he wanted to avoid War and thought a united front with France was the best way to achieve that. Once it became apparent War was near unavoidable, he tried proposing a Conference. It was only right at the end that he pushed for British military intervention, threatening resignation as others have said. I'm sure I've read somewhere that other cabinet members were "horrified" when he revealed the extent of his talks with the French and the degree to which he had led them to believe that Britain would back them.

So why he didn't threaten Germany with war unless Belgium is left alone, which supposedly gives him small chance of avoiding war in case Germans fold, if not threatening Germany means that Belgium is violated as UK "has to" go to war?

Because he couldn't. Grey was only Foreign Secretary of the British Government, threatening War on a sovereign nation would be the role of the Prime Minister. Grey's statements and communications on British policy in the run up to WWI were confused and at times contradictory reflecting that he knew that the cabinet wasn't united on it's view of the situation. I get the impression he would have liked to make a strong statement on the building tensions and lay out Britain's desire to intervene, but knew he couldn't as the cabinet wasn't unified on its desire for intervention.
 
That's one interpretation, I was always under the impression he wanted to avoid War and thought a united front with France was the best way to achieve that. Once it became apparent War was near unavoidable, he tried proposing a Conference. It was only right at the end that he pushed for British military intervention, threatening resignation as others have said. I'm sure I've read somewhere that other cabinet members were "horrified" when he revealed the extent of his talks with the French and the degree to which he had led them to believe that Britain would back them.



Because he couldn't. Grey was only Foreign Secretary of the British Government, threatening War on a sovereign nation would be the role of the Prime Minister. Grey's statements and communications on British policy in the run up to WWI were confused and at times contradictory reflecting that he knew that the cabinet wasn't united on it's view of the situation. I get the impression he would have liked to make a strong statement on the building tensions and lay out Britain's desire to intervene, but knew he couldn't as the cabinet wasn't unified on its desire for intervention.

Actually I remember reading in the british documents on the origins of war that Grey told the german ambassador sometimes during the first Morocco crisis that they would go to war ower Morocco. In light of that I think Grey could have informed the germans about Belgium being a casus belli if he wanted to avoid war - which i dont believe in.
 

Deleted member 94680

Actually I remember reading in the british documents on the origins of war that Grey told the german ambassador sometimes during the first Morocco crisis that they would go to war ower Morocco. In light of that I think Grey could have informed the germans about Belgium being a casus belli if he wanted to avoid war - which i dont believe in.

I don't recall seeing that before, do you have a source? I'm fascinated by this period of history and as time goes on, more and more comes out on who said what and when. Grey talking during the First Moroccan Crisis (which was in 1906) is one thing; but if he did, as I said, it's his own opinion without the PM making a statement or agreeing to Grey saying it in Parliament.

There was a high degree of "hearing what they wanted to hear" in the German decision making process, it seems. The lack of a strong, unequivocal statement of British intent and (more importantly) the degree to which they were willing to enforce that intent allowed Berlin to imagine the British would ignore the "scrap of paper".
 
I don't recall seeing that before, do you have a source? I'm fascinated by this period of history and as time goes on, more and more comes out on who said what and when. Grey talking during the First Moroccan Crisis (which was in 1906) is one thing; but if he did, as I said, it's his own opinion without the PM making a statement or agreeing to Grey saying it in Parliament.

There was a high degree of "hearing what they wanted to hear" in the German decision making process, it seems. The lack of a strong, unequivocal statement of British intent and (more importantly) the degree to which they were willing to enforce that intent allowed Berlin to imagine the British would ignore the "scrap of paper".

For source British documents on the origins of the war vol III document nr 229 according to my notes. Grey told the german ambassador, Metternich that the british would join France in a german-french war ower Morocco, even if the war doesnt start with an unprovoked german attack.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Google translate doesn't work on scanned hardcopy books, only softcopy things.
I know only too well. My solution : typing it by myself.
Then the Belgiums have to call Berlin instead of London, haven't they?

Diplomacy was very important in WWI. If the Entente messes that up like Germany did IOTL, they might well loose like Germany did IOTL.
What I tried to wxplain : the belgians didn't have to ask anybody ... as well as nobody has to ask the belgians about intervening for defending/restituting its neutrality/integrity. That's not at all adressed in the treaty how the guarantee of the powers is to be executed.

The solution Gladstone found for this in 1870 was to make seperate but to everybody known treaties with France as well as Prussia in which he theatened :
  • to fight Prussia with whatever means Gladstone might see fit and allying with France against Prussia
  • to fight France with whatever means Gladstone might see fir and allying with France against Prussia
in case any of them would violate belgian territory in the course of their war 1870/71.
Really?!?! 4-6 pages?

Do you have a source for that in English? Even if you have 4-6 pages in German I'd like to figure it out.
Unfortunatly these plans were lost (as fas as is known so far, who knows what might still "sleep" insome undiscovered/yet unopened archives) due to bombing in WW II.
However, you can get an idea of what size they might have had from "The Real German War Plan" where Terence Zuber also lists the documents the unknown compiler used.
4-6 pages may be a bit low number but including some maps etc. I would render them around a dozen or so.
These were the "battle plans" NOT the mobilisation orders, which run into the thousands ... and were burned with every new deployment plan.
(Otherwise we wouldn't even know anyhting of them).



There's nothing to explain here. I accept that not everyone agrees that Grey would want to enter the war once it erupted, but everyone knows that a lot of people think he would. You're being disingenuous. You don't get to tell me to "read up", when apparently you've never ever heard of widely known theory that Grey wanted to enter the war once it already erupted. You might disagree with it, but don't act like you've never heard of it.
I know very well about the "Grey wanted war" position and that it's widely spread (also on this board).
However, I've never seen someone producing some evidence for this in form of contemporary citations, documents, tellings of Greys co-workers, memoirs or similar.

What I asked you to explain was :
the fact they were already gunning for entering war with Germany ;).
What "fact" ? What "gunning" ?

Surely you meant 31 July?
Yes I meant that. Sry ... typo.
... If he didn't, he'd actually make it clear to Germans that violating Belgium meant war, precisely so he wouldn't be "forced" to declare war in defence of Belgium.
...
So why he didn't threaten Germany ...
What he actually did ... on several occasions ... well before the 1.August (out of my head : on 27. or 28. the first time) in talks with the german ambassador Lichnowsky as well as through the british ambassador in Berlin to Bethmann-Holweg.
 
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That's one interpretation, I was always under the impression he wanted to avoid War and thought a united front with France was the best way to achieve that. Once it became apparent War was near unavoidable, he tried proposing a Conference. It was only right at the end that he pushed for British military intervention, threatening resignation as others have said.
I agree, Grey didn't want UK to go to war until he was certain European War was unavoidable.

What I asked you to explain was : What "fact" ? What "gunning" ?
Yeah, sure nickpick on satirical comment that was actually accompanied with a wink so nobody would take it too literally. Go ahead and ignore rest of argument.
See my reply to Stenz above: Grey was demanding UK to go war, but only after war in Europe already erupted. See below:

Yes I meant that. Sry ... typo.
Well, there you go. Grey was threatening French to not go to war before Russo-German war erupted. Not after. You cannot use fact that Grey was trying to avert war before Germany declared war on Russia/France as counter argument, because I am not arguing that Grey wanted war before 1st August.
What he actually did ... on several occasions ... well before the 1.August (out of my head : on 27. or 28. the first time) in talks with the german ambassador Lichnowsky as well as through the british ambassador in Berlin to Bethmann-Holweg.
Germans seemed pretty surprised when UK declared war over "scrap of paper".
In any case, we are dealing with alternate scenario where UK successfully pressure Germany to leave Belgium alone.
What Grey could do that he historically didn't, that could potentially stop Germany?
  • If answer is "nothing, he did everything he could to discourage Germany", then premise of the thread fails, because Germans will enter Belgium.
  • If answer is "there is this and that what he could do, and it would work", then we acknowledged that Grey utterly failed to convey to Germans that entering Belgium would equal war.
 
These were the "battle plans" NOT the mobilisation orders, which run into the thousands ... and were burned with every new deployment plan.

Can you elaborate in this, because I think it's an important distinction?

To me 4-6 or even 12 pages sounds like the plan you give to an Army commander to be going on with once his Army is mobilised and deployed to the theatre. Something like; X corps will be deployed between towns A and B to guard area C and Y corps will be kept in reserve for contingency.......... Or ; once Liege falls your army will advance through Belgium without violating Dutch territory and your initial objective will be Brussels with the aim of taking the Franco-British Armies on their outer flank..........

This is vastly different to the sort of organisation that it takes to get almost a million soldiers onto troop trains crossing the Cologne bridges every 12 minutes, that's what I'm saying can't be turned on an off as per the whims of politicians because they've misinterpreted a telegram translated from another language.
 

Deleted member 94680

What Grey could do that he historically didn't, that could potentially stop Germany?
  • If answer is "nothing, he did everything he could to discourage Germany", then premise of the thread fails, because Germans will enter Belgium.
  • If answer is "there is this and that what he could do, and it would work", then we acknowledged that Grey utterly failed to convey to Germans that entering Belgium would equal war.
In a scenario where the Germans changing their plans depends on Britain's actions, the only real chance is Grey being in a position where he can issue an ultimatum. This, in turn, requires that the cabinet comes to an agreement on intervention (or directly supporting the French how Paris sees fit, which amounts to the same thing) much earlier than OTL.
How that occurs I'm not sure
- Home Rule being 'solved' earlier, allowing London to concentrate fully on the continent?
- rockier relations with Germany (saying something I know!) putting Britain more firmly in the French camp?
- Belgium requesting a British presence early on in the crisis, effectively blocking Belgium to German advances without giving London a clear casus belli?

Otherwise, as @Mackus says, I'm not sure there's anything that would change the German deployment plans. Possibly (and I mean to the extent it's almost ASB) you could have Anglo-German relations improve over the years prior to 1914 to the extent that Berlin avoids Belgium simply because they don't want to make it awkward for Britain (as the only uninvolved signatory of the 1832 treaty) and the fully believe that Britain won't get involved and control of the channel ports isn't necessary. But as I say, with the personalities involved in the German decision making positions, that's incredibly unlikely to come about.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Germans seemed pretty surprised when UK declared war over "scrap of paper".
Not a surprise, more the feeling of dissapointed hopes

However, for the OTL situation we perhaps can agree on Grey wanting to avoid war before things got running very/too fast from 31.July/1.August onwards. But with the starting of DoWs he was ... "forced" (by whatever considerations) to take and choose a position, and he choose to support France (even though he had to buy in Russia as well) from what point onwards he sought to convince the cabinet to take a position of "pro-intervention" (with whatever means to intervene).
The rest is ... history.

(thinking off, it comes to my mind, that our "disagreement" might be less qualitative but more ... quantitative ? ... like : how strongly he really "wanted" war or felt "just forced" to it ... by the mixed and messed up circumstances of the moment ?)




Well, then for the alternative scenario of the OP :
In any case, we are dealing with alternate scenario where UK successfully pressure Germany to leave Belgium alone.
What Grey could do that he historically didn't, that could potentially stop Germany?
  • If answer is "nothing, he did everything he could to discourage Germany", then premise of the thread fails, because Germans will enter Belgium.
  • If answer is "there is this and that what he could do, and it would work", then we acknowledged that Grey utterly failed to convey to Germans that entering Belgium would equal war.
Your first point is IMO out of question. ... Otherwise this board and its discussions on alternatives would be futile. :biggrin:

What he IMO could have done different to IOTL :
backing his "teaser" to Lichnowsky of possible neutrality with an offer or declaration to act and take a position as in 1870 Gladstone did (see my post #91).
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@Riain You pretty well descibed, what I mean.

However,
First :
In the ITTL scenarion still about half of the army would deploy in the west on the prepared mobilisation orders, timetables and schedules (the "thousands, that were burnt" with every new mobilisation plan).
Second :
I would give Staabs with his assumptions of the possibility of a western-to-eastern deployment switch on 1.August credit. He had the knockwledge serving in Groeners post for 5 years, though only to 1908. But this let me assume his thoughts even more to be true, as his knockwledge of the capabilities of the railway-department might have been a bit outdated. These capabilities for planning and changes increased in the years after his reign of the department.

But I have to admitt, that the mere fortnight to achive battle/attacking readiness in the east he assumed seems also to me a wee bit too optimistic.
 
(thinking off, it comes to my mind, that our "disagreement" might be less qualitative but more ... quantitative ? ... like : how strongly he really "wanted" war or felt "just forced" to it ... by the mixed and messed up circumstances of the moment ?)

Well, unless we could directly peek into Grey's mind at the time he was making decision, it might be be kinda silly to split hair as to whether he argued for war enthusiastically or through gritted teeth. Probably closer to the latter, since he did try to avert it at the start, and later on was just trying to make a dish with whatever ingredients were left.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I'm not sure there's anything that would change the German deployment plans.
IOTL the possible offer of a possible neutrality ba phone to Lichnovsky was enough for Willy (with support of Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow and Tirpitz and a few others) to order Moltke to NOT execute the invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium.

"Only" the telegram of a "misunderstanding" from Georgie to Willy at late night 1.August let Willy allow Moltke "to do what he wants".

Another option for Grey might have been to convince King George, that he (Grey) is trying to negotiate something, nothing confirmed yet, just "keep on talking" with the germans and this telegram won't be sent.
WITH some unbinding further talking the next days, a new, german eastern deployment (the position of Willy and Bethmann-Hollweg enforced just by keeping on talking, the french woudn't declare war on Germany before finishing their mobilisation) could be "locked in", when France finally decides to go at war.
 

Perkeo

Banned
The OP said that Germany abandoned Schliffen plan. But as many of you argue its near ASB for them to do that as the germans werent nearly that incompetent OTL. So if in TTL they decide to abandon Schliffen plan it most likely means that they have an Eastern mobilisation plan as its really hard to imagine of the OHL to make such a decision without one. Or the german military leadership is changed drastically for them to allow to make such a decision without an Eastern plan.
As others have said, once the Germans decide to call off the Schlieffen Plan they certainly try to call off the war. However with a POD after July 28th there's a difference between trying and succeeding.

But can thay not mobilize as planned on the eastern front and parts on the western front - and simply not mobilize those units that were supposed to march into Belgium. In the next step, they feverishly work on developing a new deployment plan to so they can do something unseful on the eastern front, while the diplomats try to delay or better prevent the war.
 
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