WI: World war 1 - Germany abandoned Schlieffen Plan in last minutes, AND some other butterflies

NoMommsen

Donor
Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't the Germans' only mobilization plan for invading Belgium and starting the "Schlieffen Plan"? In that case, they'd have to be improvising the entire mobilization process as they went which could slow thing down and leave their army in chaos for a while if they decided to concentrate on Russia first.
You are 100% correct.
Sry, but ... only partially correct.

Correct, that in August 1914 the germans had only one mobilisation plan/schedule/timetable prepared.

But :
Incase they decide at the last minute for change to an eastern deployment (for which not too general outlines from 1912/13 were still available, only the detailed railways schedule for (almost) every single item were burned), the schedules for the remaining western armies (5th, 6th, 7th, maybe parts of 4th) would/could almost entirely stay as they were.

Further, in 1912 and 1913 the railway section of the General staff had experimented and tested, though on "small scale", methods "unfixed", "free" mobilisation methods, giving the operational section the "freedom" of sending the troops more or less on short notice (couple of days) whereever they want. In 1914 such plans were in the works for the entire armed forces to be "tested" in 1915.
Btw, these preparations helped the railways section a lot, when some units were reallocated and in conducting some transpotrs even faster than originally planned.
(source : "Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, Die Eisenbahnen zu Kriegsbeginn" [The german Field railwayorganisation, The railways at the begin of war], Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Reichsarchiv 1928)
(Btw : for the interested, some very interesting maps, timetables etc. in the appendix parts ;-) )
 
Am I the only one who has noticed that defeating France in 1870/71 took six months, not six weeks????????

And even then France would have been all but unable to keep the German army busy and wait for reinforcements, if there had been any to wait for.

Yes, but the course of the war was decided by the German victories on the Frontier at the very start of the war. It was a good example of clauswitz' maxim that if the main forces of the enemy are defeated everything else will follow. The idea in 1914 was to do something similar, smash the French armies on the Frontier and the pursue the secondary forces. Given that Germany didn't plan to send even 50% of its army east this is a perfectly reasonable assumption.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Some notes on the "belgian guarantee" aka the London treaty of 1839 :

It does NOT contain any desription of a mechanism, how this guarantee should be carried out or be invoked.

Esp. it doesn't give explicitly Belgium the "right" to appeal to any certain guarantee power, may it call a single power, two ore more of the FIVE guaranteeing powers (France, Germany, Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary).
It was even debated, if a single guaranteeing power would have the right to act on itself or if all of the five have to act in concert or at least after confering about.
(discussion of the Derby-Stanley-Clarendon "doctrine" in british foreign policy around 1867. I've attached what I've found on a search in an entry in google books.)

However, by this treaty also Germany could claim to "rightfully" fighting for belgian neutrality, if they invade AFTER the french have invaded first. The treaty doesn't states, that Belgium HAS to appeal for help.

Here is the attached file
Derby-Stanly-Clarendon doctrine on Luxemburg.jpg
 

NoMommsen

Donor
And who would make them?
There would be far less support for semi-justifiable war with France than for war with Germany.
Their international reputation.

If they wouldn't do so any treaty they had/would sign with whatever partner/country would be rendered not worth the ink.
 
Their international reputation.

If they wouldn't do so any treaty they had/would sign with whatever partner/country would be rendered not worth the ink.

We know with benefit of hindsight, that their treaties were already considered not worth the ink, precisely because Germans went to war thinking treaties signed by UK were just "scrap of paper". So no need for UK to go to war that'd be counter to their interests for sake of honour.

But this is only intellectual curiosity, what's actually important is:

You just said one post above this one, that nothing in the treaty would actually oblige UK to declare war on France. UK wouldn't have to go to war with France because they invaded Belgium.

Betraying countries (France and Russia) which were seen by everyone as being allied to UK, would hurt British diplomatic reputation more than violating spirit or even letter of more than fifty years old treaty. World wouldn't think: "Damn, those British really stick to their commitments, no matter how old they are. How honourable.", they think "Oh crap, British used some old scrap of paper as an excuse to backstab their ally, attacking them when they were counting on their help! We have no way of knowing if they wouldn't try to pull this with us!"
 

NoMommsen

Donor
This is true. The whole war was because Germany thought this was the last year they could get a fast victory (thinking they could knock france out relkatively quickly and Russia wouldn't even have finished mobilization when they could shift gear east). Boy were they wrong.
Who was this Germany bloke? Certainly no one in the German high command expected the Schlieffen plan was going to knock France out of the war anytime soon...

...between 1906 and 1914, Moltke, the General Staff, the War Ministry, and numerous other government agencies (not to mention Marshal Joseph Joffre, then chief of the French General Staff) openly and repeatedly stated that the next general conflict would be a long one. Therefore, the argument that German military thinkers were laboring under the illusion that the next war would be a short one is untenable... After Clausewitz, Antulio J. Echevarria II
Both positions IMO don't really catch what was going on in the military "thinkers" heads. I think it was a bit more complicated.

First :
In 1914, already in 1913 actually NO german military thought, that the french could be knocked out before Russia starts severe hostilities. In 1914 the german General Staff assumed the troops of Warsaw and Vilnius districts ready to march at the 5th to 7th day of mobilisation (The german General Staff in preparation and conduct of the Worldwar, Hermann v. Kuhl, 1920).
One of the reasons, why Moltke significantly changed the "blueprint" of the Schlieffen-memorandum in putting a whole army into East Prussia.

Second :
Almost every military expert world wide feared the very possible outlook of a long war. They were all very aware of the changes to warfare due to the rapid industrialisation and globalisation and interconnection of trade and economies.
... if not some action would be taken against this.

Third :
Their solution found was to declare the necessity of a short war, only possible by utmost offense right at the beginning.
And in fearing the quite well understood attrition by a prolonged war they also declared - thereby further supporting their need/greed for offense - a prolonged war as impossible/unsustainable by modern societies.
(a wee bit like a dog hunting his own tail)
 
We know with benefit of hindsight, that their treaties were already considered not worth the ink, precisely because Germans went to war thinking treaties signed by UK were just "scrap of paper". So no need for UK to go to war that'd be counter to their interests for sake of honour.

But this is only intellectual curiosity, what's actually important is:

You just said one post above this one, that nothing in the treaty would actually oblige UK to declare war on France. UK wouldn't have to go to war with France because they invaded Belgium.

Betraying countries (France and Russia) which were seen by everyone as being allied to UK, would hurt British diplomatic reputation more than violating spirit or even letter of more than fifty years old treaty. World wouldn't think: "Damn, those British really stick to their commitments, no matter how old they are. How honourable.", they think "Oh crap, British used some old scrap of paper as an excuse to backstab their ally, attacking them when they were counting on their help! We have no way of knowing if they wouldn't try to pull this with us!"
But Britian DID something to get Germany off Belgium. I.e. they drew the line in the sand. And that will more likely then not be public. So in effect Britian has reaffirmed that they will fight for Belgium. This is more then OTL so it will be a very important "Scrap of Paper". And Britain will have to think hard about what it will do.
So then France goes into Belgium, the same Belgium that the British threatend war with Germany about. So no they will not be seen as jumping one way or another if they fight for Belgium. They just recently said they would. But "sadly" for them they will be pressured to fight against France by their own moves.
 

Perkeo

Banned
Am I the only one who has noticed that defeating France in 1870/71 took six months, not six weeks????????
Yes, but the course of the war was decided by the German victories on the Frontier at the very start of the war. It was a good example of clauswitz' maxim that if the main forces of the enemy are defeated everything else will follow. The idea in 1914 was to do something similar, smash the French armies on the Frontier and the pursue the secondary forces. Given that Germany didn't plan to send even 50% of its army east this is a perfectly reasonable assumption.
There are lots of example in military history where defeating the main forces of the enemy was not enough, e.g. the Second Punic War or Vietnam. And I'm not even quoting examples with help from outside like the French had.

I don't blame the German leadership for not knowing what to do, but they definitely, definitely, definitely should have known that the Schlieffen plan wasn't going to work.
 
Yes, but the course of the war was decided by the German victories on the Frontier at the very start of the war. It was a good example of clauswitz' maxim that if the main forces of the enemy are defeated everything else will follow. The idea in 1914 was to do something similar, smash the French armies on the Frontier and the pursue the secondary forces. Given that Germany didn't plan to send even 50% of its army east this is a perfectly reasonable assumption.

Since the Germans sort of did this anyway sort of successfully, after they were stopped, i.e. the trenches allowed them to be on the defense send large forces east (when they wanted too). Different better more proactive leadership could have made changes to the west first plan on the fly, to allow them to go east anyway (even if the French not completely defeated):

a) At some point at the end of August, the Germans could have decided to not swing east of Paris, seize Amiens and Abbeville and have a short line from Verdun to the sea, seizing significant economic areas, then go east.
b) The Germans don't panic, win the battle of the Marne (or don't panic in East Prussia and keep corps west to fill the gaps), thus winning the race to the sea (probably securing Amiens, but at least an area larger than OTL, holding more resource areas than OTL and a chunk of the channel). Then go east.
c) After reaching the sea as OTL the Germans could go on the defense for the next X years (No Ypres, Verdun, Somme counter attacks etc and defeat the Russians earlier than OTL).
d) OTL but from January 1916 on, while holding OTL territory east and west make a serious effort to make peace with USA help, defend only in the west, while doing only limited attacks in the east to secure smallish objectives.

So the "Schlieffen Plan" should be more of, do what you can do in the six weeks provided to seize key strategic, political and economic objectives in the west, but then regardless start moving some forces east, inflict defeats on the Russians secure key economic and political objectives in the east. Then make peace. It sort of worked that way in OTL but the Germans messed it up with unrealistic peace goals and poor politics (USW as in OTL, Zimmerman, etc.)
 
But Britian DID something to get Germany off Belgium. I.e. they drew the line in the sand. And that will more likely then not be public. So in effect Britian has reaffirmed that they will fight for Belgium. This is more then OTL so it will be a very important "Scrap of Paper". And Britain will have to think hard about what it will do.
So then France goes into Belgium, the same Belgium that the British threatend war with Germany about. So no they will not be seen as jumping one way or another if they fight for Belgium. They just recently said they would. But "sadly" for them they will be pressured to fight against France by their own moves.
You're refuting just an intellectual curiosity that I noted, not my actual argument that follows it.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
We know with benefit of hindsight, that their treaties were already considered not worth the ink, precisely because Germans went to war thinking treaties signed by UK were just "scrap of paper". So no need for UK to go to war that'd be counter to their interests for sake of honour.
Wrong. It was a half-hearted, "last" attempt by Bethmann-Hollweg to convince the Brits to view the treaty as the infamous "scrap of paper" to give them an excuse to still stay out of the war.

But this is only intellectual curiosity, what's actually important is:

You just said one post above this one, that nothing in the treaty would actually oblige UK to declare war on France. UK wouldn't have to go to war with France because they invaded Belgium.
Wrong. What I said was, that it was open to interpretation, if Britain was oblieged to do anything to fight for belgian neutrality on his own.
As Britain interpreted the treaty in that way, it was oblieged to fight the aggressor, violating belgian neutrality. In this case France.

Betraying countries (France and Russia) which were seen by everyone as being allied to UK, would hurt British diplomatic reputation more than violating spirit or even letter of more than fifty years old treaty. World wouldn't think: "Damn, those British really stick to their commitments, no matter how old they are. How honourable.", they think "Oh crap, British used some old scrap of paper as an excuse to backstab their ally, attacking them when they were counting on their help! We have no way of knowing if they wouldn't try to pull this with us!"
That's the catch-22 Britain would be in, if France attacks Belgium first.
 
You're refuting just an intellectual curiosity that I noted, not my actual argument that follows it.
But AFAIK the Entente you see as a actual alliance was anything but...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_Cordiale
it was a clear up of the colonial sphere. What more it was seen as is not importnat in the legal way. Sure France and Russia counted on the British but they did not have a firm alliance. So the doing of the British at the start, the warning off of Germany, will be the last important point for all. And here they did something to get Germany off, so in practice they very likely told them that invading Belgium means war.
That the French then invade is the point that brings the cart down. They, the British, would like nothing better then to trounce Germany, at least the Germanphobes would. But they only days or weaks befor told all the world that the Belgian neutralety is very importnt to them. And now they will engage the Germans after the French invaded Belgium? That this is accepteble diplomatically and for the population I very much doubt.
That will lead to very important delays in the British reaction as they will have to decide what they will do and how they will word it to the world.
 
That's the catch-22 Britain would be in, if France attacks Belgium first.

When caught between conflicting treaties, they'd have to choose which one to honour. One would be considered in their interest, and it would have some support, other one would be considered against their interest, and have even less support...
Not sure how's that a catch-22, when one is clearly worse.

I am sure there have been many cases in history when a country, including UK, did not honour a treaty on the ground it was signed long ago and no longer relevant, being overruled by newer, fresh treaties. That they honoured treaty guaranteeing Belgium, I am sure had nothing to do with the fact they were already gunning for entering war with Germany ;).

But AFAIK the Entente you see as a actual alliance was anything but...
Semantics. I wrote the words in context of "UK being considered untrustworthy if she didn't protect Beglium", not her real commitments, but perceptions of them. Declaring war on France would hurt her reputation more, since she was seen as being French and Russian ally, regardless of whether this was technically true. Kinda like when everyone thinks two people are dating, even if they're not and they're openly denying it, when one of "pair" makes out with third party, everyone thinks that person is cheating jerkass, even if she/he is innocent because wasn't in relationship. Sorry UK, everyone can see you and France have great chemistry. Who're you trying to fool :)


On serious note, there is one big problem with the premise:
"UK pressures Germany to not invade Belgium."
Why? Grey doesn't want war in the first place, but now that it erupted he wants to join it. Germany is at war with Russia, and even if France isn't yet, it'll join soon. Grey has nothing to gain by saving Belgium from Germany, he'd in fact think nothing of letting Germany's guard down by fooling them into thinking they have an okay to trample Belgium. He just didn't had to.
If Grey would actually pressure Germany, it'd be firm demand to continue negotiations with Russia regarding peaceful solution to Sarajevo crisis, and warning that UK would not let Germany dominate Europe. Nobody in UK would openly object to peace in Europe. Neither would anyone in UK support "German domination of Europe". Grey wouldn't threaten to go to war against Germany, which if he did, would not be very strongly opposed in House of Commons either. (And out of two bad options, Grey would prefer support of Tories to form Liberal led coalition government, over Liberal Interventionist MPs crossing benches and Tory government entering to war.)
Germany would either agree to de-escalate successfully (as tsar was already willing to halt mobilisation), or execute Schlieffen anyway.
 
Sry, but ... only partially correct.

Correct, that in August 1914 the germans had only one mobilisation plan/schedule/timetable prepared.

But :
Incase they decide at the last minute for change to an eastern deployment (for which not too general outlines from 1912/13 were still available, only the detailed railways schedule for (almost) every single item were burned), the schedules for the remaining western armies (5th, 6th, 7th, maybe parts of 4th) would/could almost entirely stay as they were.

Further, in 1912 and 1913 the railway section of the General staff had experimented and tested, though on "small scale", methods "unfixed", "free" mobilisation methods, giving the operational section the "freedom" of sending the troops more or less on short notice (couple of days) whereever they want. In 1914 such plans were in the works for the entire armed forces to be "tested" in 1915.
Btw, these preparations helped the railways section a lot, when some units were reallocated and in conducting some transpotrs even faster than originally planned.
(source : "Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, Die Eisenbahnen zu Kriegsbeginn" [The german Field railwayorganisation, The railways at the begin of war], Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Reichsarchiv 1928)
(Btw : for the interested, some very interesting maps, timetables etc. in the appendix parts ;-) )


That's very interesting. Thank you. Now if only I could read German
 

BooNZ

Banned
You are 100% correct.

The funny thing is people laugh at AH who had 2 plans and got the worst possible result by trying to switch from one to the other in the political confusion, but then say Germany should have done exactly the same thing. It was typical of the state of the art at the time that the plan for war had to be decided in advance based on military calculations, trying to change this to achieve ephemeral political goals at the last second is not a recipe for success, only failure.

Yeah, equating the organizational and military capabilities of 1914 AH to the Heer is entirely legitimate. You only need to look at the Battle of Tattenburg or the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes to see how terribly the Heer operated without a rigid battle plan to guide them...
 

NoMommsen

Donor
That they honoured treaty guaranteeing Belgium, I am sure had nothing to do with the fact they were already gunning for entering war with Germany ;).
?? Could you please explain ?
... Sorry UK, everyone can see you and France have great chemistry. Who're you trying to fool :)
Such a great chemistry, that Grey "threatened" France (aka ambassador Cambon) until 31.August NOT to go at war on behalf of France.
He even denied Cambon the symbolic the sending of symbolic one or two divisions of the BEF up to the 1.August as a "sign" of their ... "good chemistry".


On serious note, there is one big problem with the premise:
"UK pressures Germany to not invade Belgium."
Why? Grey doesn't want war in the first place, ...
... probably the only thing you got right about Grey and his conduct of diplomacy and politics.

I would recommend some more studying the sources, i.e. the British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 (freely available over https://archive.org/ ) or "Memorandum on Resignation August1914" by John Viscount Morley (same source of availability) or "There Must Be Some Understanding" : Sir Edward Grey's Diplomacy of August 1, 1914" by Stephen J.Valone (google it, freely availably as pdf from the site of the St.John Fisher College).
 

NoMommsen

Donor
That's very interesting. Thank you. Now if only I could read German
google translate (I use it for russian and french texts, though its a pain in the ar--, due to the strange russian syntax and grammar and google translates problems with grammar in general)
 

BooNZ

Banned
Once Belgians call UK to help, they defacto temporarily surrender their sovereignty to London. That gives Grey field of manoeuvrer.

UK sends BEF to Belgium as peacekeeping force, and then "demands" from French to give up what French never wanted, such as "forcing them" to stay south of Meuse, but simultaneously guarantee French unobstructed passage through Wallonia south of Meuse.
Belgium: "UK, why you didn't kick out French out of Belgium?!"
UK: "Its called tactful diplomacy and compromise, you Ardennian barbarians. You're the ones who called us for help, so don't question the means by which we provide it."
And if Germans accidentally, for example during counter-attack against French violate Belgian territory, UK has its CB to declare war on Germany, for "escalating already inflamed situation in Belgium".

Probably not. Belgium took defense of its neutrality seriously and before the war recorded its suspicions of British and French intent. It was clear Belgium had no intention of handing over the keys to its ports and fortresses to the Entente in the face of German hostilities. To put things in perspective, it was expected Germany would likely breach Belgium neutrality through the Ardennes rather than through the Belgium fortresses and into heartland Belgium. Due to geographical difficulties, Belgium did not contemplate the breach of their neutrality from France.

In the case of France choosing to breach Belgium neutrality, it lacks the heavy artillery to breach Belgium fortresses on a timely basis, so would need to limit its offensive to the Ardennes, which provided limited prospects of success. There is some debate that if Germany had limited its OTL breach to the Ardennes that Britain might have stayed out of WW1 (I'm not convinced). The Belgium defense plans alternated between actively defending and abandoning the Ardennes. Suffice to say, a French advance into the Ardennes would not trouble the Germans, would not trigger the Belgiums to ask for help and would not cause much of a reaction from Britain.
 
google translate (I use it for russian and french texts, though its a pain in the ar--, due to the strange russian syntax and grammar and google translates problems with grammar in general)

Google translate doesn't work on scanned hardcopy books, only softcopy things.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
There would be on economic reforms in Britain like IOTL after the war, such as ICI or Central Electricity Board. Thus, British industrial decline would accelerate at an even greater pace than IOTL. However, it would not face a mountain of debt. If the war goes long enough, German economy would suffer a short period of slump, but after that it would surge ahead.
 
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