WI: World war 1 - Germany abandoned Schlieffen Plan in last minutes, AND some other butterflies

NoMommsen

Donor
Depends when mobilization happens..
From the OP :
1. In early August 1914, ...
and
In this TL, the Germans can just not declare war on the French and not declare war on the Russians (if they haven't already) while transferring the forces. ...
I would assume a PoD on 1st or 2nd August.
Therefore russian full mobilisation as well as Austrian full mobilisation as well as french mobilisation are ordered and on their way.


In this TL perhaps the Austrians can keep second army in Serbia, occupy Belgrade ...
Unlikely. The redeployment of 2nd Army to southern galicia was ordered 30th or 31st August already. That it take so long was a technical railways schedule problem.

And given the overall performance of the austrian forces (esp. High Command(s)) I still would rener it doubtfull, that Austria would have managed a serbian defeat even with the 2nd Army there.
 

Deleted member 1487

From the OP :andI would assume a PoD on 1st or 2nd August.
Therefore russian full mobilisation as well as Austrian full mobilisation as well as french mobilisation are ordered and on their way.


Unlikely. The redeployment of 2nd Army to southern galicia was ordered 30th or 31st August already. That it take so long was a technical railways schedule problem.

And given the overall performance of the austrian forces (esp. High Command(s)) I still would rener it doubtfull, that Austria would have managed a serbian defeat even with the 2nd Army there.
That's too late to cancel Schlieffen's plan. Time is of the essence and the trigger has already been pulled.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Depends when mobilization happens. Also the Russians take time to mobilize, so if the Germans realize they aren't going for Schlieffen they can negotiate to get Moscow to stop...plus it was partial mobilization against Austria, so it is eminently stopable, especially if they force the Austrians to back off of invading Serbia.

I was of the understanding the Russians were not actually capable of a 'partial mobilization', although that fact was not reflected in communications between Willy and Nicky. NoMommsen appears to have done some recent reading on Russian mobilization plans and may be able to clarify. The Russians (and French) were not opposed to a war and had commenced mobilization 25/26 July 1914.

That's too late to cancel Schlieffen's plan. Time is of the essence and the trigger has already been pulled.

I understand a senior German railway official claimed after the war the German railways could have coped with a last minute pivot to the East.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
That's too late to cancel Schlieffen's plan. Time is of the essence and the trigger has already been pulled.
Debatable.

It was ordered to put on halt at 18:40 1st August to be restarted at 00:30 2nd August IOTL.
And there is also the "good old" and his writing, as it could have been changed into an eastern deployment. von Staabs
 

From my reading the 1913 plan didn't update the G variant, only the A was considered realistic. The 1914 plan was almost Plan 20, it was the 1924 A plan with an accelerated timetable and the addition of 2 new field armies being sent to Poland in about week 6 and tasked to invade Silesia. By 1914 the Russian plan was as rigid as everyone else.

That said they did expect to face between 16 and 25 divisions in the first attack into East Prussia, not the 10 they actually faced.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I was of the understanding the Russians were not actually capable of a 'partial mobilization', although that fact was not reflected in communications between Willy and Nicky. NoMommsen appears to have done some recent reading on Russian mobilization plans and may be able to clarify. ...
The russian "officially" started to mobilze the districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan (IIRC) "only" with Warsaw, St.Petersburg and Cauasus following. debatable on 29th/39th already.

According to the french ambassador to St.Petersburg his "contacts" told him, that "partial" mobilisation would have been nonsense and the men just below the Tsar were giving orders for full mobilisation alraedy on the 28th July, NOT communicating the withdrawel order of the Tsar (from full mobilisation).
 

BooNZ

Banned
The issues are more how much they need the iron and coal fields they seized, and what can they really accomplish in Poland and Lithuania before the frost sets in.
In the first in instance they did not - aside from initial looting, the Germans made poor use of industry in captured Western territory - for example the iron ore rich French provinces contributed no more than 15% of German iron/steel requirements at their peak (I think it was substantially less, but do not recall the sources at hand, so have used a higher guestimate).

In previous discussions on this subject it was pointed out Russian Polish fortresses were being used as huge ammunition caches for the Russian field armies. In the early years of the war Russia did not have the industrial capacity to easily replace such early munition losses. Further, if A-H avoid the OTL mauling they received in the opening months of the war, Bulgaria may enter earlier and Italy is likely to stay out altogether. A neutral Italy and Belgium will make a British blockade far more challenging from a logistical and political perspective.
 

Deleted member 1487

I was of the understanding the Russians were not actually capable of a 'partial mobilization', although that fact was not reflected in communications between Willy and Nicky. NoMommsen appears to have done some recent reading on Russian mobilization plans and may be able to clarify. The Russians (and French) were not opposed to a war and had commenced mobilization 25/26 July 1914.

I understand a senior German railway official claimed after the war the German railways could have coped with a last minute pivot to the East.
Partial mobilization was in this sense only being against the Austrians. They claim their plans could do either Germany or Austria, or both. They said they started with Austrian mobilization and the Germans declared war, forcing them to go to full mobilization. They had commenced 'secret mobilization' on that date and AFAIK the Germans and Austrians had taken similar measures around the same time. Said German official did not mean on August 1st or 2nd as I recall, I think he meant July and I think it was a personal pride deal/attempt to push the blame off of his department for what happened and place it back on the general staff; I don't trust his statement as fact, but do think his effort was justified as it puts the blame for the war where it belongs: on Moltke and the army for opting to start the war.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Well, first the British might have declared war on Germany anyway. They did it IOTL for balance of power reasons, the invasion of Belgium was just used to sell the war to the public. But without the invasion you would have had more resignations from the cabinet (there were two IOTL), the Coalition between the Liberals and the Tories would have had to have been formed earlier, and there would have been much less solidarity among the public for the war effort in both Britain and France, and much less good will in other countries (such as the USA) which might have affected things down the line.
That's something I still don't understand despite its being metioned again and again.

Grey had a damn hard fight to "convince" cabinet. Surely also due to his "secretive" conduct in-office not informing the other cabinet members during the July-crisis. At 1st and 2nd August he hardly convinced them to view the "belgian" question as a possible-maybe casus belli for Britain. On 2nd August they were still debating "how much" (a "wee bit" of invasion perhaps only in the southern corner ... naah not enough) of an invasion into Belgium could serve as such.
Already for this he had to threat the cabinet with his resignation.
With Germany now not only clearly declaring NOT to attack neither belgium nor France ... I can't see how he could convince them for even more.

Oh, and ... I've never heard, that somewhere in Weestminster, Downing Street or elsewhere ther sits a "Britannia" in all of her armor, whispering her "needs" into every politician around.
Politics are made by human beings, who have to be convinced, who have own thoughts, believes, wishes.

So : how to convince them to go to war, when Germany removes almost all reasons at hand ?


A thoght on the "offer" of Bonar Law to support the goverment, if they want to go to war : there were a damn awfull lot of strings on it.
  • bowing to the Tories about home rule, putting it on ice as OTL might not have been enough a price
  • what - together with "accepting" them on the cabinet - would have torn the Liberals definitly apart. But with how much of the liberals now opposing the "new coalition" together with Labour and the Irish MoPs ... would it still be enough a majority in parliament for the "new" coaltion ?
  • whit such a split the next election would definitly and for sure turn into a Tories victory. Therefore it would be for Asquith just a gallows period until he hade to move for Bonar Law as PM
IMO this "offer" was seen by Asquith as what it was : a Danaans gift.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... Said German official did not mean on August 1st or 2nd as I recall, I think he meant July ...
He meant 1st of August, the date the mobilisation was signed.

In his view (I agree perhaps a bit too ... enthusiastically) it might have been possible to concentrated an army of 17 Corps in East Prussia as well as 3 Corps and the Landwehr Corps (Woyrsch) in Silesia up to the 15th August IF the decision hade been made on the late afternoon/evening odf 1st August 1914.
 
So : how to convince them to go to war, when Germany removes almost all reasons at hand ?

If Germany doesn't declare war on France or invade Belgium, it seems likely the British will wait, mobilizing, offering peace proposals and offers of conferences, until such time as about the middle of September after which if the French are repulsed at Metz and the Russians start to lose Poland. Then the British will have to go in or risk being isolated without friends anywhere. Even then though I imagine it will be slower process, blockade only at first, no land forces committed anywhere, then attack German colonies, etc...

That month and a half though will allow the Germans to mobilize reservists, slip supplies to colonies, outfit raiders, import stuff and bring home merchants. Might be a better show in the colonial and raider war in 1914 then.
 
No Schlieffen Plan, no war. The entire reason the Germans were willing to go to war was that they thought they could knock France out quickly, not get dragged into a long term two front war where they had to invade the depths of Russia.
This and if the French keep pouring money into Russia to beef it up the British will get increasingly worried about it.
 

Deleted member 1487

This and if the French keep pouring money into Russia to beef it up the British will get increasingly worried about it.
I've read that the Anglo-Russia treaty was set to expire in 1915 and there was little hope in the foreign office of Britain of getting it resigned.
 
I've read that the Anglo-Russia treaty was set to expire in 1915 and there was little hope in the foreign office of Britain of getting it resigned.
Yes, I am under that impression aswell and should British Russophobia go back into full swing, the only real option for a counterweight to the Russians is the Germans.
 
wiking said:
"The entire reason the Germans were willing to go to war was that they thought they could knock France out quickly, not get dragged into a long term two front war where they had to invade the depths of Russia."

What is weird about the German thought process on this. Even if they achieved a 1870 like victory, destroyed the main French armies, encircled Paris. What if the French remain in the war (which the German have to consider likely because they did in 1870 without any allies)? Germany still has to send their armies into the depths of Russia anyway to get them to make peace. Britain is likely in regardless in this scenario so your under blockade, armies fully mobilized for months, probably years regardless of a "victory" in France.

At least a valid eastern option allows you to combine war with diplomacy since you don't have to declare war on everyone right away, there are more neutrals, maybe even Britain. A compromise peace is more achievable. And your a going after the enemy first (Russia) which might be unbeatable in 10 years (maybe 2).
 

Deleted member 1487

wiking said:
"The entire reason the Germans were willing to go to war was that they thought they could knock France out quickly, not get dragged into a long term two front war where they had to invade the depths of Russia."

What is weird about the German thought process on this. Even if they achieved a 1870 like victory, destroyed the main French armies, encircled Paris. What if the French remain in the war (which the German have to consider likely because they did in 1870 without any allies)? Germany still has to send their armies into the depths of Russia anyway to get them to make peace. Britain is likely in regardless in this scenario so your under blockade, armies fully mobilized for months, probably years regardless of a "victory" in France.

At least a valid eastern option allows you to combine war with diplomacy since you don't have to declare war on everyone right away, there are more neutrals, maybe even Britain. A compromise peace is more achievable. And your a going after the enemy first (Russia) which might be unbeatable in 10 years (maybe 2).
The Germans thought they'd just have to smash French armies (the armies, not Paris, was the target) to be able to free up troops to shift east and do the same to advancing Russian armies; the thought then was that negotiations from a position of strength were possible and that the Russians wouldn't want to continue after a smashing of their and the French armies. They were sort of right in that they were able to smash up Russian armies in their territory or not far from the border, so advancing into the depths of Russia were not necessary, as would be the case if they attacked. The problem was that they didn't smash the French armies as they intended, the Russians weren't completely smashed as intended, and the Austrians collapsed unexpectedly. I think the Germans plans were more than a bit crazy in retrospect, but then they didn't have hindsight on their side.
 

BooNZ

Banned
wiking said:
"The entire reason the Germans were willing to go to war was that they thought they could knock France out quickly, not get dragged into a long term two front war where they had to invade the depths of Russia."

What is weird about the German thought process on this. Even if they achieved a 1870 like victory, destroyed the main French armies, encircled Paris. What if the French remain in the war (which the German have to consider likely because they did in 1870 without any allies)? Germany still has to send their armies into the depths of Russia anyway to get them to make peace. Britain is likely in regardless in this scenario so your under blockade, armies fully mobilized for months, probably years regardless of a "victory" in France.

At least a valid eastern option allows you to combine war with diplomacy since you don't have to declare war on everyone right away, there are more neutrals, maybe even Britain. A compromise peace is more achievable. And your a going after the enemy first (Russia) which might be unbeatable in 10 years (maybe 2).

Moltke Jr was out of his depth and was chosen due to his pleasant disposition and relationship with Wilhelm rather than his capabilitities. He clung onto the Schlieffen plan/concept well past its use-by date. What little Moltke Jr wrote on military theory confirmed his expectations next war would be a long war, so even Moltke Jr was under no illusions the Schlieffen plan would ever knock France out of the war. I rate Moltke Jr right up there with Conrad...
 
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Can people tell me what they meant by Russian partial mobilization? Is it the 'period prior to mobilization', where officer cadets are sent to units and other administrative things? Or is it mobilising the districts close to the action but not those deep in European and Asian Russia?
 

BooNZ

Banned
Can people tell me what they meant by Russian partial mobilization? Is it the 'period prior to mobilization', where officer cadets are sent to units and other administrative things? Or is it mobilising the districts close to the action but not those deep in European and Asian Russia?
http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t040831b.html

"Three types of mobilisation.

General mobilisation: Simultaneously over the whole country all the trained manpower which has seen service is called up to bring the Army and the Navy to war strength. Some untrained or little trained reserves may also be called up ie some conscript years.

Gradual Mobilisation. Same object but by districts and provinces. May be used in the case of a strong but remote neighbour on whose frontier the mobilised army can be concentrated only slowly and gradually because of insufficient rail capacity.

Partial mobilisation: Against a weak neighbour when the whole strength of the Army and fleet is not necessary to achieve war goals"
...
"Strategically, a partial mobilisation was simply folly. It was envisaged to mobilise 4 districts, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and Kazan. 13 army corps were based in those districts. They must be moved immediately to their deployment places. Suppose this were done? What about the Warsaw District? This should remain undisturbed so as to give Germany no occasion for mistrust. So the whole of the southern boundary of the Warsaw District bordering on Austria-Hungary would be uncovered and unprotected. And what consequences if later general mobilisation was necessary?"
...
"On this day, 25 July, Janushkevich attended a meeting of the Council of Ministers at Krasnoye Selo and at 8 pm a meeting of the General Staff Committee ie all the department heads. At this, Janushkevich said that the decision for partial mobilisation was unalterable, that Russia, as protector of the Slavs, would send a suitable reply to Austria-Hungary. All planned measures were confirmed. Already, next day, the Guards regiments returned to barracks and the cadets were commissioned."




 

BooNZ

Banned
There would have been much more assistance to Russia from Britain and France. Again IOTL they were calling on the Russians to launch ill=advised offensives to take the pressure off of the Western Front. They would have had to so something to take the war to Germany, and the two realistic projects would have been to invade Belgium, or to take the Straights to make it easier to aid Russia. They could also have done something in the North Sea, including invading Denmark, but taking the Straights accomplishes the same thing and is a much better idea. You would probably see an invasion of the Straights that was actually not half-assed.

Wow, that is an awe inspiring collection of terrible ideas...
  • In respect of Belgium, the Entente had no detailed plans to invade Belgium and Belgium took its neutrality seriously. The Entente was deficient in heavy artillery and little in the way of super heavy artillery, so Belgium fortresses would be impregnable in the short/medium term. This would channel any Entente offensive through the Ardennes, with difficult terrain and almost non-existent infrastructure - well suited to defense, terrible for transiting armies heading north.
  • In respect of the Straights, the Dardenelles campaign was not 'half arsed' for want of resources, but for a lack of expertise and competence - that does not change in the scenario given.
  • In respect of invading Denmark, even Bismarck thought the idea of Britain invading the continent was a joke - and that was when the German navy consisted of a collection of ironclads.
Germany would have been in a worse situation militarily, but gotten big advantages in propaganda, especially if the Entente powers take to invading neutral or third countries, and that might have more than made up for the military disadvantages.
  • In the West, the Germans would have suffered far fewer casualties and defending a far shortened defensive line with terrain better suited to defense. A neutral Belgium means no Belgium forces, a significant trade partner and a weaker British blockade. Also, not much room for a significant BEF on the front.
  • In the East, at a minimum the Russian 1st and 2nd armies have both disappeared early, Russian Polish territory and resources are in CP hands early and A-H prewar armies, manpower and territory are intact.
  • In the South, Bulgeria likely enters early, eliminating Serbia and opening up lines of supply to the Ottomans. Italy, Romania and Greece are likely to remain neutral for the foreseeable future. More neutrals mean more trade and a weakened British Blockade.
 
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