WI: Warring States period after the Ming?

This is a scenario which has been covered somewhat in timelines before, but I thought I would like to prompt a more generalist discussion to try and work out the possibilities of such a state of affairs. The general idea is that the Ming financial woes and internal rebellion lead to a collapse of that regime, but instead of being replaced by a new native or foreign dynasty, no single power is able to dominate completely and instead a new period of Warring States begins, perhaps lasting for a century or even longer. What would be the ramifications?

It is clear that the concept of the Divine Mandate and unity of China as an empire/civilization would retain their cultural power, so an eventual unification is probably unavoidable, but in the meantime there could be a lot of interesting effects. If this happened later, in the late 18th or early 19th century, it is likely that China would fall prey to opportunistic European colonialism. However in the 17th century this is much more unlikely. Europeans would play roles, but probably as technical advisors or allies of the various Chinese states. Continual military conflict, while it would play havoc on the economy and general livelihood of the populace would also tend to stimulate military technological innovation. European weapons would be imported, but native innovation would also kick in and lead to development paralleling or exceeding that of Europe in this period.

The economic ramifications wouldn't be small either. China would likely be a poorer place, however with less centralized control some of the component states may be more inclined to push into foreign trade for capital, particularly any based around the Fuzhou region. The need to compete with Europeans for South East Asian trade may stimulate naval development around the southern coast.

There is also the question of surrounding peoples. The Manchus, even if they miss their chance for conquest of China due to bad timing or circumstances, will likely be a major player, as will be the Eastern Mongols and the Dzungars. Korea will find itself into a bit of a sticky political position, as it won't be able to go into the "pay tribute to the barbarous Qing while holding ones nose but keep a shrine to the Ming" ideological defensive posture they adopted in OTL. How they deal with multiple claimants to the Mandate of Heaven, plus aggressive Manchu, will be interesting.

Japan would likely get itself involved somehow as well. Tokugawa isolationism was always less about keeping Westerners out as it was to do with the fact that Chinese economic and diplomatic stonewalling and the Japanese unwillingness to submit to the Chinese tribute system. With that system in tatters, the Japanese are going to have a much greater motivation to try and create a new system with their own Emperor as the All-Under-Heaven. So, probably pressure on Korea and possibly another go at military adventures on the mainland.

And, there's the Russians coming around in the north. So lots of foreign pressure, combined with internecine warfare. Seems like this could go a number of different ways.
 
Glad you posted this - I've been kicking the same idea around myself as of late. Obviously, any Warring States period would in large part be shaped by the circumstances out of which it emerged. You're thinking of a POD immediately after the initial Ming collapse. I like a different one a few decades later, based on the idea that the War of the Three Feudatories turned out a bit differently. Let's say that the rebels are a bit luckier/more decisive/don't feud amongst each other quite as much, and by 1678 the Qing are close to total defeat - when Wu Sangui drops dead on schedule. It would be difficult at that juncture for anyone to unite the country in the near term, and you'd have a host of different players vying for control. So what happens next?

Wu's "empire" would certainly split in the aftermath of his death. Then there are the other feudatories in Guangdong and Fujian. All sorts of rebels/bandits would emerge in central China. The Dzungars would be big winners here in the northwest, since they're about at the height of their powers and now get a disunited China to play with.

As far as Europeans go, the Dutch and the Spanish would undoubtedly be involved, though I'm not sure that would manifest itself. The British had a factory on Taiwan from the 1670s, so it's easy to see them supporting the Zhengs, who would be another wild card. I tend to doubt that Japan would get involved too much. The fate of Korea and Russian expansion in the northeast in this scenario probably depend on just how beaten-down the Manchus are.

Agreed that eventual unification is extremely likely if not inevitable and that while China will be a poorer and less populated place, whichever polity does re-unite China will likely be much more flexible in dealing with the West than the Qing were and correspondingly be much more open to trade and innovation.

There are a ton of ways that such a scenario could go, and they're all very fun to think about.
 

RousseauX

Donor
Wu's "empire" would certainly split in the aftermath of his death. Then there are the other feudatories in Guangdong and Fujian. All sorts of rebels/bandits would emerge in central China. The Dzungars would be big winners here in the northwest, since they're about at the height of their powers and now get a disunited China to play with.
here's another interesting possibility: Koxinga, the Ming loyalist who took Taiwan from the Dutch, was about to launch an attack on Spanish Philippines right before he died and before the war of the three feudatories. Let's just say he lives and wrestle the islands away from the Spanish. So now you got another Chinese state: a maritime one which has to rely on trade and commerce to survive.

Would it also be possible to get something like a western Hsia analogue in the north or further splits?

This is really a fascinating POD that I would love to see more discussion on.
 
here's another interesting possibility: Koxinga, the Ming loyalist who took Taiwan from the Dutch, was about to launch an attack on Spanish Philippines right before he died and before the war of the three feudatories. Let's just say he lives and wrestle the islands away from the Spanish. So now you got another Chinese state: a maritime one which has to rely on trade and commerce to survive.

Would it also be possible to get something like a western Hsia analogue in the north or further splits?

This is really a fascinating POD that I would love to see more discussion on.
The main reason why Koxinga defeated the Dutch in Taiwan is because of the lack of reinforcements

No, Because of the Spanish Armada and the Macabebe scouts, it was the Macabebe scouts that made the Spanish held on the Northern Philippines, there is no way that you could defeat these problems..I think the best POD would be the Malong revolt succeeds and defeats the Macabebe scouts, which will make the Spanish weaken because they will lose control over Northern Philippines, The only question is if this rebel state would grant Koxinga land plus if Koxinga tried to establish a state there it will desinify over time because it will be isolated by the Qing and it was only recently(since 19th century) that the Chinese mass migrated to South East Asia and the Earlier Migrations were more or less assimilated by the natives and the non-muslim South East Asians readily assimilate the Chinese compared to the muslims and Taiwan was just the opposite coast of Fujian actually.
 
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So, we could have two different versions of a post-Ming Warring States Period. I could imagine that if the Qing don't take over China, perhaps China could be divided: Southern Ming remnant around Nanjing and Fuzhou, around the Prince of Fu or the Prince of Tang; Zhang Xianzhong would take Sichuan and form his own state there, Li Zicheng might flee back to Xi'an Shaanxi; the Qing would stay in Beijing instead. Perhaps a good point of divergence is that Shi Kefa defends Yangzhou successfully. Hooge, Dorgon and Dodo die earlier, maybe due to a smallpox epidemic, and the Qing are weakened. This would get us a four-way division of China. Without the fall of the Southern Ming, Zheng Chenggong would have less reason to flee to Taiwan and declare his own kingdom though.

Less complicated might be Li Zicheng taking all of North China, with the Manchus staying outside the Great Wall. Perhaps a good start here is that Li Zicheng doesn't execute Wu Sangui's father and doesn't attack Shanhaiguan. The Manchus then don't come in. Zhang Xianzhong would still be rampaging around. The Southern Ming still holds Nanjing. This gets a three-way split of Ming territories.

If we use the Three Feudatories idea, we could get a Qing in the north of China, Wu Sangui's Zhou in the South, and Guangdong and Fujian as basically independent. I think this would be harder: after all, Wu would be disliked by both the Qing supporters and Ming loyalists, and the Manchus are in a stronger position in 1673 than in 1644.

I feel that the problem is that post-Ming China is geared towards a north-south split regardless of point of divergence: the earlier scenario would have the Southern Ming be a strong force for unity, and the later scenario would leave the Qing in a position too strong to easily fall. I can imagine Wu Sangui and the other two generals taking all of China south of the Yangzi, but I can't imagine them evicting the Qing from Beijing or being able to defeat them completely. So it might be easy to have a unified north and a divided south (Qing versus Three Feudatories), or a divided north and a unified south (Southern Ming vs. Northern warlords), but that's not quite "Warring States" material to me.

If the Southern Ming stay intact, Zheng Chenggong would probably stay on the mainland, and probably wouldn't take Taiwan, because he wouldn't need to. That would make history less interesting.
 
I think a Warring States Period would definitely speed up the adoption of musketry and 'modern' drill practices as used in Europe; look at contemporary Japan: Oda Nobunaga and other warlords used European arms and expertise to get an advantage over their rivals. China saw a similar phenomenon in the early 20th century; warfare went from bows and arrows (infamously still used during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895) to poison gas and bombers in about forty years.

However, I think a return to stable, unitary rule may put those on ice; not to the extent of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan, because China's simply much larger and thus much harder to police, plus without such a stable class hierarchy, no matter what Confucius thought.
 
Do you guys think that the Chinese States might start competing with each other through pacific exploration?

Of course if Christianity plays a major role we might see an early replay of the Taping Rebellion and it would probably be supported by the west..

Afterwards though if China reunifies they would most liekly go on a binge of conquest and go to places that the Chinese had never conquered before... Western Burma, Philippines Indonesia or maybe even Papua New Guneia
 
I think the title is disingenuous. It wouldn't be a Warring States analog (that would entail a near complete disintegration of centralized authority, and a wide array of small states, city-states, etc.). What we have here is a Three Kingdoms or Northern/Southern Dynasty analog.

It's an interesting concept, though I will say that either the Manchu or Li Zicheng would develop a suitably powerful enough state to unify the country (whichever controls the North, essentially: there's a reason why the Ming moved the capital from Nanjing to Beijing). The South, after the Three Kingdoms period, is the economic and cultural heartland of China, due in part to the location of the Yangzte (with irrigation and a high degree of precipitation, rice can be grown, which is an immensely productive crop [with proper techniques, you can make four harvests a year]): however, due to the social structures developed by this, (very labor intensive, lots of preexisting, local infrastructure necessary), this also weakens the military and political strength of any state based in the South. It promotes the development of extremely powerful landlords, and miscellaneous factors, which make centralized states difficult to accomplish, and military power weak besides naval power (due to the water-based economy of the South). In the North along the Yellow River, you see seasonal harvests of wheat, millet, barley, soybeans, sorghums, which you can at best get four harvests every three year. On the other hand, infrastructure there is primarily state operated/maintained (dikes over large waterworks and rice terraces etc), and the primary unit of agriculture is the nuclear family (in comparison to the south where high labor costs require the formation of extended family clans). These factors all contribute to far weaker regional landlords, and, in addition to close contact and cross-pollination/assimilation/what have you with nomads, and the North China plains (which allow for the development of a strong cavalry component), the North has always has the stronger states and stronger militaries (due to a lack of social opposition to strong centralized states, be it Han Chinese or semi-nomadic hybrid dynasties which dominate much of Chinese history beyond the Han and the Ming). Thus the rise of the saying, that the North is a state without a dynasty, and the South is a dynasty without a state.


Also, a Taiping rebellion depends on the underlying social conditions, not on the introduction of Christianity (most of the residents of Taiping don't care too much, insomuch as it offers an avenue for Hong Xiuquan to claim to be a Son of Heaven [through another means, but still :D]). The question of Taiping is whether or not a rigidly centralized, but weakening state (and to a degree foreign, though this is not as great a factor as modern day perspectives on nationalism would have you believe) imposes or perpetuates the unfair social and economic conditions which created the underlying unrest for the rebellion in the first place. That's what a Taiping analog (or any peasant/grassroots rebellion) will be reliant on. Like the Yellow Turbans who flourished with a campaign for land reform and against the extractive and steadily weakening Eastern Han (which at that point was effectively ruled by the great families), Taiping gained support due to their promise of land and social reform, gender equality of a degree, and economic equalization of wealth, after the population boom experienced under the Qing (particularly in the South). The radical reforms are part and parcel of rebellion in an effort to engender social support against a weakening dynasty or centralized state, including the odd syncretic variety of Christianity that Hong Xiuquan advocated/believed in.
 
Could Li Zicheng actually develop his own strong state from scratch though? At least the Manchus had some experience with the Chinese model, more than Li did actually. Li might turn out to be another Zhu Yuanzhang, but I'm not too convinced he was that capable. If he did temporarily rule over all of China before his regime collapses, I would think this might be more likely to produce a true Warring States period.
 
wow that was would be considered essay material at my school :)


Thanks for the overview on Southern Chinese agriculture it seriously helped.
 
Could Li Zicheng actually develop his own strong state from scratch though? At least the Manchus had some experience with the Chinese model, more than Li did actually. Li might turn out to be another Zhu Yuanzhang, but I'm not too convinced he was that capable. If he did temporarily rule over all of China before his regime collapses, I would think this might be more likely to produce a true Warring States period.
It's not about developing a strong state, it's about co-opting the Han bureaucracy into service for the maintenance of civil affairs, which is something others have done constantly throughout the ages, be they Han Chinese warlords or semi-nomad northern states. If Li Zicheng can consolidate his control over the north, without being forced out by semi-nomads like the Manchu, then he is in prime position to reconquer China, despite the huge demographic disparity between the north and the south (the north has only ~25% of the population in China, not sure of the exact demographics at the time period, of course).

And even if he does fall, it becomes more reminiscent of a Three Kingdoms or Northern and Southern Dynasties period, though unification is necessarily swifter given the incentive of the Grand Canal providing a unifying factor between the northern and southern economies. Warring States period is a whole 'nother level of disunity here.
 
It's not about developing a strong state, it's about co-opting the Han bureaucracy into service for the maintenance of civil affairs, which is something others have done constantly throughout the ages, be they Han Chinese warlords or semi-nomad northern states. If Li Zicheng can consolidate his control over the north, without being forced out by semi-nomads like the Manchu, then he is in prime position to reconquer China, despite the huge demographic disparity between the north and the south (the north has only ~25% of the population in China, not sure of the exact demographics at the time period, of course).

And even if he does fall, it becomes more reminiscent of a Three Kingdoms or Northern and Southern Dynasties period, though unification is necessarily swifter given the incentive of the Grand Canal providing a unifying factor between the northern and southern economies. Warring States period is a whole 'nother level of disunity here.

I think what I meant was regarding the idea that Li Zicheng could conquer China based solely on whether he hold the north. After all, by that argument, the Ming should never have come into existence, with Zhu Yuanzhang having conquered China south-to-north.

Let's say Li Zicheng takes Beijing, doesn't attack Wu Sangui (who thus helps keep the Manchus out, for now), and puts more effort into winning over the loyalties of the remaining generals. Would he necessarily be able to defeat the other rebels, Zhang Xianzhong and all, while being able to defeat the Southern Ming? Or would there be a recap of the An Lushan rebellion, with Li Zicheng holding the capital and much of the north, but still getting defeated by Ming loyalists, who control the south and the Yangzi River Valley?

In the latter scenario, I would imagine that if Wu Sangui remains loyal to the Ming, Li Zicheng would remain in a much weaker position, regardless of the loyalty of the bureaucracy.
 
Less well known was Zhang Xianzhong, who captured Sichuan and proclaimed the Da Xi Dynasty, before massacring the entire population of Sichuan en masse.

By the mid 17th century we could have four claimants to the throne: the Manchus, the Southern Ming, Li Zicheng, and Zhang Xianzhong. We'd have an extended "Four Kingdoms" period.
 
By the mid 17th century we could have four claimants to the throne: the Manchus, the Southern Ming, Li Zicheng, and Zhang Xianzhong. We'd have an extended "Four Kingdoms" period.

Thanks for the support. Emphases mine.

I could imagine that if the Qing don't take over China, perhaps China could be divided: Southern Ming remnant around Nanjing and Fuzhou, around the Prince of Fu or the Prince of Tang; Zhang Xianzhong would take Sichuan and form his own state there, Li Zicheng might flee back to Xi'an Shaanxi; the Qing would stay in Beijing instead. Perhaps a good point of divergence is that Shi Kefa defends Yangzhou successfully. Hooge, Dorgon and Dodo die earlier, maybe due to a smallpox epidemic, and the Qing are weakened. This would get us a four-way division of China. Without the fall of the Southern Ming, Zheng Chenggong would have less reason to flee to Taiwan and declare his own kingdom though.

That being said, I'm pretty sure Zhang's regime will run out of steam eventually. I think I agree with Inquisitor Tolkien though. Two or three states in China proper should be about it. However, the maximum disorder possible should probably be something like: Zhang Xianzhong, Li Zicheng, the Manchu Qing, Wu Sangui (if he decides to declare his own dynasty much earlier), and one fiefdom each for the four Southern Ming princes, of Fu, Gui, Lu, and Tang, if the Southern Ming falls to infighting. Not very likely, but it could be interesting.
 
Less well known was Zhang Xianzhong, who captured Sichuan and proclaimed the Da Xi Dynasty, before massacring the entire population of Sichuan en masse.
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Sichuan actually seems pretty ideal as an independent state; it's difficult to get to from the rest of China (as you saw as late as the Second Sino-Japanese War, no?)

What do you guys think of the theory that Li Zicheng was a Muslim?
 
Afterwards though if China reunifies they would most liekly go on a binge of conquest and go to places that the Chinese had never conquered before... Western Burma, Philippines Indonesia or maybe even Papua New Guneia

What? why?

Less well known was Zhang Xianzhong, who captured Sichuan and proclaimed the Da Xi Dynasty, before massacring the entire population of Sichuan en masse.

By the mid 17th century we could have four claimants to the throne: the Manchus, the Southern Ming, Li Zicheng, and Zhang Xianzhong. We'd have an extended "Four Kingdoms" period.

The problem was Zhang's state was pretty much unsustainable (there's only a finite number of people to massacre). On the other hand, a less omnicidal and insane leader could probably have maintained Sichuan as a more or less independent state until the rest of China was reconquered and stabilized to the point an expedition is viable.
 
What do you guys think of the theory that Li Zicheng was a Muslim?

Wouldn't make a difference. There are claims Zhu Yuanzhang was also Muslim or even Manichean, which scarcely made a difference in his policies. One of the Southern Ming Emperors had his entire court baptized as Catholic after Portugal provided cannons, yet that was ultimately a footnote in history. A person's religious beliefs won't have made any difference.
 
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