Your posts. The ones about firestorms. You brought them up, I said they weren't important to my argument, you then seemed to agree with me because you said (and I agree) they never happened in Britain. I think that's it?
Air defences. While weaker air defences would indeed have made 1940 V1s more effective relative to 1944, because fewer would have been intercepted, the absolute increase in effectiveness is not great, because even with zero air defence V1s are not capable of concentrating ordnance in time and space, and are much less likely to hit a target such as the London docks. It it thus relatively easy for civil defence to manage, making V1s an inefficient use of tonnage.
However, the weaker air defences in 1940 make bomber attacks feasible, as OTL showed, whereas they were not in 1944. If we accept that the key to effectively inflicting damage is concentration of ordnance in time and space, overwhelming local civil defence, then, since bombers are capable of concentrating ordnance in this fashion whereas V1s are incapable, it stands to reason that, if air defence is as inadequate as it was in 1940, then bombers are more effective.
You mention navigation and attrition, but the record of the Blitz shows that the Luftwaffe was readily capable of finding London, aided hugely by the Thames, that attrition was low, and could be concentrated in time and space. Whereas the V1s of 1944 could not be.
If we want to quantify this theory then we could start adding in attrition rates, accuracy, precision etc., damage per ton per square kilometre per hour, but I think we'd be missing the forest for the trees. We can identify the dominant factors in the equation by reviewing the historical record of what made strategic bombing effective, when it was effective.
Air defences. While weaker air defences would indeed have made 1940 V1s more effective relative to 1944, because fewer would have been intercepted, the absolute increase in effectiveness is not great, because even with zero air defence V1s are not capable of concentrating ordnance in time and space, and are much less likely to hit a target such as the London docks. It it thus relatively easy for civil defence to manage, making V1s an inefficient use of tonnage.
However, the weaker air defences in 1940 make bomber attacks feasible, as OTL showed, whereas they were not in 1944. If we accept that the key to effectively inflicting damage is concentration of ordnance in time and space, overwhelming local civil defence, then, since bombers are capable of concentrating ordnance in this fashion whereas V1s are incapable, it stands to reason that, if air defence is as inadequate as it was in 1940, then bombers are more effective.
You mention navigation and attrition, but the record of the Blitz shows that the Luftwaffe was readily capable of finding London, aided hugely by the Thames, that attrition was low, and could be concentrated in time and space. Whereas the V1s of 1944 could not be.
If we want to quantify this theory then we could start adding in attrition rates, accuracy, precision etc., damage per ton per square kilometre per hour, but I think we'd be missing the forest for the trees. We can identify the dominant factors in the equation by reviewing the historical record of what made strategic bombing effective, when it was effective.